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Catastrophic terror attacks, including the use of a nuclear device, are amongst the highest 
priority risks to the UK according to the 2017 National Risk Register. A nuclear attack could 
result in mass fatalities, contamination of people and buildings, widespread infrastructure 
damage, and interruption to the supply of essential goods (Cabinet Office, 2017i). 
Despite the severity of a nuclear incident, there are actions which members of the public can 
take to reduce the risk to themselves and others. These include preparedness actions, such as 
assembling an emergency supply kit (Taylor et al., 2011), and taking actions following a nuclear 
attack, such as sheltering-in-place (e.g. Florig & Fischhoff, 2007; Khripunov, 2010). 
To understand more about factors which influence engagement with pre-nuclear incident 
information, and to examine ways to overcome potential barriers, I conducted multi-phase, 
mixed methods research involving a systematic review of relevant literature, scenario-based 
focus groups and two surveys.  
In my systematic review I found preparedness for nuclear disasters to be low, though it is 
notable that nuclear-specific studies have focused on nuclear power plant disasters. Outcomes 
of these studies also show a mixed-picture of adherence to recommended countermeasures 
such as instructions to shelter-in-place or to evacuate. A wide range of preferences were 
expressed for pre-incident communications including for communicating source and for 
method of communications. 
Focus groups were split into groups of London residents and groups residing close to Hinkley 
Point nuclear plant. Little difference was found across all groups for factors such as perceived 
risk of a nuclear disaster (attack or radiation leak), nor was there a strong desire to receive pre-
nuclear incident risk communications, unless an attack was known to be imminent. Notably, 
groups suggested that a nuclear risk communication campaign would be received poorly 
unless it was normalised in society, such as by being introduced slowly through institutions 
such as workplaces or schools. Groups also suggested that levels of trust in the source of 
information is not important if suggested countermeasures are felt to not be efficacious. 
My surveys were conducted with the UK public and with the Hawai’i public following the 
ballistic missile false alert that Hawai’i experienced in January 2018. Low levels of deliberate 
adherence to the missile alert recommendation to shelter was found in the Hawaiian public, 
though the timing of the warning meant that most were already at home and so remained 
there. I found preparedness of both UK and Hawai’i participants, in terms of owning 
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recommended items, to be higher than is suggested by previous literature; however, 
preparedness was for general disasters, not for nuclear disaster specifically. Individuals who 
felt nuclear disaster to be more likely to occur were more prepared but less likely to desire 
preparedness communications. There was also low belief in the efficacy of recommended 
countermeasures (such as sheltering). A critical finding of the Hawai’i-based survey, the only 
study of its kind to investigate preparedness with a population warned of an incoming nuclear 
attack, was the early warning confirmation sought. This need appeared to drive people to 
social media and friends and family. Insights such as this and others gained throughout this 
thesis are crucial for public health authorities in their preparedness and response planning. 
Overall, the outcomes of this thesis suggest that increased engagement with pre-incident 
communications can be achieved where messaging: primarily concerns preparedness, 
sheltering, radiation effects and, if appropriate, stable iodine; details actions that authorities 
would take in a disaster, including how food would be supplied to affected people; contains a 
range of actions for varying radiation-disaster situations; is clear in layout and recommended 
actions; is distributed via multiple methods; shows how recommended actions can be 
effective, achievable or reasonable; maintains honesty, including stating where there is 
uncertainty; includes how families can be protected if not together (such as advice around the 
collection of children from school) and how to communicate with loved ones and, is embedded 
in institutions such as schools and workplaces. To facilitate increased adherence with 
protective instructions in the event of a nuclear attack, messages should: provide adequate 
information (such as how long to shelter) to enable the public to undertake actions; inform the 
public as to whether food and water could be delivered to those who are sheltering and; use 
basic terminology. 
As catastrophes go, perhaps none are as unthinkable as nuclear attack. And yet, evidence 
shows that preparedness for such an event is essential. By implementing the measures 
discussed in this thesis, policy makers charged with communicating pre-nuclear incident 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Little Boy, the first atomic bomb to be used against civilians, exploded 1900 feet above 
Hiroshima at 8.16am on August 6th, 1945. At three-quarters of a mile from the blast residents 
were thrown off their feet - though many survived. At two miles witnesses had time to react; 
they sheltered as best they could. Whether due to prior education or instinct, it is likely that 
sheltering saved lives. 
First-hand accounts gathered by John Hersey, later compiled into one book titled Hiroshima 
(1946), documented the event. Hersey’s account retains its power to shock readers for its 
graphic, but still humanistic, descriptions of an event unimaginable in its scale of disaster and 
suffering. And yet the threat of nuclear war, and the more recent threat of a nuclear device 
being used by terrorists, continues to hang over us today. 
At 08:07 on January 13th, 2018, at the height of a nuclear stand-off between the USA and 
North Korea, mobile phones in Hawai’i received the message “BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT 
INBOUND TO HAWAII. SEEK IMMEDIATE SHELTER. THIS IS NOT A DRILL.” Although the message 
itself was authentic, originating from Hawai’i’s Emergency Management Agency (HI-EMA), it 
had been sent by mistake – no threat had been detected. Subsequent inquiries (e.g. Berman 
and Fung, 2018; Wang, 2018) into the events surrounding the misuse of the emergency alert 
system focussed on how such an error could have been made. But one critical factor stood out 
during the incident – how few members of the public appeared to follow the clear instruction 
to “seek immediate shelter”. 
1.1.1. Nuclear risk 
Existential risks, such as the deliberate detonation of a nuclear device as a weapon used 
against the public are termed by Peter Ho from the Centre for Strategic Futures as a black 
elephant: a product of our cognitive biases to discount future risks whilst placing more weight 
on present costs and benefits: 
The black elephant is a cross between a black swan and the elephant in the room.  
The black elephant is a problem that is actually visible to everyone – the proverbial  
elephant in the room – but no one wants to deal with it, and so they pretend it is not  
there. When it blows up as a problem, we all feign surprise and shock, behaving  
as if it were a black swan (a rare and hard-to-predict event). (Ho, 2017) 
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This concept of an obvious yet dismissed or denied risk implies an interaction in cognitive 
processes in which we implicitly acknowledge that this event may happen but avoid, or 
pretend that it will not while also considering what preparedness is in place or required. 
Preparedness here requires not only mastery of protective behaviours, but also the ability to 
recognise the occurrence of a black elephant and to select the protective behaviours 
appropriate to this set of circumstances. This ability to select and adapt behaviours in response 
to difficult or challenging situations is often referred to as agility, or ‘the capability to 
successfully effect, cope with, and/or exploit changes in circumstances’ (Alberts, 2014) and 
should be addressed by risk preparedness communications (the what, when, why and how of a 
potential disaster). More specifically, this metaphor of a black elephant highlights principles 
central to effective risk communication: development of protective countermeasures or 
behaviours; situational awareness (or recognition that the risk exists), and; the ability to 
choose a response appropriate to the situation (agility).  
Agility is a multidimensional concept which encompasses resilience, responsiveness and 
flexibility, amongst other facets of cognition (Alberts and Hayes, 2007). Importantly, agility is 
only useful when actions taken are also effective. So, responsiveness is not simply responding 
quickly, but responding in a timely and efficient manner. In this sense, preparedness requires 
the ability to anticipate the stages of an event: as a nuclear disaster will almost certainly be 
dynamic and complex, so to must protective behaviours be dynamic in having to be 
appropriate for timeline and context. This includes anticipation of the consequences of 
preparedness and response behaviours. The projected timeline of a nuclear catastrophe is 
illustrated later in this chapter.  
There are around 14,500 nuclear weapons at present, with between 1800 (Ritchie, 2017) and 
4000 (Kristensen and Norris, 2017) on ‘hard alert’: ready to be fired within minutes of 
notification as an act of aggression or deterrence. Nuclear war is considered more plausible 
now than any time since the end of the Cold War. In 1947 scientists working on the Manhattan 
Project used the image of a ticking clock set at seven minutes to midnight on the front of an 
internal newsletter. Now set yearly by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the Doomsday clock is 
a representation of how close humanity is to its own demise by nuclear annihilation. Since 
December 2017 it has been set at two minutes to midnight; the closest since 1953 when the 
US first tested the H-Bomb (Clay, 2018). Figure 1.1 presents Baum et al.’s 2018 model of 
nuclear war prediction, which outlines multiple credible scenarios that could result in 
deliberate events (in red) and inadvertent, or accidental events (in blue) escalation towards 
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the use of nuclear weapons. The shaded area represents historical incidents and the unshaded 
area is Baum’s scenario model. 
 
Figure 1.1. A Model for the Probability of Nuclear War (Baum et al., 2018). Reprinted with 
permission. 
Amongst the strategic trends that are causing CBRN threats to evolve, as outlined in an 
Emerging Risk Report produced by the insurance market Lloyd’s (2016) are a growing list of 
potential perpetrators and advancing technological and scientific capabilities (such as 
nanotechnology and 3D printing). These advances enable development of cheaper, more 
powerful and easier to use weapons. 
In fact, government studies have concluded that it is plausible for a terrorist group with 
adequate expertise to make a bomb if they acquired nuclear material. It is easier to make a 
crude nuclear explosive small enough to fit in the back of a truck than it is to make a reliable 
weapon of known yield to be delivered by missile or aircraft (Bunn and Roth, 2017). The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported 175 cases of nuclear material trafficking 
between 1993 and 2001 within a worldwide information and equipment sharing network 
(Becker, 2004). As of 2015 this had increased to 714 cases (IAEA, 2016) with over 100 cases of 
unauthorised activities involving radioactive materials being reported each year (IAEA, 2013i). 
Many conflict zones are known sources of nuclear material for occupying and terrorist groups 
(Shuster, 2017). Al Qaeda has made numerous attempts at acquiring nuclear weapons in 
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Sudan (1993-1994), Russia (1996) and Pakistan (2001) (Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). Aum Shinrikyo 
have attempted to purchase and mine their own uranium in Russia and Australia (Daly et al., 
2005). As recently as 2014 the so-called Islamic State group made attempts to purchase what 
transpired to be fictional nuclear material, ‘red mercury,’ in pursuit of building their own 
nuclear weapon (Chivers, 2015). The technological ability of states and cyberterrorists to hack 
into ‘Command and Control’ defence systems, manipulate early warning systems into believing 
an attack to be imminent, and force the recipient of the hack into retaliatory action presents 
an additional risk given the current state of readiness of nuclear weapons (Schlosser, 2014). 
Rising tensions amongst worldwide nuclear powers are a likely prompt for governments to 
reassess their own preparedness measures (Hennigan, 2018). This is particularly true in light 
of the increased speed at which escalation of conflict between nations can occur 
(Stafford, 2012). Assessment by experts of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering 
and Medicine is that “the threat picture has changed, and the risk of (nuclear attack) 
happening has gone up” for reasons including North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons 
(The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2018). Large and smaller 
scale nuclear and radiological attacks are also amongst the risks to public health rated highest 
for potential impact in the UK’s most recent National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies 
(Cabinet Office, 2017i). This register, which comprises expert risk predictions from cross-
government agencies, is perhaps the key source document providing direction for the UK 
planning and response community. Addressing these risks is therefore of vital importance to 
public health planning and security. 
1.2. Nuclear Detonation 
Upon detonation of a nuclear weapon, energy is released in three ways, known as prompt 
effects: a blast wave, powerful enough to topple buildings within a certain radius; heat, likely 
in the form of a fireball; and a burst of ionising radiation (e.g. Bunn and Roth, 2017). Sources 
such as the ‘Nukemap’ website (https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap) and declassified US 
government data (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977) suggest instant fatality for almost all directly 
exposed persons within two-thirds of a mile from the blast centre. Estimates of the exact 
extent of these effects vary depending on the size and type of device detonated (e.g. air-burst 
or ground-burst). The USA’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) uses a nominal 
10 kiloton (KT) yield (1KT is the measure of energy released by 1000 tons of dynamite (Dodgen 
et al., 2011)) ground detonated nuclear device to estimate impacts in high-density urban areas 
in their emergency planning guidance (FEMA, 2010). This size and type of device is agreed by 
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experts at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the US (e.g. Buddemeier and Dillon, 
2009) to be appropriate for preparedness and response planning. Information available in the 
UK for a comparable device is protectively marked. Throughout this thesis I have followed 
FEMA’s convention. 
In contrast to prompt effects, a delayed effect of detonation relates to the dust and debris 
dispersed by the explosion combining with radionuclides created during the fission process. 
These attach to air particles which fall back to earth, causing residual radiation. This is 
commonly called fallout. Health is threatened by gamma and beta radiation emitted in fallout, 
such as burns to exposed skin. Even up to twenty miles away, unprotected (i.e. unsheltered) 
people may be killed by residual radiation (FEMA, 2010). Figure 1.2 is a time sequenced 
example of radiation spread (FEMA, 2010). Whilst a lethal radiation dose would occur within 
half a mile from detonation, this is perhaps a moot point since people at such a distance would 
be close enough to be killed by other prompt effects (Wilkinson, 2009). Figure 1.3 presents a 
comprehensive model of anticipated impacts of nuclear detonation, ranging from thermal 
radiation (heat) effects, to blast effects, ionising radiation, electromagnetic pulse and 
subsequent societal consequences of the catastrophe. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Time sequenced size of dangerous fallout zone following a 10KT ground burst 





Figure 1.3. Summary of the nuclear war impacts model (Baum and Barrett, 2018). Reprinted 
with permission. 
Baum and Barrett’s model shows that nuclear detonation is likely to be catastrophic for 
reasons in addition to mass fatality. Longer term occurrences such as population displacement 
(Meit et al., 2011), physical and mental health disorders (Kaidanovsky et al., 2003; Ueda et al., 
2016) and the impact of radiation permeating food chains and water sources, not considered 
in Baum and Barrett’s model aside, a number of non-radiation related effects may increase 
fatalities in the immediate aftermath of detonation. Although modern buildings are not 
comparable in structure and materials to those destroyed by the atomic bombs used against 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it remains likely that pressure related to wind generated by the blast 
wave (categorised as dynamic pressure and overpressure) will topple nearby buildings and 
overturn cars (FEMA, 2010). Beyond three miles physical infrastructure will be largely intact 
(Hick et al., 2011). An electromagnetic pulse may also cause damage to communication 
equipment up to approximately three miles distance, though equipment not connected to 
power outlets such as mobile telephones and battery powered radios are unlikely to be 
affected (Knebel et al., 2011). Destruction of key infrastructure such as hospitals would 
severely limit the response abilities of medical services, with any hospitals still functional being 
compromised in their ability to cope with the thousands of casualties. 
For those with direct sight of the blast, the nearly instantaneous flash of light would be 
temporarily blinding, possibly causing permanent damage to vision (Buddemeier and Dillon, 
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2009). However, since light from a detonation moves more quickly than the shockwave it may 
provide a brief signal (up to 30 seconds if at a mile’s distance) to take cover (FEMA, 2010). 
Unless prepared for such an event, individuals are unlikely to recognise the flash as a nuclear 
detonation and may be susceptible to injury from breaking glass as they approach windows to 
investigate (Buddemeier and Dillon, 2009). 
In their 2010 planning response, FEMA propose severe, moderate and light damage zones 
based upon levels of damage occurring at varying distances. These are presented in Table 1.1. 
Note that according to FEMA (2016) a 10KT device can cause damage within 3-5 miles of 
detonation. 






Few survivors –protection from stable buildings (underground 
parking, subway tunnels) may enable survival of initial blast  
Few (if any) buildings left standing 
Radiation levels present significant risk to survivors and responders 
Debris in streets likely impassable  
Moderate 
Damage Zone 
0.5 – 1 mile 
radius 
Many people will survive – in comparison to survivors in other 
zones, these people are suggested to benefit most from urgent 
medical care 
Substantial building damage (particularly lighter and wood framed 
buildings) 
Broken water, gas, electrical and communication lines 
Downed utility lines, overturned cars, fires 
Visibility may be limited due to raised dust and smoke 
Light Damage 
Zone 
1 – 3 miles 
radius 
Windows and doors will be blown (flying glass injury may occur 
approx. 3 miles away) 
Vehicles may be stalled or crashed 
 
In the moderate and light damage zones, there is high possibility of injury but survival. 
However, not only would debris, crashed or overturned vehicles, dust and fire cause major 
blockages for evacuation and access for emergency responders (Bunn and Roth, 2017), for an 
initial period of perhaps 24 hours at least, contamination due high radiation levels may also 
restrict emergency responder access. Whilst radioactivity will rapidly decay (every sevenfold 
increase in time equates to a tenfold decrease in radiation (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977)) and 
intensity decreases with distance due to dispersion and absorption by buildings, the risk from 
26 
 
exposure to radiation will remain for some time depending on the size of the device (FEMA, 
2010). Figures 1.4a and 1.4b are further representations of the range of damage resulting from 
nuclear detonation. The darker areas indicate the greatest damage and the overall extent of 
damage lessening in the lighter areas from a 10KT blast in an urban area (1.4a), and in 
comparison, a 1KT and 0.1KT blast (1.4b). 
 
 
Figures 1.4a and 1.4b. Extent of damage zones from 10KT nuclear blast (ground burst) (FEMA, 
2010). Permission for use requested from https://www.fema.gov/media-
library/assets/documents/24879 
1.2.1. Nuclear power plant accidents 
Nuclear weapons are not the only source of potentially catastrophic radiation release. Nuclear 
power stations are common in many areas of the world and accidents are far from unheard of. 
In a review of intention to evacuate in different disasters, Perry (1983) found participants were 
unable to distinguish between how radiation might disperse from a nuclear power plant 
compared to detonation of a nuclear bomb. Particularly, participants typically described 
outcomes of radiation exposure related only to high doses (e.g. death).  
Following the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster in 2011 mandatory evacuation was ordered at 
up to 20km distance and sheltering at 30km (Moller and Mousseau, 2013). The actual spread 
of radiation was far greater with the initial radiation plume travelling hundreds of miles (over 
the Pacific Ocean) in just two days; Fukushima radiation was detected on the west coast of 
Canada three years later (Buesseler, 2019). Whilst there are no blast effects association with 
nuclear plant disaster, the potential impact can be widespread, and protective actions similar. 
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While there may be obvious distinctions between deliberate release of radiation such as via a 
radiological dispersal device, otherwise known as a ‘dirty bomb’, or improvised nuclear device 
and accidental release of radiation such as from a nuclear power plant, these differences 
become important when considering how the public might protect themselves from the 
effects of radiation (and associated blast effects in the case of a deliberate release). The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS, 2008) provide guidance that outlines these 
differences. These are presented in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2. Features of deliberate radiation attack and accidental radiation release (DHS, 2008) 
Deliberate attack (e.g. improvised nuclear 
device or radiological dispersal device) 
Accidental release (e.g. nuclear power plant 
accident) 
More likely to occur in a major city centre with 
large population 
Many nuclear facilities are located in less densely 
populated, rural settings (emergency planning 
not typically exercised in towns without nuclear 
facilities) 
May start without advance warning 
 
Likely several hours / days of prior warning based 
on reactor operational characteristics  
Radiation release would likely have a relatively 
short duration 
Release would be likely to be drawn out over 
many hours 
If a terrorist act, the incident becomes a crime 
scene meaning emergency personnel may be 
further hampered in responding 
Most nuclear facilities have detailed emergency 
plans (e.g. protective actions, evacuation routes 
and methods to alert the public) 
Severity would be dramatically greater than an 
accident (e.g. a large radius of severe damage)  
Evacuations more manageable and impact to 
critical infrastructure likely to be smaller 
 
In this thesis, I present a series of literature reviews and studies that explore the presentation 
of risk and preparedness information regarding nuclear risks, with the goal of helping policy 
makers to develop better methods for informing the public. 
But before setting out the specific aims for this thesis, we should first consider the 
recommended behaviours in more detail. What is it that policy makers want the public to do 
before or after a nuclear incident has occurred? Why are these behaviours believed to protect 
against the effects of a nuclear incident? And what previous attempts have been made at 
engaging the public with information to enhance preparedness for a nuclear incident?  
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1.3. What can the public do in the immediate aftermath of a nuclear incident?  
Before specifying the recommended countermeasures for self-protection in the event of 
nuclear catastrophe, it is first important to specify where in the timeline of such an event the 
focus of this thesis sits. 
Expressing a timeline for nuclear events comes with several caveats. For example, rising 
tensions between nuclear powers may present an escalation in risk which presents the general 
public with great perceived cause for preparedness and engagement with preparedness 
communications; differing yields in nuclear explosive devices mean that the reach of radiation 
is less wide in the immediate aftermath allowing for greater time to prepare; similarly, a 
nuclear device detonation will look different in terms of immediate blast effects coupled with 
radiation, while a nuclear radiation leak from a power plant may allow for greater time to take 
countermeasures prior to being effected by the fallout.  
The timeline of a nuclear disaster presented in figure 1.5 is therefore an approximation based 
on key resources in nuclear disaster modelling (these are Buddemeier and Suski, 2015; FEMA, 
2010) and actual historical disasters (IAEA, 2011; Nagourney et al., 2018; Pacific Atrocities 
Education, 2020). Indicated on this timeline is where the current thesis in placed. 
 
Figure 1.5. Timeline for placement of project within lifespan of nuclear disaster 
As this timeline shows, the elongated period post-event would undoubtedly have many far-
reaching health effects. Any attempt to cover the full psychological or behavioural aspects of a 
nuclear incident would take many PhD theses to do justice to, though Redlener and colleagues 
(2004) suggest a lack of both logistical and emotional preparedness in the public. However, as 
outlined in this introductory chapter, the actions in the first minutes and hours, as well as prior 
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preparedness can be crucial for survival. In this thesis, therefore I focus on the pre-event and 
immediate aftermath period of the timeline. 
1.3.1. Sheltering-in-place 
For survivors of immediate blast effects, at a radius of approximately 0.5 to 1 mile and further, 
protection from delayed blast effects is largely reliant on ability to shelter, preferably indoors 
at the nearest location (often referred to as sheltering-in-place) at the time of the blast (DHS, 
2008). Whilst considered the action most likely to save lives within the first hour following 
detonation (FEMA, 2010), sheltering for longer periods will offer greater protection 
(Buddemeier and Dillon, 2009). This is due to unsheltered people being subject to exposure 
from gamma radiation deposited on the ground and roofs of buildings:  the ‘ground shine 
dose’. The ground shine dose has a typical radiation magnitude greater than internal hazards 
resulting from inhalation or ingestion. Sheltering-in-place therefore serves a significant life-
saving function.  
Different shelters offer differing levels of safety. Whilst a basement is considered the optimum 
shelter (Bunn and Roth, 2017), much contemporary research regarding radiation sheltering is 
US-centric where, unlike the UK, basements are a more common feature of homes. 
Buddemeier (2010) suggests that whilst some ionizing radiation can penetrate buildings, 
shielding provided by walls and moving away from exterior walls (and fallout) will reduce 
exposure by a factor of 10 or more. Buddemeier defines shelter quality by its ‘protection 
factor’: the outside dose rate divided by the inside dose rate. Higher protection factor values 
mean lower exposure (see Figure 1.6). US federal Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear 
Detonation (FEMA, 2010) considers a protection factor of 10 to offer adequate shelter from 





Figure 1.6. Protective factor estimates based on evaluations conducted in the US circa 1960 for 
typical structures during that era (courtesy of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory). 
Reprinted with permission. 
It is notable however that the modelling that was used to provide presumed protective factors 
was not only based on typical structures for 1960 and are presumably not wholly reflective of 
modern engineering of city structures, it also simplifies available shelters into three basic types 
of structure. This is particularly non-reflective of common UK households which are less likely 
to have a basement, seen here to provide the most effective form of shelter. Presumably, this 
model does account for sources of potential ‘leakage’ such as air ducts and water sources, 
however this is not specified in the source documents. Nonetheless, it does provide a rough 
illustration of how different forms of sheltering can provide greater or lesser effectiveness in 
protection from radiation. 
A 2010 evaluation of shelter effectiveness by Sandia National Laboratories (Brandt, 2009, as 
cited in Buddemeier, 2010) named Operation Golden Phoenix used a model developed by the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory of a terrorist attack near Universal Studios, 
Hollywood. In this scenario 285,000 people were found to die or be exposed to dangerous 
radiation levels. Using shelters with protection factor values of 10 reduced this number to 
45,000; shelters with higher protection factor values, common in urban environments, would 
reduce this number still further (Rainey, 2017). Ad hoc mitigation of internal contamination 
such as holding a cloth over the mouth and nose for respiratory protection in lieu of sheltering 




Of course, protective actions still require some notice. Sheltering is potentially feasible for 
most people who receive an emergency broadcast, such as a ten-minute warning. Evacuation, 
another protection from radiation (and blast effects) would require more significant warning 
and planning. Radiation exposure during evacuation depends on evacuation route: without 
information as to areas of hazard it would be difficult to know which route to take. For miles 
surrounding the detonation of a nuclear weapon, dust and debris would limit visibility and 
once settled there would be little visible evidence of fallout affected areas. Further analysis by 
Sandia National Laboratories showed exposure would be highest for those who shelter for the 
shortest time and attempt evacuation soonest, as opposed to those sheltering for longer and 
evacuating many hours or days following detonation (Buddemeier and Dillon, 2009). 
Evacuation is perhaps a more effective protection in a nuclear power plant accident if earlier 
warning is offered.  
Protective Action Guides (PAGs; e.g. Environmental Protection Agency, 2017; FEMA, 2016) 
which detail factors in deciding protective action in nuclear power plant emergencies, based 
on projected dose to a population, suggests that evacuation is more difficult and costlier as 
population size increases. However, there is often time in nuclear power plant emergencies for 
local emergency services to initiate evacuations, particularly if they are able to accurately 
predict projected radiation plume movement. 
1.3.3. Secondary protective actions 
‘Secondary’ protective actions recommended in PAGs include medical countermeasures such 
as administration of stable iodine (KI). KI works by stopping accumulation of radioactive iodine 
in the thyroid and is considered most protective in nuclear power plant incidents involving 
radioiodine release (National Radiological Protection Board, 2001). In the longer term there is 
potential for consumption of certain foods and water to be restricted if it is believed to be 
contaminated (FEMA, 2016). 
1.4. Preparedness 
Preparedness is widely considered to be the most effective way to mitigate disaster impact in 
general (e.g. Ablah et al., 2009; Katz et al., 2006; Lemyre et al., 2007; Nyaku, et al., 2014; 
Schoch-Spana, 2013). Taking preparedness actions, such as practising sheltering procedures at 
work, and receiving risk-communications are associated with an increase in adherence with 
protective instructions given immediately following radiation release (Dombroski et al., 2006). 
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Although we cannot say that disaster preparedness alone results in survival without the need 
for outside assistance (Perman et al., 2011), preparedness actions, such as the storing of non-
perishable food and water, are also likely to make sheltering easier should it be required.  
Evidence of the public’s preparedness for disasters involving radiation is sparse, but we can 
gain some idea based on research into terrorism preparedness in general. Immediately 
following the London bombings of 2005, a representative sample of residents of London were 
surveyed and 51% were found to have made four or more emergency plans (e.g. having a 
method of contacting family) and 48% had assembled four or more emergency supplies (Page 
et al., 2008). However, radiation disaster preparedness research conducted with the UK public 
is mainly concerned with knowledge of preparatory actions for protection in the areas 
surrounding nuclear power plants. For example, in one survey of residents and workers within 
3km of a UK nuclear power plant, only one-in-eight knew what stable iodine was for (Pheby 
and Robinson, 1990) while only 39% in a separate survey of households in a 550-metre radius 
of a nuclear submarine testing area knew when to take it (Astbury, 1999).  
Similar to the London data, half of New York residents report having compiled emergency 
supply kits, though they often admit to their kits being incomplete (New York University, 
2006). Ablah (2009) found 78% of the public across multiple US states reported feeling 
prepared for a terror attack but that only 45% had taken at least five of the following actions: 
evacuation planning, storing three days’ worth of water, storing three days’ worth of food, 
storing three days’ worth of medications, having a battery-operated radio or having a flashlight 
and batteries. Murphy and colleagues (2009) found lower rates of preparedness within a 
similar sample: an average of 0.65 preparedness measures out of four. Eisenman et al. (2006) 
found that 28% of members of the public in Los Angeles reported having stored emergency 
supplies following the World Trade Centre and Anthrax attacks of the early 2000s, whilst few 
preparedness measures were found to have been taken in the Canadian public though many 
expressed a desire to take first aid training or to assemble an emergency supply kit (Lemyre et 
al., 2007). Lemyre also found differences in preparedness rates according to factors such as 
gender, age and education whilst Chesser et al. (2006) found familiarity with preparedness 
terminology to be less amongst rural focus group participants compared with urban groups.  
1.4.1. Recommended preparedness actions 
FEMA publishes two-page guidance, most recently in March 2018, titled ‘Be Prepared for a 
Nuclear Explosion’ (FEMA, 2018). This guidance elaborates on the ‘Get Inside, Stay Inside, Stay 
Tuned’ message. Under the heading ‘What to do: Now Prepare’ advice includes identification 
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of shelter locations and construction of an emergency supply kit containing bottled water, 
packaged food, medicine, a battery-powered radio, a flashlight and extra batteries for 24 
hours’ use (three days if possible). Other documents exist that suggest a greater number of 
items are required, but for general disaster preparedness (e.g. American Red Cross, 2006; CDC, 
2005; DHS, 2006). An expansion of the ‘Get Inside, Stay Inside, Stay Tuned’ message as 
detailed on the website Ready.gov (DHS, 2018) is shown in Table 1.3. 
Table 1.3. Full ‘Get Inside, Stay Inside, Stay Tuned’ message (Ready.gov; DHS, 2018) 
Get Inside Stay Inside Stay Tuned 
Get inside the nearest 
building to avoid radiation. 
Brick or concrete are best. 
Stay inside for 24 hours unless 
local authorities provide other 
instructions. 
Tune into any media available 
for official information such as 
when it is safe to exit and 
where you should go. 
Remove contaminated clothing 
and wipe off or wash 
unprotected skin if you were 
outside after the fallout 
arrived. 
Family should stay where they 
are inside. Reunite later to 
avoid exposure to dangerous 
radiation. 
Battery operated and hand 
crank radios will function after 
a nuclear detonation. 
Go to the basement or middle 
of the building. Stay away from 
the outer walls and roof. 
Keep your pets inside. Cell phone, text messaging, 
television, and internet 
services may be disrupted or 
unavailable. 
 
In 2018 Sweden published the document ‘If Crisis or War Comes’ (Swedish Civil Contingencies 
Agency, 2018). The brochure, sent to all households in the country at the behest of the 
Swedish Government, states that “everyone who lives in Sweden shares a collective 
responsibility for (their) country’s security and safety”. Whilst not specific to radiation 
disasters, If Crisis or War Comes provided a checklist of ‘home preparedness tips’, under the 
headings: Food (various non-perishable foods that can be stored), Water (store clean jerry 
cans with water), Warmth (store warm clothes, matches, blankets) and Communications (store 
a battery powered radio, important phone numbers on paper). It also provides information 
regarding likely warning siren alerts that might be sounded in emergencies, how and where to 
shelter and promises that Sweden ‘will never give up’ if attacked. 
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1.4.2. What preparedness information is there in the UK? 
Preparedness guidance for nuclear attack has not been made available in the public sphere in 
the UK in modern times (Preston, 2018). Information regarding radiation safety in the event of 
nuclear power plant leaks (‘Go in, Stay in, Tune in’ (EDF, 2017)) is primarily distributed to 
residents within the vicinity of nuclear power plants, and not the wider public.  
UK pre-incident disaster communications combine guidance from a number of emergencies. 
For example, Preparing for Emergencies (Updated November 14th, 2018) is published online 
and as a booklet by HM Government (Cabinet Office, 2018). This guidance, informed by the 
National Risk Register (Cabinet Office, 2017i) and National Business Resilience Planning 
Assumptions (Cabinet Office, 2017ii) outlines risks for which communities should plan and 
prepare. The booklet version (which uses the sub-heading What you need to know) contains 
advice for specific emergencies: fire, bombs and chemical, biological and radiological incidents: 
no mention is made of nuclear, although it is recognised that the general public are poor at 
distinguishing between CBRN categories. Due to the catastrophic potential of nuclear hazards, 
in the event of widespread loss of communications nuclear disaster stands out as a case for 
which generic C, B or R preparedness information is not adequate. 
What Preparing for Emergencies (particularly the online version) provides is sign-posting, such 
as to Local Resilience Forum contact details from which individuals can read about ‘planning 
assumptions’ in their local area. Also included are government and emergency response 
agency steps taken for national security. A key difference between versions of Preparing for 
Emergencies is that the booklet version includes the advice ‘Go in, Stay in, Tune in’. The 
booklet also includes a tear-off page on which emergency contact details and the frequency at 
which the local radio station can be written. 
1.5. Nuclear preparedness in the UK 
There was a time during which nuclear safety was a more public concern in the UK. To provide 
warning of an imminent attack during the Cold War period (1947-1991) some World War Two 
sirens were retained to provide a ‘four-minute warning’. A national warning message 
authorised for distribution using the code word Falsetto was also recorded by Peter Donaldson 
(a ‘familiar voice,’ intended to reassure the public that the BBC had not been wiped out). It 
instructed the public via radio to “stay tuned to this wavelength, stay calm and stay in your 
own homes”. It also gave instructions to turn off gas supplies, how to ration food and to fill 
containers with water (Davey, 2018). Again, this was reliant upon factors such as people being 
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able to tune in and being aware of the need to do so. It is unclear whether arrangements such 
as this are currently in place. 
Perhaps more widely recalled is a pre-nuclear incident information campaign prepared for the 
Home Office by the Central Office of Information (COI) and distributed in 1980 called ‘Protect 
and Survive’ (HMSO, 1980). Protect and Survive was distributed to the UK public in the form of 
a booklet, 20 televised films, 22 radio scripts and a series of newspaper inserts. The originally 
planned broadcast schedule involved distribution during low level crisis (TV and radio only), 
during a ‘preparatory’ period (booklet only) and via all mediums if an attack was thought to be 
probable. The booklet version of Protect and Survive bills itself as “tell(ing) you how to make 
your home and family as safe as possible under nuclear attack”, whilst it goes on to note the 
uncertainty that would come with nuclear war, it does suggest that those living in rural areas 
are potentially in equal danger to those living in towns which are perhaps perceived to be 
more conventional targets. In bold letters, Protect and Survive declares that readers should 
take note of its contents: “Your life and the lives of your family may depend upon it”. Specific 
advice includes planning a fallout room with inner refuge to be used for shelter in the event. 
Pictures show a man moving large furniture in front of floor-to-ceiling glass doors, blocking the 
fireplace and chimney with bags and bricking up windows. It also details the items that should 
make up a survival kit including drinking water, tinned food, portable radio and spare 
batteries, tin and bottle openers, cutlery and crockery and warm clothing. Preparations for 
sheltering include keeping a portable stove and fuel, table and chairs, first aid kit, boxes of 
sand, brushes and shovels, cleaning materials, a clock and a calendar. It also advises on how to 
construct a make-shift toilet. Following an attack, people are advised to remain in their 
shelters or point of refuge for up to 48 hours without going outside until instructed that it is 
safe to do so. 
Although not the only nuclear preparedness example of public pedagogy (public education for 
political purposes) to be distributed since World War Two, Protect and Survive is remembered 
as the most controversial. It was received poorly upon distribution and considered a ‘fantasy 
document’ (Preston, 2014) in many quarters. Amongst criticisms levelled at the publication, 
the preparedness and protective actions presented were considered unrealistic and too 
simplistic in the face of such a complex and uncertain event. A 1982 BBC documentary (QED: A 
Guide to Armageddon) had people follow the guidance included, concluding it to be lacking in 
efficacy. It was criticised for commercialisation and promotion of DIY as protective measures 
such as building a fallout shelter (Stafford, 2012). The reliance on resources to carry out a 
number of these actions caused ideological criticism, with accusations that it was classist and 
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racist due to the potential for inequalities in patterns of survival across socio-economic groups 
(Preston, 2014). Protect and Survive was also alleged to promote the idea of nuclear war as 
survivable: a way for the Government to get the public to support their stance on nuclear 
weapons. This, it was suggested, represented a misplaced effort wherein the Government 
should be focussed on prevention. Production of Protect and Survive was considered an 
admission that the government had failed in this (Preston, 2014). 
Protect and Survive came at a time of severely limited public spending on civil defence. 
According to the then Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, Sir Philip Green, the primary 
concern at that time was to provide warning to the public in the event of nuclear attack 
(Stafford, 2012), an approach not fitting the definition of civil defence. Subsequently, the 
campaign was developed from restricted information. For example, the video series includes a 
clip entitled ‘stay at home’ intended to dissuade the public from mass evacuation, warning 
that “nobody can tell where the safest place will be” and stating that by moving the authorities 
will be unable to assist with food and other essentials (HMSO, 1980). This new ‘stay at home’ 
policy was withheld from a parliamentary statement reporting conclusions of a Home Defence 
Review of 1970–1, subsequently used as a basis for civil defence funding allocation. Ultimately, 
The Home Office appeared to favour simplicity in their presentation over the information given 
by advisors. Selective inclusion of information in Protect and Survive was felt to be dictated by 
a need to weigh public adherence with necessity for national survival (Stafford, 2012).  
This public backlash, coupled with government disagreements regarding distribution (Preston, 
2017) has meant that no follow up to Protect and Survive has been produced. The COI 
produced “Civil Defence – Why We Need It” (COI, 1981) to address questions that arose 
following the publication of Protect and Survive. Still, in 1985 the COI brought together public 
survey findings that around 40% in the UK believed nuclear war to be ‘likely someday’ but that 
around 80% expressed pessimism about their chances of survival, considering civil defence to 
make little or no difference to this (Preston, 2014). The COI also found the public to desire an 
honest approach from the Government regarding defence from nuclear war. This perhaps is at 
odds with previous communication campaigns such as Protect and Survive in which there is an 
emphasis on documents being politically defensible with practical use in an emergency being a 
secondary concern. Protect and Survive was considered didactic in its approach, fitting more 
with early behavioural science concepts of a panic-stricken public rather than contemporary 
models of a rational and aware public (Preston, 2014). 
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1.5.1. Other attempts to change behaviour   
Other previous attempts at providing effective preparedness communications to the public 
reveal the many challenges for such campaigns. 
As with Protect and Survive, the original US civil defence campaign, ‘Duck and Cover’, is 
considered misleading by many in the public for the popular perception that it suggested 
nuclear war to be survivable. However nuclear defence experts consider much of its protective 
recommendations to be constructive and worth resurrecting (Sander, 2018). According to 
nuclear weapon historian Alex Wellerstein (Reinventing Civil Defence, 2017), at least in the US, 
“Cold War perceptions are unfortunately the ones that guide a lot of our discussions about civil 
defense(sp) and nuclear preparedness today”. Whilst such protections may be largely 
ineffective in the face of thermonuclear weapon bombardment, they would certainly prove 
effective for many in scenarios involving detonation of smaller devices: radiological dispersal 
devices; a 10KT improvised nuclear device perhaps used by a terrorist group; in the event of a 
nuclear power plant leak; or even in detonation of a single larger device such as those 
developed by foreign nuclear powers. 
Previous studies have shown public mistrust of preparedness advice to be reinforced by 
distribution of unclear information (Kuroda, 2017) or not meeting public expectations (Frewer 
et al., 1996) presenting barriers to engagement. This is a problem since adherence (Bass et al., 
2015) and preparedness (Eisenman et al., 2012) are reduced where there is low trust in the 
officials’ providing information. Mistrust of information also affects information processing, 
such as reducing capacity to integrate large amounts of information or make complex 
decisions (Keselman et al., 2005). The nuclear industry has been found to be significantly less 
trustworthy in public opinion than local authorities and scientists (Latré et al., 2017). Further 
to this, attempts at influencing preparedness and increasing knowledge of protective 
behaviours in the context of civil defence in the UK has received equally negative publicity 
(Preston, 2014) as Duck and Cover in the US, or has not been engaged with or recalled when 
needed (Page et al., 2008; Rubin et al., 2005). In fact, one evaluation of emergency 
preparedness literature distributed in the US found behaviour change (engaging in at least one 
preparedness action) in only 10% of the population (Marshall et al., 2007). 
According to Rachel Bronson in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, there is less concern 
regarding nuclear threat in young people today due to a rise in personal threats such as gun 
violence and because many did not live through the era of Duck and Cover. Bronson states that 
“images (of this time) do not resonate in the same way (with people today). We need to 
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approach it differently”. In the UK in the 1980s 40% to 50% of respondents to nationwide polls 
reported fear of nuclear war to be a serious issue for them. After the Cold War this dropped to 
1-2% (Clay, 2018). 
During the 1980s there was some push back against the idea of nuclear planning, causing the 
distribution of Protect and Survive to have the opposite than desired effect in some cases. This 
was reinforced culturally such as by the release of the BBC film Threads (Hines and Jackson, 
1984) which depicted the aftermath of a nuclear attack on Sheffield. To many, Protect and 
Survive and Threads highlighted the absolute horror that nuclear attack would bring and the 
perceived “absurdity” (David Blunkett, leader of Sheffield Council between 1980-1987; Clay, 
2018) of trying to protect oneself. Actions in Protect and Survive were considered by many 
either not doable (e.g. keeping bottled water at a time when bottled water was not a common 
feature of everyday life) or not effective (e.g. papering over windows). Some UK cities declared 
themselves nuclear free zones during this time, meaning nuclear preparedness was not 
considered (Clay, 2018). 
Lofstedt (2003) suggests that individuals make decisions about risk initially based on factual 
information, and on emotion (based on previous experiences) only in lieu of facts. This is 
particularly the case when inconsistency occurs, such as when messages do not reflect risk for 
everybody in the same way (e.g. not reflecting economic status: Bass, 2016). This may be a 
contribution to the failure of Protect and Survive. For example, in assessing information 
seeking and interpretation of radiation risk, focus groups made up of school principals in 
Estonia with no prior knowledge of a risk to draw upon had difficulty making sense of a nuclear 
power plant leak warning. Basing their responses on emotional content then led to 
disagreements and uncertainty (Harro-Loit et al., 2012). 
This presents a substantial issue. In the event of any disaster involving radiation, be it nuclear 
detonation, radiation leak or radiological dispersion device, sheltering-in-place is likely to be 
the most life-preserving action that the public can take (e.g. Becker, 2004; Buddemeier and 
Dillon, 2009; FEMA, 2018). However, members of the public are often either unaware of this 
fact or consider advice to shelter to be an outdated remnant of the Cold War (Redlener, 2018). 
What is more, available evidence on the provision of public education materials for 
preparedness and protective actions to take in incidents involving any chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agent suggests that the provision of education material is not 
always enough to alter the public’s behaviour (Florig and Fischhoff, 2007; Heagele, 2018). 
People may not engage with the material prior to an incident, may become overly anxious 
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(Taylor et al., 2011) or may not remember the information when they need it (Hildebrand & 
Bleetman, 2007). Education material may be particularly ineffective if the likelihood of an 
incident occurring is perceived as being low (Rogers et al., 2013) and if suggested actions to 
take are perceived as ineffective (Taylor et al., 2011).  
There is therefore a need to identify facilitators and barriers to engagement with pre-incident 
information, and to examine ways to overcome potential barriers. This should enable more 
effective pre-incident messages about nuclear terrorism to be designed that are likely to 
enhance public engagement and therefore promote public preparedness for nuclear 
catastrophe. 
1.5.2. Need for improved public communication around radiation emergencies 
Previously, the US National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP, 2001), 
emphasized social, psychological, behavioural and communication issues as key to the success 
or failure of preparedness and response efforts for radiation emergencies. According to the 
NCRP, a communication approach to preparedness should be “informed by an awareness of 
people’s fear and concerns and that effectively conveys the information needed to protect 
health and safety”. Not attending to psychosocial and communication issues could result in 
increased morbidity and mortality and inability of responding organisations to maintain public 
trust. The Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), reflecting on the overwhelming 
volume of requests for information during the 2001 anthrax attacks, concluded that the risk of 
unconventional terror attacks necessitated a proactive approach to risk communication that 
involved the use of basic, agent-specific messages distributed pre-event (e.g. Becker 2004).  
In reviewing responses to nuclear and radiological emergencies, including the Fukushima 
nuclear power plant catastrophe, the IAEA found public communication to be amongst the 
biggest challenges in radiation emergency management (IAEA, 2013ii; Tateno and Yokoyama, 
2013).  
Increasingly, development of strategies for effective communication are recommended at all 
phases of a crisis, including the preparedness stage (Seeger, 2006). Yet despite these and other 
endorsements of pre-event communication, public communication around nuclear risks has 
rarely focussed on preparedness. In part, this is due to a belief that preparedness 
recommendations will not be accepted by the public and in part it relates to fear that 
confidence in civil nuclear activities might be harmed (e.g. Oshita, 2017).  
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Practical difficulties in communicating about nuclear risks also exist. A review by Prezelj and 
colleagues (2016) found practical limitations to communicating in the event to include: 
difficulty coordinating messages in unpredictable and complex emergencies; different opinions 
and perspectives adding to difficulties in coordinating information about risk situations and; 
difficulty (or impossibility) of effective public communication without public involvement in 
pre-planning. 
These findings highlight the scientific uncertainty, evolving situations and the pressure that 
responding organisations will be under to provide timely, clear, and consistent information in a 
radiation emergency such as ways in which survivors can protect themselves and their families 
(Freimuth, 2006). Having some understanding of what is known by the public regarding an 
emergency of this nature can allow communicators to ensure their message resonates with 
pre-existing knowledge (Glik, 2007). Nonetheless, protective messages delivered when 
detonation is imminent or immediately following detonation would have to provide detailed 
information and instructions, with little time for the public to act, and in a period of incredibly 
high stress. Development of effective pre-incident communications which are distributed 
during ‘peacetime’ can complement what information could be given to the public in the event 
of an incident.  
1.6. Theoretical approaches to radiation risk communication 
Whilst there are practical steps that can be taken to reduce the risk of harm should a nuclear 
catastrophe occur, people will only take these steps if aware of them. Informing the public of 
protective actions falls within the remit of risk and crisis communication. 
1.6.1. Risk and crisis communication 
In disaster communications literature, the terms risk communication and crisis communication 
are often used interchangeably (e.g. Covello, 2003; Latré et al., 2017; Wendling et al., 2013; 
Wray et al., 2006). However, risk communication can be defined as specific to communicating 
about adverse outcomes and the probability of that outcome occurring, either informing 
decision making in the future or helping recipients in adjusting to the knowledge of outcomes 
of an event that happened in the past. Crisis communication concerns presenting of factual 
information such as actions the public should take in the event of an unexpected disaster. In 
this definition the information presented is assumed to be sound and not requiring an expert 
to validate its truthfulness. Emergency risk communication, according to this definition, 
combines the requirement of communicating risks and benefits with the urgency of a crisis, by 
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means, according to Glik (2007), of practices and requirements less generic than those 
involved in standard risk communication. The term risk communication will be used from this 
point to indicate communications incorporating aspects outlined in the definitions of both risk 
and crisis communication above. 
Risk communication has been used to improve public understanding of CBRN risks (Etchegary 
et al., 2008), to inform the public, manage fear and fatalism, encourage cooperation with 
protective instructions given by authorities during a crisis (National Research Council, 1989)  
and enhance openness in science-policy making (House of Lords Committee on Science and 
Technology, 2000). 
Covello (2011) considers risk communication to be effective in emergencies if providing timely, 
accurate, clear, objective, consistent and complete information; it can “rally support, calm a 
nervous public, reduce misinformation, build trust and confidence in the public towards 
responding authorities, encourage cooperative behaviors(sp), and potentially help save lives”. 
For risk communicators it has been suggested that effective messaging requires more than 
simply knowledge of the risk, but should empower the audience, provide an honest and 
empathic exchange and adopt cultural and demographic requirements such as language, 
education and communication styles (Aherne, 2010; Fischhoff, 1995; Ulmer et al., 2007). 
Non-crisis, or pre-incident risk communications are designed to share content that has 
meaning attributed to it by the message recipient (Windahl et al., 2009); recipients being the 
population whose “behaviour, attitudes or knowledge is to be influenced, directly or 
indirectly’” (Glik, 2007). In its broadest sense, pre-incident communication should meet the 
requirements of the recipient who receives the information; understands the information; 
understands that the message applies to them; understands that they are at risk if they do not 
take the recommended protective action(s); decide that they need to act on the information; 
understands what action(s) need(s) to be taken; and is able to take action (Mileti and 
Sorensen, 1990). 
Whereas emergency risk communication can result in misinformation or inconsistency (Pew, 
2006; Rainie, 2005) by combining unexpectedness, threat, stressed populations and a mass 
media that is looking for news (Garrett, 2001) particularly during the immediate period 
(Thelwall & Stuart, 2007), pre-incident communication can be undertaken in a more measured 
way, giving time and consideration to what is said, when it is said, who says it and to whom it 
is said (Covello and Anderson, 1988). 
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The design of pre-incident communications, according to Florig and Fischhoff (2007), deserves 
detailed analyses not only to provide the public with sound advice, but also to ensure that 
authorities disseminating messages have realistic expectations of the public’s response to 
them. Certainly, studies have shown that the public perceive CBRN terrorism as being low in 
likelihood and consider preparedness planning for such events to not be worthwhile (e.g. 
Lemyre et al., 2007) though severity of consequences is rated differently in terms of societal 
consequences, as opposed to personal impact (Lemyre et al., 2006; Krewski et al., 2005). Pre-
incident communication should also support the public in making decisions, and not just 
provide facts (Lasker, 2004). Messages that have undergone empirical evaluation give the 
public the greatest chance of understanding the risks they face and of making appropriate 
choices (Florig and Fischhoff, 2007). 
Examples exist of radiation specific-messaging designed with public information needs in mind. 
For example, the CDC sponsored Pre-Event Message Development Project (e.g. Becker, 2005) 
was designed to improve public messaging for (amongst other things) nuclear terror events. 
The methodology used in this large-scale project placed the public and their self-reported 
information preferences at its heart. Similarly, The Rhode Island Department of Health used a 
social marketing approach (rather than a more traditional top-down planning approach: 
Brown, 2006) to identify pre-emergency ‘‘wants and needs’’ of the public. Following a series of 
focus groups and interviews a pre-intervention awareness flyer and 32-page informational 
booklet (Make a Kit, Make a Plan, Stay Informed) was produced (Marshall et al., 2007). 
1.6.1.1. Risk communications to increase preparedness 
Preparedness, or at least knowledge of what protective actions to take in the event of nuclear 
incident, is likely to save lives. One central illustration of the life-saving function of 
preparedness is that areas close to nuclear detonation will be devastated, with 
communications and access for emergency services limited. Assistance may not be possible for 
many hours, if not longer (DHS, 2008). Being prepared to shelter-in-place for prolonged 
periods by storing emergency supplies such as food, water and essential medication can help 
maintain safety during this early period following detonation (Department of Energy and 
Climate Change, 2015; FEMA, 2018; Wray et al., 2008). Key preparedness actions are explained 
in further detail below (section 1.5.1. Recommended Preparedness Actions). Whilst we cannot, 
individually or as a community, expect to be fully prepared for a catastrophic nuclear attack, 
distribution of effective pre-incident preparedness communications should help reduce 
fatalities. For example, a central message in contemporary UK radiation protection guidance 
developed by the independent National Steering Committee on Warning and Informing the 
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Public is to ‘Go in, Stay in, Tune in’ (e.g. EDF, 2017). This mnemonic (and U.S. guidance to ‘Get 
Inside, Stay Inside, Stay Tuned’ (FEMA, 2018)) advises waiting for further information from 
emergency officials once sheltering. However, in the event of a nuclear attack it is not certain 
that communications will be open for this purpose, or for how long they might be down. And 
given that it is assumed that “no significant response” would be available (perhaps 
optimistically) for at least 24 hours (Bunn and Roth, 2017), ensuring the public are prepared 
for lengthy sheltering, and have knowledge of how to protect themselves in such a situation is 
probably wise. 
It is widely considered that pre-incident risk communication for radiation emergencies requires 
a focus on presenting the information that people most need to understand but have yet to 
learn (Fischhoff et al., 2003). Yet simply providing factual information may not be enough to 
engage those who are sceptical about the need to take action such as preparedness measures 
(e.g. Rubin et al., 2015). Members of the public might be frightened or anxious at the time of 
receiving information; communications must be sensitive to this. Ensuring provision of credible 
and relevant information can enable action and adherence in an anxious and frightened, but 
informed public (Timmons, 2010). For this reason, it is vital to provide scientific rigor to the 
process of developing effective and evidence-based risk communication (Rubin et al., 2015). 
This is equally relevant for policy makers in creating realistic policies wherein authorities 
charged with civil defence and emergency response would benefit from understanding, “how 
people think about, perceive and respond to risk” (Ho, 2013). Without this understanding such 
policies may be ineffective. Current UK communication directives tend to focus on statutory 
requirements to include particular information (such as technical specifications) rather than 
basing public communication on evidence of what information people want or need. For 
example, nuclear safety information leaflets distributed to those living close to nuclear sites 
are designed to satisfy the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Radiation Emergency 
Preparedness and Public Information Regulations (REPPIR) (HSE, 2018) requirements, but 
these do not provide guidance on how best to present the information (Hellier et al., 2014). 
1.6.2. Theoretical perspectives: Behaviour change models in disaster research 
If communication is key to increasing preparedness, how should this communication be 
performed? With its genesis in environmental risk, disaster management, health promotion 
and media communications, current risk communication research draws upon social, cognitive 
and economic psychology and their applications within organisations and the community (Glik, 
2007). Whilst there are undoubtedly aspects in the many theories of risk communication that 
44 
 
are relevant to this project, such as the use of heuristics, or rules-of-thumb, in the reception of 
information (Chaiken, 1980), the use of persuasion through positive or negative associations 
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) or the interpretation of risk shaped by information processes, 
institutional structures and interpersonal interactions (or ‘social amplification’, Kasperson et 
al., 1988), there are many characteristics of these theories that do not necessarily apply to the 
research questions.  
The models outlined here have historically been used in understanding and development of 
risk communication messaging. They share aspects including risk perception, knowledge and 
perceived trust in the communicating source. Alongside the goal of increasing knowledge, risk 
communications are intended to influence behaviour. This emphasises the importance of using 
models of behaviour change to guide practice it is not enough to simply increase knowledge, 
the public must be motivated to act on information. In this section, I will summarise several 
key theories that I believe can add to our understanding of how best to communicate radiation 
risk to the public. 
Learning Theory 
Learning theory suggests that establishment of knowledge networks (or mental maps) assist in 
organising information as people learn about their world (Keselman et al., 2005). Knowledge 
acquired from new information must resonate with what is already known (in accordance with 
personality, experience and cultural influence) before assimilation into working memory (Kools 
et al., 2004). This suggests that risk communications must account for knowledge already 
acquired and beliefs held about the type of disaster being targeted to effectively frame the 
information presented. The use of Learning Theory as a basis for the development of radiation 
risk communication is supported by many radiation disaster and communication study 
outcomes. For example, information campaigns for residents near nuclear power plants 
(Železnik and Perko, 2012) and informational videos (Latré et al., 2017) can increase radiation 
knowledge and reduce risk perception, leading to greater acceptance of subsequent messaging 
during non-crisis periods (Perko et al., 2012; 2013). Whilst a number of academics (e.g. 
Khripunov, 2010; Kiisel and Vihalemm, 2014) echo the view that the public tend to base their 
views of risk on personal experience, one challenge in this area is that few people have had 
experiences that can provide meaningful guidance in reacting to nuclear attack. The public 
tend to demonstrate low levels of knowledge about CBRN agents in general and hold 
inaccurate beliefs about them which can make communicating about CBRN incidents 




Whilst it is not a model of communication per se, the Social-Cognitive Model of individual 
response to terrorism (Lee and Lemyre, 2009) with its genesis in Social-Cognitive Theory (e.g. 
Bandura, 2001) draws upon the concept that intentions to take preparatory actions, motivated 
by outcome expectancies and self-efficacy, are dependent on social-contextual factors such as 
trust in the source of preparedness information. Whilst providing information about terrorism 
has been found to alter perceptions as to the probability of terror-events occurring (Lerner et 
al., 2003), the Social-Cognitive Model posits that affective responses (such as worry) are a 
function of such cognitive evaluations, in addition to social-contextual factors. These factors, 
most centrally perceived coping-efficacy, perceived likelihood and perceived front-line 
preparedness, are predictors of individual preparedness and information seeking behaviour. 
Testing of this model has suggested that raising awareness about both individual ability to 
survive terror-related disasters and front-line preparedness may reduce worry and 
subsequently encourage individual preparedness. 
Figure 1.7 is a full representation of the cognitive, social-contextual and affective factors that 
the model proposes to influence behavioural response to terror. This model is supported by 
research with the public regarding a deliberate radiation release which highlight barriers to 
information engagement including perceived low likelihood of an incident occurring (Rogers et 
al., 2013), and the suggested actions being deemed ineffective (Taylor et al., 2011). Not only is 
this an issue in terms of public communication but a challenge also exists in convincing policy-
makers to pay attention, and perhaps even allocate funds, to a catastrophe that may not even 
happen (Ho, 2017). 
 
Figure 1.7. Model specifying relationships between cognitive factors, social-contextual factors, 




The social-cognitive model may also account for unhelpful behaviours occurring in response to 
radiation emergencies. For example, one survey of intended responses in a hypothetical 
radiation scenario found that misperceptions regarding likelihood and methods of exposure 
are associated with increased worry and engaging in behaviours detrimental to the response 
effort such as attending monitoring and assessment facilities unnecessarily (Pearce et al., 
2013).  
Communication Persuasion Matrix 
Covello (2011) suggests risk communication is based on four organising models which affect 
how information is processed and how perceptions of risks are formed. These are the risk 
perception model in which risks are perceived differently if upsetting or believed to have 
potential to cause harm; the mental noise model which explains the degree to which stress and 
strong emotions impair information processing; the negative-dominance model which suggests 
negative information is given greater weight (loss aversion) and is attuned to more than 
positive information, and; the trust determination model which places trust as the central 
aspect in determining perceptions of risk. This is an elaboration of the Communication 
Persuasion Matrix (McGuire, 1989), also known as the ‘input-output’ matrix. This matrix 
comprises five input variables: source, message, channel, audience and destination (desired 
outcome) that relate to the characteristics of the communication itself and can be manipulated 
to elicit a set of 13 possible outputs. The output is concerned with how the audience processes 
information. Each output variable (or ‘stage’) must occur for communications to be considered 
effective in changing behaviour. 
Outcomes of studies into radiation emergency response and risk communication support 
Covello’s organisational model of communication. For example, warnings alone have been 
found not to motivate protective behaviour and instruction adherence; individuals must also 
perceive risk (Lee & Lemyre, 2009). Yet radiation concerns causing the public to feel they need 
to be prepared may not necessarily prompt protective actions. For example, 81% of 
respondents to one US survey considered the threat of a dirty bomb attack on their country to 
be serious; however, 63% considered themselves unprepared for an attack with 56% uncertain 
of how to respond (report to the Radiological Threat Awareness Coalition, 2008). 
Often it is perception of risk and not the actual risk itself that influences response (Fischhoff et 
al., 2003). This reinforces the need for scientific information to be presented in ways that non-
technical audiences can understand; with faulty risk perceptions causing misunderstanding 
and misinterpretation of scientific or probabilistic information (Slovic, 1987). Addressing 
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counterproductive perceptions and beliefs in the public represents a further challenge in the 
development of effective preparedness communications which might be addressed using 
models such as the Communication Persuasion Matrix.  
Extended Parallel Process Model 
The Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM: Witte, 1992; Witte & Allen, 2000) suggests that 
under some circumstances (such as when perceiving low self-efficacy) fear-inducing messages 
can provoke resistance (including avoidance, denial and reactance). The Theory of 
Psychological Reactance (reactance is “the motivational state that is hypothesized to occur 
when a freedom is eliminated or threatened” (Brehm & Brehm, 1981) and has been found to 
weaken the impact of health messages that invoke fear (Witte, 1992)) and EPPM are perhaps 
applicable to the apparent existence of a pervasive sense of fatalism in public attitudes 
regarding radiation. For example, the nuclear attack survival rate expected by the public was 
quantified in one study (Nasar & Greenberg, 1984) to be lower than 50% despite a belief that 
survival chances were enhanced by evacuation planning. In another study (Malešič et al., 2015) 
respondents felt nuclear sites are safe, but qualified this by stating that in a radiation leak 
there would be no time to employ protective actions if instructed. This belief in almost certain 
death in a radiation emergency of any nature may be a powerful barrier to engagement in risk 
communications that suggest otherwise. Though EPPM is not focussed solely on reactance and 
fatalism, these are aspects relevant to this topic. 
The social psychology of public response to warnings 
According to Mileti, perceptions are formed in response to emergency warnings in the same 
way that perceptions are formed in any other social event (e.g. Mileti and Peek, 2000). Such 
processes are affected by beliefs, understanding, experience-based expectations and 
environmental cues, such as the behaviour of others (Sorenson, 1983). This model is used to 
explain behavioural responses to emergency risk communications, and not to pre-incident risk 
communication. 
Mileti suggests this process involves sequential stages. Mileti and Peek (2000) present these in 
the context of radiation emergency risk communications. The first stage is hearing: warnings or 
sirens may not be heard by all. The second stage is understanding: not simply ability to 
interpret, but also the attachment of meaning; understanding therefore includes risk 
perception. Third is belief: for example, the perceived accuracy of information. The fourth 
stage is personalisation of risk: the perceived implications that the risk may have on the 
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receiver. The fifth stage is deciding how to respond, and the final stage is performing the 
behaviour. 
These sequential stages are repeated each time new information is received and so, risk is 
perceived as an emerging process, not resulting from a single event. This is additionally 
impacted by the content of warnings, the style of communication and recipient characteristics. 
Rather than await the delivery of information, however, people actively seek additional 
information (warning confirmation: Mileti et al., 1975). 
Summary  
A common feature of these models is that interruption of perceptual, cognitive and 
behavioural steps during engagement with and assimilation of information, such as by 
questioning of the validity of the message, is a cause for non-adherence to risk communication 
(Tierney, 2000). This may be particularly the case when considering radiation emergency 
preparedness wherein the effectiveness of communications may be reduced by the nature of 
their high-risk, high-outrage qualities (Sandman, 1989). For example, emotions such as fear 
that are likely to reduce information processing in a major event (Nutbeam, 2000). 
Below I will outline how models of behaviour change are applied in a disaster context. 
1.6.2.1. Models of health behaviour change in disaster research 
Health behaviour research has examined how the public can be helped to make positive 
behaviour changes at an individual level such as smoking cessation (Black et al., 2020) or 
vaccination uptake (Smith et al., 2020). 
There are a number of behaviour change models central to health-promotion research and 
application. For example, Social Cognitive Theory (e.g. Bandura, 2001) suggests that the public 
learn socially contextual information through continual interaction with their environment and 
has been applied in public health communication (e.g. Breastfeeding of pre-term babies: 
Ahmed, 2009; AIDS prevention: Bandura, 1994). In 2006, NICE (Taylor et al., 2006) published a 
comprehensive review of social cognition theory based models, namely the Health Belief 
Model (HBM; Rosenstock et al., 1994), the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA; e.g. Fishbein and 
Azjen, 1975), the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB; Azjen, 1985) and the Trans-Theoretical 
Model (TTM; Prochaska & DiClemente, 1993) and use of each in predicting health related 
behaviour change.  
The reviewers found none of these models were able to incorporate the significance of social, 
economic or environmental factors as determinants of health behaviour. They went on to 
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suggest that a priority for promotion of effective public health research is to integrate and 
extend the existing capacities of established models. While evidence such as NICE guidelines 
suggest that we are moving closer to establishing models of behaviour with proven success in 
supporting health behaviour change, the evidence as to the effectiveness of behaviour change 
approaches remains unclear (Laverack, 2017). A further issue in the use of behaviour change in 
health promotion is in its widening of health inequality (e.g. Baum, 2007). According to 
Laverack (2017) a comprehensive strategy (that includes a behaviour change approach; a 
strong policy framework and the empowerment of people to take control over health 
decisions) will require both behaviour change communication opportunities and community 
empowerment. 
Models of behaviour change traditionally used in health psychology are increasingly applied in 
disaster research. Paton (2003) identifies intention-formation variables including outcome 
expectancy and self-efficacy in disaster preparedness attitudes amongst the public. Using the 
Social-Cognitive model to inform motivation towards disaster preparedness, Paton suggests 
that after thinking about the hazard itself, the public would then make judgements as to how 
their actions might mitigate those hazards. Paton also suggests that variables such as a sense 
of belonging to their community moderated the extent as to which preparedness intentions 
translated into actions.   
Recently we have seen the importance of applied health psychology in the early 2020 SARS-
CoV-2 (Covid-19) pandemic. Without a vaccine available at the time of the outbreak, slowing 
it’s spread requires nation and even worldwide behaviour change. Raihani and de-Wit (2020) 
found that people who reported more concern also adopted more preventive behaviours 
while concern for the self and family predicted behaviour change and support for policy 
change. A key countermeasure in the quest to protection from coronavirus is self-isolation, or 
quarantine. Webster and colleagues (2020) identified factors associated with quarantine 
adherence during infectious disease outbreaks finding adherence decisions were related to 
perceived knowledge about the disease and quarantine procedure, perceived risk and 
perceived benefits of quarantine.  
However, there is a need for consideration of the use health behaviour models in public health 
communication and disaster preparedness research. In a systematic review of the application 
of behaviour change theories in emergency health preparedness, Ejeta and colleagues (2015) 
found that theories and models of health psychology have been applied predominately to 
50 
 
disease outbreaks and natural hazards with little information as to their use in man-made 
disasters.  
Whilst many theories of what influences behaviour can be brought to bear on the current 
problem, in recent years, constructs found to be influential in behaviour change have been 
subsumed into the Theoretical Domains Framework (TDF; Cane et al., 2012). 
1.6.3. The Theoretical Domains Framework approach 
The Theoretical Domains Framework is a holistic model for behavioural change theory. This 
framework integrates constructs present in 33 models of behaviour change to include a range 
of mental and social processes and contains 14 domains with 84 component constructs (Table 
1.4). For example, the domain knowledge comprises the constructs: knowledge of scientific 
rationale (e.g. knowing the evidence for recommended actions is sound), procedural 
knowledge (e.g. knowing the actions to take if advised to shelter-in-place) and knowledge of 
task environment (e.g. knowing the place in which sheltering is necessary, including the 





















Table 1.4. Key domains relating to behaviour change in the Theoretical Domains Framework 
(refined) (Cane et al., 2012) 
Domain (definition) Example Constructs 
Knowledge (awareness of existence of something) Knowledge of condition/scientific rationale; 
procedural knowledge 
Skills (ability or proficiency acquired through 
practice) 
Skills development; competence; ability 
Social / professional role identity (individual’s 
behaviours / personal qualities in social or work 
setting) 
Social identity; group identity 
Beliefs about capabilities (acceptance of ability 
that can be put to constructive use) 
Perceived competence; self-efficacy; 
empowerment; beliefs 
Optimism (confidence in desired outcomes being 
attained) 
Optimism; pessimism 
Beliefs about consequences (acceptance of 
outcome of behaviour in a given situation) 
Outcome expectancies; attitudes; beliefs 
Reinforcement (increased probability of outcome 
by arranging a dependent relationship between 
response and given stimulus) 
Rewards (proximal/distal, valued/not valued, 
probable/improbable); incentives; 
contingencies 
Intentions (conscious decision to perform a 
behaviour in a certain way) 
Goals (autonomous, controlled); intrinsic 
motivation 
Goals (mental representations of desired 
outcomes) 
Goals (distal/proximal, 
autonomous/controlled); action planning 
Memory, attention and decision processes 
(retaining information, selectively focussing and 
choosing between alternatives) 
Cognitive overload/tiredness; attention control; 
decision making 
Environmental context and resources 
(circumstances encouraging or discouraging skill 
development) 
Environmental stressors; resources; barriers 
and facilitators; person x environment 
interaction 
Social influences (interpersonal processes that 
change thoughts, feelings or behaviours) 
Social and group pressure/norms/supports 
Emotions (experiential, behavioural and 
physiological elements used to deal with 
personally significant events) 
Anxiety; fear; stress 
Behavioural regulation (managing or changing 
observed or measured actions) 
Self-monitoring; breaking habit; action 




The TDF represents a new science of behaviour change designed as an integrative model 
(which includes the behaviour change wheel) that allows mobilisation of knowledge for policy 
makers, making science actionable. It is a particularly good model to support research into 
public reactions to information about nuclear incidents, since it is designed to bring together 
the range of social, environmental and psychological processes which make up its domains. 
Bringing together conventional but disparate models avoids the potential constraints of these 
models in identifying areas for targeted behaviour change. To apply the TDF to behaviour 
change implementation, an understanding of the nature of behaviour in its specific context is 
required. It can be used to inform the Capacity, Opportunity and Motivation – Behaviour 
(COM-B; Michie et al., 2011) model,  commonly used to answer the question of what needs to 
change in order for a desired behaviour to occur. The COM-B suggests that behaviour occurs as 
an interaction between three conditions: capability to enact behaviour, motivation to enact or 
inhibit a behaviour and opportunity within an enabling environment. For example, physical 
and psychological capability may map to physical skills and knowledge possessed by the 
individual. It is a dual process model; the COM-B recognises behaviour change resulting from 
automatic (implicit and unconscious thought) and reflective (explicit, controlled and conscious 
thought) processes. According to this model, the automatic system is a stronger influence on 
behaviour than the reflective system. 
By identifying a desired target behaviour and gathering information that addresses TDF 
domains (Michie et al., 2005) in the necessary context, behaviour change interventions can be 
designed. In this case, evidence-based communications can be designed that target 
psychological processes most likely to change behaviour such as those which present a barrier 
to engagement or instruction adherence. 
This model proposes ways in which we can use research methods to understand how to design 
behaviour change interventions. One such way is through a process of systematic review of the 
literature, qualitative research to gather a rich understanding of how the problem is 
conceptualised in the public sphere, and quantitative data collection to refine the ideas arising 
from the previous phases. Basing these approaches on the TDF helps to ensure that potentially 
important components are not overlooked. 
1.7. Towards a model of nuclear disaster preparedness communication and behaviour 
Communications are recommended at every phase of disaster preparedness and response, 
however, as is outlined in the literature I have detailed above, when the public are provided 
with pre-incident information, they have more time to prepare, potentially allowing for a 
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greater impact. This literature also shows particular psychological factors that are at play in 
making communications effective. Fatalism and trust in the communicating source, for 
example are shown to be important in risk-related behaviour response, risk perception and 
uncertainty are shown to be important in multiple studies, with mixed findings as to the role of 
anxiety (e.g. Gray and Ropeik, 2002; US Dept of Health and Human Services, 2002). The 
evidence of the role of self-efficacy and perceived likelihood are scant in the literature, despite 
good theoretical arguments for the importance of these factors. A model is presented below 
(figure 1.8) which outlines factors (including societal, psychological, communications) for 
consideration in the development of effective nuclear disaster communications at each phase. 
This conceptual model is intended to represent specific factors that might be of influence on 
behaviour that are identified in the literature, and broader factors that may be expected to be 
relevant based on theory. 
This model is an attempt to illustrate the current thinking as to how behaviour might be 
changed through effective communication by integration of the concepts that have been 
introduced within this introductory chapter. It is not my intention to test all factors within this 
model. Instead, those that are most relevant or most amendable to study in the context of a 
PhD will be explored, and the model updated in the final chapter. 
 
Figure 1.8. Model representation of factors known to contribute to effective communications 
targeted at behaviour change. This includes social and psychological factors that derive from 
the literature outlined above and some derived from the following models: Theoretical 
Domains Theory; Learning Theory; Social-Cognitive Model; Communication Persuasion Matrix; 
EPPM; Social Psychology of Warning Response.  
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1.8. Project aims 
A prepared public is important to reduce the risks associated with nuclear incidents, yet the 
public are underprepared and research on how best to remedy this is scant. The theories I 
have reviewed suggest various key features that may be important. These include framing of 
information being communicated in alignment with perceptions and cognitions to ensure the 
public are able to carry out desired behaviours, and considering social-contextual factors that 
are meaningful to the public such as trust in the information source, perception of the risk 
involved and the provision of sufficient information. 
This, in turn, can be achieved by three steps: ensuring that pre-incident communications 
inform the public of what they want to know in the event of a radiation emergency to enhance 
engagement in those messages; ensuring that pre-incident communications inform the public 
of what they need to know in the event of a radiation emergency to reduce barriers to 
engagement such as fatalism and lack of trust in the source of the message and; ensuring the 
message is framed in a theoretically and evidence-based way to maximise the likelihood of 
behaviour change. 
I have outlined a framework (model) of factors that come into play in this context. My 
overarching aim for this thesis is to identify preparedness behaviours and how best to 
communicate with the public about preparedness for an incident involving the release of 
nuclear radiation. Several sub-objectives are used to achieve this. As this is an applied thesis in 
which I am producing work intended to inform policy, as opposed to generating theory, my 
desired goal for this work is to generate policy recommendations. 
The specific aims of this project were therefore to:  
1. Identify predictors of behaviour in a. preparation for and b. the immediate aftermath 
of an incident involving release of nuclear radiation. 
In line with the specific potential barriers and facilitators to engagement with pre-incident 
communications outlined in this introductory chapter, variables tested included trust, anxiety, 
fatalism, recall of protective actions to take in the event, perceived risk, pre-existing 
knowledge, perceived efficacy of suggested countermeasures, perceived self-efficacy, 
situational and personal factors such as being a parent and perceptions of frontline 
preparedness. 
2. Identify how best to communicate pre-incident information to the public. 
55 
 
Specific aspects of risk communication to be tested include: whether communications are 
most desired pre-incident or during the incident; who do people want to receive messages 
from; what format is preferred; what content should be included; and what method of 
distribution is preferred? 
These aims were met through four phases of data collection, reported in the following four 
chapters. In Chapter 2, I describe a systematic review of studies that have previously explored 
predictors of preparedness, adherence with recommended countermeasures and pre-incident 
information seeking for nuclear disasters. I note here that the nature of the event in question, 
that of catastrophic radiation release has thankfully, seldom occurred in history, and so study 
of communication around this phenomenon is reliant on both hypothetical and real scenario 
outcomes. While this might be an issue in terms of drawing conclusions, this approach does 
allow for the documenting of various aspects of the preparedness problem. 
Objectives of this review relating to aim 1 are to identify: 
1. factors which are associated with behaviour in preparation for a nuclear incident, 
including whether the public will attend to pre-incident messages;  
2. factors which are associated with behaviour in the immediate aftermath of a 
nuclear incident. 
The objective of this review relating to aim 2 is to identify: 
3. preferences among members of the public for information designed to educate 
them about actions to take in the event of a nuclear incident. 
In Chapter 3, I report the results of focus groups with members of the general public that 
explored pre-nuclear disaster information preferences.  
The objective of this study relating to aim 1 is to identify: 
1.  possible predictors of behaviour in the preparedness and immediate stages of a 
nuclear emergency. 
Objectives of this study relating to aim 2 are to identify: 
2. what factors might promote engagement with pre-nuclear incident 
communications;  
3.  the preferred pre-incident information distribution method among the public;  
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4. factors that promote trust in the message and perceived source credibility. 
In Chapter 4, I report on an online survey of the Hawai’i public conducted to explore their 
immediate behavioural responses to the false missile alert of January 2018 as well as prior 
preparedness behaviour, and the factors associated with these behaviours.  
Objectives of this survey relating to aim 1 are to:  
1. identify the proportion of people who a) possess adequate materials (as defined by 
HI-EMA) within their home to allow them to cope with a nuclear emergency, and b) possess 
these materials specifically as a result of attempts to prepare for a nuclear emergency;  
2. assess adherence to the instruction to shelter-in-place. This will be achieved via the 
following sub-objectives:  
a. identify the prevalence of behaviours that were, a) deliberately adherent to 
the instruction to shelter, i.e. involving participants taking active steps to follow the 
guidance; and b) incidentally adherent, i.e. involving participants taking active steps to 
follow the guidance or else being adherent by virtue of circumstance, such as being in 
bed at the time;  
b. identify the proportion of people who believed the message to constitute a 
genuine emergency alert;  
c. assess whether the following variables were associated with adherence and 
preparedness outcome variables: by what means the message was received; whether 
participants believed it to have been a genuine message from HI-EMA; whether they 
believed an attack to be imminent; whether they had prepared for an emergency; how 
much preparedness information they had previously received; their level of trust in 
Hawai’i’s defence capabilities; their perceived likelihood of a nuclear attack occurring 
in Hawai’i, and; the perceived level of effort involved in taking protective measures 
(such as sheltering).  
The objective of this survey relating to aim 2 is to:  
3. assess the desire for pre-incident information relating to nuclear preparedness 
following the false alert. 
Aligning with the second of the project aims, the same survey was used to gather additional 
data that would be of use in developing improved communications with the population, 
specifically: ways in which participants attempted to find out information as to how they could 
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protect themselves or others; from which sources they had obtained preparedness 
information prior to receiving the warning; how recently had this information been received; 
whether this information was viewed as having been sufficient; preferred timing of 
communications; reasons for not wishing to receive pre-incident communications; preferred 
content of pre-incident communications, and; their ratings of trust in potential information 
sources. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I report an online survey of the UK public which studied factors that 
facilitate nuclear attack preparedness and engagement with pre-incident communications.  
Objectives of this survey relating to aim 1 are to: 
1. identify the proportion of people who a) possess adequate materials to allow them 
to cope with a nuclear disaster, b) possess these materials specifically due to a concern about 
nuclear disasters and c) are prepared out of a concern for general emergencies; 
2. assess whether the following variables were associated with disaster preparedness: 
perceived risk to self and loved ones of a nuclear attack against the UK (and perceived 
likelihood of an attack occurring and it not affecting them); perceived risk to self and loved 
ones of an unspecified disaster in the UK (and perceived likelihood of a disaster occurring and 
it not affecting them); how much preparedness information they had previously received; 
perceived information sufficiency; their level of faith in the UK’s defence capabilities; the 
perceived level of effort involved in taking preparedness measures (such as storing items) and 
effectiveness in sheltering, as is recommended in nuclear disaster preparedness guidance, and; 
demographic variables. 
The objective of this survey relating to aim 2 is to: 
3. identify factors that promote anticipated engagement with pre-nuclear incident 
communications, including: timing (whether during peacetime or when a threat is 
known/raised); source of the communications; method and format by which communications 
arrive (i.e. online or leaflet; from government official, nuclear expert or other), and; perceived 
risk perception of a nuclear disaster occurring during their own lifetime, and the risk of this 
having a direct impact upon themselves or their loved ones. 
As can be seen, there was a broad initial scope to this thesis in which both nuclear and 
radiological radiation disasters were to be examined in the context of pre-incident 
preparedness. This is reflected in the scope of my systematic review. But, as data were 
generated, the aim of this thesis was tightened to be focussed on the specific issue of nuclear 
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attack scenarios. The reasons for this are primarily an identified lack of previous literature 
regarding public perceptions of nuclear attack preparedness and response behaviour, PPI 
group feedback prior to undertaking focus groups (which minimised the discussion of an 
accidental radiation release scenario) and finally the false ballistic missile alert in Hawaii which 




Chapter 2: A systematic review of factors associated with behaviour in relation to a 
nuclear incident, and reported preferences for information  
2.1. Introduction 
As we have seen in Chapter 1, recent advances in the capability and willingness of terrorists 
and state actors to use unconventional weapons (NATO, 2015) have raised the spectre of 
catastrophic attacks against civilian populations. The potential for chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons to generate large numbers of casualties, economic 
harm and widespread fear unfortunately acts as an incentive (Mazzone, 2013; NATO, 2015) 
and reports exist of terrorist groups trying to acquire radiological capability (Shuster, 2017) 
and operating weapon development facilities (Meulenbelt and Nieuwenhuizen, 2015). 
Radiological and nuclear incidents are perhaps the most alarming to the public and emergency 
planners alike. Catastrophic terrorist attacks, including use of a nuclear device, were identified 
as amongst the highest priority risks in the 2015 UK National Risk Register (Cabinet Office, 
2015) and as having the highest impact severity in the 2017 edition, with civil emergencies 
such as nuclear power plant leaks also figuring highly (Cabinet Office, 2017i). 
If such events happen, public reactions will play a substantial role in determining eventual 
mortality rates (Khripunov, 2015). In one model of a nuclear detonation in Los Angeles, the 
potential number exposed to harmful radiation fell from 285,000 to 45,000 when people 
sheltered in even moderately protective buildings (Buddemeier, 2010). Immediate evacuation 
following release of radioactive material can result in increased exposure as well as hindering 
the ability of emergency responders to attend the scene (Sugimoto et al., 2012). Other 
behaviours, such as moving quickly away from windows following the flash of a detonation 
(Buddemeier and Dillon, 2009), assembling an emergency supply kit ahead of time (Ablah et 
al., 2009; Taylor et al., 2011) and (for those near a nuclear power plant) taking stable iodine 
tablets in the event of a release (Khripunov, 2015) are also likely to reduce mortality rates. 
However, planners have often assumed that panic and lack of knowledge will prevent the 
public from following instructions on how to protect themselves (Preston, 2014). Furthermore, 
belief about CBRN lethality (Sheppard et al., 2006), unfamiliarity (Covello, 2011) and 
unpredictability (Smith, 2010) have been found to elicit intense responses in the public such as 
anxiety (Becker, 2004) and fatalism (Taylor et al., 2011). In smaller radiological incidents, 
misperceptions, for example of the routes of radiation exposure, are associated with increased 
worry and engaging in potentially harmful behaviours (Pearce et al., 2013), and overburdening 
of medical facilities (Havenaar et al., 2003). 
60 
 
Generic advice has been written about how to communicate health emergency risks with the 
public. Recent guidelines emphasise, among other things, the need to consider social and 
cultural influences on risk perception (WHO, 2017), the importance of understanding personal 
risk exposure (Rubin et al., 2011) and media relations training for emergency responders (Glik, 
2007). Yet, whether the public are likely to engage in specific protective behaviours during 
situations likely to create fear is unknown. 
In Chapter 1, I discussed the benefits of using the Theoretical Domains Framework to help 
improve the development of pre-incident communications. Atkins et al. (2017) and Chadborn 
and Sallis (2019) outline the practical applications of the TDF, suggesting that relevant 
contributors to the behaviour that is targeted for change should be identified and ranked for 
frequency at which it arises in the literature. This allows us to identify domains for inclusion in 
further investigation and for consideration in the design of an intervention.  
In this chapter I present a systematic review of studies which have assessed public responses 
before or immediately after a radiation disaster to identify factors that should be addressed in 
a future communications campaign, categorised according to the TDF. The objectives of this 
review were to identify:  
1. (aligning with the first of the project aims) factors which are associated with behaviour in 
preparation for a nuclear incident, including whether the public will attend to pre-incident 
messages;  
2. (aligning with the first of the project aims) factors which are associated with behaviour in 
the immediate aftermath of a nuclear incident;  
3. (aligning with the second of the project aims) preferences among members of the public for 
information designed to educate them about actions to take in the event of a nuclear incident. 
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Study identification  
I searched Ovid (Embase; Medline), PsycINFO (NICE HDAS), Web of Science and the Emergency 
Planning College online library (http://epc.cirqahosting.com/HeritageScripts/Hapi.dll/search1) 
from inception to January 2017. Keywords and MeSH terms were grouped into three 
categories: nuclear terms and events (e.g. radiation, Chernobyl), radiological terms and events 
(e.g. dirty bomb, Litvinenko) and behavioural or communication terms (e.g. shelter, evac*; 
communicat*). The full strategy is in Appendix A. Searches were conducted up to 31st May 
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2017. Titles and abstracts were downloaded using Endnote software. I undertook a detailed 
review of the full text of papers plausibly meeting the inclusion criteria. A sub-sample of 
papers were crossed checked with project supervisors. 
2.2.2. Inclusion criteria  
I used five inclusion criteria. First, only studies which sampled the public were included. I 
excluded studies if the population sampled had received occupational training in emergency 
response procedures. 
Second, I included studies relating to actual or hypothetical incidents involving a radiation 
hazard in which the potential for physical harm was present.  
Third, I included studies if they explored factors associated with behavioural response before a 
radiation incident occurred and/or in the immediate aftermath. Studies were also included if 
they assessed preferences relating to pre-event or post-event information provision. ; 
Fourth, I included studies if they used self-report (such as questionnaire or interview) or 
objective methods (such as footfall data) to assess actual or intended behaviour. For 
information preferences, I included outcomes measured through self-report, objective indices 
or any related measure.  
Fifth, due to resource constraints, I only included papers published in English.   
2.2.3. Data extraction  
Where possible, I extracted data from each study regarding design, type of incident, location, 
sample, what predictors or correlates of behaviour were studied and outcome assessment. 
2.2.4. Risk of bias  
I appraised the quality of included studies using Downs and Black’s (1998) checklist (Deeks et 
al., 2003; Pettigrew and Roberts, 2006). This has been validated for assessment of both 
randomised and observational studies. Items assess reporting, external validity, internal 
validity and confounding. Items not relevant to studies included in this review were not 
assessed (e.g. blinding). Studies were given a score out of twenty-two with a high score 
equating to high quality (see Appendix B, Table B1). 
2.2.5. Procedure  
I conducted the literature search, application of inclusion criteria, data extraction and quality 
appraisal with the project supervisory team providing consistency checks of a subset of results.  
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I grouped studies according to the predictors of behaviour that were assessed. Further 
subdivisions were based on whether incidents were nuclear or radiological, actual or 
hypothetical, and whether the study used a quantitative or qualitative approach. Differences in 
outcomes between studies relating to accidental nuclear facility emergencies and deliberate 
detonation of nuclear or radiological devices are explicitly mentioned in the results where 
these were apparent. 
For quantitative studies I extracted effect sizes where possible and used a narrative approach 
to their synthesis. I used meta-ethnography to synthesise qualitative studies (Noblitt and Hare, 
1988). This involves induction and interpretation of original data across a seven-step process 
allowing for building of a ‘comparative understanding’ (Barnett-Page and Thomas, 2009). Steps 
of this systematic approach to synthesis involve coding and mapping, or extracting 
characteristics of included studies to provide a ‘map’ of the research on this issue (as defined 
by the review question and inclusion criteria). This iterative process allowed for identification 
of the clearest categories within which outcomes are reported and headings are generated. 
Integration of findings allows creation of higher level explanations of phenomena. This 
approach was chosen as it allowed me to take into account the heterogeneity of included 
studies. 
In accordance with the TDF approach, factors that were associated with behaviour related to 
information seeking, preparedness and adherence (including acceptance of pre-incident 
communications) were categorised under one of the 14 domains of the framework. Each 
factor was ranked by frequency at which each was identified in the literature as being key to 
behavioural response to, and messaging preferences for a radiation emergency. Tables for 
each domain (with examples for each construct) are presented in Appendix C. 
2.2.6. Prospero registration  
This review was registered with Prospero on 20/01/2017 and was added to the Prospero 
database on 23/01/2017. Registration number: CRD42017055664. 
2.3. Results  
2.3.1. Search results  
I identified 9480 records by database searching. Following de-duplication, another 155 were 
identified from forward-citation and reference list searching of included papers, an index of 
behavioural science publications held at Public Health England and the Emergency Planning 
College library. See Figure 2.1. 
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Outcomes from four studies were reported across multiple papers (Kanda et al., 2013i; Kanda 
et al., 2013ii; Kanda et al., 2013iii; Perko et al., 2012; Perko et al., 2014; Perry, 1981; Perry, 
1983; Prince-Embury, 1991; Prince-Embury, 1992i; Prince-Embury, 1992ii). Therefore, while 
the total number of papers included was 41, the total number of studies included was 35. 
 
Figure 2.1. PRISMA flow diagram of study selection. Reprinted with permission. 
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2.3.2. Study characteristics  
Thirty-three papers reported outcomes of quantitative methods, three used qualitative 
methods, three used a mixed methods approach and two employed an experimental design. 
Twenty-one studies (producing 24 papers) were undertaken with US or Canadian populations 
and 10 (producing 11 papers) with European populations. Of the remaining studies three were 
conducted in Japan and Australia (producing six papers).  
Nineteen articles (based on 14 studies) presented data on behavioural responses to real 
emergencies (including the Fukushima and Three Mile Island leaks) or events such as mass 
distribution of iodine prophylaxis, while 22 concerned hypothetical situations. Tables 2.1-2.3 
provide a summary of the methods for each study (studies are listed in the table as according 
to whether they used a hypothetical scenario or materials, or whether they reported findings 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.3.3. Quality Assessment  
Other than two papers, those using qualitative methods tended to score poorly for 
methodological robustness, with quantitative studies receiving a mixed range of scores. 
Studies generally scored poorly for adequate adjustment for confounding variables, quality of 
reporting, description of the distribution of principal confounders, and estimates of random 
variability. A number of studies using quantitative methods failed to report probability values. 
Studies scored particularly highly for the clarity of study aims and findings, and for selecting 
participants from the same population. 
2.3.4. Predictors of behaviour in preparation for a radiation emergency 
16 studies reported factors associated with preparatory behaviour (see Appendix B, Table B2). 
2.3.4.1. Information seeking  
One high quality survey (Lee and Lemyre, 2009) identified several cognitive factors associated 
with information seeking about nuclear emergencies, specifically the perceived probability and 
likely personal impact of an incident, one’s perceived ability to cope, and worry. Perceptions of 
government or front-line preparedness were not associated with information seeking. In a 
study of people living near Three Mile Island, information seekers after the actual meltdown 
were found to be more highly educated but did not report the most worry about the radiation 
emergency that had occurred there (Prince-Embury, 1991). This study also scored well for 
quality though only examined a small sub-section of the US population living near to a nuclear 
plant. 
2.3.4.2. Preparedness 
Individual aspects of preparedness behaviour for hypothetical CBRN terror (such as compiling a 
first aid kit or supplies) have been variously associated with being older, a resident of rural 
areas, having higher education (Lemyre et al., 2007), and with the perceived probability of an 
incident, coping efficacy, perceived front-line preparedness, and worry (Lee and Lemyre, 
2009). Few preparedness actions were found in residents near a nuclear facility who believed 
the site to be safe, but that in an emergency there would be no time to evacuate (Malešič et 
al., 2015). This study using a hypothetical scenario found a similar trend of low concern in 
residents living nearby to a nuclear plant (for example, see Prince-Embury, 1991, above), 
though scored poorly for internal consistency and reporting in quality assessment. 
Mixed evidence was found for predictors of evacuation and sheltering preparedness in two 
further studies of hypothetical incidents, with preparedness being associated with having 
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children under 18 years, whilst barriers to preparedness included denial of a threat existing, 
unwillingness to follow instructions and feeling unable to plan for the unknown (fatalism) 
(Guterbock et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2005). Notably, Guterbock’s study scored considerably 
more highly for internal validity and adequate adjusting for confounders. 
Collection and potential use of stable iodine was explored solely in studies of nuclear facility 
leak preparedness measures. One study found only 5% of almost 80,000 people living within 
ten miles of three Michigan nuclear power plants collected free iodine via a voucher system 
(Zwolinski et al., 2012). Non-collectors in this study had planned for a nuclear plant emergency 
to a lesser extent than collectors. Stated reasons for collection included preparedness (58%), 
safety (18%), the fact that it was free (14%), and because it was recommended (13%), though 
it should be noted that this is based on a small section of the sample. Reasons for non-
collection included lack of awareness of its availability (36%), not receiving a voucher (12%), 
being ‘uninterested’ (7%) and feeling it unnecessary (4%). In an experiment, no difference was 
found between a standard nuclear safety leaflet and one supplemented with extra information 
about state-level preparedness in terms of how frequently they were kept or read by 
households which received them (Hellier et al., 2014). This was the only included study to 
conduct a randomised controlled trial on nuclear-safety information preferences, so no 
comparison data is available. The high quality of this research allows for some confidence in 
drawing conclusions however. 
2.3.4.3. Adherence to evacuation recommendations 
Two studies (Guterbock et al., 2010; Nasar and Greenberg, 1984) of hypothetical evacuation 
behaviour found that pre-incident warnings of an impending nuclear attack would prompt 66% 
of the affected population to leave, rising to 73% if warnings intensified such as via presidential 
message (Nasar and Greenberg, 1984), in contrast to 18%-19% for a radiological dispersal 
device attack, rising to 24% if warned by a ‘top local official’ (Guterbock et al., 2010). We might 
place more confidence in the outcomes of the higher quality scoring Guterbock study. 
Nonetheless, significantly fewer were suggested would evacuate if they learnt an actual attack 
was in progress (Nasar and Greenberg, 1984).  
2.3.5. Predictors of behaviour immediately following a radiation emergency 
23 studies tested factors associated with post-incident behaviour (see Appendix B, Table B3). 
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2.3.5.1. Information seeking 
Among British nationals living near Fukushima, uncertainty about exposure to radiation or its 
hidden effects was found to cause distress and anxiety which were in-turn associated with 
heightened information-seeking behaviour (Rubin et al., 2012). Though it was the only 
included study exploring post-incident mental health effects and subsequent information 
seeking, it was amongst the highest scoring for quality. 
2.3.5.2. Adherence to evacuation recommendations 
The leak at Three Mile Island resulted in self-evacuation of 54% of the entire local population 
following an advisory that pregnant women and children should leave (Cutter and Barnes, 
1982). Self-evacuees were more likely than those who remained to have attained high school 
education and be parents (Prince-Embury, 1992ii). There is varying quality amongst studies of 
Three Mile Island-related behaviour, though consistency in outcomes is apparent among them, 
other than the effect of proximity to a nuclear plant and its influence on evacuation behaviour, 
as outlined below. 
The likelihood of evacuating during the TMI disaster decreased with age, increased with 
household size, and a significant association existed between behaviour and behaviour of 
neighbours. Stated reasons for evacuating were having received the advisory to do so (68%), 
fear of harm (46%), confusion (41%) and anticipation of a broader evacuation order with 
associated problems such as traffic gridlock (8%) (Cutter and Barnes, 1982). Three lower 
quality studies noted situational danger (cited by 30% (Perry, 1983) and 91% (Perry, 1981)) or 
concerns around forced evacuation (14% (Perry, 1983); 68% (Houts et al., 1980); 76% (Perry, 
1981)) as reasons for self-evacuation. Reasons for non-evacuation were low perception of 
danger, fear of looting, waiting for an order for the general public to evacuate and believing 
oneself to be at a safe distance (Cutter and Barnes, 1982; Houts et al., 1980; Perry, 1981; 
1983). Receiving conflicting reports was cited as both a reason to, and not to evacuate (Houts 
et al., 1980). Conflicting evidence exists as to whether close proximity to a nuclear power plant 
promotes or deters evacuation (TMI disaster: Miller, 1981; hypothetical scenarios: Pheby and 
Robinson, 1990; Zeigler and Johnson, 2010). Two reasonably robust papers and a third less so 
found actual (from Fukushima (Kanda et al., 2013iii)) and anticipated (Zeigler and Johnson, 
2010) evacuees were more likely to be families with children under 19 and internet users 
(Kanda et al., 2013ii), also surveyed following the Fukushima disaster. 
Similar findings have been reported in studies assessing intended evacuation in hypothetical 
scenarios involving deliberate attacks. Here, factors promoting anticipated evacuation have 
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included: official announcements, news coverage, having children under 18 (Nasar and 
Greenberg, 1984) perceived likelihood of harm (Gerber et al., 2006) and following the actual 
TMI disaster disruption to telephone services (Miller, 1981). A majority of parents (55%) 
reported they would attempt to collect children from school during an incident even if 
knowledgeable about school evacuation plans and their children’s location (Nasar and 
Greenberg, 1984). 
2.3.5.3. Adherence to sheltering recommendations 
Participants in three qualitative studies regarding hypothetical radiation attacks (two of high 
quality and concerning radiological dispersal device detonation) found sheltering 
recommendations counterintuitive, reducing their likelihood of adherence (Bass et al., 2015; 
Oak Ridge, 2011; Rogers et al., 2013). Trust in information source, perception and knowledge 
of the issue, checking information with trusted others (such as family and friends), family 
needs (Bass et al., 2015) and receiving a leaflet which included decontamination information 
(Rogers et al., 2013) tended to increase adherence. A fourth study noted reduced adherence 
to anticipated sheltering in ethnic minority groups following a deliberate attack due to a desire 
to gather the family together before attempting to evacuate (Becker, 2004). Confidence can be 
placed in these findings; each study being of particularly high quality.  
Studies using quantitative methods found 8% of the population within 50 miles of a nuclear 
power plant (hypothetical scenario: Nyaku et al., 2014), 23% within 20km (preparedness 
communications evaluation: Van Bladel et al., 2000) and 33% in the US capital region (TMI: 
Miller, 1981) were unlikely to comply with sheltering instructions in a nuclear emergency (the 
differences in outcomes perhaps explained by the low quality reporting and internal validity 
assessed in each of these studies); 11% (Lasker, 2004) to 15.5% (Williams et al., 2005) in 
hypothetical radiological dispersal device incidents. More positively, this suggests a reasonably 
good level of compliance overall, although in this context, even a low percentage of the 
population not complying might translate into a large absolute number of deaths. Six studies 
(Guterbock et al., 2010; Lasker, 2004; Malešič et al., 2015; Nyaku et al., 2014; Van Bladel et al., 
2000; Williams et al., 2005), three of high quality (Guterbock et al., 2010; Lasker, 2004; 
Williams et al., 2005), found prioritising collection or checking on children or other family 
members was a primary reason for non-adherence in both hypothetical nuclear accident and 
deliberate attack scenarios. Anticipated adherence would increase if people were able to 
communicate with, or know that loved ones were safe (Lasker, 2004) or if they believed that 
food and water would be delivered to shelters (Guterbock et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2005) in 
scenarios involving a deliberate attack. Further reasons for non-adherence with sheltering 
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advice in both scenario types were low confidence or trust that community or government 
preparedness planning had been conducted effectively, feeling safer elsewhere, and to get 
supplies (Lasker, 2004; Miller, 1981; Nyaku et al., 2014). Two studies of radiological dispersal 
device detonation response (Lasker, 2004; Williams et al., 2005) found adherence with 
sheltering recommendations was predicted by community attachment, being over 65 and 
trusting the information source to provide accurate information. Adherence with sheltering-at-
work was 39% (Williams et al., 2005) and was higher in those aware of their building’s 
sheltering arrangements or those confident in their community’s ability to manage a 
radiological dispersal device attack (Guterbock et al., 2010). 
2.3.6. Preferences for information in the event of a radiation incident   
26 studies examined information preferences (see Appendix B, Table B4). 
2.3.6.1. Information seeking 
Choice of information method and source Two studies explored preferred hypothetical pre-
incident information distribution method, finding leaflets to be preferred by 62% of residents 
within 3km of a nuclear power plant (Malešič et al., 2015) and that residents of the US capitol 
region preferred local television and radio (25% and 21% respectively), general internet 
searching (28%) and family/friends (24%/21%) for radiological dispersal device information 
(Guterbock et al., 2010). 
Two high quality focus group studies found preferred information methods and sources during 
a hypothetical nuclear attack would be the media (television/radio), internet, national level 
experts, word of mouth, emergency broadcast systems and local authorities (Becker, 2004), 
while young males would also seek out their peers (Bass et al., 2015). 
Seven further studies explored sources during a radiation emergency using quantitative 
methods; high quality reports found friends or family, first responders (Taylor et al., 2011),  
internet news/government websites (Williams et al., 2005) in hypothetical scenarios and local 
or national media (Vyncke et al., 2016) during the actual Fukushima disaster were preferred. 
These findings are supported by four less robust surveys of both hypothetical and actual 
events (Carini, 2011; Kanda et al., 2013i; Nyaku et al., 2014; Radiological Threat Awareness 
Coalition, 2008). In a hypothetical radiological dispersal device emergency television network 
news and news or government websites were preferred; while social media, healthcare 
providers and the CDC were preferred by fewer than 2% (Guterbock et al., 2010). 
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Pre-incident nuclear information was found to be confusing and unclear in two studies (using 
focus groups (Becker, 2004) and an experimental design (Hellier et al., 2014)). For example, 
participants did not fully understand the terms, ‘shelter-in-place’ and ‘plume’. In one 
experiment with low-literacy ability individuals, the participants were randomly assigned to an 
intervention group in which they received a literacy-appropriate aid or to a control group in 
who received a CDC factsheet. A questionnaire tested understanding of the material which 
was compared across groups related to gaze patterns and time spent reading as well as 
perceived confidence in understanding (such as how to respond in a dirty bomb scenario) and 
subsequent intended behaviour. Higher confidence in understanding terms, how to respond 
and perceived ability to carry out instructions was seen in those with the very lowest literacy in 
the intervention group (Bass et al., 2016i).  In a second RCT, participants were presented with 
either the original nuclear safety information leaflet or a trial leaflet developed following an 
RCT examining preferences for information content. Pre-test memory for and understanding of 
nuclear safety information were assessed. The dependent variables tested were intention to 
act in relation to safety advice, self-reported understanding of the information presented, 
leaflet preference as well as memory being assessed again at the study period and following 
the study. The trial leaflet was found to be preferred by residents of homes within 2km of a UK 
nuclear power plant due to greater ease of understanding, being more informative, offering a 
pin-up summary, and using preferred pictures and layout (Hellier et al., 2014). Studies using 
focus groups and hypothetical radiological dispersal device scenarios found leaflet length, 
density and complexity, lack of illustrations, accessibility for disabilities (Pearce et al., 2013) 
and recommendations without explanation (Rogers et al., 2013) to be criticisms, whilst a live 
voice delivering messages was preferred to a recording during a hypothetical incident (Oak 
Ridge, 2011). 
Preferences for information content In hypothetical pre-incident scenarios 77% of the US public 
expressed interest in knowing government and community radiological dispersal device 
response plans (Lasker, 2004) whilst 77% of participants presented with a scenario in which 
radiological materials were found in possession of terrorists would seek health-related 
information (Pearce et al., 2013). 
After the incident at Three Mile Island (Cutter and Barnes, 1982), some residents (number not 
reported) sought information on impact, while British nationals in Japan made requests for 
consistency in information across communicators, clarity regarding safety concerns and regular 
updates during the Fukushima disaster (Rubin et al., 2012). In a hypothetical nuclear 
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emergency, guidance on countermeasures and food safety would be sought by 86% of Italian 
respondents (Carini, 2011). 
One focus group study using a hypothetical radiological dispersal device emergency found 
desired information to include protective actions according to distance from the site of the 
incident, water and food contamination risk and actions of authorities (Rogers et al., 2013). 
2.3.6.2. Perceived credibility of information source  
Multiple studies explored trust and credibility in hypothetical radiation disasters. Their results 
varied: UK non-governmental sources (Pearce et al., 2013), scientists (also rated most 
competent alongside authorities (Latré et al., 2018)) and the US President (Guterbock et al., 
2010) all tended to be rated as most trustworthy, followed by local public health departments 
(Nyaku et al., 2014) and national news/media (Radiological Threat Awareness Coalition, 2008; 
Williams et al., 2005). Least trusted to provide honest and accurate information were US 
national media and local (US) authorities (Bass et al., 2015; Guterbock et al., 2010), nuclear 
industry (Latré et al., 2018), local religious leaders and government (Radiological Threat 
Awareness Coalition, 2008; Williams et al., 2005). 
In general, increased trust in the advice itself was associated with consistency between 
messengers and messaging from authorities, such as expert medical advice (Rogers et al., 
2013), whilst perceived reliability was associated with the use of basic terminology during the 
TMI disaster (Prince-Embury, 1992i), and increased confidence with recommended protective 
actions having been proven effective in a hypothetical scenario (Becker, 2004). A series of 
studies demonstrated that acceptance of information during an actual radiation leak was 
predicted by one’s level of agent-specific knowledge, trust in the message source (Murakami 
et al., 2016; Perko et al., 2012), whether the disaster is assumed to have low potential to cause 
personal harm and being from a directly affected population (Perko et al., 2014). 
Regarding information preferences of different subgroups, in one particularly high scoring 
study using communication materials, Bass (2016ii) found low literacy (mostly ethnic minority) 
survey respondents fell into three categories based on their perceptions of information 
sources and anticipated adherence to recommendations: those most likely to trust that 
information is accurate and to adhere to sheltering instructions despite believing that 
authorities are unlikely to provide them with the same level of support as they do others; 
those least likely to adhere or prepare out of distrust in authorities as a source, and their 




2.3.7. Theoretical Domains Framework 
I used the Theoretical Domains Framework to help analyse the review outcomes and as a tool 
to inform the topic guide for the next phase of this study which was based on qualitative 
research using focus groups. Table 2.4 shows the final ranking of each of the 14 domains of the 
Theoretical Domains Framework based on the outcomes of this review. The table includes the 
number of studies that refer to each of the domains. 
Table 2.4. Ranking of TDF domain frequency in systematic review outcomes 
Rank Domain Number of studies 
referring to domain 
1 Memory, attention and decision processes 38 
2 Social / professional role identity 30 
3 Knowledge 23 
4 Beliefs about consequences 18 
5 Emotion 15 
6 Environmental context and resources 14 
7 Beliefs about capabilities 9 
8 Social influences 7 
9 Intentions 2 
10 Reinforcement 2 
11 Behavioural regulation 1 
12 Goals 1 
13 Optimism 1 
14 Skills 0 
 
2.4. Discussion  
How the public would behave immediately following a catastrophic nuclear or radiological 
incident is uncertain. For example, in a hypothetical radiological dispersal device or nuclear 
scenario most people in the US capital region report that they would shelter-at-home or in 
their workplace (Guterbock et al., 2010; Miller, 1981). In contrast, actual nuclear incidents have 
seen self-evacuation to be common, particularly among those receiving information felt to be 
confusing or unclear (Becker, 2004; Cutter and Barnes, 1982). Further complicating factors 
highlighted in this review is the issue of cultural differences as a potential influence on 
adherence, particularly since the two actual nuclear plant meltdown scenarios from which 
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adherence data was collected came from eastern (Fukushima) and western (TMI) locations.  
Though the literature of cultural differences in CBRN response is limited, insights may come 
from studies of health-regime compliance in which only ‘superficial’ difference (Oh, 2013) is 
found in adherence rates, although adherence is found to improve when the source of medical 
information (such as the general practitioner) is felt to be culturally competent (Nilchaikovit et 
al., 1993; Ohana and Mash, 2015). Exploration of adherence across cultures in response to risk 
communication by Harro-Loit and colleagues (2012) found adherence following events 
including a hypothetical nuclear disaster to be dependent more on emotional, 
proximate/distal and knowledge-based experience which are influenced by cultural 
background. Where differences are found to exist, it is not in terms of overall adherence rates, 
but instead in consistency, wherein more individualistic participants who undertook a short 
survey showed stronger consistency when later asked to complete a longer survey than more 
collectivistically oriented participants (Petrova et al., 2007). Finally, and relating directly to 
terror attack response, no difference was found across cultures in individuals affected by the 
World Trade Centre attacks of 2001 (Walker & Chestnut, 2003). Given the likely link between 
behaviour and the overall health effects of a nuclear incident, this reinforces the suggestion in 
Chapter 1 that encouraging protective behaviours should be a priority. The public’s willingness 
to engage in protective behaviours in the event of a nuclear disaster will be explored in 
subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
Encouragingly, rates of information seeking suggest a desire amongst the public to learn 
protective actions (Becker, 2004; Carini, 2011; Lasker, 2004; Lee and Lemyre, 2009; Pearce et 
al., 2013; Rogers et al., 2013). This includes a wish to understand pragmatic issues, many of 
which could only be addressed after the specifics of an incident are understood. Some aspects 
could be addressed prior to any incident, however. In particular, one study of public 
communication around nuclear power plant emergencies suggest that participants had a 
desire to better understand risk (such as of the event happening) (Cutter and Barnes, 1982) 
whilst regarding a deliberate attack there was a clear desire to understand the threat (such as 
the likelihood of harm coming to those not directly affected) (Rubin et al., 2012). Immediately 
following the Fukushima emergency, for example, more than one-third of questions posed 
over the internet sought radiation-related knowledge (Ohno and Endo, 2015). 
Yet are the public receptive to messages about radiation or protective behaviour in advance of 
an incident occurring? As we saw in Chapter 1, theories surrounding the uptake of protective 
behaviour in other contexts suggest that certain pre-requisites may be required before 
messages are attended to or acted on. These include perceived threat and a perception that 
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the recommended behaviour may be effective (e.g. Lee and Lemyre, 2009). In the absence of 
such conditions, information campaigns may be ignored or quickly forgotten (Rubin et al., 
2005). In contrast, public information campaigns can increase knowledge (Bass et al., 2016i; 
Železnik and Perko, 2012), which may increase receptivity to future messages when a threat 
becomes more apparent (Perko et al., 2012). Certainly, in the literature I have reviewed, 
perception of risk appears to be an important predictor of behaviour. While there is literature 
in the health behaviour field to suggest that perceived risk and subsequent behaviour are not 
necessarily linear (e.g. Deese et al., 2018), in this review it appears that there is an influence of 
risk perception on: acceptance of messages (Perko, 2014), taking preparatory measures (fewer 
in those with high radiation risk perception: Malešič et al., 2015), self-evacuation (Gerber et 
al., 2006) and information seeking (Pearce et al., 2013). Communicating with the public while 
perceptions of risk are low may result in messages being ignored. Nonetheless, if pre-incident 
communication is to be used, these results do offer guidance regarding what information 
should be given and how it should be conveyed. 
2.4.1. Source and Method 
A trend for greater preference for traditional media sources exists for pre-incident information 
relating to nuclear power plant emergency preparedness than for attack scenarios, whereas a 
small number of reasonably good quality studies found that more would seek information 
using the internet if an attack were to occur. However, the shift towards public preparedness 
against catastrophic terror in the risk communication literature, precipitated by the World 
Trade Centre attacks in 2001 coincided with the rise of the internet and social media. We 
might therefore predict this to be a stronger trend than is evident in this review. 
Changes over time in communication technology inevitably raise questions about applicability 
of older findings to the current context. Nonetheless the general point raised by many studies 
would seem to remain true: people will seek information from sources they trust. To build 
upon this, the synthesis of studies examining trust in this review show that there is an 
interaction between a trusted source of information and trust that the message is accurate in 
terms of recommended actions. Providing information from sources that are most trusted will 
mean information is more readily accepted and adherence to instructions more likely to occur. 
Receiving messages from trusted sources was highlighted in multiple studies, though opinions 
inevitably differed as to who is trusted. A comparison of sources (Latré et al., 2018) found 
government authorities were viewed as most credible (and were a preferred pre-incident 
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source: Carini et al., 2011; Guterbock et al., 2010; Kanda et al., 2013i; Nyaku et al., 2014; 
Radiological Threat Awareness Coalition, 2008; Williams et al., 2005), although scientists were 
considered more trustworthy than authorities and nuclear industry, and equally competent as 
nuclear industry. The nuclear industry, despite being perhaps best placed to provide 
information regarding radiation safety, appear least trusted to do so. If an incident were to 
occur, the public also want to hear from sources with knowledge particular to them and their 
area, such as local media, local authorities or friends and family. This suggests a primary 
concern in knowing how personally affected they might be as opposed to the national 
situation. 
Given this heterogeneity, perhaps the best that can be recommended is the old adage of 
multiple sources speaking with one voice (e.g. IAEA, 2012); having messages endorsed by 
multiple experts and agencies increases the chances of them being accepted. In today’s media 
climate this approach may be difficult to achieve. In many instances, the media actively seek 
out opposing views (Smith, 2005), oftentimes subjective in nature (Prezelj, 2016), which 
increases distrust of scientists and public health messages (Mythen, 2004). The finding that 
scientists appearing on national media lost credibility (Pearce et al., 2013) highlights this point. 
This is interesting as Pearce studied preferences across samples from two separate, though 
both Western, countries (The UK and Germany). It is perhaps unrealistic to expect one-voice 
communication to occur in an incident of this nature. The 2018 false alert of a nuclear attack in 
Hawai’i is an example in which the authoritative voice was one of many and was arguably lost 
amongst social media feeds. 
Prezelj et al (2016) found reporting of the Fukushima disaster in Europe received limited public 
information coordination, warning that failure to fully address these limitations is likely to 
result in ‘symbolic readiness’ and insufficient preparedness. Prezelj suggests that the ‘one-
voice’ approach such as that presented in IAEA guidelines (2013ii) offers false expectations of 
the effectiveness of future nuclear risk communication in which the IAEA would be one of 
many voices. This perhaps supports the apparent need for corroboration of information from 
peers as was found in one study conducted in the US (Bass et al., 2015). Ideally, different 
endorsements are needed for different groups. For example, one high quality study (Bass et 
al., 2015) conducted with low-income residents of urban areas found most trust in local media 




2.4.2. Content and format 
Two experiments were included in this review both of which found clarity and ease of 
understanding were commonly requested both pre- and during incident messaging. This was a 
pressing concern among low literacy individuals who might require decision-aided materials; 
that is information visually designed to be information appropriate in content while fitting the 
existing perceptual maps of participants and is intended to improve knowledge of actions and 
intention to adhere to sheltering instructions (Bass et al., 2016i). The need for clear messages 
was also expressed within the wider public. Consistency in messages within and across sources 
is also desirable and associated with adherence to recommendations (Bass et al., 2015; Perry, 
1981; 1983). Inevitably, much more information is desired immediately following an incident 
than pre-incident, relating to issues such as food and water contamination (Carini, 2011), 
actions of authorities and recommendations specific to where the individual is at that time 
(Rogers et al., 2013), as well as regarding the likelihood of further attacks (Pearce et al., 2013). 
The other experiment, a study of the effectiveness of a pre-incident communications leaflet 
(Hellier et al., 2014) found advisories best recalled were arguably those with the most personal 
impact on the recipient, such as not collecting children from school and not using mobile 
phones. Instructions less well recalled (e.g. to take stable iodine if told to) are perhaps 
considered out-of-the-ordinary in terms of activities undertaken regularly, or are ones not 
previously considered. Other criticisms of leaflets such as excessive length, density and 
complexity, lack of illustrations, accessibility issues for disabilities and recommendations 
backed up by facts without explanations represent potential barriers to the reception of 
information; however, whilst recall of certain advisories increased with a developed leaflet, no 
significant difference in intended adherence or understanding was found. 
Several instances of apparent fatalism hindering the likely uptake of messages were found. For 
example, many individuals living close to a nuclear power plant felt that preparing for an 
emergency was not worthwhile since they would not have time to evacuate (Malešič et al., 
2015) and were disinterested in collecting free stable iodine (Zwolinski et al., 2012). These 
findings, in non-UK population samples would benefit from further exploration in providing 
more robust evidence for desire and preferences in pre-nuclear incident communications in 
the UK. For example, the early 2020 Covid-19 pandemic has shown that the public’s willingness 
to change behaviour in the face of potentially existential crisis may be underestimated and 
even be more a question of opportunity to adhere, not necessarily motivation (e.g. Webster et 
al., 2020) However, based on the outcomes of this review it appears that to encourage 
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preparedness, pre-incident communications should provide information regarding the efficacy 
of the suggested behaviour. This may require a degree of education about the nature of 
radiation, the mechanism underlying the benefits of stable iodine, conditions under which 
evacuation or sheltering would be appropriate and how people might be informed as to which 
action is recommended depending on the nature of the incident. 
Greater detail in communications regarding the processes that survivors who are exposed to 
radiation might experience, such as an explanation of decontamination procedures (Rogers et 
al., 2013), may increase adherence. Adherence to recommendations will likely increase if the 
public can be reassured, for example, that food and water can be delivered to them whilst 
sheltering (Pheby and Robinson, 1990) or that they can be evacuated to somewhere where 
support will be offered. This extends to psychological support (Malešič et al., 2015). 
In addition to neighbours and friends influencing behavioural responses, with individuals 
looking to the actions of others to inform their own decisions, family needs are fundamental in 
shaping actions. Several studies (Cutter and Barnes, 1982; Gerber et al., 2006; Guterbock et al., 
2010; Lasker, 2004; Nasar and Greenberg, 1984; Perry, 1983; Rogers et al., 2013; Van Bladel et 
al., 2000) identified a desire to collect children from school and make contact with loved ones, 
even at the expense of increasing exposure to radioactive material. This latter phenomenon 
has been observed in previous non-radiological incidents (Rubin et al., 2005) and must be 
addressed in pre-incident communications, perhaps by providing parents with information on 
the responsibilities and emergency plans of schools for protecting children. 
2.4.3. Gaps in understanding 
Gaps emerged from the literature that appear central to our understanding of effective public 
communication in the pre-incident phase. One gap relates to use of social media in radiation 
emergency communications. Social media is likely used by a large number who would choose 
the internet as a source and method of information gathering following an incident. It is 
unclear at this stage to what extent social media could be used to disseminate and promote 
pre-incident public education for radiological and nuclear emergencies. Secondly, more data is 
needed on how different information sources can foster trust in the public. Trust is central to 
whether information is accepted and recommended actions adhered to. Previous studies have 




The longer-term impact of any information campaign is a third key knowledge gap. Hopefully, 
any pre-event messages that are disseminated will never need to be used. However, 
maintaining knowledge over time is important. To date, studies have generally only focused on 
the immediate impact of messages. Whether messages about high impact events which later 
do not come to pass have a wider, detrimental, effect on the credibility of future messages on 
related issues is also unknown (Rubin et al., 2015). This presents a challenge for 
communicators, and the frequency with which messages need to be repeated and reinforced 
is an area worthy of further investigation. 
Whilst this review provided evidence for what factors influence behaviour (actual or 
anticipated), we are, of course, constrained by what the existing literature tells us. In 
considering theoretical drivers for behaviour in the context of the TDF we find that the 
literature provides little or no evidence for the impact of intentions, reinforcement, 
behavioural regulation, goals, optimism or skills as is shown in Table 2.4. In future these 
domains of behavioural motivation might benefit from being studied, however they will not be 
focussed on in this thesis. This table is intended to be used as a guide in the development of 
materials for the first phase of original data collection in this PhD: focus groups with members 
of the public. Particularly, the review data will aid in the development of a topic guide for 
discussion. For example, predictors most commonly found in the previous literature to present 
barriers to message engagement, preparedness or adherence can be probed for reasons why, 
and for ways in which such barriers might be overcome.  
Finally, this review highlights the apparent narratives of nuclear disaster preparedness and the 
importance of adding to the public discourse and societal representations, or mental models, 
of such emergencies. This will help the public to become more informed and importantly, 
better able to prepare for nuclear disasters. 
2.4.4. Limitations 
Relatively few studies included in this review provided evidence about actual behaviour. Those 
that were available often suffered from methodological deficits, possibly related to their 
reactive nature and the need to begin research promptly during the immediate period 
following an emergency. It was therefore necessary to include anticipated behavioural 
responses from hypothetical scenarios in drawing conclusions. Arguably, studies using 
hypothetical scenarios are flawed: how can members of the public be expected to know how 
they would react or what information they would want in such extreme circumstances? A 
possible counter to this flaw is that many of the studies used well researched and realistic 
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scenarios such as those based on modelling and plume calculations in their studies; yet the 
difference between viewing a news report of a real attack taking place versus watching it from 
the comfort of a focus group is inescapable. In exploring anticipated adherence and 
information needs in a radiation emergency, hypothetical studies make up the majority of 
research in this area. Though the methodological quality of hypothetical scenario studies in 
this review was stronger than that of studies from actual events in most instances, this 
limitation must be considered in the interpretation of results. 
The following questions were excluded from quality assessment using Downs and Black’s 
checklist: Have all important adverse events that may be a consequence of the intervention 
been reported?; Have the characteristics of patients lost to follow-up been described?; Were 
the staff, places, and facilities where the patients were treated, representative of the treatment 
the majority of patients receive?; Was an attempt made to blind study subjects to the 
intervention they have received?; Was an attempt made to blind those measuring the main 
outcomes of the intervention?; In trials and cohort studies, do the analyses adjust for different 
lengths of follow-up of patients, or in case-control studies, is the time period between the 
intervention and outcome the same for cases and controls?; Was compliance with the 
intervention/s reliable?; Were study subjects randomized to intervention groups?; Were losses 
of patients to follow-up taken into account? These questions were excluded from quality 
appraisal as it was found from conducting the appraisal that studies were consistently scoring 
0 for each. It was assessed therefore that these questions were not appropriate to the nature 
of the studies included in this review. I am confident therefore that the scoring of the included 
studies would remain consistent with or without the inclusion of these questions. It was 
deemed appropriate to take this approach as the original publication of this checklist stated 
that ‘Most of the questions could be asked of any analytical study of any health care 
intervention…. (some) were inevitably topic sensitive and had to be customised’. Furthermore, 
a number of studies have modified this checklist to meet the aspects of studies included in 
their own systematic reviews. Despite these adaptations, I felt that use of Down’s and Black’s 
quality checklist remained justified as it has been identified in Deeks et al (2003) as amongst 
the most highly rated tools (in a sample of 213 tools) for quality assessment of both 
randomised and non-randomised research designs, meeting most of Deeks’ criteria for internal 
and external validity. In addition, the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination Guidance for 
Undertaking Reviews in Healthcare (2009) found Downs and Black’s checklist to be one of only 
3 (out of 200 reviewed) to be suitable for quality assessment of studies using a cross-sectional 
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design  and to ‘(have) been extensively validated’ in Systematic Reviews in the Social Sciences: 
A Practical Guide By Mark Petticrew, Helen Roberts (2006). 
One observation of study quality was the absence of effect sizes reported for some studies 
using quantitative methods. This made comparison between study outcomes difficult, allowing 
me to judge only whether findings were generally in the same direction. Future research in this 
area should address this to ensure direct comparison can be made between populations. 
The literature would also benefit from variation in the populations studied: few studies 
explored information preferences across populations with potentially differing information 
needs. In addition, few studies used mixed methods; meaning information gathered regarding 
potential predictors of behaviour by use of one method (such as using focus groups) were not 
explored further in terms of strength of predictors.  
Resource availability meant that I could only include studies published in English. There are 
likely to be studies conducted in other countries that have experienced nuclear incidents or a 
nuclear threat (e.g. Japan and South Korea) where efforts to prepare the public have been 
ongoing for some time. A recent study of ecological meta-analyses found that including only 
English language studies caused a bias in analyses due to differences in study characteristics 
and effect-size estimates (Konno et al., 2020). It could be argued that if non-English abstracts 
were found to be highly relevant through automatic translation apps, it would have been 
appropriate to translate those articles to gain additional insight. A future review should seek to 
identify studies published in languages other than English, focusing particularly on countries 
that have been observed to implement pre-incident public information campaigns. In this 
review, only two studies were excluded following initial key-word search on the basis of 
language. 
Finally, no formal double checking of included studies was undertaken and so no kappa score 
was calculated. 
2.4.5. Recommendations based on the findings of this review 
Several practical implications can be drawn from this review. Whilst these are outlined below, I 
will return to these recommendations in the final discussion chapter of this thesis and update 
them in line with the new insights generated by the studies presented in Chapters 3 to 5. 
• Perceived risk was found in many studies to differ across populations. Pre-incident 
communication regarding preparedness actions should therefore be targeted at the 
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recipient population (i.e. residents close to a nuclear power plant should receive 
advice regarding stable iodine collection and use) 
• Studies that explored understanding of terminology and recommended actions found 
the public to vary in their comprehension of terms used. Therefore, advisories as to 
potential actions (evacuation; shelter-in-place) should include details as to how 
individuals can find out which action is most suitable to them (such as based on their 
location to the emergency), and who they can expect to give this information 
• Low trust in information sources or in the efficacy of protective actions was often 
found to result in poor (anticipated) adherence. Information regarding recommended 
actions should clearly explain reasons why these might be advised, including the 
circumstance under which there might be a danger in non-adherence 
• According to the studies in this review, preferred methods of distribution are likely to 
differ: pre-incident information will benefit from being accessible in the public’s own 
time such as leaflet, letter or website information, whereas information distributed 
during an incident are likely to involve a preference for internet communications  
• Information seeking was found to be common amongst the public in radiation 
emergencies which present fear-inducing and uncertain circumstances. Information 
should minimise uncertainty in the public by outlining frequently requested 
information including exposure effects (means of contamination; symptoms), 
protective actions to take and the length of time people may potentially be required to 
shelter 
• One major study found that groups with low-literacy skills are at risk of harm due to 
not understanding information presented to them. Pre-incident information should 
include links to further information including low-literacy aided and preferred 
language materials 
• Basic terminology should be used in all communications to minimise misunderstanding 
amongst all recipients 
• In studies that explored it, a desire to be with or collect loved ones, particularly 
children, was expressed amongst parents. Information should specifically address the 
impact on families/children such as protective actions for parents/caregivers to take, 
actions to take if children are at school in an incident and health effects for children 
• To address a common point of uncertainty expressed in the included studies, food and 
water contamination should be addressed in communications including what could 
safely be consumed 
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• Studies have shown no clear preference amongst the public for a particular source to 
communicate pre-incident preparedness materials. Therefore, combined sources may 
be used in presenting information: for example, messages presented by recognised 
government officials should cite health protection agencies and/or nuclear industry 
sources 
• However, where multiple sources make information available, a consistent message 
must be relayed to promote trust in communicators 
• Studies found that communications will not be engaged with in the pre-incident period 
by many who are instead more likely to engage during an emergency, or information 
will be forgotten when required. Therefore, information presented in the event of a 
radiation emergency should echo information presented pre-incident with reassurance 
given that if pre-incident communications were not received or have been forgotten 
that there are ways of accessing them still (if opportunity allows) 
2.5. Conclusion 
This review highlights factors that could increase engagement with key messages and promote 
the uptake of protective behaviours and emergency interventions that will save lives in the 
unlikely event of a catastrophic radiation emergency. The first step in achieving this would be 
additional research in the UK to explore preferences amongst the public for pre-incident 
communications regarding nuclear emergency preparedness. Without consideration of best 
practice in such communications, a catastrophic incident could become worse than we 
currently fear; it is essential that further research and planning for how the public should be 
informed of protective actions in the event of a nuclear emergency is undertaken; this is the 






Chapter 3: What do the UK public want to know about nuclear catastrophe 
preparedness? A focus group study 
The systematic review detailed in the previous chapter has highlighted a number of 
recommendations as to how communications might be delivered to the public before and at 
the time of a disaster involving radiation. It also has provided an insight into how the public 
might behave in such incidents. Building on this knowledge, this chapter will detail a series of 
focus groups conducted with members of the public to explore how pre-nuclear incident 
communications might be most effective in eliciting preparedness and desired behavioural 
response. The groups were designed to further refine the findings of the review but to also 
develop our understanding of the underpinning psychological frameworks that drive 
motivation towards preparedness and adherence to recommended protective actions. Specific 
areas that these groups aimed to address included: what the perceived risk of a nuclear attack 
is among the public (and whether this motivates a desire to receive pre-nuclear incident 
information); what UK-based sources are preferred to communicate preparedness information 
(a wide and inconsistent range are reported in the literature); what specific information might 
be contained in messaging and; how it might be presented. 
3.1. Background 
3.1.1. Incidents and populations to study 
In the systematic review (Chapter 2) I showed that despite nuclear terror representing a 
catastrophic threat, there has been little research on how best to prepare the public. Studies 
involving the development of public communication materials have primarily explored 
preparation for smaller scale, ‘dirty bomb’ incidents  (e.g. Bass et al., 2015; Lasker, 2004; 
Pearce, et al., 2013; Rogers et al., 2013) though exceptions exist. Two such studies, both in the 
US, used focus groups to explore preferences amongst the public for information distributed 
only in the immediate aftermath of an improvised nuclear device attack (Becker, 2004; Oak 
Ridge Institute, 2011), not prior to it.  
Although agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have since 
developed materials (IAEA, 2014) for pre-incident information, there was no direct public 
contribution to their development. Certainly, no studies have used UK participants for this 
purpose. Nor is there publicly available evidence of focus groups having been conducted to 
identify public information needs in a nuclear emergency following an accidental release from 
a nuclear power plant, rather than deliberate attack.  
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These routes of potentially catastrophic radiation exposure possess differing characteristics. 
Each will likely have an immediate effect on different populations: nuclear plants are located 
away from large, urban areas, whereas a deliberate attack on the public using a nuclear device 
would more likely occur within an urban, densely populated area. Injury may occur via 
different means also. A deliberate attack would involve radiation dispersion coupled with an 
explosion; the blast effects would likely result in injury or death by way of smashed glass or 
overturned vehicles (e.g. Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). Blast effects, if occurring, would be 
unlikely to affect the public in a nuclear power plant radiation leak.  
In the systematic review, I found varying levels of anticipated adherence with protective 
instructions, high levels of information-seeking behaviours during a radiation emergency and a 
general lack of preparedness to have been previously reported among the public. 
Several factors were associated with these behaviours, which give some indication as to how a 
communication intervention to improve preparedness might best be designed. This includes: 
trust in the source of communications (Florig and Fischhoff, 2007; Lasker, 2004; Rogers et al., 
2007), found to influence source preference, and engagement with, and adherence to, 
instructions (Latré et al., 2017; Murakami, 2016; Perko et al., 2013; Rogers et al., 2013); the 
method by which information is distributed (e.g. social media/internet after an incident (Lee 
and Lemyre, 2009) or traditional media and leaflets pre-incident (Perry, 1981)); the content 
and format of messages, such as pin-up summaries, colour and images (Bass et al., 2016i; 
Hellier et al., 2014); perceptions as to the effectiveness of recommended actions (Rogers et al., 
2013; Taylor et al., 2011); risk perception (Gibson et al., 2007; Železnik and Perko, 2012); and 
attitude or belief of the recipient (e.g. fatalism (Nasar and Greenberg, 1984)). I also outlined 
how these outcomes map onto the Theoretical Domains Framework (illustrated by Table 2.4 in 
the review chapter and by tables in Appendix C). 
Whilst these findings offer important insights into the facilitators and barriers to acceptance 
and reception of nuclear preparedness communications, most literature reviewed in Chapter 2 
was not specific to the UK population. In fact, reports of the UK public’s perception of nuclear 
risks and guidance regarding protective actions is sparse. Instead, UK-based studies of nuclear 
risk perception are largely focussed on issues surrounding the siting of nuclear plants (e.g. 
Grimston et al., 2014; Leonard and Thomas, 2017). 
There are some exceptions to this. In focus groups with UK residents presented with a dirty 
bomb detonation scenario followed up with a nationwide telephone survey, Pearce et al 
(2013) found perceived delays between exposure and health impacts and radiation 
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misperceptions (such as contamination methods) caused uncertainty, anxiety and behaviour 
change detrimental to public health efforts. Rogers et al (2013) used focus group findings to 
design dirty bomb preparedness materials which increased anticipated adherence to attend a 
treatment facility. Rubin et al (2012) explored psychological symptoms in UK nationals present 
in Japan during the Fukushima plant disaster of 2012. They found uncertainty, inability to rule 
out radiation exposure and receiving information from sources believed to lack credibility was 
associated with distress, anxiety and anger. Anticipated behaviour was examined by Pheby and 
Robinson (1990) who found many would ignore sheltering advice to self-evacuate whilst 
others reported no means or desire to evacuate. Only Hellier et al (2014) has published results 
of a study exploring communication with the UK public specifically for nuclear emergencies (in 
this case, for accidental plant leaks). They found low recall of safety advice with some 
improvement following distribution of a trial leaflet developed using existing guidelines for 
improving public communication. 
Given the lack of evidence as to how best to encourage preparedness and adherence to 
protective advice in the UK population, I used a series of qualitative focus groups in this study 
to collect data to provide the basis for a future information campaign.  
3.1.2. Research questions 
This study had the following broad objectives: 
1. (aligning with the first of the project aims) to identify possible predictors of behaviour in the 
preparedness and immediate stages of a nuclear emergency;  
2. (aligning with the second of the project aims) to identify what factors might promote 
engagement with pre-nuclear incident communications;  
3. (aligning with the second of the project aims) to identify the preferred pre-incident 
information distribution method among the public;  
4. (aligning with the second of the project aims) to identify factors that promote trust in the 
message and perceived source credibility. 
This research proceeded in two stages. First, I used public and patient involvement to test and 
refine the proposed study design. Second, I conducted eight focus groups with members of the 
public.  
Focus groups were chosen as a methodology since they produce data through interaction, 
appropriate to the social nature of this subject (Finch et al., 2014). Socially-driven factors such 
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as actions taken by neighbours (e.g. Prince-Embury, 1992) and seeking information from 
friends and family (e.g. Rogers et al., 2013) influence behaviour in the event of a radiation 
emergency. As Hydén and Bülow (2003) state, focus groups aid in our understanding of ‘how 
attitudes and opinions are created and sustained through interaction with others’. Murphy et 
al (1998) suggest that qualitative methods enable a fuller understanding of rationales (why), 
processes (how) and contexts (when), such that cannot easily be elicited by quantitative 
methodology. Though Murphy’s description concerns patients’ interactions with health care 
services, it is equally applicable to the aims of this study, intended to explore ‘why’ the public 
would require pre-incident information, ‘how’ they would prefer to receive information, and 
‘when’ it might be best received. 
3.2. Public Involvement 
3.2.1. Introduction and aim 
The UK’s National Institute for Health Research (NIHR, 2014) states that the public can 
contribute to research by, amongst other things, ‘offering advice as members of a project 
steering group, commenting on and developing research materials.’ Public involvement in 
research allows for the conducting of research ‘with’ or ‘by’ the public, rather than research 
that is ‘for’ or ‘about’ them. This also allows for identification of differences between public 
perspectives and those of health or social care professionals (NIHR, 2012). By actively giving 
voice to the public we might better understand what is important to them in research.  
Public involvement is the term that is used to describe researchers and members of the public 
working together to develop research which is relevant to public and patient need. Active 
involvement of the public can occur in any stage of the research process. Ethical approval for 
public involvement activities is not required (NIHR, 2014). Many organisations who undertake 
health research in the UK hold a pre-existing public panel who have agreed to be called upon 
to assist in these activities. 
Use of a public involvement group during the development of this study provided an 
opportunity to obtain feedback and guidance regarding the proposed procedure and materials. 
This was not considered a ‘pilot’ study as it contributed to the process of development of 
group materials. 
The objectives of using a public involvement group were: 
• To identify key priority points within the topic guide to be used in focus groups; 
• To test the suitability of the scenarios to be used; 
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• To ensure the timings of the group were accurate; 
• To receive feedback on my own moderation and facilitation techniques and; 
• To become further accustomed with the topic guide. 
3.2.2. Method 
3.2.2.1. Design  
The public involvement discussion took place on September 6th, 2017 at the Public Health 
England offices at Wellington House, Lambeth, close to London Waterloo railway station. 
Initial drafts of the scenarios and topic guide were used. 
3.2.2.2. Participants 
Public Health England (PHE) has an established public involvement database of individuals 
willing to assist the Emergency Preparedness and Response Department in research 
development activities, some with experience of focus group participation and public health 
matters, from which group members were drawn.  
Twenty-three individuals replied to an invitation e-mail sent to this database. Six participants 
were purposively selected to provide a wide-ranging demographic profile (two women and 
four men), with ages ranging from 20 to 75, who were of Asian British, Bangladeshi and White 
British ethnicities. Two reported having school age children.  
3.2.2.3. Materials 
Participants were provided with the following materials to review and comment on:  
• Study consent form and information sheet and; 
• Two draft scenarios. 
An ‘urban’ improvised nuclear device detonation scenario was provided, based on Scenario #1 
of the 15 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) national planning scenarios (DHS, 2005) and 
the FEMA Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation (FEMA, 2010). This has 
been checked for realism and scientific validity by experts in the field (e.g. Buddemeier & 
Dillon, 2009) and is widely employed in modelling scenarios (e.g. Buddemeier and Suski, 2015). 
The scenario was adapted for relevance to a UK audience. Participants were told to imagine 
that they had heard an explosion but not witnessed it directly, although a mushroom cloud is 
seen following the blast. This suggests a nuclear blast occurring several miles from the 
participant’s location. Detonation of a 10KT nuclear weapon outside London’s Waterloo 
Station would result in a damage radius of 2.5 miles. This would extend the reach of the blast 
radius to an area defined by FEMA as just outside of the moderate damage zone into the light 
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damage zone (FEMA, 2010). The estimated population within this defined area is 602,529 
people (Freemaptools, 2017). This scenario is in Appendix D. 
In the second scenario, participants were asked to imagine that they had heard of a ‘partial 
meltdown’ at an unspecified nuclear power plant over the radio. The scenario included some 
technical information specific to the incident and a sentence relaying recommended protective 
instructions. The scenario is also detailed in Appendix D. 
3.2.2.3.1. Topic Guide Design 
A topic guide was informed by the systematic review (Chapter 2) findings as outlined above, 
with additional items relating to the domains of the Theoretical Domains Framework (TDF) 
where relevant. Development was supported by supervisory and advisory teams who 
proposed additional points for discussion. This allowed for exploration of themes in the 
existing literature and knowledge gaps in increasing engagement with preparedness materials. 
Table 3.1 is an example question included in the topic guide. It shows that consideration was 
made of radiation disaster related factors identified in previous literature. In this case: 
information seeking and preparedness.  
Table 3.1. Example question from focus group topic guide with consideration of factors 










What do you think you would need to know prior to 
being alerted of this to help you protect yourself better? 
 
     Prompts: decision making regarding protective 
actions, factual information, where did the attack come 
from, who is/will be affected 
 







The full topic guide annotated with associated TDF domains is presented in Appendix E. 
Groups were required to discuss communication strategies (what information people might 
want; how they wish to receive it), and anticipated responses to receiving communications.  
Hypothetical questions were included to allow reflection upon whether certain new items of 
knowledge would increase or decrease message engagement or instruction adherence. This 
also allowed for challenging of social norms and consensus that may have developed amongst 
the group (the ‘norming’ stage; Tuckman and Jenson, 1977). For example, if consensus was 
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that evacuation would occur regardless of sheltering instructions, I asked whether receiving 
information about the benefits of sheltering might alter those intentions. Examples of these 
hypothetical questions included:  
“What if I told you that… 
….explosion damage will not extend more than 3 to 5 miles, but radioactive material in 
the air will travel further?” 
….overloading of the phone network can hinder aid. Would you still try to call people?” 
Topics within the discussion guide followed a logical order in which groups discussed 
anticipated responses following presentation of a scenario before entering greater depth in 
which specific items were discussed. Where necessary and because of time restrictions, I gave 
priority to those items most aligned to study aims. 
3.2.2.4. Procedure 
An advert was emailed to the PHE public involvement mailing list in August 2017. Selected 
participants were sent a copy of the study information sheet. On arrival participants were 
asked to complete consent and demographic data forms (Appendix F). 
The session was recorded using a voice recorder. Notes were taken by the facilitator and public 
involvement recruitment lead who was also present.  
The session began with an introduction to the group and research aims. Ground rules were 
also outlined (e.g. try to avoid talking over others during discussion). Participants had the 
opportunity to ask questions and to introduce themselves to the group. 
Participants were given time to read the first scenario, involving detonation of an improvised 
nuclear device in an urban area, before discussion. Following a midway break, the second 
scenario involving a nuclear power plant emergency broadcast via radio was introduced. 
Finally, the main points that emerged through discussion were summarised and participants 
were thanked for their participation.  
Time was allowed for informal feedback following the group. This included thoughts on the 
scenarios, topic guide items and facilitation. Participants were given an evaluation form to 
complete and return.  
Feedback was discussed with the supervisory team and reflected upon for further 




The sections below summarise the key areas of feedback from public involvement participants 
that were used to inform revisions to the study materials. 
Study Paperwork 
It was noted that the proposed consent form for the main study did not make clear the 
exclusion criteria (being military or emergency services personnel or being aged under 18). 
Some participants queried whether they were eligible to take part. The information sheet was 
edited to reflect that in addition to these selection criteria, participants were eligible if living 
either within a 50-mile radius of a nuclear power plant or within a large city. 
Time-keeping 
The focus group ran for two hours including a 15-minute break. The group moved through 
discussion points at a good pace allowing time for all to contribute. This was echoed in 
feedback. 
Scenarios 
Participants had some difficulty expressing their initial thoughts following the first (nuclear 
explosion) scenario. Feedback suggested that the scenario gave inadequate context, and so 
anticipating a reaction was difficult. For example, participants asked whether they had been 
warned in advance or had made preparations.   
The second scenario (nuclear facility leak) was not effective. Participants commented that the 
scenario was not realistic, that it read like “a joke” or Wellesian “radio play”. Confusion was 
also expressed regarding the distance participants were to imagine they were from the site at 
the time the scenario occurred. The term ‘local radio’ was used in the scenario and so it was 
assumed that the nuclear station in question was local to them, whereas others knew the 
location of Hinkley Point and assumed themselves to be at a greater distance.  
In feedback the group expressed differences in how they would wish to receive information for 
each scenario and that their distance from the incident was a factor in their behavioural 
response. However, responses during the focus group discussion itself did not mirror this and 
no difference in response was expressed. Importantly, no different needs or requirements for 
pre-incident information were proposed between the two scenarios. 
3.2.2.6. Discussion 
The public involvement group supported many decisions made regarding study materials and 
design. Participants commented that the topic guide content allowed for flowing discussion 
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and it was felt that including a scenario provided a constant reference and context for 
discussion. However, several areas for improvement were noted. 
Changes made following feedback and reflection 
I felt that some realism was lost by including too much information (such as windows breaking) 
in the improvised nuclear device detonation scenario. In fact, the experience would 
undoubtedly be different for everyone involved. To not influence responses the scenario was 
made less specific in its description, instead allowing participants to ‘fill in the blanks’.  
In practice the second half of the session (in which scenario 2 was presented) was used as an 
opportunity to probe aspects of the topic guide not covered during the first. Little value was 
added by repeating the same discussion for both scenarios, but upon reflection, participants 
acknowledged some differences in information needs and anticipated response between the 
two. My reflection was that there would be some benefit in keeping both scenarios, but not in 
the way I had originally planned. I therefore revised the group format in the following ways: 
a. The improvised nuclear device detonation scenario would remain the central basis for 
discussion. The nuclear power plant leak scenario was no longer presented in its own 
right, instead being incorporated as a topic guide item: it would be asked during 
discussion whether a radiation leak would warrant differences in pre-incident 
communications.  
b. Clarity would be provided as to where participants were in geographical location to 
each incident occurring. 
c. Discussion would not be conducted in two halves, separated by two scenarios, a 
method which did not appear to elicit additional detail.  
During facilitation, I felt that the topic guide was too dense to be meaningfully followed whilst 
also giving full attention to discussion. To ensure all items were given adequate time in the 
main study, I reduced it to key headings and a small number of prompts. This had the benefit 





3.3. Main Study 
3.3.1. Methods 
3.3.1.1. Design 
Eight focus groups received variations of the same scenario to discuss and were asked to 
consider them whilst discussing information needs.  
3.3.1.1.1. Evolution to variations of one scenario 
As previously mentioned, following discussion with my advisory team and public involvement 
group, focus groups received one scenario with slight variations depending on whether they 
were London residents or residing near to Hinkley Point nuclear plant. Variations of the 
scenario are presented in Appendix D. In brief, these included witnessing a resultant 
mushroom cloud rising or hearing of an attack on a city location over the radio. 
3.3.1.1.1. Topic guide 
The modified topic guide was used, as detailed in Public Involvement above. 
3.3.1.2. Participants 
I intended to recruit eight groups, with six to eight participants per group. This allowed for 
drop-outs whilst maintaining reasonably sized groups. Previous studies of this nature in the 
field of CBRN research have found this number to be sufficient in reaching data saturation (the 
point at which no new data is discovered) (e.g. Castle et al., 2010). This number was also 
achievable given budgetary constraints for participant compensation and transcription. 
The study population was the general public. Members of the military, healthcare workers and 
emergency response staff were excluded to minimise prior knowledge or experience of CBRN-
related preparation, communication and response within groups.  
Additional inclusion criteria related to location of residency. Participants were drawn from only 
those living within 50km of Hinkley Point or within a city location; London was selected as 
being arguably the city most likely to be targeted in a deliberate nuclear attack due to its 
symbolic value and it being a centre for vital infrastructure such as government, 
telecommunications and finance. This study was initially designed to split participants into two 
sets of groups based on their area of residence and to compare outcomes of these groups. 
However, due to confounding variables between these groups this was deemed to not be 
possible and so results are presented as one set of focus groups. 
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The primary recruitment source was online social media networks, specifically Facebook. Local, 
quasi-private, community pages (‘Bridgwater Matters,’ ‘Minehead Conversation Group,’ 
‘Taunton Somerset UK News and Events’; ‘Tower Hamlets Mums,’ ‘Love Barnet’  were targeted. 
Additional recruitment advertisements were placed on the community website Gumtree.com. 
To recruit on Facebook pages, administrators (‘gatekeepers’) were contacted directly for 
permission.  
A further source of recruitment (callforparticipants.com) was used after an initially slow 
response from London residents. Callforparticipants.com is an open platform through which 
research studies can be advertised. Distribution of the study advertisement was successful and 
supplemented the participant sample to the desired number. An opt-in method of recruitment 
was used, with £40 in the form of a bank transfer or high street vouchers offered as 
compensation. A full list of online recruitment resources is given in Appendix G. 
3.3.1.3. Procedure 
An e-mail address was provided with the advertisement inviting interested individuals to make 
contact. Potential participants received the study information sheet and a demographic data 
profile form (Appendix F) to complete and return. An online recruitment page was also created 
(TypeformTM). This contained the information sheet and demographic form. Hard copies of the 
information sheet were provided upon arrival at the group. Consent was recorded on paper on 
arrival at the focus group or online via the recruitment page. The consent form is presented in 
Appendix F. 
Respondents living near to Hinkley Point were geographically clustered around two locations: 
Minehead and Bridgwater/Taunton. Groups took place at a location convenient for the 
greatest number to minimise drop-out. One group was conducted in Minehead and three in 
Bridgwater in village/community halls. Focus groups for London residents took place at King’s 
College London’s Waterloo campus. Potential participants were matched to a day and time 
based on preferences where possible.  
Following distribution of the information sheet and completion of consent forms, rules for 
conduct in a focus group were read aloud, as were my role as facilitator and reiteration of the 
groups aims. Participants were then asked to introduce themselves to the group. 
Groups then began with a short scenario, followed by guided discussion through the points in 
the topic guide. Towards the end of the session, participants were asked in turn whether 
anything discussed during the group was particularly memorable to them and why this was. 
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Sessions were recorded using voice recorders. Recording began once participants finished 
reading the scenario. Recordings were transferred to an encrypted memory stick for storage 
and sent away for transcription. Notes were taken to record aspects of discussion central to 
the aims of the group and for reference to prompt discussion where needed.  
After thanking participants for taking part, signposting to more information regarding radiation 
and its effects was offered. Although many expressed an intention to go away and read more, 
none accepted these links. 
3.3.1.4. Analysis 
Sampling was felt to have been successful when data saturation, or the occurrence of no new 
information within groups, occurred.  
A ‘framework’ approach to analysis was adopted (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994, as cited in Ritchie 
et al., 2014). Following familiarisation with the raw data, this method involved a process of 
indexing and sorting data during which a list of topics was generated. This enabled an initial 
thematic framework, or a hierarchy of emergent themes and themes taken from the research 
question (a priori) to be formed that were grounded in the data. Theme headings were formed 
at this stage, these were Preparatory knowledge and actions; Responses to scenarios (Actions 
and behaviours); Pre-incident communications; Message content; Method of information 
distribution; Information sources and; Anticipated adherence. 
These descriptive themes (and sub-themes) were coded to provide signposting to cross-
sectional (applying across transcripts) and non-cross-sectional (cases specific to that group) 
data. From this, a framework was further developed that was formed of thematic matrices 
wherein groups were allocated a row and themes allocated columns. Data extracts were 
reviewed at this stage to check accuracy of coding.  
The matrix-based format used in framework analysis allowed for a summary and display of 
data which can be used to move between levels of abstraction where interwoven themes are 
present, as was the case in this study. It was important to build ‘conceptual clarity’ (Ritchie et 
al., 2014): a clear definition of responses to include in each independent category, within the 
framework to avoid overlap or omission of vital data. This allowed for identification of links in 
the data. This approach, which Glaser and Strauss (1965) term ‘substantive’ was deemed 
suitable as it captured representations of the participants’ social worlds, feelings and 
perceptions. This process of interpretation of the data also allowed for identification of 
superordinate, or motivational, themes which provide some explanation for behaviour. 
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The Framework approach is used increasingly in healthcare research. For example, Ward et al. 
(2013) in a study of experiences amongst nurses, comment on its transparency, provision of an 
audit trail and accessibility to researchers of diverse disciplines. Parkinson et al. (2016) used 
this approach to analyse data from interviews conducted with young people regarding their 
experiences of depression, due to its flexibility in using a priori and emergent data in 
development of the analytic framework and its ease in managing large data sets.  
I undertook the coding of transcripts, samples of which were checked by the supervisory team. 
This step was completed using MS Word before coded transcripts were imported to NVIVO 10 
(QSR) software for indexing and sorting of data. Labels used for coding were a combination of 
‘a priori’ (taken from themes identified during literature review) and ‘emergent’ (grounded in 
the data) concepts. Coding was conducted ‘in vivo’ (from terms used by participants) where 
appropriate. 
A Framework matrix constructed at the data abstraction stage is included as Appendix H.  
3.3.1.5. Ethical approval 
Ethical approval for the focus group stage of this study was granted on the April 3rd, 2017 by 
the PNM Research Ethics Subcommittee. REC Reference:  HR-16/17-4118. 
This study presented few ethical issues. However, discussions had the potential to cause upset 
and anxiety. Participant reactions were monitored throughout the focus groups; a strategy to 
check whether participants wished to continue was agreed prior to undertaking groups but at 
no time did it appear necessary. Participants were also reminded of their right to withdraw 
and offered links to further information and sources of support. 
3.4. Results  
A total of 43 participants took part. Ages ranged from 18 to 74. More women took part (N=28 
overall). London-based participants were: white British (N=33); black African (N=3); 
mixed/multiple ethnicity (N=1); Pakistani (N=2); Bangladeshi (N=1) and; Chinese (N=3).  Eight 





Table 3.2. Summary of focus group demographic profiles 
  % of participants (N) 
Gender Male 35 (15) 
 Female 65 (28) 
Age range 18-24 21 (9) 
 25-44 42 (18) 
 45-64 21 (9) 
 65-74 16 (7) 
 75+ 0 (0) 
Employment status Full time employment 35 (15) 
 Part time employment 26 (11) 
 Student 9 (4) 
 Retired 12 (5) 
 Voluntary employment 5 (2) 
 Unemployed 9 (4) 
 Prefer not to say 5 (2) 
Ethnicity White British 77 (33) 
 Black African 7 (3) 
 Any other mixed / multiple 
ethnic background 
2 (1) 
 Pakistani 5 (2) 
 Bangladeshi 2 (1) 
 Chinese 7 (3) 
Education Completed school 21 (9) 
 College level qualification 32 (14) 
 Degree level qualification 30 (13) 
 Higher than degree level 16 (7) 
 Did not attend school 0 (0) 
Marital status Married 30 (13) 
 Unmarried, cohabiting  19 (8) 
 Same-sex civil partnership 0 (0) 
 Divorced 7 (3) 
 Separated 0 (0) 
 Widowed 0 (0) 
 Single 42 (18) 
 Prefer not to say 2 (1) 
Dependent Children? Yes 19 (8) 
 No 81 (35) 
If yes, do your children live with 
you? 
Yes 12 (5) 
 No 2 (1) 
 1 or more do 5 (2) 
If yes, are your children school 
aged? 
Yes 7 (3) 
 No 2 (1) 




3.4.1. Preparatory knowledge and actions 
Groups expressed a belief that authorities have protections in place (without suggesting what 
these are) and that information would be made available when needed. Believing that 
authorities have protections in place was suggested to relieve anxiety. 
Participants also expressed knowledge of nuclear radiation protective measures that had come 
from movies and that, without contrary information, actions observed in fictionalised accounts 
would be followed. 
“The government could do that thing where they get all the police with their big 
microphones, be like, this what’s happening (sp), do this, and then just like drive round 
the streets and give directions to people, like they do in the movies.” (Group 7; lines 
674-677) 
Little fear was associated with lack of preparedness knowledge, many preferring to risk 
radiation exposure and death than live in a post-catastrophe society. Some suggested that 
knowing the current national threat level would influence their response. However, threat 
warnings intensifying without consequence was felt to desensitise people to threat. Most felt 
protective advice is only required when in a high-risk situation, whilst others suggested that 
reminders of risk and actions to take in unlikely events do not cause adverse effects: 
“When you sit in an aircraft and the stewardess holds up a card. Nobody gets rushing 
off…saying ‘oh my god you’re frightening me to death’.” (Group 1, lines 863-866) 
Little prior knowledge of preparedness or protective actions was expressed for nuclear 
emergencies by many groups. 
“if you're seeing it on the BBC News, like hey guys, we need to start getting ready for 
this impending nuclear attack, then I'll be like, Christ, I don't know what to do”. (Group 
5, lines 233-235) 
“We should be much better informed than we are. We should be given information…on 
both strands…nuclear attack or terrorism or war…but in particular because we live near 
a nuclear power station and we’re not., it’s a low-density population. But I think we 
should matter” (Group 1, lines 1096-1101) 
Participants living near to Hinkley Point had some knowledge of stable iodine, including a 
belief in it being effective at certain radiuses and that there are likely now to be better 
methods of protection. Several participants had received stable iodine from various sources in 
103 
 
the area including pharmacies. These recipients felt that the information included with stable 
iodine, such as relating to side-effects, was inadequate.  
“How can taking a pill help against nuclear fallout? Explain how it helps, why does it 
help, because otherwise I don't believe it. And I don't care who is the expert that's 
telling me that in my mind that doesn't make sense” (Group 4; lines 775-780) 
Based on their personal experience of (non-nuclear) disasters, some felt that the public are 
increasingly responsible for their own protection (once educated in protective methods). 
However, few reported having researched preparatory advice.  
3.4.2. Responses to scenarios 
For some participants, their immediate response was influenced by their recall of, and 
expectations from previous disasters. Experience of a communications outage during the 7 July 
London bombings and inability to obtain information during bush fires were recalled. Whilst an 
earthquake survivor expressed increased need for preparedness, people with experience of 
other disasters suggested a decreased desire to change behaviour.  
“I think I'm happier just being oblivious to it, I honestly do. I think, I've gone three 
decades of feeling perfectly safe and secure, and I don't want that to change” (Group 
4; lines 696-697) 
This was due to having reinforced beliefs of authorities having undertaken protective planning 
but also that the unpredictability of disasters reduces the effectiveness of preparedness 
planning. The Grenfell Tower disaster was cited as an example of protective actions in the 
event (evacuation) not being possible. Many recalled their own emotional response to 
disasters, expecting that they would panic given the present scenario.  
Knowledge of past nuclear disasters and comparison to the presented scenario was a second 
key influence on response. Some considered the scenario to lack realism and not meet 
expectations, citing images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and depictions from movies. One 
comment was that witnessing the detonation flash made survival impossible.  
3.4.2.1. Actions and behaviours 
Anticipated behaviour varied widely. Protective actions were felt to be largely ineffective in 
the attack scenario and somewhat effective in a nuclear power plant leak . Groups living in its 
vicinity, would close windows and doors (to keep pets safe) or self-evacuate by car (to keep 
children safe) if Hinkley Point were to leak. In an attack on London, groups residing in that 
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location would shelter (at home, in local buildings with easy access such as pubs or churches, 
in high-rise buildings, or underground) believing the streets too dangerous, or would self-
evacuate despite believing that exposure would result in death. It was anticipated that others 
would panic, behave irrationally, or react violently if without information. 
Emotional response Fatalistic attitudes were evident in all groups, particularly toward the 
London scenario:  
“I wouldn't know what to do so I can't do anything, so well, I'm not going to worry 
about it.” (Group 5, lines 176-177) 
Participant 1: “In the event of a situation like this, it’s not something that we can do 
anything about in the first place. Even if it comes over the news, dear Christ, 
somebody’s launched a nuclear missile and we don’t know where it’s going to hit, it 
could be anywhere within…” 
Participant 2: “…This area, what good is that? Because anybody within the thousand-
mile radius of where it could land…” 
Participant 3: “…stick your head between your legs and kiss your ass goodbye!” (Group 
2, lines 388-410) 
Though others expressed less concern towards the London attack scenario: 
“We feel so far removed from London here”. (Group 4; lines 77-78) 
In some, denial and dissociation manifested in some staying indoors and “ignoring” the 
incident. 
Information seeking Despite believing communication lines would be overwhelmed, many 
reported that they would attempt to contact emergency services, particularly if directly 
affected such as by injury to themselves or family members. Participants from all groups would 
attempt to contact loved ones in the attack scenario While some would physically seek out 
loved ones. 
Information seeking in the event would be for corroboration: clarifying the nature of the 
event, informing others or checking on safety; gauging severity, spread and scale (distance, 
personal effect and whether the incident was an isolated or on-going emergency) and; seeking 
advice on what actions to take (food and water safety, local contact, evacuation or 
decontamination requirements). Related to this were questions such as evacuation 
destinations and means, shelter locations, when stable iodine should be used and how families 
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can be protected if not together (can children be collected?). A desire was expressed for two 
to three simple actions to be communicated in the event, even if appearing obvious, and for 
honesty if protective actions would not be helpful. This included a desire to know what actions 
authorities were taking. 
“Am I going to be affected? Would I need to evacuate straight away? Would I need to 
shelter? I don't think the authorities would necessarily know that at that time…So I 
think it would be more important to be saying, these are the ways we will contact you 
and let you know how to proceed” (Group 4; lines 626-631) 
3.4.3. Pre-incident communications 
Attitudes varied as to whether pre-incident communications for nuclear emergency 
preparedness were wanted or required. Reasons for not believing them necessary included: a 
necessity for secrecy, fatalism, ‘blissful’ ignorance, avoidance of worry, inability to predict the 
nature of a nuclear catastrophe, lack of interest and concerns about the potential impact on 
house price. Some remarked that excessive pre-planning is a barrier to exercising common 
sense in the event. One participant cited having received pre-incident information for CBRN 
protection overseas and subsequently feeling less safe.  
“…we were like…it's like an April Fool's-type joke, it was just so silly. But, some families 
felt that they wanted to come back to the UK. The wives wanted to pick up their 
children and get on the next flight home, so it does influence people.” (Group 4; lines 
541-546) 
Attitudes towards pre-incident communications were mixed. Benefits expressed included: a 
desire for self- and child protection; mitigating the anticipated inability of people to take on 
new information during a catastrophe and; as means to avoid erratic or dangerous behaviour 
in others.  
Some also suggested that pre-incident communications need not be nuclear specific but 
instead should advise actions applicable to many scenarios, including personal emergencies 
such as acid attacks.  
“If they just said, ‘if this happens, do this’. I wouldn’t trust it. If they perhaps gave you a 
range of possibilities … I would have more faith in it, I think” (Group 1, lines 436-440) 
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“There are so many different things to be aware of these days…like acid attack - water; 
radiation - water. So, I think knowing what to do for different types of experiences 
…you can't predict what is, where things are going to go” (Group 5, lines 370-375) 
However, some also made comparison to past nuclear preparedness campaigns in which 
messages were felt to be diluted when communicated together with non-nuclear related 
advice.  
It was generally felt that pre-incident communications would not be read: literature was 
compared to free newspapers and Brexit newsletters, while SMS-based messages were likely 
to be considered bogus and ignored. Comparison was made to pre-flight information, 
elements of which would be ignored (e.g. protecting oneself before helping children) or 
forgotten, and to advice about house fires in which safety advice is “logical, makes 100% 
sense”, is not fear-inducing and has repeatedly been shown to be effective when required. It 
was also felt that honest pre-incident information would not be made public to prevent panic 
and distress. 
“I've lived here for 30 years and suddenly I'm getting this information through, it would 
ring alarm bells. Why do you suddenly care if I've got iodine or not?” (Group 3, lines 
114-116) 
Participants had expectations that a warning would be sent via SMS prior to a known attack. 
However, a suspicion was raised that the government might not advise members of the public 
in the event of a nuclear attack.  
“They didn’t teach sailors how to swim because they knew they would drown quicker 
and they wouldn’t suffer so much. So, I think we’re along those lines.” (Group 1, lines 
372-375) 
Participants also expected the situation to get worse more quickly than communications could 
keep up with. Many noted that common communication channels may not work in such an 
event. However, for those who felt that communication channels would remain available, this 
rendered pre-incident communications redundant. 
3.4.3.1. Message content 




Actions to take Groups felt that a range of actions tailored to different scenarios would 
increase faith in information. This would increase a belief that the needs of the public were 
considered in disaster planning, specifically; protections for pets, what to do if injured and how 
to help others. Specific self-protection actions were favoured, attached to stages of a visual 
warning system. Some also appeared to prefer to be educated as to types of radiation and how 
they might be affected. What to have prepared to take, where to evacuate, planned 
evacuation procedures and how and where to shelter were other information needs shared by 
all. One participant who had received pre-CBRN preparedness messaging whilst living in a 
warzone felt it ineffective as it was not personalised to their circumstances: 
“They were saying things like, seal up the letterboxes but we had chimneys, and 
nothing was said about the chimney. So it seem(ed) so stupid.”  (Group 4; lines 535-
537) 
Stable iodine Participants living close to Hinkley Point were most interested in stable iodine, 
wanting information on when to use it, why it helps and reassurance that it will not cause 
further problems.  
Event specific Groups wished to know how to recognise symptoms of radiation poisoning, 
what “removes” radiation and where does it go. Worst and best-case scenarios were desired 
to reassure that actions are appropriate.  
“I’d be more worried of going out because obviously radiation is going to get you more. 
I would really only want to evacuate if that was the worst-case scenario.” (Group 8, 
lines 591-593) 
Some groups expressed additional information needs including whether protective clothing 
such as HAZMAT suits would be available and personal accounts of radiation survivors (e.g. 
what they did to survive).   
How to present information Groups felt that people would not read information beginning “in 
the event of (nuclear power plant) leakage…” but instead “if you hear X warning take stable 
iodine (or) go to ….” 
“You have to think about morale…we’re probably statistically pretty safe (but) the 
inference is that if they put this information out there…we suddenly think it is going to 
happen. It makes us more worried…we don’t need to know now, but if anything did 
happen we’d want to know pretty quickly what to do and what they are going to do.” 
(Group 2, lines 379-395) 
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Others suggested that “three things to do in the event of a nuclear disaster” (Group 8, part 2; 
line 115) would be read, particularly if relevant to different scenarios and including 
demonstrations such as online videos or on television in which protection methods are tested. 
Explanation as to why actions are advised, can manage fear and expectations. 
It was considered that factual information (not “preachy”) enables the public to make 
informed choices. This should be brief, using visuals, bullet points, logos or catchphrases.  
Groups felt that campaigns should be nationwide and not localised. A further suggestion was 
that information distributed to homes should also be specific for the type of house or building.  
Groups also expressed a desire to know government plans and what an emergency alarm 
would sound like. 
“We should know, because it takes a lot of anxiety away from people knowing things 
like that, kind of, helps with a bit of the worry that at least you know that if the worst-
case scenario were to happen that there is something in place to, kind of, help” (Group 
3, lines 277-282) 
3.4.3.2. Method of information distribution 
No clear preference emerged as to distribution method, however groups preferred for 
information to be “drip fed” into society’s consciousness, being less alarming and more 
effective than an information campaign; “explosions” of information being difficult to deal 
with. Specifically, information and protective training (e.g. emergency drills) should be 
embedded in institutions: 
“…to really change the way people are educated you get it in schools, you get it in your 
Cubs and your Brownies, get your nuclear awareness badge, you know. That's how you 
educate people.” (Group 8, lines 304-307) 
Leaflet / Letter A personalised letter informing recipients that a leaflet is coming would buffer 
communications being too alarming or assumed junk-mail. However, it was considered that 
there are not enough non-internet users to justify a postal campaign.  
Media Groups expressed no desire to watch televised news items regarding nuclear radiation 
protection and preparedness. Preferences were expressed for radio discussion and the BBC 
news app. 
Internet / Social Media Videos on nuclear authority websites were considered accessible 
before and during an emergency. Social media was felt to be open to disinformation but 
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preferable for some as a way to raise awareness that can then be followed up using more 
reliable sources. This preference was attributed to online groups often sharing demographics; 
for example, information shared on “mums groups” would be read by other mums.  
“I'm a mother of young children, so a lot of my social media groups and people I talk to 
on social media will be the same as me really. I think people can sometimes overreact 
(on social media). Social media influences people when you're talking about 
evacuations or sheltering” (Group 4, lines 387-396) 
3.4.3.3. Information sources 
No clear preference for information source emerged. Instead, groups expressed a need to 
relate to the source. For example, qualities necessary for delivering information included 
“humour” and what was perceived as “honesty”. 
Participants felt that information should come directly from the source, not via a 
spokesperson. Having a celebrity putting their name to a campaign was felt irritating and 
“soapboxing”. Direct sources were defined as expert organisations with “hands on experience” 
and public safety as a priority. Groups preferred information to come from a local contact with 
a channel to an official source or any direct source but specifically MI5 or MI6, the London 
Mayor, national government, universities and the police. 
Importantly, source was considered not to matter if the advice was not felt to be sensible; 
believing actions to be unreasonable may, according to participants, cause the public to 
believe they are not real. 
“if something doesn't seem plausible then you know it's wrong.” (Group 4; lines 539-
540) 
Government The Met Office Twitter account was presented as a model source and channel 
due to its seeming ability to “negotiate alarmism and sensible awareness” and because it is 
“updated properly”. Groups assumed that the government had responsibility for pre-incident 
communications which would be read if “verified”, meaning actions have been approved by a 
specialist source (e.g. the Home Office verified by a nuclear watchdog).  
Specific individuals within Government split opinion: for example, the Mayor of London was 
considered a direct source with knowledge of national and local situations whilst others could 
not identify the current mayor.  
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Nuclear authorities A “UK atomic agency” (a term used to indicate an independent, specialist 
agency) or IAEA were considered preferable to EDF (the owners of Hinkley Point) or the UK 
government as they bypass internal politics, have appropriate expertise and no conflict of 
interest.  
Participant: “Atomic Energy Authority, isn’t it? Or Agency maybe. I think I would have 
more faith in that” 
Moderator: “So, an International Regulatory Body. Not the Home Office?” 
Participant: “No, not the Home Office. I’d read theirs, but…I would prefer an outside 
agency…it’s an official agency with educated people that know what they’re talking 
about, and I haven’t got a bloody clue” (Group 1, lines 718-732) 
Similarly, responsibility for communication was felt to lie with nuclear authorities (alongside 
government). Information from Hinkley Point staff was considered likely to be accurate but 
would not influence instruction adherence.  
Other sources British university departments and the police were perceived to be 
knowledgeable, and The Guardian and Al Jazeera were considered unbiased. Radio 4 split 
opinion for being factual, but government controlled. Due to their perceived infrequency of 
public communications, the MOD, WHO, GCHQ and UN were considered organisations to take 
seriously.  
3.4.4. Anticipated adherence with instructions 
Anticipated adherence with pre-incident preparedness instructions was considered reliant on a 
person’s ability to carry out actions ‘properly’, assurance that personal circumstances were 
accounted for and adequate information being given (e.g. how far to evacuate; how long to 
shelter). Repetition over time was considered an influence on increased adherence. Repeated 
messages to be aware of unattended bags were given as an example of something now 
thought of differently than before: 
“When you're used to frequently seeing these campaigns and hearing about them, it's 
just something that becomes embedded in you. When you have a one-off campaign, it 
won't really stick in. Repeatedly telling us, you learn to think, ‘okay I have to take this 
seriously and take it on board’.” (Group 5, lines 493-500) 
However, barriers to adherence existed. Belief that the aftermath of a nuclear attack would 
see a worsening situation, non-adherence of others (e.g. to not use mobile phones), perceived 
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failures of past public information campaigns, detachment from the city (“you just feel a 
different sort of attachment to the situation. Like you do feel very detached from a city that 
you've just moved to” (Group 8, lines 410-411)) and preference for taking protective actions 
only in the event would reduce acceptance of pre-incident communication. 
Ultimately, participants felt that the likelihood of an attack is low. However, they also felt that 
the perceived likelihood of an attack may rise following the distribution of preparedness 
communications. Furthermore, some felt that a perceived increase in terrorism had resulted in 
less attention being paid by the public to terror-related information and increased defiance 
(such as a reduced likelihood of making preparedness-related lifestyle changes): 
“I (ride) horses and I’ve always been told (that I will be thrown off)…I don’t dwell on it, I 
just keep it at the back of my mind. The sun’s getting bigger and it can swallow, 
obviously, planets…there’s always an, ‘if’, in life. Life’s a massive, ‘if’.” (Group 2, lines 
360-369) 
Sheltering (nuclear attack scenario) Reasons given for not sheltering-in-place if instructed to 
in the event of an attack were a belief that it would be better to shelter elsewhere, to seek 
loved ones and not knowing that sheltering was advised.  
Participant 1: “I'd go get my daughter, so I'm not going to stay in the house. I would, if 
that's the only piece of information I got is to create a place inside a place, yes I'd 
create…I can create that den into anything I wanted, and she would stay in there with 
me” 
Moderator: “But the order is to shelter, the order isn't to go and get your daughter and 
bring her back” 
Participant 1: “Yes, I would break that order. She's worth the risk” 
Participant 2: “I wouldn't be comfortable leaving my children with somebody else 
because I would feel that they were better with me and I would feel that I will be able 
to comfort them better” (Group 7, lines 664-680) 
Some felt advice to shelter would hide an ulterior motive such as containing the spread of 
radiation and denial of the problem (implicitly suggesting that the emergency does not 
warrant drastic action).  
Whilst many would adhere to sheltering-in-place instructions, one difficulty cited by many was 
in having no way to fix windows (described in the scenario as having been broken by the blast).  
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Participant 1: “Are we actually safe in our houses though? It would come in, wouldn’t 
it?” 
Participant 2: “All houses are leaky, yes” 
Participant 3: “You got chimneys, you got open fires” 
Participant 2: “But better than standing outside really” (Group 2, lines 810-814) 
Sheltering following a London attack was dependent on their distance from detonation and 
size of the device.  
Sheltering (nuclear power plant leak) Participants living close to Hinkley Point were unlikely to 
shelter if the plant were to leak. Some participants reported that sheltering would occur only 
after first leaving home to collect water and would be self-limited to 24 hours due to a 
shortage of food.  
“In the case of a minor leak, like, okay, ‘we want you to stay indoors for the next 24 
hours just to be on the safe side’. That’s fine. Nobody’s going to have a problem with 
that, but if they turn around and say, ‘you’re going to have to stay indoors for two 
weeks’ then…then you’d better have a way of feeding and watering me while I’m 
staying indoors. You were the ones who knew what was going on” (Group 2, lines 704-
707) 
Reasons for sheltering or not sheltering Other reasons for sheltering non-adherence were 
witnessing others self-evacuate and fear of being attacked by their dog(s) if left without food. 
Practical concerns were expressed such as the difficulty of containing young children. Groups 
agreed that they would not shelter at work, though student participants suggested colleges to 
be shelters.  
Instinct emerged as a more powerful influencer than historical reports for sheltering 
adherence: groups were informed that people who self-evacuated following the Fukushima 
incident exposed themselves unnecessarily to radiation. This did not change their intentions: 
“Sometimes people follow their instincts so sometimes they don't follow instructions 
because they don't think that's what's best for them…simply you know what's best for 
yourself.” (Group 5, lines 189-192) 
There was a lack of clarity expressed regarding water contamination and the safest length of 
time for sheltering. One participant had experienced a situation in which sheltering-in-place 
was carried out and stated that effective sheltering was not possible. Others suggested 
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sheltering meant suffering for longer, feeling trapped. It was suggested that an important 
distinction in communications is in clarifying the difference between sheltering and simply not 
evacuating; understanding this difference would potentially influence adherence. This was 
echoed in urban groups who were largely unaware of how to shelter effectively. 
Evacuation (nuclear attack scenario) Evacuation was considered a last resort measure in 
London-based participants and that “by this time it may be too late anyway”. Also, transport 
infrastructure would be overburdened and others too panicked to make evacuation possible.  
Moderator: “’You have to evacuate immediately’; what do you think your reaction to 
that might be?” 
Participant 1: “Panic. It's impossible to get outside of London” (Group 5, lines 25-27) 
Evacuation advice might be adhered to, dependent upon where and how far, but self-
evacuation was unlikely.  
Moderator: “If there was a message then to evacuate?” 
Participant 1: “Yes, we couldn't” 
Participant 2: “I think it would depend on where you live… If you're smack in the middle 
of (town), not much of a chance. Because the infrastructure's so bad” 
Participant 3: “People will be loathe to, because they're going to leave all their 
possessions, when it turns out to be a false alarm and you come back, and you've been 
looted…” 
Participant 4: “Weekday 10 am, I'm going to go and get my daughter, she's at school, 
that's what I'm going to do” (Group 3, lines 350-378) 
Evacuation (nuclear power plant leak) Participants living close to Hinkley Point preferred 
evacuation (if given direction), particularly those with children. The decision to evacuate would 
be influenced by social media talk, wind direction and what they could bring. Reasons for not 
evacuating included care for pets, fear of looting and desire to help others. Concerns remained 
regarding ability to evacuate due to population and transport issues. Some maintained that 
they would not leave.  
Reasons for evacuating or not evacuating Other determinants of evacuation adherence were 
reassurance that evacuation is the safest option, ability to reconnect with loved ones and 
inability to find a better shelter.  
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“I might decide ‘well who do I want to be with in case this is the end of the world?’ and 
meet up with them. And it might not be a case of evacuating I think for me if it gets to 
that point. If they’re just saying evacuate and they’re not telling you where, there’s no 
decent information, I think the more important thing for me is just be with the right 
people.” (Group 8, lines 461-465) 
Stable iodine Groups felt that taking stable iodine in a small-scale event, if they had 
information about side-effects and if it was guaranteed to help children, was worthwhile. 
However, in a catastrophic event, it was felt there is little benefit in taking it. 
3.5. Discussion 
I found evidence for specific facilitators and barriers to adherence with preparedness 
recommendations and information preferences relating to radiation disaster threats. The 
results of this study build upon what is already known about preferences for pre-nuclear 
communications and present some novel findings. The central points of contribution are: 
• For message content, a range of advice is desired; 
• By way of distribution, there is a preference for ‘drip feeding’ information in slower 
time than a one-off campaign; 
• There is a desire to be able to relate to the information source, with qualities of the 
source encompassing factors of trust present in the previous literature, however the 
source was considered unimportant if the advice given is not considered effective; 
• Regarding behaviour, sheltering was not preferred over desire to be with loved ones in 
an emergency; 
• Individual’s perception of risk was considered an influence on adherence and on 
acceptance of pre-incident communications which are desired only when the threat is 
heightened, and; 
• Where there is felt to be low efficacy in carrying out recommended countermeasures, 
fatalistic attitudes emerged. Evidence was required for the effectiveness of actions. 
These outcomes are expanded upon below. 
3.5.1. Key findings 
Four points of consensus were reached by the focus groups. 
First, regarding content, a range of advice for varying radiation-disaster situations was desired. 
In the review in Chapter 2 no advice about specific actions was identified other than 
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information about the length of time to shelter (Guterbock et al., 2010) or about protective 
actions tailored to the individual’s distance from the incident (Rogers et al., 2013). Participants 
in the present study requested a broader range of information, including how and where to 
shelter, evacuation procedures, how they might be affected by radiation, how to help injured 
others and protections for pets. 
Second, for message distribution, participants stated that they felt that information that is drip 
fed into society’s consciousness or embedded in institutions, rather than presented as a 
sudden preparedness campaign is more likely to be impactful. This was not present in studies 
included in the review where traditional media (e.g. Becker, 2004; Vyncke et al., 2016) and the 
internet (e.g. Guterbock et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2005) were commonly mentioned. Though 
the use of multiple sources does correspond between both my focus groups, as participants 
suggested varying preferences, and the review outcomes. 
Third, participants wanted to be able to relate to the information source, though the source 
was considered unimportant if advice given did not appear to be sensible. Whilst studies 
included in the review often specified preferences for particular information sources 
regardless of reason, one study (Bass et al., 2015) specified that young males would seek out 
their peers for information while another (Rogers et al., 2013) found there to be criticisms of 
communications that provided recommendations without explanation. The lack of consensus 
as to a preferred source appears consistent with much of the literature around disaster 
information sources. While some preference for a ‘direct source’ with ‘hands on experience’ of 
public safety initiatives emerged, this too is not always supported by recent literature. Latre et 
al. (2017) for example found a lack of credibility to be found for nuclear emergency 
communicators among the public following the Chernobyl disaster. While the nuclear industry 
as a whole were found to be competent, they were perceived to lack in trustworthiness. 
Lemyre and colleagues (2006) found, in a study of attitudes among the Canadian public, that 
the media were most often referred to for credible information whereas politicians and 
government were not. This perhaps supports the finding of some groups who suggested a local 
contact (which might include local media) with channels to official sources. This issue of 
credibility is vital when considering the prominent finding in the present study that source was 
considered unimportant if their advice was not considered feasible, a finding likely to influence 
perception of credibility in sources. This is important as numerous studies have shown 
perceived credibility to influence acceptance of information (e.g. Renn and Levine, 1991). This 
also does not provide direct support for the finding that participants felt a need to relate to the 
information source. Incorporating factors commonly found central to determining trust and 
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credibility for information sources among the public, Renn and Levine propose five key 
attributes: competence; objectivity; fairness; consistency, and; faith (goodwill). Covello (2003) 
furthers this by attaching these factors to determinants of credibility: competence 
corresponding with knowledge and expertise; objectivity and fairness with openness and 
honesty and; consistency and faith with concern for others. Perhaps based on the outcomes of 
these groups, being able to relate to the source is a further addition to this set of trust and 
credibility determinants?  
Fourth, sheltering-in-place was generally not a preferred protective action for groups due to a 
repeated desire to be with loved ones. Sheltering-in-place may not be adhered to as 
participants also expressed disbelief that their own homes are an effective shelter and to 
lacking resources to do so. Studies included in the review (Becker, 2004; Guterbock et al., 
2010; Lasker, 2004; Malešič et al., 2015; Nyaku et al., 2014; Van Bladel et al., 2000; Williams et 
al., 2005) also found prioritisation in collection of children to be a reason for non-adherence. 
Those who perceived sheltering recommendations to be counterintuitive were also less likely 
to shelter (Bass et al., 2015; Oak Ridge, 2011; Rogers et al., 2013). 
3.5.1.1. Motivational (Superordinate) Themes 
Beyond the outcomes detailed above, some overarching issues appeared to be repeatedly 
discussed throughout the focus groups: risk perception; normalisation of information; efficacy, 
and trust. 
3.5.1.2. Risk Perception 
Risk was frequently raised within groups. Participants variously reported that their perception 
of risk is an influence on the reception of pre-incident information and on subsequent 
adherence to recommended actions. For example, groups largely felt that protective 
information was only necessary when there was imminent threat or after an attack actually 
occurs. Participants who perceived there to be a high likelihood of a nuclear attack occurring 
cited global flashpoints such as North Korea and felt an attack on London would affect the 
entire country. Others felt removed from this type of threat. Low risk perception individuals 
included those more aware of nuclear power plant safety measures. These same participants 
expressed a need “to not fear radiation” and expressed views suggesting themselves to be 
avoidant of preparedness information. This is somewhat consistent with previous findings that 
risk perception influences information acceptance (Perko et al., 2014), preparedness (Lee and 
Lemyre, 2009) and self-evacuation (Cutter and Barnes, 1982). Certainly, outcomes from these 
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groups suggest risk perception strongly motivates adherence, certainly it was discussed as a 
factor more so than the influence of information received on adherence. 
This may pose difficulties for future risk communications. It is difficult for pre-incident 
communications to address risk perception. Perhaps one answer is to develop pre-incident 
communication materials but to distribute them only at a time of raised threat. This would 
however run contrary to the suggestion from participants that distributing communications 
during a time of low risk could help familiarise people with information that might be later 
deployed, addressing uncertainty around the nature of nuclear attack and fostering trust in the 
communicating source. 
Perceived likelihood was partly based on the regularity of incidents: for example, participant’s 
perceived likelihood of fires occurring was higher than nuclear attack. Believing there to be a 
risk of being affected by fire was felt to stimulate increased attention to fire safety 
information. Perceived likelihood was also felt to depend on how official agencies act. For 
example, active preparedness of emergency service was considered by groups to suggest 
increased likelihood, spurring receptiveness to preparedness information. There may be limits 
to how far agency actions can increase perceived likelihood, however. During the Second 
World War the public considered newer weaponry on which they had received warning 
information to not be ‘as bad’ as air raids experienced from the onset of the war (Jones et al., 
2006). This was considered a form of habituation, the result perhaps of improved 
communications, becoming accustomed to war, or both. Such habituation has been suggested 
more recently in response to terror threats (Galea et al., 2002; Kirschenbaum, 2006). For 
example, between 2007 and 2010 several terror-related incidents were reported by Australian 
media: surveys conducted within this population at each time-point found a significant 
increase in perceived likelihood of terrorism occurring, but a significant fall in concern (Stevens 
et al., 2011). This group was also more willing to evacuate during a terror-event. Stevens 
concluded that a return to ‘baseline’ arousal following exposure to terror-related stressors 
illustrates community resilience even in populations with limited exposure.  
Little need to prepare was expressed towards a London attack despite mixed thoughts on 
likelihood. Here, fatalistic attitudes determined low perceived need for preparedness. This 
suggests that perceived likelihood alone is not enough to change behaviour. Two surveys 
examining correlations between personal predictive factors and terror threat perception 
(Goodwin et al. 2005) found London residents to perceive a lower likelihood of attack than 
rural residents. This was attributed to cognitive dissonance (choosing to live in what is 
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considered a high-risk area whilst also wishing to remain safe). In this case, the question exists 
as to whether the forms of habituation perhaps observed here (that of living in high-risk areas) 
are adaptive or maladaptive in the context of preparedness. 
3.5.1.3. Normalisation of Information 
Another concept addressable by communication is that of information normalisation. This is 
interpreted based on study outcomes as the feeling that sudden distribution of a nuclear 
emergency preparedness campaign would cause fear and suspicion whereas “drip feeding” 
information to the public was a preferred method. 
The finding that normalisation was seen as a positive step by focus group participants is an 
outcome not present in earlier studies of nuclear attack preparedness. In practice some groups 
suggested that normalisation might require nuclear preparedness to be embedded in schools. 
Whether, as some group members suggested, this would cause high levels of anxiety is 
uncertain. However, it is notable that other forms of emergency preparedness are tolerated 
well by children, including fire safety and school shooter lock-down drills wherein information 
normalising has realigned expectations towards the potential event and recommended 
actions. 
3.5.1.4. Efficacy 
Efficacy is defined here in terms of self-efficacy (belief in one's ability to succeed in certain 
situations and the influence of that belief on subsequent motivation; Bandura, 1993) and 
efficacy of the instructions themselves (whether one believes actions to be effective).  
Efficacy was found to be important as low efficacy was associated with fatalistic attitudes, 
subsequently reducing engagement with communications. For example, despite evacuation 
being considered the only effective survival method in the presented scenario, it was also felt 
impossible by groups given location constraints. Efficacy appeared here to be linked to risk 
perception in that participants considered there to be a trade-off between the difficulty that 
they expect to be present in undertaking protective actions and changes in lifestyle that this 
effort would require against the relative risk of harm that they perceive.  
An important feature of efficacy in terms of nuclear preparedness is the reoccurring desire 
expressed amongst groups for evidence for the effectiveness of specific actions. At least one 
study of CBRN preparedness information has shown a link between increased confidence in 
the reliability of protective information and evidence of effectiveness (Becker, 2004). It is also 
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a factor in the social-cognitive model of communication (Lee and Lemyre, 2009) as a pre-
requisite for engagement with information.  
Interestingly, few expressed trust in authorities to provide reliable information about effective 
countermeasures. Where protective information has been given, such as Duck and Cover, 
instructions were perceived by groups as ineffective, fear-inducing and “lunatic”. Groups felt 
that no information would be given if an attack was imminent since the effectiveness of known 
protections would be outweighed by the worries of officials about the likelihood of panic if 
information was given out. This may be more a comment on trust than efficacy, which can 
again be referenced in previous literature where the provision of reliable information has been 
found to cultivate trust (e.g. Rogers et al., 2013). Importantly, where efficacy is perceived to be 
low trust is reduced, but provision of information regarding efficacy can enhance trust.  
As will be discussed below however, trust in this context, plays a less vital role, at least in 
adherence with recommendations, than risk perception and efficacy of instruction. 
3.5.1.5. Trust  
According to the groups, the benefits of a trusted source are clear: information is more readily 
received and accepted as the best available. However, it became apparent in groups that while 
trust matters in many circumstances, in the context of existential threat it is not as straight-
forward. 
Trust appeared to be related to several factors: perceived honesty in the reasons for why 
certain countermeasures are recommended; whether recommendations come with evidence 
of effectiveness; pre-conceived beliefs and experiences of a communicating source; whether 
full disclosure on the part of authorities occurs, and; belief in protection offered to the public 
against nuclear threat by authorities such as the government and military. These are similar 
issues to those in the literature. Individual dimensions of trust have been found to include 
competence, (Löfstedt, 2005), consistency, (Renn and Levine, 1991), caring, (Kasperson et al, 
1992) and dedication (Covello, 1993). The Pre-event Messaging Project (Wray et al., 2006) 
explored elements of public trust in government which are evident in my outcomes including 
confidence in government preparedness (providing reassurance) and willingness to disclose 
information. 
How important trust is in terms of convincing people to engage in preparedness or protective 
behaviours is complicated. The key message that came from groups’ discussions of trust in the 
information source is that trust does not depend on what is said, rather it reflects the 
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individual’s perception as to whether the communicating source has the public’s best interest 
at heart. Therefore, we could posit from this, coupled with the wide-range of preferred 
information sources expressed by groups, it is not important who the communicating source of 
information is, as long as they adhere to the principals of trust outlined above. This also aligns 
with the aspects of dedication and caring (also present in findings of the Pre-incident 
Messaging Project). In Earle’s (2010) consensus model of trust in risk communication this 
concept of perceived benevolence in communicators is termed relational trust. There is then 
an inherent problem: how do communicators ensure that they are instinctively believed? 
A further complication comes from the finding that whether a source is trusted to provide 
accurate information was felt by focus groups to be less important if the recipient believes that 
the actions recommended would be ineffective, or that the effort involved in taking such 
actions outweighs the perceived potential for harm. Based on discussions on the subject of 
trust, , there appears to be an inherent distrust of information currently available at present. It 
could be that these aspects interact: communicating efficacious actions improves trust, while 
communicating ineffective actions degrades it. 
Groups added that in a situation perceived by many to be hopeless in terms of self-protection, 
the absence of options forces a reliance on trust. To be explicit, in considering existential 
threats “you have to trust that plans are in place.” There is little choice but to trust in some 
kind of protection from, as was suggested unanimously, the government. This suggests that 
many feel that responsibility for public protection is in the hands of others. This relates to the 
second concept of trust in Earle’s consensus model: calculative trust. Based on past behaviour 
of communicating authorities and on constraints imposed on future behaviour (and perhaps 
perceived efficacy and effectiveness of recommended countermeasures) this relates to the 
amount of confidence that the public has in authorities. This perhaps also suggests that in fact 
there is too much trust amongst the public in the protective powers of government to the 
detriment of personal responsibility for preparedness.  
Nonetheless, it remains the responsibility of risk-communicating authorities to present 
information known to be most effective in offering protection. What’s more, trust cannot be 
ignored as a factor in nuclear preparedness communication development due to its 
significance in risk and crisis communication research. Individuals have been found more likely 
to follow the instructions of trusted sources (Shore, 2003) and trust has been found to 
influence actions when knowledge of risk is low (Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000) highlighting the 
potential interplay between risk perception and trust, two central influences of adherence.  
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In the forthcoming phases of this research it will be important to examine whether beliefs 
around authority or emergency service preparedness, or perceived effectiveness of 
recommended actions are barriers to taking preparatory actions. These outcomes provide 
evidence for inclusion in the final stages of this project, two online surveys. 
3.5.2. Limitations 
Focus groups involve refinement of what the participant wishes to express through interaction 
with and probing of central ideas and discussion points. Whilst important in ‘attitudinal’ 
research, a methodological limitation is the extent to which the facilitator injects themselves 
into discussion. Lehoux et al. (2006) feels that freedom to express views in focus group 
participants is influenced by the way in which initial tasks are presented (the scenario) and 
how participants are invited to ‘break the ice’. I would suggest that a further influence was re-
orientation to ensure sufficient addressing of research questions. Groups in this study 
frequently returned to the subject of information reception and information seeking only in 
the event of a nuclear emergency; there appeared to be difficulty in maintaining focus on pre-
incident communication. This is consistent with the expressed preference for information to 
be given only when needed. This may be a failing of the topic guide, the scenario, group 
facilitation or a combination. On the contrary, the scenario appeared to effectively allow 
participants to envisage themselves experiencing the scenario with some realism, drawing out 
reported information needs at that time. A different scenario might have aided focus on pre-
incident communication. 
It was difficult to avoid sampling bias in recruitment. Several attempts were made to correct 
this. Parents were relatively under-represented during recruitment so potential participants 
with children were prioritised for group selection. London area recruitment resulted in many 
students responding, most likely since the callforparticipants.com distribution list includes 
universities. A small number of students were selected to not weight groups heavily by this 
demographic. 
It should also be noted that  a small number of participants were known to each other, 
potentially eliciting a response bias. However, this did not appear to influence responses; there 
was disagreement between participants known to each other to an equal extent of agreement.  
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3.5.3. Implications for next phase 
Phase one of this project used a systematic review to outline gaps in our knowledge about how 
to communicate with the public about a nuclear disaster. The present study has helped to fill 
some of these gaps and clarify areas where additional research might be beneficial. 
A wide range of information preferences were expressed meaning clarity in terms of what the 
public feel constitutes ideal messaging has not yet been achieved, or perhaps more likely, that 
there is no ‘ideal’ in pre-incident communications for nuclear catastrophe preparedness. 
Amongst emerging questions is whether preparedness information is wanted during the pre-
incident stage, and not solely in the event of a disaster or imminent attack. Not only is this a 
question of gathering further evidence regarding the timing of public communications, but also 
whether desire for information is a requirement in this context. This second point is of less 
relevance: communications in the context of health promotion maintains a focus on what the 
public need to know, rather than what they want to know, and communicate with the public 
based on this knowledge (Ratzan, 2001). However, the question of desired information is still a 
valid one; presenting information that we know the public want may increase the likelihood 
that they attend to that information. Without meeting the public’s information needs there is 
a danger that they are lost as an audience.  
Another area for further study is the role of factors potentially beyond the remit of 
communications (such as risk perception). It has been discussed how risk perception is 
important in influencing effectiveness of pre-incident communications and how public 
communication might, in turn, affect risk perception. Outcomes of this study suggest that 
those most likely to believe that pre-incident information for nuclear emergencies is needed 
are those who perceive that an incident is more likely, who are most concerned with harm to 
children and who believe it important to be prepared. Importantly though, outcomes suggest 
risk perception to be a stronger predictor of adherence in those attending to information than 
the actual information received.   
It has been discussed how outcomes related to trust in sources does not fully support previous 
evidence as to the role it plays in information reception. Even so, appropriateness and 
preference for the sender of information is still an area that should be explored in developing 




Little desire was expressed for pre-incident communications designed to inform people how to 
better prepare for a nuclear incident, though while participants appeared pessimistic, there 
was little evidence of fatalism. This is exemplified in  the perceived countermeasure efficacy 
among groups. For example, while opinions differed across groups as to whether pre-incident 
communications are necessary, there was unanimous interest in stable iodine. This suggests a 
conflict in some: those who express no desire to take preparedness measures (perhaps due to 
perceived low likelihood) but who are not dismissive of potential safety actions to be taken in 
the event of an incident. It may be that the key factor influencing information engagement is 
instruction efficacy and achievability. In the case of stable iodine, taking a pill to obtain some 
protection against radiation is likely to be considered more achievable and less taxing than 
actions such as evacuation, stockpiling food or sheltering-in-place. Many who were aware of 
stable iodine felt better forms of protection are likely to be available, however. It is important 
therefore that risk communicators remain mindful that not wanting pre-incident 
communications does not necessarily equate to lacking a desire for self-protection. 
Unresolved questions remain, including: how important is trust; who do people trust to 
provide the most effective preparedness advice; and what is the importance of perceived risk 
and instruction efficacy? These are questions to be explored further in the following phases of 




Chapter 4: Survey with Members of the Public in Hawai’i Following a False Ballistic 
Missile Alert  
The focus groups outlined in the previous chapter elicited outcomes not previously seen in the 
literature specific to nuclear risk communications. This includes participants expressing 
concerns as to the level of perceived effort involved in carrying out adequate preparedness in 
relation to the efficacy or effectiveness of those measures in the face of nuclear catastrophe. 
These groups also provided a mixed picture as to their desire for pre-incident information and 
their anticipated adherence to recommended protective measures. The survey that the 
present chapter maps out is undertaken with members of the public in Hawai’i. While this 
phase of data collection was not planned at the outset, the false ballistic missile alarm 
experienced by the Hawai’ian public presented an opportunity to collect data on actual 
behaviour in the face of potential nuclear catastrophe not present in the previous literature on 
this topic. This was therefore an important opportunity to build on the outcomes of the 
previous chapters with a particular focus on behavioural response to the warning. 
4.1. Background 
On January 13th, 2018, a Saturday, at 08.07am local time, members of the Hawai’i public 
received an emergency alert via SMS from the Hawai’i Emergency Management Agency (HI-
EMA), a Governmental agency representing the first line of state-wide disaster response 
(http://dod.hawaii.gov/hiema/). This alert read: 
Ballistic missile threat inbound to Hawaii, seek immediate shelter. This is not a drill.  
News reports (e.g. BBC, 2018; Hennigan, 2018) and social media feeds (Reinstein, 2018) 
suggested that the public did not adhere to this instruction. Reported actions included leaving 
home to find concrete buildings or placing children in drainpipes to protect them, risking 
drowning or exposure to dangerous gases. Whilst some sheltered in bathtubs and manholes, 
others reported a “resigned acceptance” (Hennigan, 2018) or not knowing what to do. Whilst 
some reports existed of “hysteria” and “panicked evacuations” (BBC, 2018; Karl and Lytle, 
2019), interviews conducted with around 80 residents and tourists a few days following the 
alert (Peterson, 2018) suggests that this was rare, finding that despite confusion, people took a 
more measured approach that primarily involved information seeking based on a lack of 
knowledge, such as not knowing shelter locations. This is exemplified by screenshots of Twitter 
feeds and SMS messages full of comments such as “….everyone’s phones are buzzing with a 
warning...Info? Anyone?”  and “Not sure what to do. Sirens are going off”.  
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Fortunately, the alert had been sent in error; there was no inbound missile. An employee at HI-
EMA had mistakenly selected the alert from a dropdown list of confusingly near-identical 
options (Wang, 2018) after failing to hear the word exercise during the briefing given for what 
was actually a practice run (Berman and Fung, 2018). HI-EMA corrected the mistake with an e-
















Figure 4.1. Timeline: distribution of the ballistic missile false alert (CBS News, 2018; KITV 4, 
2018; Nagourney et al., 2018) 
Since threats between the US and North Korea had escalated in the preceding months, the 
Hawai’i ballistic missile false alert was probably the first credible activation of a nuclear attack 
warning system since the Second World War (Preston, 2018). Previous research into the 
predictors of instruction adherence in nuclear emergencies has been conducted following 
nuclear facility emergencies (Fukushima: e.g. Rubin et al., 2012; Three Mile Island: e.g. Prince-
Embury, 1992) or has relied on hypothetical attack scenarios (e.g. Becker, 2004). The false alert 
• 8:07am: reports begin of members of the public viewing the alert on their smartphones 
• Local television broadcasts are interrupted by an audio and scrolling banner alert; a civil 
danger warning broadcast stating: 
“The US Pacific Command has detected a missile threat to Hawaii. A missile may impact on land 
or sea within minutes. THIS IS NOT A DRILL. If you are indoors, stay indoors. If you are outdoors, 
seek immediate shelter in a building. Remain indoors well away from windows. If you are 
driving, pull safely to the side of the road and seek shelter in a building or lay on the floor. We 
will announce when the threat has ended. THIS IS NOT A DRILL. Take immediate action 
measures.” 
• 8:13am: State Warning Point system used to cancel the alert (this prevents it from 
reaching phones that have not already received it) 
• 8:20am: Official messages refuting the alert are sent out: 
o HI-EMA use social media accounts to inform the public that the original alert 
had been sent in error. 
o Electronic signs over major roadways used to alert drivers of the error. 
• 8:45am: Second emergency alert sent, stating: 




in Hawai’i offers a unique opportunity to identify factors that promote adherence with 
protective advice in a population who have experienced the existential threat of being 
informed that a nuclear attack was under way. 
The Hawai’ian islands are widely known to be susceptible to natural disaster: most commonly 
flash flooding, though the state has experienced two devastating hurricanes this century and 
tsunamis hit at least once every year. While not all of Hawai’i’s islands homes an active 
volcano, earthquakes caused by volcanic activity have a wide-reaching effect and the state is 
affected by them on an almost constant basis. Anecdotally Hawai’ians consider themselves not 
to be ‘preppers’ (Wallis, 2018) though a number of emergency preparedness resources and 
guidance-producing organisations exist (e.g. HI-EMA; Pacific Disaster Center (PDC.org); Hawaii 
Army National Guard: Family Emergency Preparedness Plan (Hawaiiguardohana.org). It is 
notable that in the months prior to the false alert, Hawai’ian authorities had conducted drills 
using public alert systems and made disaster preparedness information available to the public 
in various forms, such as online and in town hall meetings (Kelkar, 2017). The threat of nuclear 
attack meant that over twenty town hall meetings and television advertisements to educate 
the Hawai’i public on preparedness for a nuclear strike were aired during late 2017 (Broder 
Van Dyke, 2017). In the month prior to the alert, Cold War-era emergency sirens were widely 
tested throughout Hawai’i, with 93% found to be working; though some residents reported not 
being able to hear them, and twelve mistakenly played an ambulance siren (CBS News, 2017). 
Hawai’i’s emergency siren warning system was not formally activated during the alert period 
(Magin, 2018) but officials did nonetheless report some activated on Oahu (presumably locally, 
rather than by HI-EMA centrally) following the notification (CBS, 2018; VOA News, 2018).   
Previous phases of this PhD, and additional evidence from other resources, have shown factors 
that might affect preparedness and response in relation to nuclear threats. For example, the 
systematic review (Chapter 2) suggested that the behavioural impact of a nuclear alert might 
be affected by communication-related variables including distrust of the information source 
(e.g.  Bass, 2016), conflicting or inconsistent reporting (Pheby and Robinson, 1990), the 
perceived counter-intuitiveness of instructions (Oak Ridge, 2011) and not understanding terms 
such as shelter-in-place (Becker, 2004; Pearce et al., 2013). Some previous literature has also 
suggested that there are demographic differences in how information is received (e.g. Kanda, 
2013i) and how it influences behaviour (e.g. Bass et al., 2016). Perhaps most consistent is the 
finding that people would ignore or delay self-protective actions in a nuclear emergency to be 
with or contact loved ones, particularly children (e.g. Nasar and Greenberg, 1984). Outcomes 
of focus groups with UK participants (Chapter 3) also found specific factors that might 
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influence adherence regarding protective actions, including the perceived efficacy of 
recommended actions and ability to effectively carry out the action.  
In a study with American participants (not Hawai’i citizens exclusively) conducted shortly after 
the false alert, 64% still reported having not been informed of nuclear attack preparedness 
recommendations despite the events in Hawai’i occurring only months before. Furthermore, 
most reported not thinking about what they would do if a nuclear attack occurred. In fact, 29% 
stated that they put little effort into preparedness despite believing the likelihood of an attack 
to be only slightly more unlikely than likely (Karl and Lytle, 2019). This low level of 
preparedness is important, given evidence that paying attention to preparedness 
communications not only increases knowledge but also influences how people intend to act 
during a genuine emergency. While many factors may influence whether people prepare for a 
nuclear emergency, one factor suggested by both the systematic review and focus group 
findings is whether people perceive that, a) a nuclear incident is unlikely, and b) even if one 
does occur they nonetheless trust that plans are in place via the government which will protect 
them. Sadly, both of these perceptions may be incorrect.  
Trust is a recurring factor in the reception and acceptance of risk communication. In fact, the 
importance of trust in the source of communications represents perhaps the most significant 
discrepancy between systematic review and focus group outcomes. The review found that 
information acceptance during an incident was predicted by trust in the message source 
(Murakami et al., 2016; Perko et al., 2012), amongst other factors not related to trust. Trust in 
the source and checking the information with trusted others, such as family and friends (Bass 
et al., 2015) also tended to increase instruction adherence. Non-adherence with sheltering 
advice was found to be associated with low trust or confidence in community or government 
preparedness. UK non-governmental sources (Pearce et al., 2013) scientists (Latre et al., 2017) 
and the US President (Guterbock et al., 2010) were rated as being the most trustworthy 
sources. Least trusted were US national media and local authorities (Bass et al., 2015; 
Guterbock et al., 2010). The nuclear industry also appears amongst the least trusted to provide 
risk communication information. Trust was found to increase as a result of consistent 
messaging between authorities, such as expert medical advice (Rogers et al, 2013). Whilst 
focus groups suggested clear benefits of trusted sources providing communication, there was 
also a belief that trust is less important when the threat is existential. Instead, groups were 
consistent in their belief that the public must trust that plans are already in place for public 
protection, and for authorities to communicate with the public in the event. Pre-incident 
information was therefore seen as unnecessary for nuclear threat. Furthermore, it was felt by 
128 
 
focus groups that trust does not influence adherence in instances where recommended 
actions do not appear reasonable. In this sense, it is what is being said rather than who says it 
that counts. 
Much of the literature on how risk communications are received is concerned with the channel 
by which it is delivered. For example, channels that involve written communication have been 
found to result in the transfer of more accurate information than verbal channels (Edworthy et 
al., 2014). Social media is an increasingly convenient channel by which information is quickly 
spread. Whilst a large 2017 review of empirical studies by Rasmussen and Ihlen found a limited 
literature on risk communication and social media, this is a growing area of research. For 
example, examination of risk information and its sources found target groups to use social 
media during a crisis for checking in with family and friends and for “insider information”; 
whilst traditional media was used instead as an educational tool. The use of both channels is 
often influenced by convenience and personal recommendations: sole use of traditional media 
influenced by perceived credibility whilst negative attitudes towards social media’s more 
commonly perceived uses discourage its use for risk communication purposes (Austin et al., 
2012). However, following the trend seen in increased social media use during a crisis (Pew, 
2006) and the increases in the perceived credibility of the medium (Procopio and Procopio, 
2007) Austin and colleagues (2012) showed that social media influence was greater during an 
emergency than information received from traditional media pre-crisis. 
In addition to psychological variables playing a key role in how people respond to a nuclear 
alert, the situation people find themselves in when they receive emergency risk 
communications is also likely to be relevant. This event presented an important opportunity to 
gather data as to actual levels of preparedness in the public that would aid in responding to a 
nuclear emergency. At the most basic level, it will be easier for someone to shelter if they are 
already within a building than if they are outside. However, related factors may also be 
important, such as whether they are at work or at home at the time (Pearce et al., 2013). This 
is reflected in the objectives of this study.  
There are limitations to undertaking a study such as this, which was unplanned at the outset of 
undertaking this thesis. Recruitment for this study was not budgeted for nor were established 
links or known reliable recruitment avenues in place. I was able to form links with academics at 
the University of Hawai’i who offered support in recruitment as well as education in terms of 
the Community-Based Participatory Research model favoured on the Islands, important 
historical context and previous less-than-ethical practices of non-native researchers which 
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allowed me to approach recruitment with respect and sensitivity. Still, this study provided a 
population group with important historical, contextual and cultural differences to those that 
this research was intended to serve (the UK public) upon initial study design. The efficacy of 
these outcomes are also reliant on self-reporting after the event, a post-event only design and 
no comparison group, much of which is documented in detail in the discussion section of this 
chapter. Nonetheless, this event represented a unique opportunity to gather data of this kind 
which will no doubt inform the overall findings. 
4.1.1. Study objectives 
In this study a cross-sectional survey of a sample of the Hawai’i population was used, 
approximately nine months following the false ballistic missile alert to: 
1. (aligning with the first of the project aims) identify the proportion of people who a) possess 
adequate materials (as defined by HI-EMA) within their home to allow them to cope with a 
nuclear emergency, and b) possess these materials specifically as a result of attempts to 
prepare for a nuclear emergency;  
2. (aligning with the second of the project aims) assess the desire for pre-incident information 
relating to nuclear preparedness following the false alert;  
3. (aligning with the first of the project aims) assess adherence to the instruction to shelter-in-
place. This will be achieved via the following sub-objectives:  
a. identify the prevalence of behaviours that were, a) deliberately adherent to the 
instruction to shelter, i.e. involving participants taking active steps to follow the guidance; and 
b) incidentally adherent, i.e. involving participants taking active steps to follow the guidance or 
else being adherent by virtue of circumstance, such as being in bed at the time;  
b. Identify the proportion of people who believed the message to constitute a genuine 
emergency alert; 
c. Assess whether the following variables were associated with adherence and 
preparedness outcome variables:  
• by what means the message was received;  
• whether participants believed it to have been a genuine message from HI-EMA;  
• whether they believed an attack to be imminent;  
• whether they had prepared for an emergency;  
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• how much preparedness information they had previously received;  
• their level of trust in Hawai’i’s defence capabilities;  
• their perceived likelihood of a nuclear attack occurring in Hawai’i, and;  
• the perceived level of effort involved in taking protective measures (such as 
sheltering). 
Aligning with the second of the project aims, the same survey was used to gather additional 
data that would be of use in developing improved communications with the population, 
specifically: 
• ways in which participants attempted to find out information as to how they could 
protect themselves or others;  
• from which sources they had obtained preparedness information prior to receiving 
the warning;  
• how recently had this information been received;  
• whether this information was viewed as having been sufficient;  
• preferred timing of communications; 
• reasons for not wishing to receive pre-incident communications;  
• preferred content of pre-incident communications, and; 
• their ratings of trust in potential information sources. 
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Design 
This study was conducted using an online, cross-sectional survey sent to members of the 
public in Hawai’i. Theoretical Domains Framework was used to inform items for inclusion. 
4.2.2. Participants 
Members of the public were eligible to take part if they had been in Hawai’i on the 13th 
January 2018, had received the ballistic missile alert by any means including mobile phone, 




An online survey was developed using QualtricsXM software. Questions were forced choice and 
routed so that participants were directed only to questions relevant to them and away from 
those not applicable to the respondent. Full survey items are shown in Appendix I.  
4.2.4. Outcome variables 
4.2.4.1. Preparedness  
Respondents were asked to select from a list all preparedness actions they had taken prior to 
January 13th, 2018. Listed actions were taken from Protect and Survive (HMSO, 1980), from 
FEMA’s most recent information sheet published in March 2018 and from the HI-EMA website 
(HI-EMA, 2017). Actions included: obtaining a battery powered radio and batteries; storing a 
14-day supply of food and water; having a first aid kit; attending a town hall meeting on 
emergency preparedness; and being prepared to shelter for 72 hours. For each action that was 
endorsed, respondents were asked to give their reason for undertaking this action. The four 
possible reasons were: specifically for nuclear attack preparedness; in case of a different 
specific emergency such as hurricanes; for general emergency preparedness or, not for 
emergency preparedness purposes.  
4.2.4.2. Pre-incident communication preferences 
Respondents were asked whether they wished to receive pre-incident information regarding 
protective actions in a nuclear attack. Those who responded no were asked to elaborate. 
Response options included: I would be too afraid, and I don't believe I could be protected if 
Hawai’i was attacked.  
Those who responded yes to this question were directed to a further question asking when 
they feel would be the best time for them to receive this information; during a period of low 
threat, or only when a threat is known to be imminent. This group were also asked, using an 
open-ended question, to detail two pieces of information they felt it would be most important 
to be informed of in pre-incident communications.  
4.2.4.3. Adherence 
Respondents were asked to report the actions they took upon receiving the initial ballistic 
missile alert. Response options were a combination of behaviours identified in previous 
disaster response literature and in news reports from the event (e.g. BBC, 2018; Peterson, 
2018; Reinstein, 2018). They were: took no action; sought immediate shelter; made efforts to 
verify that the information was correct; made efforts to find out protective actions I could 
132 
 
take; initiated a pre-arranged plan; left home to seek out friends or family and; got in contact 
with/tried to contact friends or family via social media or phone.  
Participants were asked why they took the action(s) they did upon receiving the ballistic 
missile warning and offered eight possible response options: I felt prepared/knowledgeable as 
to what actions I should take; I felt unprepared/lacked knowledge as to what actions I should 
take; I wished to verify that the information received was accurate; I wanted to protect my 
family; I wanted to be with family/friends; I wanted to help others (strangers) who may have 
been hurt; my family/friends and I had a pre-arranged meeting place for such an emergency; I 
did what the warning advised me to do (regardless of whether I felt it the safest action or not); 
I thought my actions would protect me and, ‘other’ reasons. 
Respondents who stated that they sought further information were asked to detail the sources 
of information they used or attempted to use for this purpose.  
Respondents who reported taking no action were directed to a free text question asking why 
that was the case. 
4.2.4.4. Belief in message 
Respondents were asked whether, upon first hearing the original warning, they believed that it 
had been sent by HI-EMA. Respondents could answer: yes; not applicable - I did not hear until 
after it was known to be a false alarm: no - I believed the warning to be from a source other 
than HI-EMA; or no - I believed the warning to be a hoax. Participants who gave either of the 
two ‘no’ responses were directed to an open text question allowing them to state why they did 
not believe the warning to be a genuine HI-EMA message. Those who responded not 
applicable were redirected past that block of questions. 
Respondents were also asked whether they believed that an attack was imminent. Response 
options were: yes – I believed that an attack was imminent and no – I believed the warning to 
be a hoax or a mistake or that it would come to nothing. Full frequency data for the remainder 
of the survey is presented in Appendix J. 
4.2.5. Predictor Variables  
4.2.5.1. Awareness 
Two items related to being made aware of the warning. The first item asked how participants 
became aware of the alert. The second item asked where they were upon receiving the 
information. It is felt that receipt of a warning such as that which is the subject of this research 
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would constitute a ‘where were you when you first heard….’ moment and so some confidence 
can be retained from recall of this information despite the time that has passed.  
4.2.5.2. Risk perception 
To assess the perceived risk of a successful nuclear attack occurring in the future, participants 
were asked if they believed Hawai’i to be protected from nuclear attack by military 
intervention and their perceived likelihood of a nuclear attack occurring in Hawai’i during their 
lifetime. Unfortunately, with no reference in which the military has been called upon to defend 
Hawai’i from an incoming attack of this magnitude to draw from, this question is reliant upon 
perception of respondents. However, perception of protection from threats has been shown to 
influence risk perception and preparedness behaviour (Becker, 2004).  
4.2.5.3. Prior information received 
Respondents were asked to state the amount of general disaster preparedness information 
they had received prior to January 13th, 2018, and the amount of preparedness information 
specific to nuclear disasters that they had received. They were asked where they had received 
preparedness information from, when it was most recently received and whether participants 
felt that information received had been sufficient. Again, accuracy of reporting for these items 
are reliant on recall. As preparedness guidance can be received for various scenarios and 
situations, from vehicle breakdown to natural disaster and everything in between, it may be 
the overlapping recommendations can become confused in terms of source or in priming the 
memory of nuclear threat, previous information received may not be recalled if intended to 
prepare the recipient for a small-scale threat.  
4.2.5.4. Perceived preparedness effort 
The perceived effort that would be required to adequately prepare was a prominent feature in 
focus groups (previous chapter) in that participants expressed a belief that there is a trade-off 
between lifestyle changes that the effort of preparing for emergencies would require against 
the relative risk of harm that they perceived to be present. This resonates with disaster 
preparedness literature, such as actions in pre- and post-disaster relief effort being weighed 
against perceived disaster magnitude (He and Zhuang, 2016) and the wider health literature 
such as the effort-reward imbalance model (Siegrist and Li, 2016) which suggests that over-
commitment (high effort) combined with low rewards is a cause of poor health such as 
increased stress. In this survey participants were asked to rate the perceived effort involved in 
carrying out individual actions listed in the earlier preparedness question with the addition of 
the following activities: watch preparedness videos online; be prepared to shelter (e.g. at 
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home) for up to 72 hours; be prepared to shelter (e.g. at home) for up to 1 week; be prepared 
to shelter (e.g. at home) for up to 2 weeks; be prepared to leave your home to a place of 
shelter within your town or village and; be prepared to leave your home to a place of shelter 
outside of your town or village.  
4.2.5.5. Trust 
To identify the most trusted sources of information relating to nuclear preparedness, 
participants were presented with twelve sources (e.g. HI-EMA; nuclear agencies; local 
authorities; emergency services) and asked to rank them in order of most trusted to provide 
them with information about how to prepare for a nuclear emergency. It may be that 
participants have had no prior experience of dealing with a number of these sources; in which 
case aspects of trust forming identified in focus groups (previous chapter) such as belief that 
the organisation has the public’s best interest at heart and has no competing interests and 
those found in the literature such as confidence in, and perceived credibility of the institution 
(Renn and Levine, 1991) are implied in responses. 
4.2.5.6. Demographic variables 
Participants were asked to state their gender, age, ethnicity, employment status and achieved 
level of education as of January 13th, 2018. These items were taken from the United States 
Census Bureau (2017). 
Participants were also asked whether they had dependent children on January 13th, 2018. 
Response options were: no; I had a dependent child/children aged under 18 who was living 
with me; I had a dependent child/children aged over 18 who was living with me and; I had a 
dependent child/children under 18 but they did not live with me. 
4.2.6. Procedure 
Participants were identified and recruited with the assistance of collaborating partners at the 
University of Hawai’i and by commissioning a market research company based in Hawai’i to 
conduct a survey of their existing panel members. Participants recruited via the University 
were awarded course credit whilst those recruited by the market research company received a 
monetary reward. Other channels of participant recruitment were explored, including the 
patron contact list of the Kumu Kahua Theatre in Honolulu where a production about the false 
alert had been put on, and City and County of Honolulu Neighbourhood Commission Office 
online noticeboards. In practice, it was not possible to recruit via the Commission Office 
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noticeboards. Due to very low response rates using the Theatre’s contact list, participants who 
were recruited using this method were not included in the analysis.  
A link to a survey hosted on QualtricsXM was distributed to individuals who formed part of the 
market research participant database. Interested individuals were able to follow this link 
anonymously and access an information sheet using any internet enabled device. Providing 
they indicated their consent by ticking the relevant consent items, they were then able to 
participate in the survey. The survey link was also made available to students enrolled in 
undergraduate courses at the University of Hawai’i via an online research participation 
database. The survey became available for market research participants on October 5th, 2018 
(slightly under nine months following the alert) and met the required sample size after three 
days. It was available for University of Hawai’i students throughout November 2018. 
4.2.7. Ethical Considerations 
Approval for the study was granted by the King’s College London Psychiatry, Nursing and 
Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee (ref: HR-17/18-7059) and the University of Hawai’i 
(protocol number: 2018-00712). 
4.2.8. Sample size calculation 
Based on a Hawai’i population of 1.42 million (World Population Review, 2018), to obtain a 
95% confidence level with 5% margin of error a sample size of 385 completed responses was 
required according to the sample size calculator tool on surveymonkey.com. 
4.2.9. Outcomes and Analysis 
All responses were recorded on an Excel (Microsoft) spreadsheet. This was imported into SPSS 
version 25 (IBM) for statistical analysis.  
Weighting was initially applied to reflect the gender distribution in the general population. 
However, comparison of weighted against unweighted outcomes showed negligible 
differences. All analyses were therefore conducted with unweighted data.  
Some outcomes required re-categorisation for comparative significance testing. Where re-
categorisation occurred, it is detailed below. 
4.2.9.1. Preparedness 
Because there is a potential difference in the factors associated with whether someone 
consciously engages in actions to prepare for a disaster, and whether they engage in actions 
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that, by accident or coincidence, make them prepared (e.g. collecting camping gear), the 
sample was recategorized as intentional (taken for disaster preparedness reasons) or 
incidental (undertaken for non-disaster preparedness reasons) preparedness. Undertaking 
actions for general emergency preparedness, nuclear-specific preparedness and preparedness 
for a different type of emergency were all defined as intentional.  
Scores for absolute preparedness (that is, regardless of whether it was intentional or 
incidental) ranged from 0 to 8 activities.  For intentional preparedness, a median split was used 
which categorised people reporting zero to two intentional preparedness actions as having low 
intentional preparedness, and those reporting three to eight actions as having high intentional 
preparedness. Binary logistic regression was used to calculate odds ratios for the associations 
between intentional preparedness and demographic variables. Adjusted odds ratios were 
calculated (adjusted for demographic variables) for associations between intentional 
preparedness and the following predictor variables: prior level of disaster preparedness 
information received; prior level of nuclear preparedness information received; source of 
preparedness information; how recently was preparedness information received; perceived 
sufficiency of preparedness information received; belief in protection from military; low 
preparedness effort and; high preparedness effort (see next section). Unadjusted odds ratios 
are displayed in Appendix K. 
4.2.9.2. Preparedness effort  
Responses were rated on a ten-point scale (1 = very little to no effort involved; 10 = much 
more effort than I would be prepared to take). The data reduction method principal 
components analysis was used to identify if discrete groups of preparedness actions could be 
grouped together in terms of their perceived effort or in terms of whether participants had 
engaged in that action or not. 
4.2.9.3. Adherence 
Deliberate adherence and incidental adherence rates based on adherent (sought immediate 
shelter; initiated a pre-arranged plan) or non-adherent (took no action; left home/the place I 
was at to seek out friends or family) responses were calculated. 
Incidental adherence was defined as any action that equated to adherence with the warning 
instruction to shelter, which included remaining at home upon receipt of the warning. 
Deliberately seeking shelter or initiating a pre-arranged plan were included in this definition to 
gain a full picture of adherence overall. In contrast, deliberate adherence was defined as 
simply intentional sheltering or initiation of a pre-arranged plan (that aligned with the 
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instruction to shelter). Where participants used a free text response to provide more detail on 
their actions, these were also used to assess whether they were incidentally or deliberately 
adherent. For example, where a participant elaborated that they “stayed in bed” this was 
categorised as incidental adherence.  
Non-adherence was defined as being outdoors upon receiving the warning and not seeking 
shelter or being indoors upon receiving the warning and taking action that meant sheltering 
did not occur, such as leaving the house.  
Only the respondents who reported having received the warning before being made aware 
that it was sent in error were included in analyses related to adherence.  
Binary logistic regression was used to test associations between adherence and demographic 
variables. Adjusted odds ratios (adjusted for demographic variables) were also calculated for 
associations between deliberate adherence and the following predictor variables: location 
upon receiving warning; by what means the message was received; whether the message was 
believed to be from HI-EMA; whether an attack was believed to be imminent; prior level of 
disaster preparedness information received; prior level of nuclear preparedness information 
received; belief in military protection from a nuclear attack; intentional preparedness and; 
perceived level of effort involved in sheltering for 72hrs. Unadjusted odds ratios are displayed 
in Appendix L. 
4.2.9.4. Belief in message 
Binary logistic regression was used to test associations between whether respondents believed 
the warning to be genuine, being deliberately adherent to protective instructions, and 
demographic variables. Adjusted odds ratios (adjusted for demographic variables) were also 
calculated for associations with the following predictor variables: location upon receiving 
warning; how the message was received; whether the message was believed to be from HI-
EMA; prior level of disaster preparedness information received; prior level of nuclear 
preparedness information received; source of preparedness information; how recently 
informed of preparedness information; belief that preparedness information was sufficient; 




4.2.9.5. Trust in information source 
Mean ratings across all respondents were calculated for trust in the listed information sources, 
which included HI-EMA, nuclear agencies, the federal government, local authorities (e.g. the 
Mayor), emergency services and the national news media. 
4.2.9.6. Demographic variables 
Due to low numbers in some demographic categories, recoding was undertaken to consolidate 
groups. Employment was recoded into either employed or not employed. Education level was 
recoded as either less than degree level or degree level. Age was recoded as: 18-39, 40-59 or 
60+. Having dependent children was recoded as: none; children <18 living with me; children 
>18 living with me; or children not living with me. Ethnicity was recoded as: Asian, Native 
Hawaiian, White, Mixed or Other.  
4.2.9.7. Thematic analysis 
All open text responses were analysed thematically (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This involved 
generating initial codes upon reading the data, extracting themes that arose and reporting 
these with reference to the pre-defined outcome variables. The following questions required 
open text responses: why did you not believe the warning to be genuine or from HI-EMA?; 
Why did you take no action/carry on with what you had been doing? And; what one or two 
things would you want to find out to help you prepare for a nuclear attack? Questions with 
‘other’ response options also required open text elaboration. These were: how were you first 
made aware of the ballistic missile warning?; Which of the following best describes your 
immediate response to first hearing the warning?; Why did you take the action you did upon 
receiving the ballistic missile warning?; Please select any ways in which you attempted to find 
out information as to how to protect self/others following receipt of the warning; where did 
(your preparedness) information come from? And; why would you not wish to receive 
information regarding preparedness and protective actions prior to a nuclear attack? 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Demographics  
There were 454 completed responses to the survey. Of these, 406 respondents were recruited 
from the market research panel (representing an 11% response rate) and 48 recruited from 
the University of Hawai’i. Table 4.1 shows demographic details for the sample. For comparison, 
data for the population of Hawai’i according to census data are also given (US Census Bureau, 
published June 21st, 2018). Males were under-represented in this sample, whilst over 50s were 
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over-represented. The census data do not capture retirees or those unable to work. Despite 
this, the sample appeared to have an over-representation of those who were employed. Most 
respondents (n=300, 66%) reported having no dependent children; a total of 32% (n=147) had 





















Table 4.1. Demographic profile of survey respondents 
Demographics 
(as of January 
13th, 2018) 
 Frequency % Population 
of Hawai’i % 
% outside of 
population 
rate CI (95%) 
Gender  Male 200 44 50 3.5 
 Female 253 56 50 3.5 
 Prefer not to say 1 0.2   
 Total 454    
Age Between 18-29 years old 73 16 16 0 
 Between 30-39 years old 81 18 14 3.3 
 Between 40-49 years old 65 14 12 1.4 
 Between 50-59 years old 100 22 13 8.35 
 Between 60-69 years old 104 23 12 10.4 
 70 years or above 28 6 12 5.4 
 Prefer not to say 3 0.7   
 Total 454    
Dependent 
Children 
No 300 66 73  3.35 
 I had a dependent child/children 
aged under 18 who was living with 
me 
108 24 26.7 1.36 
 I had a dependent child/children 
aged over 18 who was living with 
me 
28 6 -  
 I had a dependent child/children 
aged under 18 but they did not live 
with me 
7 1.5 -  
 I had children under and over 18 
living with me 
9 2 -  
 I had children both living and not 
living with me 
2 0.4 -  
 Total 454    
Ethnicity American Indian or Alaska Native 1 0.2 0.4  0.18 
 Asian 210 46 37.6 6.52 
 Black or African American 7 1.5 2.2 0.59 
 Hispanic or Latino 5 1 10.7 9.16 
 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific 
Islander 
61 13 10.1 2.39 
 White 102 22 25.5 2.22 
 Other 9 2 -  
 Mixed 54 12 24.2 10.99 
 Prefer not to say 5 1 -  
 Total 454    
(Other ethnicities included Filipino; Portuguese, Spanish; Mexican)   
Employment 
Status 
Employed, working 40 hours or 
more per week 
231 51 47 (total 
employed) 
1.65 
 Employed, working 1-39 hours per 
week 
88 19   





 Not employed, not looking for work 33 7   
 Retired 69 15 Not reported  
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 Disabled, not able to work 14 3 Not reported  
 Total 454    
Education Less than high school degree 4 1 Not reported  
 High school degree or equivalent 
(e.g. GED) 
54 12 -  
 Some college but not degree 102 22 -  
 Associate degree 64 14 -  
 Bachelor degree 130 29 -  
 Graduate degree 98 22 -  
 Prefer not to say 2 0.4   
 Total 454    
 
4.3.2. Preparedness 
Table 4.2 shows the number of participants who had engaged in each preparedness activity. Of 
preparedness-related actions taken prior to January 13th, 2018, having obtained a flashlight 
and extra batteries was most frequently reported. Over or close to half had also put together a 
first aid kit, obtained a battery powered radio, stored a spare supply of medication or a 14-day 
supply of food and water.   
Table 4.2. Summary of preparedness actions taken prior to January 13th, 2018 

























Total % (N) 
Obtained a 
flashlight (and 
extra batteries)   
0.3 (1) 21.5 (80) 63 (233) 15.5 (58) 82 (372) 
Put together a first 
aid kit   
0 (0) 17 (56) 67 (221) 16 (53) 73 (330) 
Obtained a battery 
powered radio   
0 (0) 25 (71) 58 (162) 17 (47) 62 (280) 
Stored a 14-day 
supply of 
food/water   
0.4 (1) 29 (65) 52 (116) 18 (41) 49 (223) 
Stored a spare 
supply of 
medication 
0.4 (1) 18 (39) 56 (124) 26 (57) 49 (221) 
Stored a bag with 
cash and important 
documents   
0 (0) 16 (29) 56 (99) 27 (48) 39 (176) 
Obtained walkie-
talkies 
0 (0) 16 (16) 42 (43) 42 (43) 22 (102) 




For participants who reported ‘other’ items, the most commonly stored related to power, fuel 
and transport including spare fuel for vehicles and generators. A small number of people 
stored batteries or chargers for devices and spare cell phones for communication. In addition 
to spare clothing, hygiene items included toiletries and toilet paper, wet weather gear and 
towels. The small number of individuals who had stored items for pet care primarily listed food 
and carriers. Items stored for safety and security were a mix of firearms and items for securing 
shelters such as plastic sheeting and window covers. One individual listed personal protective 
equipment. Despite a pre-set response option to this question being 14-days’ supply of food 
and water, some used the ‘other’ option to detail food and drink-related supplies. Whilst this 
did include methods for preparing food and drink such as gas stoves, can openers and a water 
purifier, this suggests that many individuals store food and water but not a 14-day supply.   
Each preparedness action had been undertaken primarily for reasons of general preparedness 
(apart from obtaining walkie-talkies). Storing of a spare supply of medication (one 
respondent), storing 14-days’ supply of food and water (one respondent) and obtaining a 
flashlight (and extra batteries) (one respondent) were the only preparedness actions 
undertaken in case of nuclear attack.  
A mean of 3.71 preparedness actions (absolute preparedness) were taken before January 13th, 
2018. Participants had taken a mean of 3.03 actions specifically in preparation for an 
emergency (intentional), significantly more than the mean of 0.75 actions for incidental, non-
emergency reasons (t= 15.21 (df=453), p<0.0001). 
The scree plot for the principal component analysis (Figure 4.2) suggested loading of 
preparedness actions and perceived effort onto three factors. This was confirmed through 
analysis of the pattern matrix output (Table 4.3). Main loadings on component one were the 
preparedness actions rated as requiring the least effort. Component two was made up solely 
of the preparedness action behaviours. Component three comprised the five preparedness 
actions rated most highly for effort.  
I chose to name the factors included in this analysis as preparedness effort (and actions) 
however alternative labels exist such as preparedness usefulness. It was intended that these 
labels signify a counterpoint to efficacy of actions. The accuracy of these labels for intended 
purpose could be ensured using a validation study which might involve checking the accuracy 
of labels with participants or having coders agree labels. However, for the purpose of this 
study, labelling was discussed with the supervisory team and agreed to be a robust way to 




Figure 4.2. Scree plot output of principal components analysis of perceived effort of 
undertaking preparedness actions and rates at which preparedness actions were taken 
Table 4.3. Pattern matrix output of principal components analysis of perceived effort of 
undertaking preparedness actions and rates at which preparedness/actions were taken 
 Component 
 1 2 3 
Preparedness Effort: obtain flashlight 0.99  -0.28 
Preparedness Effort: compile a first aid kit 0.95  -0.10 
Preparedness Effort: obtain battery powered radio 0.92  -0.11 
Preparedness Effort: store medication 0.85   
Preparedness Effort: store cash/documents 0.84   
Preparedness Effort: shelter for 72 hours 0.72  0.14 
Preparedness Effort: store (14 days) food/water 0.72 -0.13 0.19 
Preparedness Effort: shelter for 1 week 0.64  0.33 
Preparedness Effort: watch an online video 0.49  0.33 
Preparedness Action: other  0.71  
Preparedness Action: store (14 days) food/water  0.69  
Preparedness Action: store medication  0.68 0.14 
Preparedness Action: obtain battery powered radio  0.64  
Preparedness Action: store cash/documents  0.64 -0.15 
Preparedness Action: compile a first aid kit  0.58  
Preparedness Action: obtain flashlight  0.54  
Preparedness Action: obtain walkie-talkies  0.45  
Preparedness Effort: evacuate to out of town   0.83 
Preparedness Effort: attend a town hall meeting -0.11  0.76 
Preparedness Effort: evacuate within town 0.23  0.73 
Preparedness Effort: obtain walkie-talkies  -0.19 0.60 




A paired samples t-test comparing mean effort ratings was conducted, which confirmed 
significantly lower effort ratings for the first factor (mean=4.29) compared to the second group 
of ratings (mean=5.93) (t=-12.76 (df=453), p<.0001). These components were tentatively 
labelled as low preparedness effort ratings and high preparedness effort ratings.  
Prior to January 13th, 2018, 44% (n=201) of respondents reported having received some 
information regarding general emergency preparedness and 20% (n=92) specifically for nuclear 
attack. More than half received no information for nuclear preparedness. The most frequently 
reported source of preparedness information was local news media (n=81, 36.5%) with ‘other’ 
sources (including work-place and educational institutions) accounting for the next most 
common response (n=29, 13%). Of those who reported receiving nuclear-specific preparedness 
information, 60% (n=134) had received it during the past year (at the time of survey). Only two 
respondents reported having received nuclear preparedness information from HI-EMA. 
Primary sources of nuclear preparedness information were on the job training or information 
provided via an employer and training or information within educational settings, such as cold 
war preparedness drills or more recently civil defence seminars at university. Two participants 
reported having received information directly from the University of Hawai’i. Additional 
sources of preparedness information included church and YouTube. Nuclear preparedness 
information received was felt to be sufficient by 32% (n=71) of respondents. 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show associations between personal and predictor variables and intentional 




Table 4.4. Association between personal variables and intentional preparedness 
Variable and variable levels % (N) of 
participants 
% within variable 
level (N) scoring 




adjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Gender    
Male 44 (200) 64.5 (129) Reference 
Female 56 (253) 50 (126) 0.52 (0.35-0.78)* 
Prefer not to say 0.2 (1) 100 (1) Not calculated 
Age     
18-39 34 (154) 46 (71) Reference 
40-59 36 (165) 58 (96) 1.76 (1.09-2.82)* 
60+ 29 (132) 66 (87) 2.29 (1.31-4.01)* 
Prefer not to say 0.7 (3) 67 (2) 1.27 (0.11-14.86) 
Dependent Children    
None 66 (300) 59 (176) Reference 
Children <18 living with me 26 (119) 50 (60) 0.89 (0.55-1.44) 
Children >18 living with me 6 (28) 61 (17) 1.01 (0.44-2.32) 
Children not living with me 1.5 (7) 43 (3) 0.41 (0.08-2.08) 
Ethnicity    
Asian 46 (210) 58 (121) Reference 
Native Hawaiian 13 (61) 46 (28) 0.72 (0.39-1.33) 
White 22 (102) 63 (64) 1.06 (0.63-1.76) 
Other 6 (27) 59 (16) 1.07 (0.46-2.50) 
Mixed 12 (54) 50 (27) 0.82 (0.44-1.53) 
Employment    
Not Employed 30 (135) 61 (82) Reference 
Employed 70 (319) 54.5 (174) 1 (0.63-1.58) 
Education level    
Less than degree level 36 (162) 59 (96) Reference 
Degree level 64 (292) 55 (160) 0.64 (0.41-0.98)* 
























Table 4.5. Association between predictor variables and intentional preparedness 
Variable and variable levels % (N) of 
participants 
% within variable 
level (N) scoring 





ratio (95% CI) 
General preparedness information    
A great deal 20 (93) 68 (63) Reference 
Some information 44 (201) 60 (121) 0.75 (0.43-1.30) 
A little information 20 (92) 50 (46) 0.48 (0.25-0.91)* 
No information 15 (68) 38 (26) 0.28 (0.14-0.56)* 
Nuclear preparedness information    
A great deal 5 (23) 61 (14) Reference 
Some information 20 (92) 64 (59) 1.23 (0.45-3.33) 
A little information 23.5 (107) 65 (70) 1.37 (0.51-3.66) 
No information 51 (232) 49 (113) 0.63 (0.25-1.61) 
Source of preparedness information    
Local authorities 10 (23) 69.5 (16) Reference 
Social media 6 (14) 64 (9) 0.80 (0.17-3.84) 
Local news media 36 (81) 63 (51) 0.70 (0.23-2.13) 
National news media 5 (11) 64 (7) 0.77 (0.14-4.05) 
Friends or family  9 (20) 75 (15) 1.03 (0.24-4.51) 
National government sources 7 (16) 75 (12) 1.86 (0.39-8.94) 
Nuclear agencies 0.4 (1) 0 (0) Not calculated 
Emergency services 0.9 (2) 50 (1) 0.58 (0.02-13.29) 
The military 4 (9) 67 (6) 1 (0.17-5.85) 
Other 13 (29) 65.5 (19) 0.87 (0.24-3.19) 
Cannot recall 7 (16) 44 (7) 0.28 (0.06-1.25) 
How recently informed    
During the past year 60 (134) 62 (83) Reference 
1 – 5 years ago 30 (66) 67 (44) 1.45 (0.73-2.86) 
6 – 15 years ago 4 (9) 67 (6) 1.59 (0.33-7.60) 
More than 15 years ago 6 (13) 77 (10) 1.68 (0.39-7.27) 
Information sufficiency    
Yes 32 (71) 75 (53) Reference 
No 43 (96) 66 (63) 0.66 (0.31-1.44) 
Don’t know 25 (55) 49 (27) 0.23 (0.10-0.54)* 
Belief in protection from military    
Fully protected 14 (64) 58 (37) Reference 
Partially protected 40 (180) 65 (117) 1.47 (0.80-2.73) 
Not protected 19 (88) 53 (47) 0.81 (0.41-1.60) 
Don’t know 27 (122) 45 (55) 0.60 (0.31-1.15) 
Low perceived preparedness effort  
(continuous variable) 
4.3 (mean total) 4 (mean within 
variable) 
0.94 (0.87-1.01) 
High perceived preparedness effort 
(continuous variable) 
5.9 (mean total) 5.8 (mean within 
variable) 
0.98 (0.90-1.07) 
*= Significant result 
Adjusted for demographic variables: gender, age, dependent children, ethnicity, employment and education.  
4.3.2.1. Pre-incident communication preferences 
Table 4.6 shows the number of participants who reported a desire to receive pre-incident 
communications for nuclear preparedness. Most (83.5%) reported that they would wish to 
receive information regarding what actions they could take to prepare for a nuclear attack. Of 
147 
 
this group, 90.5% wished to have this information preferably any time before an attack is 
known as opposed to only when an attack is known to be imminent. For those not wishing to 
receive pre-incident preparedness information the most frequently cited reason was ‘I don't 
believe I could be protected if Hawai’i was attacked’ (57%).  
Table 4.6. Summary of responses relating to desire for pre-incident communications 
  % (Frequency) 
Would you want to receive information regarding what actions you could take to prepare for a 
nuclear attack? 
Yes  83 (379) 
No  16.5 (75) 
Total  (454) 
When would be the best time for you to receive information regarding actions to take in a nuclear 
attack? 
Preferably any time before an attack is known 90.5 (343) 
Only when an attack is known to be imminent 9.5 (36) 
Total  (379) 
Note: Respondents who selected ‘No’ in response to the question as to whether they would want to receive pre-incident communications were 
not shown this question 
Why would you not wish to receive preparedness information?  
I don't believe I could be protected if Hawai’i was attacked 57 (43) 
I don't believe Hawai’i will be attacked with a nuclear device 11 (8) 
I do not feel it would be possible to undertake actions advised 7 (5) 
I would be too afraid  4 (3) 
Other  21 (16) 
Total  7(5) 
Note: Respondents who selected ‘Yes’ in response to question as to whether they would want to receive pre-incident communications were not 
shown this question 
 
Fatalistic attitudes were also evident in open text responses as the primary additional reason 
for not wishing to receive preparedness communications for nuclear attack. 
This was often related to aspects specific to Hawai’i such as the size of the islands and building 
materials. One respondent referred to the perceived lack of ability in working class 
communities to take recommended preparedness actions (stockpile; save money; evacuate). A 
small number reported that they would not wish to survive a nuclear attack based on expected 
quality of life. Two respondents suggested they “know enough”. 
Respondents were asked to detail two key pieces of information that they would like to know 
to help them prepare for a nuclear attack. Responses were grouped under the following 
headings: sheltering; evacuation; preparedness actions; protections in the event; defence 
systems and; communication. 
Forms of sheltering-related questions or reported information needs were referred to 140 
times. Many requested information as to the location of nuclear shelters on the islands. Many 
asked how they would know whether to stay at home or leave for a designated shelter. Others 
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wished to improve the effectiveness of their home as a shelter (e.g. “fortification”), including 
ways to create a functional toilet, and for how long to shelter. Other notable shelter-related 
responses were for alternative protections to sheltering at home such as getting underground 
or using storm shelters, and what building materials are safest, including an explanation as to 
why sheltering is recommended. Recommendations, if unable to shelter, such as if driving or 
outside, were also requested.  
Whilst few explicitly used the term evacuation, 53 respondents asked variations on where they 
should go if an attack was imminent. Questions related to the best modes of transport (such as 
if roads are blocked) and where, if anywhere, would “safe areas” be.  
Desire for information about preparedness largely related to knowing what to include in an 
emergency kit or amounts of supplies to store. Again, some from this group said they would 
require preparedness knowledge in case they lacked an appropriate shelter.  
Other respondents expressed concern around “national defence capability and local 
government response preparation” above personal preparedness. This included the ability of 
the military to intercept a nuclear missile and “what level/length of protection that Hawai’i is 
prepared for”. One respondent suggested that knowing that intercept capability is 100% 
accurate is the only way to not be afraid. 
Information to be used in the event of a nuclear blast, as opposed to preparedness, was 
desired by some. Much of this was general information including how food and drink would be 
supplied to affected groups, how communication with loved ones might be achieved and, 
commonly, how to protect not just oneself, but one’s family. Others expressed a desire for 
nuclear specific information: the range of potential damage (would other islands be affected 
by a blast in Honolulu?); how to recognise radiation poisoning; how to avoid exposure; how 
long radiation would take to clear (including how long to remain in a shelter) and; the longer-
term effects of fallout. 
The final category of responses related more closely to emergency risk communication, i.e. 
information that individuals would like to receive in warning messages sent when an attack is 
imminent. Most commonly, this included who launched the attack, where exactly it will hit, 
and how long until impact.  
4.3.3. Adherence with protective instructions 
Table 4.7 shows the proportion of respondents who engaged in various activities after 
receiving the emergency alert. Respondents most frequently reported making efforts to verify 
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that the information was correct or genuine and attempting to make contact with friends or 
family using social media or by phone. Only 8% reported that they sought immediate shelter. 













































Table 4.7. Summary of immediate responses to the alert 
 % (Frequency) 
Which of the following best describes your immediate response to first hearing the warning? 
Made efforts to verify that the information was correct/the warning was 
genuine 
47 (186) 
Got in contact with/tried to get in contact with friends/family using social 
media or by phone   
32 (144) 
Took no action/carried on with what I was doing   22 (87) 
Made efforts to find out protective actions I could take   16 (63) 
Sought immediate shelter   9 (36) 
Immediately initiated a pre-arranged plan   4.5 (18) 
Left home/the place I was at to seek out friends or family   2 (8) 
Other 10 (38) 
Note: respondents who selected ‘I did not hear it until it was known to be a false alarm’ in response to the previous question 
did not see this question 
Why did you take the action you did upon receiving the ballistic missile warning? 
I wished to verify that the information received was accurate   42 (189) 
I wanted to protect my family 24 (111) 
I felt unprepared/lacked knowledge as to what actions I should take   19 (86) 
I wanted to be with family/friends   16 (74) 
I felt prepared/knowledgeable as to what actions I should take   8 (36) 
I thought my actions would protect me 6 (28) 
I did what the warning advised me to do (regardless of whether I felt it the 
safest action or not)   
5 (21) 
I wanted to help others (strangers) who may have been hurt   2 (10) 
My family/friends and I had a pre-arranged meeting place for such an 
emergency 
1 (6) 
Other 6 (28) 
Please select any ways in which you attempted to find out information as to how to protect self / 
others following receipt of the warning 
Contact friends/family 39 (176) 
Searched online (web search)   32 (145) 
Checked on social media   31 (141) 
N/A - (I did not seek information about protective actions when I received the 
warning)  
16 (73) 
Contacted another agency/authority 5 (24) 
Contacted HI-EMA 3 (13) 
Other 22 (101) 
 
Three-hundred and thirty participants (85%) were found to be adherent based on the 
definition of incidental adherence. Fifty-nine (15%) were found to be non-adherent. Non-
adherent individuals included those who left home to seek family and friends (n=8), two who 
detailed ‘other’ non-adherent actions upon receiving the warning whilst at home, and those 
who were outdoors but did not seek shelter (n=47). According to the definition for deliberate 
adherence 51 (13%) were found to have been adherent and 338 (87%) non-adherent. In this 
case, adherent individuals were those who sheltered (n=44), initiated a pre-arranged plan 
(n=2) or did both (n=5).   
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Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show associations between adherence and predictors. Respondents were 
less likely to have been incidentally adherent if they had children over 18 living at home, were 
native Hawaiian or were educated to degree level. Having been outdoors upon receiving the 
alert was significantly associated with incidental adherence, but not with deliberate 
adherence. Being of mixed or other ethnicity was significantly associated with deliberate 
adherence. Those believing an attack to be imminent were more likely to be deliberately 
adherent.  
Thirty-eight participants responded ‘other’ to describe their immediate response to the 
warning. Of these, most sought further information. This included one respondent who 
reported that they waited for the sounding of the siren system for authentication. Other 
respondents could be described as incidentally adherent to the message to shelter. 
Only one respondent reported taking a specific protective action: closing their windows.  
A small number reported actions intended to be protective, but are actually considered non-
adherent, such as going to the local store for supplies or terminating their dialysis treatment to 
return home. One respondent reported actions that could be classed as actively non-adherent. 
Of those respondents who sought further information, checking television news was the most 
common method. Twenty-seven turned on the radio. Emergency services and the military 
were authorities most commonly contacted for information. This included calling 911 (one 
respondent found the line was busy) or police departments directly. Others contacted friends 
or family serving in military positions. A small number reported contacting civil defence or 
public health agencies (county civil defence, department of public safety, Computer 
Emergency Response Team).  
Taking no action or carrying on with what they were doing was reported by 19% (n=87). Those 
who selected this response offered four key reasons as to why they took no action. These were 
categorised as: fatalism, denial, unawareness and uncertainty. 
Fatalism included statements expressing an inability to avoid what is believed to be inevitable 
such as “whatever was to happen would happen”; “if it's coming, we're gonna die anyway” and 
a wish to find a positive in what was believed to be final moments. 
Denial was not as common a category of response as others but included statements such as 
“unlikely to be accurate enough to hit its target”. 
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Unawareness included unawareness of actions that could be taken: “we didn't know what to 
do. It was the first time ever getting that alert, ever”, lack of awareness of the potential 
efficacy of taking protective actions and unawareness of the warning having occurred: “I 
seldom look at my phone”. 
Many respondents illustrated uncertainty when they reported not acting due to not feeling 
that they had adequate information to do so effectively. For example, “I didn't know if my 








































Table 4.8. Association between personal variables and individual responses to missile alert 
Variable and 
variable levels 





















ratio (95% CI) 
Gender      
Male 44 (172) 87 (150) Reference 13 (22) Reference  
Female 55.5 (216) 83 (179) 0.69 (0.38-1.29) 13 (29) 0.98 (0.51-1.86) 
Prefer not to 
say 
0.3 (1) 100 (1) Not Calculated 0 (0) Not Calculated 
Age       
18-39 35 (138) 88 (122) Reference 16 (22) Reference 
40-59 37 (144) 82 (118) 0.71 (0.34-1.46) 16 (23) 0.93 (0.47-1.86) 
60+ 27 (104) 85 (88) 0.87 (0.36-2.10) 6 (6) 0.39 (0.13-1.14) 
Prefer not to 
say 
0.8 (3) 67 (2) 0.12 (0.01-1.64) 0 (0) Not Calculated 
Dependent Children     
None 62 (242) 88 (212) Reference 11 (26) Reference 
Children <18 
living with me 
29.5 (115) 83 (96) 0.85 (0.42-1.71) 21 (24) 1.65 (0.85-3.21) 
Children >18 
living with me 
7 (26) 69 (18) 0.39 (0.13-
0.89)* 
0 (0) Not Calculated 
Children not 
living with me 
1.5 (6) 67 (4) 0.25 (0.04-1.70) 17 (1) 2.77 (0.29-
26.85) 
Ethnicity      
Asian 45.5 (177) 86 (152) Reference 8 (15) Reference 
Native 
Hawaiian 
14 (55) 73 (40) 0.39 (0.18-
0.86)* 
13 (7) 1.28 (0.47-3.51) 
White 22 (85) 88 (75) 1.13 (0.50-2.56) 13 (11) 1.89 (0.80-4.45) 
Other 6 (24) 79 (19) 0.63 (0.20-1.93) 25 (6) 4.29 (1.35-
13.29)* 
Mixed 12 (48) 92 (44) 1.64 (0.52-5.14) 25 (15) 3.16 (1.31-
7.61)* 
Employment        
Not Employed 28 (108) 85 (92) Reference 10 (11) Reference 
Employed 72 (281) 85 (238) 1.20 (0.59-2.45) 14 (40) 1.09 (0.49-2.44) 
Education 
level 
     
Less than 
degree level 
36.5 (142) 91 (129) Reference 11 (16) Reference  
Degree level 63.5 (247) 81 (201) 0.36 (0.17-
0.74)* 
14 (35) 1.42 (0.71-2.86) 









Table 4.9. Association between predictor variables and individual responses to missile alert 
Variable and 
variable levels 





















ratio (95% CI) 
Location upon receiving warning 
Indoors 84 (328) 97 (317) Reference 12 (39) Reference 
Outdoors 16 (61) 21 (13) 0.00 (0.00-
0.01)* 
20 (12) 1.75 (0.79-3.87) 
By what means was the message received? 
SMS from HI-
EMA 
74 (289) 86 (248) Reference 13 (38) Reference 
Warning siren 2 (8) 75 (6) 0.94 (0.14-6.50) 25 (2) 4.10 (0.60-27.90) 
National news 0.5 (2) 100 (2) Not Calculated 0 (0) Not Calculated 
Local news 2.5 (10) 100 (10) Not Calculated 20 (2) 1.91 (0.30-12.22) 
Word of 
mouth 
18 (69) 80 (55) 0.58 (0.28-1.21) 11.5 (8) 0.79 (0.33-1.87) 
Other means 3 (11) 82 (9) 1.07 (0.21-5.52) 9 (1) 1.03 (0.12-9) 
Was the message believed to be from HI-EMA? 
Yes 79 (308) 83 (257) Reference 15 (45) Reference 
No – a 
different 
source 
5 (18) 89 (16) 1.46 (0.31-6.93) 5.5 (1) 0.36 (0.05-2.91) 
No- hoax 16 (63) 90 (57) 1.96 (0.77-5.02) 8 (5) 0.49 (0.17-1.39) 
Was an attack believed to be imminent? 
No (hoax or 
mistake) 
46.5 (181) 87 (157) Reference 5 (9) Reference 
Yes 53 (208) 83 (173) 0.83 (0.45-1.54) 20 (42) 5.14 (2.31-
11.42)* 
Prior level of disaster preparedness information received 
A great deal 19 (75) 83 (62) Reference 8 (6) Reference 
Some 
information 
44 (172) 87 (149) 1.18 (0.53-2.63) 16 (28) 2.60 (0.96-7) 
A little 
information 
21.5 (84) 81 (68) 0.74 (0.30-1.80) 12 (10) 2.23 (0.70-7.04) 
No 
information 
15 (58) 88 (51) 1.11 (0.38-3.24) 12 (7) 1.97 (0.57-6.82) 
Prior level of nuclear preparedness information received 
A great deal 6 (22) 86 (19) Reference 23 (5) Reference 
Some 
information 
20 (79) 91 (72) 1.71 (0.37-7.96) 19 (15) 1.03 (0.30-3.52) 
A little 
information 
23 (91) 77 (70) 0.44 (0.11-1.80) 14 (13) 0.69 (0.20-2.36) 
No 
information 
51 (197) 86 (169) 0.76 (0.19-3.02) 9 (18) 0.35 (0.11-1.13) 
Belief in protection from military 
Fully 
protected 
15 (57) 88 (50) Reference 19 (11) Reference 
Partially 
protected 
38 (148) 84 (125) 0.84 (0.32-2.16) 10 (15) 0.50 (0.21-1.23) 
Not protected 20 (77) 88 (68) 1.31 (0.42-4.04) 19 (15) 1.11 (0.44-2.79) 





56 (256) 71 (182) 0.66 (0.36-1.23) 11 (28) 1.07 (0.57-2.01) 
Perceived 













*= Significant result 
Adjusted for demographic variables: gender, age, dependent children, ethnicity, employment and education.  
Respondents were motivated to take the actions that they did by a desire to verify that the 
information received was accurate, to protect their family or to be with family or friends. 
Among reasons given for taking actions in response to the alert, more respondents reported 
feeling unprepared or lacking knowledge as to what actions they should take, than feeling 
prepared or knowledgeable. This is reflected in respondents attempting to find out 
information by contacting friends and family, whilst 32% searched online and 31% checked on 
social media. Only 5% reported that they did what the warning advised them to do. 
In analysis of ‘other’ reasons given for actions taken in response to the warning, the following 
themes emerged: Being prepared (and wishing to adhere); Lacking preparedness and; 
Fatalism. 
Those who acted on preparedness knowledge cited hurricane and tsunami protection, though 
mentioned no specific actions. One respondent did recall nuclear specific disaster 
preparedness. 
Others referred to a need to find shelter, be it their own home, shelter in low altitude locations 
or finding what they perceived to be a more effective shelter.  
Whilst knowledge of protective actions (shelter-in-place) were referred to by one further 
respondent, some who reported a lack of preparedness stated not knowing how to respond or 
being confused. 
Further reasons for not taking protective steps were a belief that the islands would be 
destroyed by nuclear attack (a belief shared by many) or at least communications being wiped 
out. These attitudes resulted in a many making statements such as there was “nothing could 
be done but wait”. 
4.3.4. Belief in message  
Table 4.10 shows whether participants believed the message had been sent by HI-EMA and if 
an attack was imminent. 69% of those who received the alert (before being made aware it was 
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a false alarm) believed it to have been a genuine HI-EMA warning. Of that group, 53% also 
believed an attack to be imminent. Among the group who believed an attack to be imminent 
13% adhered to protective instructions.  
Table 4.10. Summary of responses related to whether respondents believed the alert 
  % (Frequency) 
Did you believe that it had been sent by HI-EMA?  
Yes  69 (312) 
No – I believed the warning to be a hoax  14 (63) 
No – I believed the warning to be from a source other than HI-EMA  4 (18) 
N/A (I did not hear it until it was known to be a false alarm)  13 (61) 
Total  (454) 
Did you believe that an attack was imminent?  
Yes  53 (208) 
No - I believed the warning to be a hoax or a mistake or that it would 
come to nothing 
 47 (182) 
Total  (390) 
Note: those who selected ‘I did not hear it until it was known to be a false alarm’ did not see this question 
 
Tables 4.11 and 4.12 show associations between personal and predictor variables with 
believing an attack to be imminent upon receiving the warning and subsequently adhering to 
protective instructions. People were significantly more likely to believe an attack to be 
imminent if they were: female, had children under 18 living with them, had received no 
previous general disaster preparedness information, did not believe preparedness information 
to have been sufficient and perceived there to be moderate to very high risk of nuclear attack 
occurring against Hawai’i. Individuals aged over 40 years, those who did not believe the 
warning to be a genuine HI-EMA alert and those who received disaster preparedness 
information between six and 15 years previously were significantly less likely to believe an 
attack to be imminent. Individuals of mixed ethnicity and those first alerted to the warning via 
emergency siren were significantly more likely to believe an attack imminent as well as adhere 
to protective instructions, whilst individuals who believe Hawai’i to be partially protected by 
the military were less likely to believe an attack was imminent or to adhere with the 








Table 4.11. Associations between personal variables and believing an attack to be imminent 
coupled with adhering to protective instructions/taking protective action 
Variable and 
variable levels 




level (N) of 
participants 
believing an 
attack to be 
imminent 
adjusted odds 
ratio (95% CI) 
% within 
variable 
level (N) of 
participants 
believing an 







ratio (95% CI) 
Gender      
Male 44 (172) 44 (76) Reference 9 (16) Reference 
Female 55.5 (216) 61 (131) 1.87 (1.21-2.88)* 12 (26) 1.10 (0.51-2.38) 
Prefer not to 
say 
0.3 (1) 100 (1) Not calculated 0 (0) Not calculated 
Age      
18-39 35 (138) 64 (89) Reference 14 (19) Reference 
40-59 37 (144) 51 (73) 0.53 (0.31-0.89)* 12.5 (18) 1.21 (0.53-2.75) 
60+ 27 (104) 43 (45) 0.52 (0.28-0.95)* 5 (5) 0.44 (0.12-1.56) 
Prefer not to 
say 
0.8 (3) 33 (1) 0.40 (0.03-5.03) 0 (0) Not calculated 
Dependent Children 
None 62 (242) 46.5 (113) Reference 9 (22) Reference 
Children <18 
living with me 
29.5 (115) 67 (77) 2.15 (1.27-3.63)* 16.5 (19) 1.06 (0.49-2.31) 
Children >18 
living with me 
7 (26) 58 (15) 1.84 (0.79-4.29) 0 (0) Not calculated 
Children not 
living with me 
1.5 (6) 50 (3) 1.08 (0.19-6.10) 17 (1) 3.36 (0.27-
41.65) 
Ethnicity      
Asian 45.5 (177) 48 (86) Reference 7 (13) Reference 
Native 
Hawaiian 
14 (55) 76 (42) 2.56 (1.24-5.27) 9 (5) 0.71 (0.22-2.31) 
White 22 (85) 48 (41) 1.19 (0.68-2.06) 12 (10) 2.25 (0.82-6.14) 
Other 6 (24) 50 (12) 0.90 (0.36-2.24) 12.5 (3) 2.43 (0.51-
11.65) 
Mixed 12 (48) 56 (27) 1.04 (0.53-2.07) 23 (11) 3.32 (1.21-
9.14)* 
Employment      
Not Employed 28 (108) 49.5 (54) Reference 8 (9) Reference 
Employed 72 (281) 55 (154) 1.03 (0.62-1.71) 12 (33) 1.06 (0.40-2.84) 
Education 
level 
     
Less than 
degree level 
36.5 (142) 57 (82) Reference 10 (14) Reference 
Degree level 63.5 (247) 51 (126) 0.88 (0.56-1.40) 11 (28) 1.44 (0.65-3.20) 






Table 4.12. Associations between variables and believing an attack to be imminent coupled 
with adhering to protective instructions/taking protective action 
Variable and 
variable levels 























ratio (95% CI) 
Location upon receiving warning 
Indoors 84 (328) 53 (174) Reference 10 (33) Reference 
Outdoors 16 (61) 56 (34) 1.05 (0.57-1.92) 15 (9) 2.13 (0.81-5.65) 
By what means was the message received? 
SMS from HI-
EMA 
74 (289) 57 (164) Reference 11 (31) Reference 
Warning siren 2 (8) 62.5 (5) 0.83 (0.16-4.17) 25 (2) 18.30 (1.04-
322.25)* 
National news 0.5 (2) 0 (0) Not calculated 0 (0) Not calculated 
Local news 2.5 (10) 60 (6) 1.25 (0.31-5.05) 20 (2) 5.35 (0.54-52.94) 
Word of 
mouth 
18 (69) 40.5 (28) 0.52 (0.29-0.92) 10 (7) 1.24 (0.43-3.59) 
Other means 3 (11) 45 (5) 0.70 (0.19-2.60) 0 (0) Not calculated 
Was the message believed to be from HI-EMA? 
Yes 79 (309) 65 (201) Reference 13 (41) Reference 
No – a 
different 
source 
5 (18) 33 (6) 0.23 (0.07-
0.72)* 
0 (0) Not calculated 
No- hoax 8 (63) 1.5 (1) 0.01 (0.00-
0.05)* 
1.5 (1) Not calculated 
Prior level of disaster preparedness information received 
A great deal 19 (75) 43 (32) Reference 7 (5) Reference 
Some 
information 
44 (173) 52 (90) 1.46 (0.81-2.63) 13 (23) 1.93 (0.60-6.25) 
A little 
information 
21.5 (84) 56 (47) 1.72 (0.86-3.42) 9.5 (8) 1.34 (0.34-5.24) 
No 
information 
15 (58) 67 (39) 2.68 (1.22-
5.86)* 
10 (6) 1.13 (0.27-4.76) 
Prior level of nuclear preparedness information received 
A great deal 6 (22) 45 (10) Reference 14 (3) Reference 
Some 
information 
20 (79) 59 (47) 1.85 (0.63-5.38) 16 (13) 0.92 (0.17-5.01) 
A little 
information 
23 (91) 53 (48) 1.32 (0.46-3.77) 10 (9) 0.51 (0.94-2.78) 
No 
information 
51 (198) 52 (103) 1.22 (0.45-3.32) 8 (17) 0.38 (0.07-1.93) 
Source of preparedness information  
Local 
authorities 
12 (23) 48 (11) Reference 9 (2) Reference 
Social media 7 (14) 78.5 (11) 1.71 (0.32-9) 21 (3) 5.58 (0.37-85.07) 
Local news 
media 





5 (9) 55.5 (5) 0.56 (0.09-3.47) 0 (0) Not calculated 
Friends or 
family  





7 (13) 61.5 (8) 1.38 (0.30-6.30) 15 (2) 2.90 (0.19-43.83) 
Nuclear 
agencies 
0.5 (1) 100 (1) Not calculated 0 (0) Not calculated 
Emergency 
services 
1 (2) 100 (2) Not calculated 0 (0) Not calculated 
The military 4 (7) 43 (3) 1.16 (0.16-8.40) 14 (1) 1.77 (0.05-58.26) 
Other 12 (23) 52 (12) 0.65 (0.17-2.48) 26 (6) 16.49 (1.49-
181.97) 
Cannot recall 8 (15) 33 (5) 0.22 (0.04-1.15) 13 (2) 39.98 (0.85-
1869.75) 
How recently informed of preparedness information 
During the 
past year 
60 (116) 59 (68) Reference 14 (16) Reference 
1 – 5 years 
ago 
31 (59) 58 (34) 0.97 (0.47-1.98) 10 (6) 0.88 (0.25-3.08) 
6 – 15 years 
ago 
3 (6) 17 (1) 0.10 (0.01-1)* 17 (1) Not calculated 
More than 15 
years ago 
6 (11) 18 (2) 0.20 (0.03-1.15) 18 (2) Not calculated 
Belief that preparedness information was sufficient 
Yes 31 (59) 41 (24) Reference 10 (6) Reference 
No 46 (88) 67 (59) 4.06 (1.78-
9.22)* 
18 (16) 1.75 (0.44-6.93) 
Don’t know 23 (45) 49 (22) 1.84 (0.75-4.52) 7 (3) 0.54 (0.09-3.09) 
Belief in protection from military 
Fully 
protected 
15 (57) 53 (30) Reference 17.5 (10) Reference 
Partially 
protected 
38 (149) 52 (77) 0.87 (0.45-1.67) 7 (11) 0.34 (0.12-1.01)* 
Not protected 20 (77) 58 (45) 1.29 (0.62-2.70) 14 (11) 0.64 (0.21-1.92) 
Don’t know 27 (107) 52 (56) 0.84 (0.42-1.69) 9 (10) 0.49 (0.16-1.50) 
Perceived likelihood of nuclear attack 
No risk at all 9 (35) 31 (11) Reference 11 (4) Reference 
A little risk 49 (190) 37 (70) 1.22 (0.55-2.74) 7 (13) 0.33 (0.07-1.45) 
Moderate risk 30 (118) 74.5 (88) 5.52 (2.33-
13.08)* 
12 (14) 0.24 (0.05-1.07) 
Quite a high 
risk 
7 (27) 81 (22) 6.29 (1.78-
22.19)* 
30 (8) 0.77 (0.13-4.52) 
Very high risk 5 (20) 85 (17) 11.35 (2.59-
49.77)* 
15 (3) 0.29 (0.04-1.87) 
Intentional 
Preparedness 
48 (217) 50 (109) 0.95 (0.61-1.46) 13 (28) 0.99 (0.47-2.09) 
*= Significant result 
Note: Adjusted for demographic variables: gender, age, dependent children, ethnicity, employment and education.  
4.3.4.1. Trust in source 
Table 4.13 shows the ranking of trust that participants gave to sources of information. HI-EMA 
was the most trusted source to provide nuclear emergency preparedness information, 
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followed by nuclear agencies and the federal government. Medical staff and online 
forums/social media were rated lowest. 
Table 4.13. Rankings of trust in pre-incident nuclear preparedness information sources 
Rank (1 = 
most highly 







1 HI-EMA 3.85 2.89 
2 Nuclear agencies (e.g. the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA); Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC)) 
4 2.87 
3 Federal Government 5.10 2.91 
4 Local authorities (e.g. the Mayor) 5.50 3.01 
5 Emergency services (e.g. police; fire brigade) 6.08 2.72 
6 National News Media 6.83 2.95 
7 Local News Media 6.95 3.48 
8 The Military 7.02 3.62 
9 Friends and Family 7.03 3.69 
10 Scientists 7.67 3.20 
11 Medical staff or resources 8.26 2.65 
12 Online Forums/social media 9.36 2.75 
Note: Rank 1 = most likely to trust if communicating information; 12 = least likely 
4.4. Discussion 
For many who experienced the false nuclear alert in Hawai’i, it represented a genuine moment 
of fear. In this study, 53% (n=208) of respondents reported that at the time, they believed a 
nuclear attack was imminent and while they undertook sheltering in line with the message 
instruction, those who doubted that message were ultimately right to do so. Further, 
participants had undertaken approximately three actions for emergency preparedness and a 
large majority reported a desire to receive greater preparedness education. The incident 
therefore represents an unprecedented chance to study how a population reacted to a 
credible nuclear alert and how we can better prepare our populations for such an eventuality.  
4.4.1. Preparedness 
An aim of this study was to identify how many people possess adequate supplies within their 
home to allow them to cope with an emergency and the amount who possess these items 
specifically to prepare for a nuclear emergency.  
The Hawai’i population appear reasonably well prepared for a general emergency, with 81%, 
for example, reporting that they have put together a first aid kit. Indeed, when asked about a 
range of preparedness behaviours, it was apparent that significantly more preparedness 
actions were taken intentionally for emergency purposes than had been taken incidentally – in 
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other words the presence of flashlights or first aid kit in the house was typically a deliberate 
attempt to prepare for an emergency rather than reflecting day to day acquisition of useful 
tools. Interestingly, subjective accounts in other sources seem to disagree with this finding. For 
example, Wallis (2018) in a perspective piece for the Washington Post stated: 
“We’re not really disaster preppers on Oahu. Most of us grab our hurricane provisions 
in a mad rush…in the days before a storm hits. Our sense of community, known as 
ohana, is strong. We all sink or swim together. So that was the excuse I’d given myself 
for not ensuring that we were prepared as a family to shelter” 
Whilst this exact sentiment was not expressed in response to this survey, it is perhaps echoed 
in fatalistic reasons given by some for not preparing for an emergency, and to explain their 
preference to not receive preparedness information. For example: 
“I feel it’s not worth trying to over plan and try(ing) to prepare for every situation. 
Some things will happen and so be it” 
In this study, however, such attitudes appeared to be in the minority. In comparison with 
levels of preparedness identified elsewhere (previous studies such as Page et al., 2008 and my 
focus group study, Chapter 3) this survey data suggest that preparedness in the Hawai’i public 
is remarkably high.   
For some of the preparedness actions, the apparently high level of uptake may appear 
unlikely. For example, 44% of respondents reported having obtained and stored a 14-day 
supply of water. In practice, this may be less effortful than it appears. Figure 4.3 shows what 
the City and County of Honolulu’s Department of Emergency Management believe a 14-day 





Figure 4.3. A 14-day minimum drinking water supply for emergency survival (7 Gallons of water 
per person. Ex: 1 x 10g Water Cooler or 2 x 5g or 7 x 1g jugs (City and County of Honolulu’s 
Department of Emergency Management, 2019). Permission for use requested from 
https://dod.hawaii.gov/hiema/ 
For other preparedness activities, this data suggests there might be room for improvement. 
Obtaining walkie-talkies was rated as being amongst the most effortful preparedness actions 
(together with being prepared to shelter or evacuate for prolonged periods). This could explain 
why it was the least frequently undertaken preparedness action. It is unclear what people find 
effortful about buying walkie-talkies, but we could speculate that it is perceived unavailability 
or cost relative to other items, or perhaps more likely, that they are deemed an unnecessary 
item since mobile and smart phones became a universally owned and more functional 
commodity. 
Regarding individual predictors of preparedness, relatively few variables that were tested 
showed any significant association with a participant having intentionally prepared for an 
emergency. In addition to those over 40 years old being more likely to have intentionally 
prepared than younger respondents, females, those educated to degree level, those who 
reported having received little or no general disaster preparedness information and those who 
expressed not knowing whether the preparedness information they had received was 
sufficient, were all less likely to have taken preparedness measures.  
That people who feel they have received sufficient information tended to be more prepared is 
supported by many previous studies (e.g. Maidl and Buchecker, 2015; Mileti and Fitzpatrick, 
1992; Perko et al., 2014). The finding lends additional weight to the idea that educating the 
public about disaster risks may have public health benefits. A problem exists, however, in 
terms of causality. It remains unclear whether some people are simply inclined to both prepare 
and to seek information, or if it is receipt of information that causes a person to prepare. 
Indeed, it is possible that both are true.  
In this survey, no associations between preparedness and perceived likelihood of a nuclear 
attack, or disaster of unspecified type occurring during respondent’s lifetimes were found to 
be significant. This is in contrast to previous research, reviewed in Chapter 2, that suggests that 
preparedness behaviour is associated with perceived likelihood, coping efficacy, perceived 
front-line preparedness and worry, while information seeking specific to nuclear emergencies 
is influenced by cognitive factors including, but not limited to, perceived likelihood and likely 
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personal impact of a nuclear disaster, perceived coping efficacy and worry (Lee and Lemyre, 
2009).  
Where nuclear-specific preparedness was found to be lacking, this could be attributed to a lack 
of preparedness knowledge. Approximately half of respondents reported not having received 
pre-nuclear incident preparedness information prior to January 13th, 2018. Furthermore, 
threats that are perhaps more salient, such as proximity to an active volcano, are also viewed 
as more enduring risks and considered a higher priority for preparedness. Taking actions to 
prepare for risks perceived as more likely to occur negates the need to separately prepare for 
newer risks such as nuclear attack. An interesting point of comparison would be another 
population who are historically at less risk of catastrophic disaster (i.e. have not been recently 
suggested to be within the reach of nuclear weapons belonging to a hostile state, and do not 
reside in proximity to an active volcano).  
Moreover, whilst the population appear well-prepared, the low rates of incidental 
preparedness suggest that preparedness planners cannot rely on the public already possessing 
recommended items, but instead should use knowledge and engagement in general disaster 
preparedness amongst the population to demonstrate how prepared they are also for nuclear 
attack.  
4.4.1.1. Pre-incident communication preferences 
Another aim of this study was to assess the desire for pre-incident information relating to 
nuclear preparedness following the false alert. The majority of respondents (n=379, 83.5%) 
appeared to have this desire. Of this sample 90.5% (n=343) reported preferring to receive 
information any time before an attack is known rather than only when a threat is imminent. 
Only eight respondents stated that they did not want pre-incident communications as they did 
not believe that Hawai’i will be attacked with a nuclear device.  
Further support for the desire for protection-related information comes from the actions 
people engaged in when they initially received the emergency alert: only 16% did not seek 
information about protective actions after receiving the warning. Not only does this indicate a 
desire for protective information but also a failure in the effectiveness of the warning message 
itself. This is despite extensive efforts by Hawai’ian authorities, including HI-EMA, in providing 
preparedness education to the public prior to this time (e.g. HI-EMA, 2017). 
In terms of the specific pieces of information that responders reported needing, many 
requested information about what constitutes an effective shelter and where to go if a nuclear 
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missile was incoming (e.g. “the best place to shelter within 5 minutes of my work and home”). 
This indicated either that many individuals receiving the missile warning were unaware that 
they can shelter in their own home, did not believe their own home to be an effective shelter 
from radiation, or both. Without increased public knowledge of sheltering-in-place the public 
may leave a viable shelter. This is an important issue to be addressed in pre-incident 
communication.   
4.4.2. Adherence 
A further aim of this study was to identify the prevalence of behaviours that were deliberately 
adherent to the instruction to shelter or that were incidentally adherent (i.e. following the 
guidance or being adherent by virtue of circumstances such as being in bed at the time). 
Initial inspection of outcomes suggested that large numbers were adherent to the instruction 
to “seek immediate shelter”. However further exploration of the data revealed an important 
caveat to this. The alert was sent at 8am on a Saturday morning; many participants were 
adherent to the advice simply because they already happened to be indoors at home (i.e. 
sheltering) when they received it. Factors that influenced non-adherence with instructions to 
shelter such as a desire to be with, or to protect loved ones, was reported by between 
74(198.83%) to 111(-28.24%) of respondents. This suggest that separation from one’s family 
during the normal working day is likely to result in defiance, or hearing the warning, knowing 
what is the recommended action, yet choosing not to adhere. Irrespective of time of day, this 
non-adherence is familiar in hurricane response where people have been found to shelter or 
evacuate in accordance with instruction, only if able to do so with family (Smith and McCarty, 
2009).  
Rates of deliberate adherence were associated with few personal variables (being of other or 
mixed ethnicity) and one predictor (believing an attack to be imminent) and appears low in 
comparison to anticipated adherence rates identified in my review of the literature (Chapter 
2). For example, Gerber et al. (2006) found only 33% of US capital region residents were 
unlikely to comply with sheltering instructions in a nuclear emergency; sheltering instructions 
in a nuclear plant emergency are likely to inspire less adherence (e.g. 8%: Nyaku, 2014) whilst 
actual evacuation instruction adherence has consistently been found to be higher (e.g. 54%: 
Cutter, 1982). 
Many of the predictors of adherence or behaviours identified in this study fit with existing 
models of risk communication. Particularly, lack of awareness of the message and not believing 
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the threat to be real relate directly to Mileti and Fitzpatrick’s (1992) first and final stages in the 
process of shaping risk perception and subsequent behaviour. Mileti and Fitzpatrick’s second 
stage, ‘confirm,’ can be seen in the most commonly observed behaviour in response to the 
warning, that of information seeking. Perceived likelihood is a factor in motivating action, 
found by Mileti and Fitzpatrick to influence interactive searching for information, and 
subsequently driving decisions of how to respond. Not only this, but risk information is often 
confirmed when delivered personally and reiterated, perhaps by a social acquaintance. In this 
survey, confirmation via social acquaintance was a particularly common response; this could 
also be seen in the many screenshots that alert recipients placed on social media (e.g. Broder 
van Dyke, 2018; Reinstein, 2018). Those same processes drive the third stage of risk perception 
forming and behaviour - ‘understanding’ - and shows that it is not enough to simply warn the 
public of risk.  
Information seeking is undoubtedly a natural response; however, in a nuclear emergency it is 
unlikely to be a practical one given the short time frame between the public being made aware 
and needing to act. This emphasises the importance of preparedness since the public are 
unlikely to rely on a sole source of information regarding such a serious threat. In the event of 
a real nuclear emergency, the reduced time to impact that exists following this process of 
information seeking (or other actions such as contacting loved ones) will mean individuals will 
be left with little time to take other protective actions.  
When asked for their reasons for not taking protective action, participants expressed fatalism, 
denial, uncertainty and lack of awareness. Not only do these closely follow reasons for not 
being prepared for a nuclear emergency, but they also appear in literature identified in 
previous chapters of this PhD (e.g. fatalism: Preston, 2014; denial: Alexander and Klein, 2005; 
lack of awareness: Prezelj et al., 2015) and in my focus groups (lack of consensus). Despite this, 
most who received the warning acted on it in some way, either by seeking shelter, trying to 
verify the message, making efforts to find out what protective actions to take, initiating a pre-
arranged plan, or attempting to contact loved ones. This certainly suggests that the message 
had an impact on the population, motivating action of some kind, albeit in many cases, not the 
desired actions. Other than remaining indoors, 88% did not report acting in a way specifically 
to protect themselves (i.e. initiating a pre-arranged plan or purposely following the instruction 
to shelter). This suggests that organisations charged with informing the public of nuclear 
disaster protections must work to guide the public in issues of preparedness, including how an 
alert of this kind will look and what it means, as well as providing adequate information in 
emergency risk communications sent in the event of an attack. Future research of this kind 
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could use hierarchical regression to analyse the variance between different groups for whose 
survey responses are nested in terms of different levels of preparedness, different 
demographic profile and previous preparedness education received, for example, to draw 
greater insight into who adheres to these messages and predictors of that adherence. 
4.4.2.1. Belief in message 
The next aim was to identify who believed the message to constitute a genuine emergency 
alert. It may be that believing an attack to be imminent is a stronger motivator of adherence 
than believing that there is a risk of an attack sometime in the indeterminate future. Indeed, 
there was a strong association between deliberate adherence and belief that an attack was 
imminent in this study.  
A wide range of factors were associated with believing an attack to be imminent. This included 
being female, under 40 years old and having children under 18 living at home. Understandably, 
not believing the warning to have genuinely come from HI-EMA or it being a hoax meant 
respondents were less likely to believe an attack was imminent. More generally, those who 
believed that there was a moderate to high risk of a nuclear attack during their lifetime were 
also more likely to believe that an attack was imminent upon receiving the alert. 
It is interesting that there was an association between being first made aware of the threat by 
hearing the sirens sounding and belief in an incoming missile coupled with subsequent 
adherence to the instruction in the SMS. This suggests a confirmation effect, relating once 
again to Miletti and Fitzpatrick’s Causal Sequence of Risk Communication. Specifically, if 
people naturally try to confirm the message, they do not feel the need to when they hear a 
siren first. Instead they save time and act more quickly. It is with this small sample of 
respondents that HI-EMA’s emergency warning system can be said to have been most 
effective.  
Like adherence outcomes, no association was found between preparedness and belief that an 
attack was imminent. Scepticism towards threats has been demonstrated before, such as in 
Rubin and colleagues’ (2015) study of swine flu risk communication which suggested white 
males and older people are more likely to be sceptical. Of course, in this instance, Hawai’ians 
were right to doubt the message. This may suggest that scepticism in the message is also 
associated with the nature and familiarity of the hazard. A review of factors affecting 
preparedness and warning response by Tierney and colleagues (2002) found most empirically 
supported associations with adherent responses included individual and group-level factors 
(including knowledge of the hazard) and factors associated with warning messages (including 
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personal communication, message specificity and credibility/familiarity of the source). It is 
noted that the warnings in Tierney’s review varied in recommended action, the agent involved 
and amount of time that recipients had to respond. 
4.4.2.2. Trust in source 
The final aim was to assess whether certain variables were associated with adherence and 
preparedness outcome variables and to gather additional data that would be of use in 
developing improved communications with the population. One central variable assessed was 
trust in information sources.  
Upon receiving the alert, the most frequently used sources of protective-action information 
were friends and family, online searching and social media. Although these sources were also 
used to check the authenticity of the warning, this is interesting as they were also ranked 
amongst the lowest for trustworthiness. This may tell us that in time poor emergency 
situations such as this, people will look to maximise the effectiveness of the actions that they 
take and where possible, in this case, checking the safety of loved ones and looking to receive 
guidance at the same time. Pre-incident, only one respondent reported that their nuclear-
specific preparedness information came from nuclear agencies despite nuclear agencies being 
rated second highest for trust. Consideration should be given regarding the accessibility and 
visibility of preferred information sources particularly with the current accessibility of less-
trusted social media and online resources.  
4.4.3. Limitations 
One limitation to consider in relation to this survey is the range of variables that were 
included. Some variables identified in Chapter 3 (focus groups) as potentially relevant were not 
tested here. These include perceived efficacy of preparedness actions. This was considered for 
inclusion, but it was decided that a central aspect of this study, given the context, was 
adherence to the warning instruction. Despite a generally good level of preparedness in this 
sample, inclusion of variables related to efficacy of actions may allow for understanding of 
incidences where low rates of preparedness are observed. Another key outcome from the 
focus group phase was that preparedness actions are unlikely to be undertaken if perceived 
effort is high even when risk perception toward the threat is high. This was not explored since 
so few participants in this study reported having prepared specifically for a nuclear emergency. 
Multiple hypotheses were tested in this study, raising the possibility of type 1 errors occurring. 
This hypothesis testing approach meant that associations between each predictor variable, 
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while adjusting for demographic variables were tested individually. But this does leave open 
the question of whether these particular variables fully explain preparedness and response of 
this population. Another approach would have been to combine the variables in a regression 
model. This would have allowed me to assess the amount of variance in the outcomes that 
could be explained by these variables such as by generating an R-squared statistic to show the 
variability of the response data around the mean of the outcome. In logistic regression there is 
no R square equivalent to demonstrate this. Future iterations of this study might benefit by 
taking this approach to the analysis. 
Other study limitations exist in the form of potential biases. Whilst anecdotally described as a 
‘flashbulb moment’ for many people in Hawai’i, the passage of time may mean that the 
accuracy of participant’s recall of events surrounding the alert was poor. Of perhaps more 
importance, however, is recall bias. For example, respondents may have retrospectively 
considered themselves to have been adherent to the instruction to shelter, discounting actual 
actions taken immediately upon receiving the warning prior to sheltering. Participants may 
also have been more likely to recall preparedness information received if they then went on to 
use that information in the event; this could create a misleading impression of how effective 
the preparedness information they received was. Similarly, participants may not have recalled 
all relevant preparedness items that they have. For example, a water butt in the garden may 
contain a 14-day supply of water but might only have been recalled and reported by 
participants who, for whatever reason, are more focussed on disaster preparedness. A degree 
of recall bias may also explain why only half of those believing the alert came from HI-EMA 
also apparently believed there to be an imminent attack – it could be that the benefit of 
hindsight led some respondents to re-evaluate whether they had really believed the alert at 
the time. 
Selection bias may also be a reason to exercise some caution whilst interpreting these results. 
The ballistic missile false alert undoubtedly would have caused varying emotional impact on 
the Hawai’i population that it affected. Not only are those who experienced a particularly 
intense emotional response potentially the most likely to have responded or changed their 
behaviour in a particular way. They may also be those more motivated to take part in this 
survey. Outcomes may therefore be skewed towards certain behaviour or beliefs, such as 
higher rates of preparedness than that typical for Hawai’ians.  
It may also be that certain groups are more likely to respond to an online survey. This can also 
be linked to the sampling strategy employed during recruitment, which raises a question 
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around external validity: market research participants and university students are not 
necessarily fully representative of the Hawai’i population and so these outcomes are limited in 
their generalisability to the wider population. 
4.4.4. Implications 
4.4.4.1. For Hawai’i civil defence and policy 
News and online media reports of the immediate response of the Hawai’i population were 
conflicting: the missile alert triggered either panic and chaotic scenes (BBC, 2018), or fatalistic 
acceptance (Hennigan, 2018; Reinstein, 2018) depending on the report. The outcomes of this 
study suggest that neither was the case. Instead, more measured responses took place: not 
necessarily following the instruction to shelter, but rather seeking information, either to clarify 
or verify the warning message or to better understand the actions that should be taken to 
offer protection. This does however suggest, as articulated by Irwin Redlener, Director of 
Columbia University’s Center for Disaster Preparedness, an “utter failure to educate the public 
about what to do in the event of a nuclear detonation” (Redlener, 2018).  
Public preparedness initiatives, particularly those relating to catastrophic emergencies, have 
been shown to be a double-edged sword. Increased awareness of preparedness and protective 
actions, in addition to nuclear emergency procedures has obvious benefits to the public who 
are more educated in actions they might take in preparing for and responding to such an 
emergency, whilst concurrently increasing a sense of alarm and anxiety in the public. 
Redlener’s advice is to “go public” with what we know about protective actions, giving us the 
best chances of survival, or at least reducing harm. This includes “remind(ing) people that our 
society can and would survive a single bomb”. Whilst transparency and honesty of public 
officials is perhaps the safest way to ensure trust is maintained on the part of the public, if 
done badly, such as by not considering public wants and needs in communications, it may have 
the opposite than desired effect, reinforcing fatalistic ideas that survival is not a realistic 
option and leading to a subsequent disregarding or ignoring of advice. 
This study highlights a potential need for providing comprehensive pre-incident 
communications, firstly in reducing information seeking in the event of an alert being sent. 
Reports not only from the participants of this study, but also news reports during the days 
following, show jamming of phone lines and data services (e.g. Boboltz et al., 2018; Hennigan, 
2018). This study suggests that the Hawai’i public used phone lines and the internet primarily 
to verify that the information they had received was accurate and to contact friends and 
family. Inability to use communication lines may have serious consequences with regards to 
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survival rates, considering the third most commonly cited action taken was to find out how to 
protect oneself.  
The second benefit of effective pre-incident communication regarding disaster protection is 
again found in both the outcomes of this study and the reports of individuals immediately 
following the event (e.g. Broder Van Dyke, 2018), and that is ensuring the public know what is 
meant by key terms such as sheltering. Again, this knowledge will likely increase survival in the 
event of an actual nuclear disaster; if the public know that their own homes, or the buildings 
they are in at the time, offer sufficient protection, then adherence with instructions in an 
emergency may increase. 
Only 9% of respondents stated that they felt prepared upon receipt of the ballistic missile 
warning, though greater numbers reported undertaking preparedness actions, with many 
participants having received no information specific to nuclear attack preparedness 
(approximately 50% in this study, compared to only 5% for general disaster preparedness). 
Additionally, more respondents felt that information received was not sufficient than those 
who felt it was. Information quality and abundance may not be the sole reason for this deficit 
in nuclear preparedness, however. Acceptance of information may also play a part. This is 
supported by the rates of respondents to this study who felt there was little risk of nuclear 
attack occurring on Hawai’i, and the large number who felt that they could not be protected 
should an attack occur. Such perceptions may cause individuals to avoid or reject attempts to 
educate them about nuclear preparedness.  
Some organisations that have taken it upon themselves to prepare those in their charge for a 
nuclear emergency have received criticism. The University of Hawai’i distributed an email to all 
students in October 2017 directing them towards HI-EMA instructions to shelter-in-place upon 
hearing warning sirens sounding (Anderson, 2017). Whilst it is routine for the University to 
send precautionary natural disaster warnings, this is not the case for nuclear attack-related 
communications. A statement made by the University’s communications team was that the 
word “unlikely” should have been placed in the subject line along with “NO REASON FOR 
ALARM”. This suggests two matters of concern for nuclear preparedness communication.  
Firstly, it is vital to consider the wording of messages to ensure that there is no ambiguity as to 
the reason for offering instructions. Perhaps a current level of severity should accompany 
messages to distinguish between levels of urgency (say, during peacetime and during a time of 
known threat).  
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The second factor is harder to address: at present, safety information specific to nuclear threat 
is not commonplace. Government agencies are often loath to place information in the public 
domain that could cause distress. For example, one Hawai’i-based website reported in 
September 2017 that local lawmakers had met without inviting the public to discuss ways in 
which the public could be helped to prepare for nuclear attack “without fear-mongering” 
(Teague, 2017). It is notable however that HI-EMA, on the Hawaii.gov website posted links to 
external news sites containing videos such as “How Honolulu is preparing for a Nuclear Strike,” 
comprehensive FAQs and a summary of guidance for coordinated public messaging in the 
event of nuclear detonation amongst other resources both prior to and following the false 
alert (http://dod.hawaii.gov/hiema/category/nuclear-threat/). It may be that the false missile 
alert, and the ways in which the public responded to it, will increase the perceived need for 
preparedness in the public as well as in government. If so, existing preparedness information 
such as that detailed above will become more widely known as a matter of course. However, 
findings of Karl and Lytle (2018) in the months following the incident indicated that more than 
half of US citizens had still received no nuclear attack preparedness information in the months 
following the false alert, suggesting this to not be the case so far. 
It is inevitable that a false alarm will create issues amongst the public towards responding 
authorities with regards to trust. Will future alarms be taken seriously? Will people trust HI-
EMA, or their government as a whole, to provide warnings and effective response if this event 
actually happened? Two interesting outcomes from this survey provide some answers. 
The first is that despite just over half of respondents believing an attack to be imminent, 
almost 70% believed the alert to have been a genuine HI-EMA alert. This suggests an element 
of doubt amongst the public with regards to the accuracy or proficiency with which HI-EMA 
were operating even at that time. 
The second is that HI-EMA was ranked as highest in trustworthiness as a source of nuclear 
preparedness information amongst twelve potential sources. This suggests that trust in HI-
EMA has not been overly damaged. The Hawai’i public may even find some reassurance in the 
knowledge that there is a functional emergency warning system in place (Preston, 2018). 
4.4.4.2. For this PhD 
Most respondents in this study reported a desire to receive pre-incident communications 
regarding preparedness and protective actions in the event of a nuclear emergency. It is 
notable that this does not correspond with the consensus of focus group participants in the 
previous phase of this project. One obvious reason for this discrepancy is that focus group 
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participants had not experienced a situation in which they believed a nuclear threat to be real 
and imminent, or at least had never received emergency risk communications to that effect. 
The next phase of this project will replicate questions asked to the Hawai’i public using the 
same survey methodology but with a sample from the UK public who have not experienced an 
existential threat of this nature. 
The focus groups also highlighted a lack of preparedness in respondents. Though focus group 
participants all lived in areas of potential risk (nuclear power plant accidents or terror attacks), 
these risks were considered low-likelihood. More Hawai’i survey respondents appear to have 
undertaken at least some preparedness actions but were living in a location which is at 
arguably greater risk of disaster, such as volcanic eruption or hurricane. Hawai’ians may 
therefore be exposed to greater volumes of general disaster preparedness information, or 
actively seek such information out, perhaps driven by increased risk perception. Without 
having been made salient in the UK, nuclear risk perception may be lower, making the 
perceived need for pre-incident communications lower in priority. 
One interesting thing explored in this study was the interplay between belief in the 
authenticity of message and adherence with the instruction to shelter. An interesting sub-
group here are those who reported that they did believe, but nonetheless did not act. Further 
sub-analysis could have given insight the motivating factors influencing this decision. 
Finally, Hawai’i was in the process of testing their nuclear emergency warning system of sirens 
in the months preceding January 2018. This may have increased risk perception, driving an 
increase in preparedness activities. Without knowledge of the existence of a public emergency 
warning system in the UK it would be interesting to observe whether risk perception is higher 
or lower in UK respondents. 
4.5. Conclusion 
Popular perceptions of the Hawai’i public’s response to what was revealed to be a false alert 
warning of imminent nuclear attack, was of panic and disorder. This is not an accurate 
portrayal of responses. However, a range of behaviours and attitudes were present that are 
consistently described in radiation-disaster literature; such as non-adherence to the warning 
instruction and fatalism. The predominant reaction, to contact friends and family and seek 
further information, despite relatively high rates of preparedness suggests a failure to provide 
the public with effective pre-nuclear incident risk communications. Outcomes of this survey 
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can be used to inform the design of pre-incident communications, likely to improve adherence 




Chapter 5: Survey with Members of the UK Public  
Whereas the survey outlined in the previous chapter, undertaken with the Hawai’ian public 
focussed particular attention on behavioural response to the ballistic missile warning, the 
survey undertaken in this chapter, with the UK public, presents an opportunity to focus on the 
pre-incident communication and preparedness aspect of nuclear catastrophe. It achieves this 
while also providing some areas where comparison can be made with a population who 
recently experienced the potentially real prospect of existential crisis, with a population who 
have not had such an experience. Particularly, this survey was also an opportunity to build on 
knowledge gained from focus groups, including the role that perceived efficacy of 
recommended countermeasures plays on behaviour. This survey provides important insights 
into perceived effort and effectiveness of what are recommended protective actions and the 
influence of perceived risk on adherence to undertaking these actions.  
5.1. Background 
The previous chapter reported on a survey conducted with members of the Hawai’i public. This 
followed the false ballistic missile alert that occurred in that state in January 2018. That 
research was an opportunity to gain insight as to how members of the public might respond to 
the possibility that a nuclear attack is imminent, including rates of adherence with protective 
instructions and the level of success of the method by which the warning and instruction was 
distributed (SMS). Preparedness for nuclear emergencies was also assessed together with pre-
incident information preferences. These data suggest ways to improve engagement with 
nuclear emergency pre-incident communications. 
The main outcomes from the Hawai’i survey were that most respondents had not undertaken 
recommended preparedness actions specifically for nuclear attack, though many had for 
reasons of general preparedness or preparedness for an alternative disaster. Following the 
alert, deliberate adherence with the instruction to shelter was low, however due to situational 
factors such as the time and day of the warning, many respondents were already at home and 
remained there. Low deliberate adherence was influenced by disbelief that the warning or 
attack was genuine and belief that no effective protective measures from a nuclear attack 
exist. Demographic and situational factors were associated with believing the warning to be 
genuine (including believing there to be a moderate to very high risk of a nuclear attack against 
Hawai’i occurring) and taking subsequent protective actions. These included being of mixed 
ethnicity, hearing warning sirens as the first indication of an attack and believing Hawai’i to be 
protected from nuclear attack by the military. Respondents were motivated to take action by a 
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wish to verify the message received, to protect their family and through feeling unprepared. 
Preferences were also expressed for pre-incident communications to be delivered to the public 
during a period when no threat is known (not only when a threat is imminent) and to include 
information as to what makes an effective shelter, what to prepare and how supplies (food 
and water) and infrastructure (communications) might be affected in a nuclear disaster.  
Those outcomes are contrary to some outcomes of previous chapters in this thesis. UK 
participants of focus groups (Chapter 3) expressed little preparedness, whether living near a 
nuclear power plant or in London, due to low perception of risk. In fact, amongst other factors 
including geography, nature of the threat and trust in information source, risk perception was 
felt to be a stronger influence on adherence with instructions than the actual information 
received. Specifically, those expressing low risk perception considered themselves less likely to 
engage with preparedness information, while high risk perception individuals held fatalistic 
attitudes prompting avoidance of information. Groups also felt that recommended protective 
actions should only be sent when a nuclear disaster was known to be imminent, expressing 
little desire for pre-incident preparedness information, again due to low risk perception. Some 
focus groups differentiated between the likelihood of a nuclear attack occurring against the UK 
and it having a direct personal consequence, such as injury to the self or loved ones, and the 
likelihood of an attack occurring but it not affecting them. This form of perceived likelihood 
represents a subset of risk perception wherein risk equals perceived likelihood x severity (e.g. 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and deserves further exploration in this survey. Perceived 
likelihood of a nuclear attack (belief that an attack is likely but that it will not necessarily cause 
them harm) was suggested not to influence behaviour change.  
Similarly, the systematic review (Chapter 2) showed varying adherence in actual radiation 
emergencies. Adherence was found to reduce if the event is considered unlikely to occur, if 
risk of direct harm is considered low (Gibson, 2007; Železnik and Perko, 2012), if 
recommended actions are felt to be ineffective (Rogers et al., 2013; Taylor et al., 2011), or if 
the individual is fatalistic (Nasar and Greenberg, 1984). While the public appear more adherent 
to protective instructions according to review outcomes than was observed in Hawai’i, three 
notable factors undermine this comparison: adherence rates identified in the systematic 
review related to nuclear plant disasters or smaller-scale radiation emergencies (dirty bombs); 
actual adherence was assessed in terms of evacuation, as opposed to sheltering, and; there is 
also the issue of uncertainty of the incident since some of the actual incidents in the review 
involved the disaster observably being underway whereas in Hawai’i it was not clear if it really 
was or not. The present survey explored whether a difference exists in intention to engage in 
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preparedness actions at a time of no known threat as well as intended adherence with 
protective actions if an attack is imminent.  
The present survey employs substantially the same methods as used in the previous chapter, 
but with a sample of the UK public. This allows for comparison with outcomes of the previous 
chapter for the following reason. In months before the false alert, tensions between the USA 
and North Korea, two nuclear powers, were at a peak. In fact, shortly before the false alert, 
North Korea announced a new capability for its ballistic missiles to reach the Hawai’ian Islands. 
Hawai’i itself had reaffirmed its emergency warning capability during the final months of 2017 
by publicly testing its warning sirens. The UK by contrast has received no such direct threats in 
recent history, nor has there been a recent public initiative to establish current civil defence 
capability. While there is an existing requirement in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 to inform 
the public as to disaster preparedness measures, studies have shown that initiatives to meet 
this requirement have been tokenistic, with many not aware and others not having read the 
information disseminated (e.g. Page et al., 2008). Risk perception may therefore differ 
substantially between the two populations. This may affect rates of preparedness and desire 
for pre-incident information. 
Repeating the survey in a sample of the UK public allowed me to refine the survey tool and 
test additional hypotheses. Two questions were added to the collection of demographic 
information. Firstly, Hawai’i respondents were not asked whether they were pet owners. 
While there are consistent findings that parents would ignore or delay protective actions in a 
nuclear emergency to be with or to contact their children (Nasar and Greenberg, 1984), no 
similar findings were identified in radiation emergency literature for pets. However, it is 
possible that pet owners have additional needs regarding nuclear attack preparedness. 
Secondly, a question of residential region was added. Hawai’i respondents were often 
fatalistic, feeling that they had no means of surviving a nuclear attack due to their geographic 
location (i.e. island-dwelling). Focus groups conducted with the public living in or close to 
London and with those living near to a nuclear power plant (Chapter 3) built upon outcomes 
from the systematic review (Chapter 2), finding little perception of risk from the nearby plant. 
London residents appeared to express slightly greater risk perception of both nuclear attack 
and of being affected by a nuclear plant accident, but not enough to affect desire for pre-
incident communications or to increase preparedness to any significant extent. Including 
region as a demographic variable may provide an indication of whether Londoners have 
greater risk perception and subsequently express a greater need for pre-incident information, 
or less need perhaps due to fatalistic attitudes.  
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Whilst the perceived effort involved in preparedness and protective actions was included in 
the previous survey, perceived efficacy of actions was not assessed. Efficacy was a central 
outcome from focus groups in which participants felt they had little control over their ability to 
effectively undertake protective actions. In particular, if recommended actions were felt to be 
ineffectual then fatalistic attitudes appeared to increase and engagement with information 
and anticipated adherence decreased. This suggests an assessment is made by the recipient of 
communications as to the trade-off between the effort involved in preparedness or change in 
lifestyle with the relative risk of harm that a nuclear attack poses. Whilst it is acknowledged 
that efficacy (the extent to which the action does more good than harm under ideal 
circumstances), by its most strict definition, differs from effectiveness (the extent to which the 
action does more good than harm under usual circumstances) (e.g. Kim, 2013). The word 
effectiveness was used due to its likely greater ease of understanding. Perceived effectiveness 
is important to consider since adherence with protective instructions may be reduced if 
recommended actions are perceived ineffective (Rogers et al., 2013; Taylor et al., 2011); a key 
outcome from the systematic review.  
5.1.1. Objectives 
1. (aligning with the first of the project aims) identify the proportion of people who a) possess 
adequate materials to allow them to cope with a nuclear disaster, b) possess these materials 
specifically due to a concern about nuclear disasters and c) are prepared out of a concern for 
general emergencies;  
2. (aligning with the first of the project aims) to assess whether the following variables were 
associated with disaster preparedness: 
• perceived risk to self and loved ones of a nuclear attack against the UK (and perceived 
likelihood of an attack occurring and it not affecting them); 
• perceived risk to self and loved ones of an unspecified disaster in the UK (and 
perceived likelihood of a disaster occurring and it not affecting them); 
• how much preparedness information they had previously received; 
• perceived information sufficiency; 
• their level of faith in the UK’s defence capabilities; 
• the perceived level of effort involved in taking preparedness measures (such as storing 
items) and effectiveness in sheltering, as is recommended in nuclear disaster 
preparedness guidance, and; 
• Demographic variables. 
178 
 
3. (aligning with the second of the project aims) To identify factors that promote anticipated 
engagement with pre-nuclear incident communications, including: 
• timing (whether during peacetime or when a threat is known/raised); 
• source of the communications; 
• method and format by which communications arrive (i.e. online or leaflet; from 
government official, nuclear expert or other), and; 
• perceived risk perception of a nuclear disaster occurring during their own lifetime, and 
the risk of this having a direct impact upon themselves or their loved ones. 
5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Design 
This study was conducted using an online, cross-sectional survey sent to members of the UK 
public. Theoretical Domains Framework was used to inform items for inclusion. 
5.2.2. Participants 
Participants were recruited by commissioning a UK market research company. Participants 
received tokens which contributed toward an eventual monetary reward. Members of the 
public were invited to take part if they were UK resident and were over 18 years.  
5.2.3. Materials 
An online survey was developed based on the items included in the survey deployed to 
members of the Hawai’i public (Chapter 4). The survey was hosted and distributed by a market 
research company. It included forced choice questions (some of which were free text but 
requiring some kind of written response) relating to disaster preparedness and pre-incident 
communication preferences amongst other items. The full survey items are in Appendix M.  
5.2.4. Outcome variables 
5.2.4.1. Preparedness  
Respondents were asked to select all preparedness actions they had taken. Listed actions were 
taken from Protect and Survive (HMSO, 1980) and from FEMA’s most recent information sheet 
published in March 2018. Actions included storing a spare supply of medication; storing a 14-
day supply of food and water; obtaining a torch and batteries; putting together a first aid kit; 
and storing a bag with cash and important documents. Obtaining walkie-talkies was included in 
the Hawai’i survey but removed as a response option here as they are not recommended 
179 
 
preparedness items in UK guidance. For each action endorsed, and because a number of items 
listed as necessary for preparedness such as a torch with batteries and band aids are those 
often possessed for non-preparedness reasons, respondents were asked to detail their reason 
for undertaking this action (specifically for nuclear attack preparedness; in case of a different 
specific emergency such as flooding; for general emergency preparedness; or not for 
emergency preparedness purposes).  
5.2.4.2. Pre-incident information preferences 
Respondents were asked whether they wished to receive pre-incident information relating to 
preparedness for, and protective actions to take in the event of, a nuclear attack. Those who 
responded yes to this question were directed to a further question asking when would be their 
preferred time to receive information (during a period of low threat, or only when a threat is 
known to be imminent). Those who responded no to this question were asked why not. 
Response options for why not included: I would be too afraid and I don't believe I could be 
protected if the UK was attacked.  
In the Hawai’i survey, participants were asked what two pieces of information would you most 
want to know in nuclear emergency preparedness materials? This elicited a large amount of 
qualitative data. The intention of the survey phase in this project was to bring focus to 
previously identified qualitative outcomes (i.e. those elicited in focus groups). The question 
requiring respondents to provide two pieces of information critical for pre-incident 
information was retained, however using the outcomes from the previous survey, focus group 
and systematic review chapters, a list of forced choice outcomes was formulated. Response 
options included information about: sheltering; evacuating; how to prepare in advance for a 
nuclear emergency; radiation; how information about an incident will be delivered; 
information specific to nuclear accident; information specific to a deliberate nuclear incident; 
how to prepare for emergencies more generally or something not listed (open text response). 
Preferred methods of pre-incident communication distribution were not assessed in the 
previous survey. Importantly, methods including social media and the internet have been 
found to be preferred to SMS in the event of an attack and traditional news media or leaflets 
for pre-incident information. Participants in this survey were asked by what method(s) would 
they prefer to receive information regarding nuclear disaster preparedness? Response options 
included internet/online, a letter posted to their residence and at a local council meeting. 
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Similarly, preferred information source, or specifically, the likelihood of undertaking 
preparedness and protective actions depending upon the communicating information source 
were included in the present survey. 
5.2.5. Predictor variables 
5.2.5.1. General 
Upon consultation with members of the project advisory team, the following updates were 
made to reflect contemporary knowledge and emergency preparedness beliefs of the public: 
a. Questions relating to protective actions that might be taken were updated to 
remove the word evacuation. This was following a suggestion that 
respondents may see evacuation as something that is forced upon them. 
Instead the response option asked whether the respondent was prepared to 
leave their home. 
b. Distinction was made between sheltering (simply staying indoors) and using 
furniture and other items to build a shelter. The suffix -in-place was also 
removed from shelter as its meaning is not always known. 
c. The response option: if an attack happened, the government would provide us 
with everything we needed, was added to the list of reasons for not wishing to 
receive pre-incident communications. 
5.2.5.2. Risk perception 
Participants were required to answer questions relating to their perceived likelihood of the 
following: a catastrophic disaster of any kind (e.g. severe flooding, earthquake, attack from 
foreign military) occurring anywhere in the UK within your lifetime; a catastrophic disaster of 
any kind (e.g. severe flooding, earthquake, attack from foreign military) occurring in the UK 
within your lifetime AND it directly affecting the health of you and/or close family members; a 
nuclear attack by another country or terrorists occurring anywhere in the UK within your 
lifetime; and, a nuclear attack by another country or terrorists occurring in the UK within your 
lifetime AND it directly affecting the health of you and/or close family members. 
Another question asked if they believe the UK to be protected from nuclear attack by military 
intervention.  
5.2.5.3. Prior information received 
Retained survey items included preparedness information received. This was the amount of 
preparedness information previously received; how long since information was received; from 
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what source did the information come and; perceived information sufficiency. An addition was 
made asking the level of general disaster preparedness information previously received. 
Information source response options were updated to reflect sources likely encountered by UK 
residents. Respondents were also able to select multiple sources. Response options for these 
items are shown in Appendix M. 
5.2.5.4. Perceived preparedness effort 
Participants were asked to rate the perceived effort involved in carrying out individual actions 
listed in the earlier preparedness question with addition of the following: watch preparedness 
videos online; be prepared to shelter (e.g. at home) for up to 72 hours; be prepared to shelter 
(e.g. at home) for up to 1 week; be prepared to shelter (e.g. at home) for up to 2 weeks; be 
prepared to leave your home to a place of shelter within your town or village and; be prepared 
to leave your home to a place of shelter outside of your town or village.  
5.2.5.5. Perceived effectiveness 
Participants were asked how effective they feel listed actions would be in protecting them 
should a nuclear attack occur 5 miles from where they are. Response options were: sheltering 
(i.e. remaining inside); building a shelter from furniture (e.g. in your own home); leaving your 
home to a destination as far away as possible; leaving your home to a shelter elsewhere in 
your location (such as the outskirts of town); taking Stable Iodine (a tablet used to prevent 
radiation damage in the thyroid); getting underground (e.g. into a basement) and; closing 
doors and windows at your location.  
5.2.5.6. Trust 
To identify the most trusted sources of nuclear preparedness information, participants were 
presented with twelve sources (including national government, nuclear agencies; local 
authorities and emergency services). Using the same list of response options, participants 
were asked: how likely are you to undertake preparedness actions (i.e. during a time whilst 
there is no known threat) for a nuclear attack if advised to by each of the following sources? 
And: how likely are you to undertake protective actions (i.e. if threat of attack is known to be 
imminent or immediately following an attack) for a nuclear attack if advised to by each of the 
following sources? 
5.2.5.7. Demographic variables 
Participants were asked to state their gender and age for which representative ratios were 
taken from a national proportion calculator belonging to the market research company which 
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provides nationally representative data per country. Quotas for geographic location were also 
taken from this calculator, response options for which were based on UK government 
organisation regions. Further demographic data were taken for employment status and 
educational attainment. Participants were asked whether they have pets or dependent 
children, response options for the latter were: no; I have a dependent child/children aged 
under 18 living with me; I have a dependent child/children aged over 18 living with me, and; I 
have a dependent child/children under 18 but they do not live with me. 
5.2.6. Procedure 
The survey was distributed via e-mail to individuals who formed part of a market research 
participant database. Interested individuals were able to follow an anonymous link using any 
internet enabled device to access survey information. Providing they indicated consent, 
respondents were then able to participate in the survey. The survey became available on 
March 1st, 2019 and met the required sample size after eight days.  
5.2.7. Ethical considerations 
Approval for the study was granted by the King’s College London Psychiatry, Nursing and 
Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee (ref: HR-17/18-8256). 
5.2.8. Sample size calculation 
Based on a UK population of 66.04 million (Office for National Statistics, 2018), to obtain a 95% 
confidence level with 3% margin of error a sample size of 1000 completed responses was 
required according to surveymonkey.com. 
5.2.9. Outcomes and analysis 
Responses were recorded on an Excel (Microsoft) spreadsheet and imported into SPSS Version 
25 (IBM) for statistical analysis. 
Some outcomes required re-categorisation for comparative significance testing. Where re-
categorisation occurred, it is detailed below. 
5.2.9.1. Preparedness 
Because there is a potential difference in the factors associated with whether someone 
consciously engages in actions to prepare for a disaster, and whether they engage in actions 
that, by accident or coincidence, make them prepared (e.g. collecting camping gear), the 
sample were split, based on why preparedness actions had been undertaken. This allowed for 
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‘intentional’ and ‘incidental’ disaster preparedness scores to be calculated (0 to 7 actions). 
General disaster preparedness outcomes were included in this analysis since few people 
reported taking preparedness actions specifically for nuclear preparedness. For intentional 
preparedness, a median split was used which and categorised people reporting zero to two 
intentional preparedness actions as having low intentional preparedness, and those reporting 
three to eight actions as having high intentional preparedness.  
Binary logistic regression was used to test associations between intentional preparedness and 
personal and predictor variables. Predictor variables included were: general disaster likelihood; 
risk perception of general disasters occurring and directly affecting the self or loved ones; 
nuclear attack likelihood; risk perception of nuclear attack occurring and directly affecting the 
self or loved ones; prior level of disaster preparedness information received; prior level of 
nuclear preparedness information received; source of preparedness information; how recently 
preparedness information was received; perceived sufficiency of preparedness information 
received; belief in protection from the military; mean average low preparedness effort scores; 
mean average high preparedness effort score and; perceived effectiveness of sheltering. 
Unadjusted odds ratios are displayed in Appendix N. Linear regression was used to test 
associations between ‘absolute’ (total) preparedness and prior level of general disaster 
preparedness information received; prior level of nuclear preparedness information received; 
source of preparedness information; how recently was preparedness information received; 
whether preparedness information was considered sufficient; belief in protection from 
military; low preparedness effort scores and; high preparedness effort score. 
5.2.9.2. Pre-incident communication preferences 
Using binary logistic regression, adjusted odds ratios were calculated (adjusted for 
demographic variables) for associations between desire for pre-incident communications and 
the following personal and predictor variables: general disaster likelihood; perception of 
general disasters occurring and directly affecting the self or loved ones; nuclear attack 
likelihood; perception of nuclear attack occurring and directly affecting the self or loved ones; 
prior level of disaster preparedness information received; prior level of nuclear preparedness 
information received; source of preparedness information; how recently preparedness 
information was received; perceived sufficiency of preparedness information received; belief 
in protection from the military; average low preparedness effort scores; average high 
preparedness effort score and; perceived effectiveness of sheltering. Unadjusted odds ratios 
are displayed in Appendix O. 
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5.2.9.3. Preparedness effort and effectiveness 
Effort was rated on a ten-point scale (1 = very little to no effort involved; 10 = much more 
effort than I would be prepared to take) and effectiveness on a seven-point scale (1 = not 
effective at all; 7 = extremely effective). 
To reduce the data and simplify the analysis, I used principal components analysis to identify 
whether an underlying structure existed for the preparedness items. These were recategorized 
as 0 (low effort actions) and 1 (high effort actions). Also included in the PCA was preparedness 
effectiveness. Outcomes are presented in the scree plot and pattern matrix below. 
5.2.9.4. Perceived disaster likelihood 
Questions were scored on a 10-point scale from 1 (Definitely will not happen in my 
lifetime/not directly affect me) to 10 (Definitely will happen in my lifetime/would directly 
affect me). Differences in mean average scores were analysed using a t-test. To draw 
comparison with outcomes from the Hawai’i survey, scores were re-categorised as follows: 
1-2 = No risk at all; 3-4 = a little risk; 5-6 = moderate risk; 7-8 = quite a high risk; 9-10 = 
very high risk/ quite probable 
These outcomes are tabulated in Appendix M. 
5.2.9.5. Source and preparedness rankings 
Average ratings across all respondents were calculated for trust in listed information sources, 
anticipated likelihood of preparedness and anticipated likelihood of protective actions. 
Responses were rated on a ten-point scale (for anticipated likelihood: 1 = extremely unlikely; 
10 = extremely likely; sources were ranked in the order most trusted from 1 - 12). 
5.2.9.6. Demographic variables 
Due to low numbers in some demographic categories recoding was undertaken to consolidate 
groups. Specifically, employment was recoded into either employed or not employed; 
geographic locations were consolidated into London and outside of London locations, and; 
parental status was re-categorised as none, children <18 living with me, children >18 living 
with me and children not living with me. 
5.2.9.7. Thematic analysis 
Open text responses were analysed thematically (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This involved 
generating initial codes upon reading the data, extracting themes that arose and reporting 
these with reference to the pre-defined outcome variables. Questions with other response 
185 
 
options required open text elaboration. These were: which from the list (of preparedness 
items) do you currently have?; What 2 pieces of information would you most want to know in 
nuclear emergency preparedness materials?; Where did (your preparedness) information 
come from?; By what method(s) would you prefer to receive information regarding nuclear 
disaster preparedness? And; why would you not wish to receive information regarding 
preparedness and protective actions prior to a nuclear attack? 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Demographics 
There were 1014 completed responses to the survey. This was a response rate of 43%. The 
sample was broadly representative of the UK population as shown in Table 5.1, with the 
exception that it appears to have slightly more male respondents, 18-29 year olds (the 
youngest age group), unemployed, people with higher qualifications, retired and disabled. 
Individuals without qualifications appear under-represented according to the 2011 UK census 
(Office for National Statistics, 2011). Most respondents reported having no children (67%) with 
almost a quarter having a child/children under 18 years old living with them. Slightly above 















Table 5.1. Demographic profile of survey respondents 
Demographics  Frequency % Population % 
Gender     
Male 503 49.6 49 
Female 507 50 51 
Non-binary gender 2 0.2  
Prefer not to say 2 0.2  
Total 1014   
Age    
Between 18-29 years old 166 16 20 
Between 30-39 years old 163 16 17 
Between 40-49 years old 176 17 17 
Between 50-59 years old 185 18 17 
Between 60-69 years old 168 16.5 14 
70 years or above 155 15 15 
Prefer not to say 1 0.1  
Total 1014   
Dependent Children   
 
No 675 66.5 57 
I have a dependent child/children aged under 18 
living with me 
234 23 20 
I have a dependent child/children aged over 18 living 
with me 
53 5 - 
I have a dependent child/children aged under 18 not 
living with me 
24 2 - 
I have children under and over 18 living with me 23 2 - 
I have children both living and not living with me 5 0.5 - 
Total 1014   
Pets    
Yes 538 53 50 
No 476 47 50 
Total 1014   
Employment Status    
Employed, working 40 hours or more per week 307 30 55 
Employed, working 1-39 hours per week 254 25 20 
Not employed, looking for work 49 5 6 (overall 
unemployed) 
Not employed, not looking for work 83 8 - 
Retired 270 27 2.8 
Disabled, not able to work 50 5 0.8 
Total 1014   
Education    
Left school without qualifications 59 6 23 
Secondary education 466 46 50 
Higher education 488 48 27 
Prefer not to say 1 0.1 - 
Total 1014   
Geographic Region    
Wales 48 5 5 
Scotland 90 9 8 
Northern Ireland 27 3 3 
North East 40 4 4 
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North West 106 10 11 
Yorkshire and the Humber 92 9 8 
East Midlands 70 7 7 
West Midlands 91 9 9 
East 99 10 10 
London 125 12 13 
South East 145 14 14 
South West 81 8 8 
Total 1014   
 
5.3.2. Preparedness 
Table 5.2 shows the number of participants who had engaged in each preparedness activity. 
Preparedness actions most commonly reported were having obtained a torch and extra 
batteries (80%) and having put together a first aid kit (74%). The least frequently reported 
action was storing cash and important documents (25%). Other preparedness items reported 
by respondents were categorised into the following themes: Clothing and comfort; Food and 
drink; Fuel, Heating and power; Security; Electronics, and; Miscellaneous. Clothing was the 
most frequently cited other item and aligned often with camping and bedding equipment. 
Unspecified amounts of food (mostly tinned) and water (and water filtration) were also 
commonly reported, less so were items for fuel (petrol), portable heating equipment and 
portable stoves which were stored by participants in equal measure. Weapons and electronics 
were occasionally reported (knives, mobile phones and chargers most commonly). 
Miscellaneous items primarily included tools (including excavation equipment such as spades) 
and items for survival which included outdoor survival kit, information on what to do, a plan 

















Table 5.2. Summary of preparedness actions taken 


























torch (and extra 
batteries)   
1 (12) 10 (85) 59 (483) 29 (233) 80 (813) 
Put together a 
first aid kit   
1 (11) 9 (68) ) 65 (486) 24 (182) 74 (747) 
Stored a spare 
supply of 
medication 
3 (13) 14 (56) 65 (263) 17 (70) 40 (402) 
Obtained a 
battery 
powered radio   
4 (14) 10 (40) 46 (178)  39.5 (152) 38 (384) 
Stored a 14-day 
supply of 
food/water   
3 (12) 14 (51) 52 (183) 30 (106)  35 (352) 
Stored a bag 
with cash and 
important 
documents   
5 (12) 16 (41) 55 (136) 24 (60) 24.5 (249) 
Other 4 (5)  20.5 (24) 58 (68) 17 (20) 11.5 (117) 
 
The scree plot (Figure 5.1) representing principal components analysis output suggested 
loading of perceived preparedness effort and effectiveness onto three factors (notably 
however this method did not reduce the data for effectiveness). This was confirmed through 
analysis of the pattern matrix output (Table 5.3). Main loadings on component one were 
preparedness actions rated as requiring the least effort. Component two was made up solely 
of the protective actions to which participants were asked to rate effectiveness. Component 




Figure 5.1. Scree plot output of principal components analysis of perceived effort of 
undertaking preparedness actions and perceived effectiveness of protective actions 
 
Table 5.3. Pattern matrix output of principal components analysis of perceived effort of 
undertaking preparedness actions and perceived effectiveness of protective actions 
 Component 
 1 2 3 
Preparedness Effort: compile a first aid kit  0.907   
Preparedness Effort: obtain battery powered radio 0.890   
Preparedness Effort: obtain a torch (and extra batteries) 0.855   
Preparedness Effort: store medication 0.755   
Preparedness Effort: store cash/documents 0.706   
Preparedness Effort: watch an online video  0.694   
Preparedness Effort: store (14 days) food/water 0.650   
Preparedness Effectiveness: shelter elsewhere within location  0.836  
Preparedness Effectiveness: evacuate as far away as possible  0.805  
Preparedness Effectiveness: get underground  0.791  
Preparedness Effectiveness: sheltering  0.745  
Preparedness Effectiveness: take stable iodine  0.745  
Preparedness Effectiveness: close doors and windows  0.731  
Preparedness Effectiveness: build a shelter from furniture  0.679  
Preparedness effort: be prepared to evacuate out of town   0.921 
Preparedness Effort: evacuate within town   0.847 
Preparedness Effort: shelter for 2 weeks   0.811 
Preparedness Effort: shelter for 1 week   0.731 




Components in this analysis relating to high and low effort preparedness activities were 
compared using a paired samples t-test. This confirmed that respondents considered high 
effort preparedness actions (mean=5.35) to be significantly more effort than the low effort 
group (mean=3.65) (t=--28.65 (df=1013), p<.000). 
Participants ranked being prepared to leave their home to a place of shelter outside of town as 
the most effortful preparedness action and obtaining a torch (and extra batteries) as the least 
effortful (Table 5.4).  
Table 5.4. Perceived Effort in Undertaking Preparedness Actions 
Rank order of 
perceived 






1 Be prepared to leave your home to a place of shelter 
outside of your town or village 
6.42 2.41 
2 Be prepared to leave your home to a place of shelter 
within your town or village 
5.69 2.44 
3 Be prepared to shelter (e.g. at home) for up to 2 weeks 5.39 2.64 
4 Be prepared to shelter (e.g. at home) for up to 1 week 4.69 2.55 
5 Be prepared to shelter (e.g. at home) for up to 72 hours 4.57 2.68 
6 Store a 14 day supply of food/water 4.57 2.57 
7 Store a spare supply of medication 4.13 2.52 
8 Watch preparedness videos online 3.90 2.50 
9 Store a bag with cash and important documents 3.69 2.43 
10 Put together a first aid kit 3.41 2.48 
11 Obtain a battery powered radio and spare batteries 3.10 2.39 
12 Obtain a torch (and extra batteries) 2.76 2.31 
1 = very little to no effort involved; 10 = more effort than I would be prepared to take 
Participants ranked getting underground as the most effective protective action to take should 
a nuclear attack occur five miles from them and building a shelter from furniture as least 
effective (Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5. Perceived effectiveness of protective actions 
Rank order of 
perceived 
effectiveness 






1 Getting underground 3.58 1.96 
2 Leaving your home for a destination as far away as 
possible 
3.58 2.03 
3 Leaving your home for a shelter elsewhere in your 
location 
2.98 1.91 
4 Taking Stable Iodine 2.82 2.17 
5 Sheltering 2.74 1.87 
6 Closing doors and windows at your location 2.67 1.88 
7 Building a shelter from furniture 2.29 1.80 
1 = not effective at all; 7 = extremely effective 
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5.3.2.1. Level of preparedness 
An absolute preparedness score (sum of preparedness actions taken, scored 0 - 7) was 
calculated for each respondent. A mean of 3.02 preparedness actions were reported to have 
been taken.  
Participants had taken a mean of 2.21 actions specifically in preparation for an emergency 
(intentional preparedness), significantly more than the 0.81 (mean) actions for non-emergency 
(incidental) reasons (t= 16.47 (df=1013), p>0.0001). 
5.3.2.2. Reasons for preparedness 
Each preparedness item was reported to have been collected or performed primarily for 
general disaster preparedness purposes. Each item was possessed specifically for nuclear 
attack preparedness by between 12-14 respondents only (five other preparedness items were 
stored for nuclear attack preparedness: unspecified amounts of food and water (x3); 
weapons/tools (“survival knives”); “information of what to do;” and clothing). 
76% of respondents report having received no information regarding general emergency 
preparedness, whilst 80% had received no information specifically for nuclear attack (8% had 
received some information). The most frequently reported sources of preparedness 
information were social media (12%) and friends/family (12%); national news media and 
national government (11% each) were the next most common. Other sources included 
education (general disaster and nuclear preparedness information). 
Information was reported by 45% to have been received between one and five years 
previously. Disaster preparedness information received was felt to be sufficient by slightly 
more than 50% of respondents, whilst 13.5% reported not knowing if the information was 
sufficient. 
Logistic binary regression was conducted to identify associations between intentional 
preparedness and personal or predictor variables (Tables 5.6 and 5.7). Though rates of 
intentional preparedness for some groups are low, and so outcomes should be considered 
with some trepidation, participants were significantly more likely to be intentionally prepared 
if having children under 18 years old living with them or having children not living with them; 
believing there to be a very high risk of an unspecified disaster occurring during one’s lifetime, 
or there being a moderate to very high risk of a disaster occurring and it personally affecting 
themselves or loved ones; believing there to be ‘quite a high risk’ of a nuclear attack occurring 
on the UK during one’s lifetime, or there being a moderate to very high risk of nuclear attack 
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occurring on the UK and it personally affecting themselves or loved ones; having received 
disaster preparedness information from emergency services; believing preparedness actions to 
be of low effort and; believing sheltering to be an effective protective action. Respondents 
aged 40-49; those without pets; those who reported having received little or no general 
disaster preparedness information, or little to no nuclear attack specific preparedness 
information; not believing, or not knowing if preparedness information received was sufficient; 
believing the UK to be partially protected from nuclear attack, not believing the UK to be 





Table 5.6. Association between personal variables and intentional preparedness 
Variable and variable levels % (N) of 
participants 
% within variable level 





adjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Gender    
Male 50 (503) 41 (205) Reference 
Female 50 (507) 40 (201) 0.94 (0.72-1.22) 
Non-binary gender 0.2 (2) 0 (0) Not calculated 
Prefer not to say 0.2 (2) 50 (1) 3.14 (0.19-52.39) 
Age     
18-29 16 (166) 47 (78) Reference 
30-39 16 (163) 39 (64) 0.66 (0.42-1.05) 
40-49 17 (176)  30 (53) 0.47 (0.29-0.75)* 
50-59 18 (185) 41 (76) 1.05 (0.66-1.66) 
60-69 16.5 (168) 39 (66) 1.20 (0.74-1.96) 
70+ 15 (155) 44.5 (69) 1.60 (0.94-2.71) 
Prefer not to say 0.1 (1) 100 (1) Not calculated 
Dependent Children    
None 66.5 (675)  35 (239) Reference 
Children <18 living with me 26 (262) 52 (136) 2.59 (1.83-3.66)* 
Children >18 living with me 5 (53) 36 (19) 1.05 (0.57-1.93) 
Children not living with me 2 (24) 54 (13) 2.55 (1.09-5.92)* 
Pets    
Yes 53 (538)  45 (242) Reference 
No 47 (476) 35 (165) 0.68 (0.52-0.89)* 
Geographic Location    
Outside of London 88 (889) 40 (354) Reference 
London 12 (125) 42 (53) 1.07 (0.72-1.60) 
Employment    
Not Employed 44.5 (452) 40 (179) Reference 
Employed 55 (562) 40.5 (228) 1 (0.72-1.39)  
Education level    
Left school without 
qualifications  
6 (59) 41 (24) Reference 
Secondary education 46 (466) 36 (167) 0.85 (0.48-1.51) 
Higher education 48 (488) 44 (216) 1.24 (0.70-2.20) 
Prefer not to say 0.1 (1) 0 (0) Not calculated 




Table 5.7. Association between predictor variables and intentional preparedness 
Variable and variable levels % (N) of 
participants 
% within variable 





adjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
General disaster risk perception    
No risk at all 12 (123) 36.5 (45) Reference 
A little risk 22 (224) 31 (69) 0.73 (0.45-1.18) 
Moderate risk 25 (254)  38.5 (98) 1.07 (0.67-1.71) 
Quite a high risk 26.5 (269) 42 (114) 1.12 (0.70-1.77) 
Very high risk/quite probable 14 (144) 56 (81) 2.01 (1.20-3.38)* 
General disaster (with direct effect) risk perception 
No risk at all 18 (186) 31 (57) Reference 
A little risk 27 (272) 33 (91) 1.19 (0.78-1.80) 
Moderate risk 31 (315) 42 (132) 1.69 (1.13-2.54)* 
Quite a high risk 18 (187) 48 (90) 1.98 (1.26-3.12)* 
Very high risk/quite probable 5 (54) 68.5 (37) 4.33 (2.18-8.62)* 
Nuclear attack risk perception    
No risk at all 26 (265) 36 (95) Reference 
A little risk 25 (258) 31 (79) 0.80 (0.55-1.17) 
Moderate risk 22 (226) 41.5 (94) 1.39 (0.94-2.04) 
Quite a high risk 18.5 (188) 48 (91) 1.64 (1.09-2.46)* 
Very high risk/quite probable 7.5 (77) 62 (48) 2.46 (1.40-4.34)* 
Nuclear attack risk perception (with direct effect) 
No risk at all 28.5 (289) 33.5 (97) Reference 
A little risk 25 (254) 33 (83) 0.92 (0.63-1.34) 
Moderate risk 25 (251) 41 (102) 1.47 (1.01-2.14)* 
Quite a high risk 15 (150) 54 (81) 2.34 (1.45-3.45)* 
Very high risk/quite probable 7 (70) 63 (44) 2.95 (1.66-5.24)* 
General preparedness information received 
A great deal 2 (25) 92 (23) Reference 
Some information 11 (113) 75 (85) 0.26 (0.06-1.19) 
A little information 10 (104) 56 (58) 0.09 (0.02-0.44)* 
No information 76 (772) 31 (241) 0.03 (0.01-0.15)* 
Nuclear preparedness information received 
A great deal 3 (35) 80 (28) Reference 
Some information 8 (86) 73 (63) 0.79 (0.29-2.12) 
A little information 8 (78) 49 (38) 0.26 (0.10-0.71)* 
No information 80 (815) 34 (278) 0.15 (0.06-0.38)* 
Source of preparedness 
information 
   
Local authorities 17 (34) 79 (27) 2.15 (0.82-5.61) 
Social media 25 (50) 76 (38) 1.41 (0.62-3.20) 
Local news media 18 (36) 83 (30) 2.58 (0.94-7.13)  
National news media 23 (45)  78 (35) 1.53 (0.64-3.67) 
Friends or family  25 (49) 73 (36) 1.49 (0.67-3.29) 
National government sources 23 (45) 69 (31) 1.33 (0.60-2.98) 
UK nuclear agencies 9 (18) 72 (13) 1.21 (0.37-4) 
International nuclear agencies 10.5 (21) 81 (17)  1.49 (0.44-5.04) 
Emergency services 18 (36) 86 (31) 3.82 (1.31-11.16)* 
NHS 14 (28) 78.5 (22) 1.56 (0.56-4.36) 
The military 13.5 (27) 81 (22) 2.80 (0.92-8.47) 
Other 5.5 (11) 36 (4) 0.38 (0.09-1.67) 
Cannot recall 11 (22) 36 (8) 0.43 (0.15-1.19) 
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How recently informed    
During the past year 19 (34) 70.5 (24) Reference 
1 – 5 years ago 45 (79) 76 (60) 1.14 (0.42-3.09) 
6 – 15 years ago 19 (33) 64 (21)  0.75 (0.24-2.29) 
More than 15 years ago 17.5 (31) 52 (16) 0.57 (0.16-2.05) 
Perceived information 
sufficiency 
   
Yes 52 (92) 83 (76) Reference 
No 34 (61) 52 (32) 0.24 (0.10-0.59)* 
Don’t know 13.5 (24) 54 (13) 0.29 (0.09-0.89)* 
Belief in protection from military    
Fully protected 12 (124) 61 (76) Reference 
Partially protected 43 (432) 44 (189) 0.51 (0.33-0.79)* 
Not protected 22 (225) 33 (75) 0.33 (0.20-0.54)* 
Don’t know 23 (233) 29 (67) 0.29 (0.18-0.47)* 
Low perceived preparedness 
effort  
3.65 (Mean total) 3.95 (Mean within 
variable) 
1.11 (1.04-1.20)* 
High perceived preparedness 
effort 
5.35 (Mean total) 5.51 (Mean within 
variable) 
1.03 (0.97-1.10) 
Sheltering Effectiveness 2.74 (Mean total) 3.20 (Mean within 
variable) 
1.22 (1.13-1.32)* 
*= Significant result 
Adjusted for demographic variables: gender, age, dependent children, ethnicity, employment and education.  
5.3.3. Pre-incident communication preferences 
5.3.3.1. Desire for pre-incident Communication 
Table 5.8 shows the number of participants who expressed a desire to receive nuclear 
emergency risk communications. Two hundred and seventy-six (27%) respondents stated that 
they would not wish to receive information regarding preparedness and protective actions 
prior to a nuclear attack. The most commonly cited reason for this response was I don't believe 
I could be protected if the UK was attacked with a nuclear device whilst other responses often 













Table 5.8. Summary of responses relating to desire for pre-incident communications 
  % (Frequency) 
Would you want to receive information regarding what actions you could take to prepare for a 
nuclear attack? 
Yes  73 (738) 
No  27 (276) 
Total  (1014) 
When would be the best time for you to receive information regarding preparedness actions to 
take in a nuclear attack? 
Preferably any time before an attack is 
known 
 74 (548) 
Only when an attack is known to be imminent  26 (190) 
Total  (738) 
Note: Respondents who selected ‘No’ in response to the question as to whether they would want to receive pre-incident communications 
were not shown this question 
Why would you not wish to receive preparedness information?  
I don't believe I could be protected if the UK 
was attacked 
 33 (116) 
I don't believe the UK will be attacked with a 
nuclear device 
 26 (94) 
I do not feel it would be possible to 
undertake actions advised 
 19 (67) 
If an attack happened, the government would 
provide us with everything we needed 
 9 (33) 
I would be too afraid  9 (32) 
Other  4 (13) 
Total  (276) 
Note: Respondents who selected ‘Yes’ in response to question as to whether they would want to receive pre-incident communications were 
not shown this question 
 
Further responses marked other provided further responses to the question of why 
respondents would not wish to receive pre-incident information. For example, reflecting the 
statement: I do not feel it would be possible to undertake actions that would be advised.  
More than 25% also selected I don't believe the UK will be attacked with a nuclear device in 
response to why they would not wish to receive pre-incident preparedness communications.  
Binary logistic regression (Tables 5.9 and 5.10) found associations between being more likely 
to desire pre-incident communications and the following variables: being aged 40-59 years 
and; not believing preparedness information received to date to have been sufficient, or not 
knowing if it was sufficient. Respondents with a child over 18 years old living at home; those 
believing there to be little to very high risk of an unspecified disaster occurring during one’s 
lifetime, or there being little to very high risk of a disaster occurring and it personally affecting 
themselves or loved ones; believing there to be a moderate to very high risk of a nuclear attack 
occurring on the UK during one’s lifetime, or there being a moderate to very high risk of 
nuclear attack occurring on the UK and it personally affecting themselves or loved ones; 
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believing preparedness actions to be low in effort and; believing sheltering to be effective 
were less likely to desire pre-nuclear incident preparedness communications. 
Table 5.9. Association between personal variables and desire for pre-incident communications 
Variable and variable levels % (N) of 
participants 
% within variable 






adjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
Gender    
Male 50 (503) 71 (359) Reference 
Female 50 (507) 74 (375) 0.99 (0.74-1.32) 
Non-binary gender 0.2 (2) 100 (2) Not calculated 
Prefer not to say 0.2 (2) 100 (2) Not calculated 
Age     
18-29 16 (166) 80 (133) Reference 
30-39 16 (163) 78 (127) 1.16 (0.68-1.99) 
40-49 17 (176) 69 (122) 1.84 (1.10-3.06)* 
50-59 18 (185) 64 (118) 2.36 (1.41-3.94)* 
60-69 16.5 (168) 72 (121)  1.51 (0.87-2.63) 
70+ 15 (155) 75 (116) 1.26 (0.69-2.31) 
Prefer not to say 0.1 (1) 100 (1) Not calculated 
Dependent Children    
None 66.5 (675) 71 (478) Reference 
Children <18 living with me 26 (262) 76 (199) 0.80 (0.55-1.17) 
Children >18 living with me 5 (53) 79 (42) 0.49 (0.24-0.99)* 
Children not living with me 2 (24) 79 (19) 0.56 (0.20-1.55) 
Pets    
Yes 53 (538) 75 (405) Reference 
No 47 (476) 70 (333) 1.26 (0.94-1.69) 
Geographic Location    
Outside of London 88 (889) 73 (650) Reference 
London 12 (125) 70 (88) 1.35 (0.74-1.74) 
Employment    
Not Employed 44.5 (452) 74 (334) Reference 
Employed 55 (562) 72 (4042) 1.20 (0.84-1.7) 
Education level    
Left school without qualifications  6 (596) 71 (42) Reference 
Secondary education 46 (4666) 72 (3352) 0.91 (0.49-1.68) 
Higher education 48 (488) 74 (361) 0.84 (0.45-1.56) 
Prefer not to say 0.1 (1) 0 (0) Not calculated  




Table 5.10. Association between predictor variables and desire for pre-incident 
communications 
Variable and variable levels % (N) of 
participants 
% within variable 







adjusted odds ratio 
(95% CI) 
General disaster risk perception    
No risk at all 12 (123) 55 (68) Reference 
A little risk 22 (224) 71 (160) 0.49 (0.30-0.78)* 
Moderate risk 25 (254) 68 (1728) 0.61 (0.38-0.97)* 
Quite a high risk 26.5 (269) 81 (218) 0.30 (0.19-0.50)* 
Very high risk/quite probable 14 (144) 83 (120) 0.27 (0.15-0.49)* 
General disaster (w/ direct effect) risk perception 
No risk at all 18 (186) 57.5 (107) Reference 
A little risk 27 (272) 71 (193) 0.55 (0.37-0.83)* 
Moderate risk 31 (315) 75.5 (238) 0.45 (0.30-0.68)* 
Quite a high risk 18 (187) 83 (155) 0.30 (0.18-0.50)* 
Very high risk/quite probable 5 (54) 83 (45) 0.31 (0.14-0.70)* 
Nuclear attack risk perception    
No risk at all 26 (265) 64 (169) Reference 
A little risk 25 (258) 66 (171) 0.92 (0.64-1.33) 
Moderate risk 22 (226) 79 (179) 0.49 (0.32-0.74)* 
Quite a high risk 18.5 (188) 82 (154) 0.44 (0.28-0.70)* 
Very high risk/quite probable 7.5 (77) 84 (65) 0.38 (0.19-0.77)* 
Nuclear attack risk perception (w/ direct effect) 
No risk at all 28.5 (289) 63 (182) Reference 
A little risk 25 (254) 68.5 (174) 0.81 (0.56-1.18) 
Moderate risk 25 (251) 77 (193) 0.55 (0.37-0.82)* 
Quite a high risk 15 (150) 83 (125) 0.38 (0.23-0.64)* 
Very high risk/quite probable 7 (70) 91 (64) 0.18 (0.07-0.43)* 
How recently informed    
During the past year 19 (34) 88 (30) Reference 
1 – 5 years ago 45 (79) 90 (71) 0.84 (0.21-3.37) 
6 – 15 years ago 19 (33) 73 (24) 2.75 (0.67-11.31) 
More than 15 years ago 17.5 (31) 90 (28) 0.70 (0.10-4.95) 
Information sufficiency    
Yes 52 (92) 93 (86) Reference 
No 34 (61) 80 (49) 6.01 (1.73-20.85)* 
Don’t know 13.5 (24) 75 (18) 14.74 (2.90-75.05)* 
Belief in protection from military    
Fully protected 12 (124) 76 (94) Reference 
Partially protected 43 (432) 78 (336) 0.77 (0.48-1.26)  
Not protected 22 (225) 67 (150) 1.28 (0.76-2.14) 
Don’t know 23 (233) 68 (158) 1.25 (0.75-2.09) 
Low perceived preparedness effort  3.65 (Mean total) 3.76 (Mean 
within variable) 
0.92 (0.77-1.83)* 
High perceived preparedness effort 5.35 (Mean total) 5.37 (Mean 
within variable) 
1.01 (0.74-1.73) 
Sheltering Effectiveness 2.74 (Mean total) 2.88 (Mean 
within variable) 
0.88 (0.81-0.95)* 




Of those wishing to receive pre-incident communications, 74% reported that they would want 
this information preferably any time before an attack is known as opposed to only when an 
attack is known to be imminent (26%).  
In response to the question of what two key pieces of information would respondents wish to 
see included in pre-incident communications, 30% selected information about how to prepare 
in advance for a nuclear emergency and 29% desired information about sheltering. 
Information about how to prepare for emergencies more generally was requested for inclusion 
by 21%. The least desired information was specific details of a nuclear accident and specific 
details of a nuclear attack. The most preferred methods of distribution were leaflet/letter 
delivered to one’s home, as an online resource, and on television. The least desired was a 
council meeting and word of mouth. Other responses to method of distribution were few but 
included SMS and via e-mail, whilst further responses indicated methods by which the public 
might be informed in the event of an imminent attack such as using sirens. Full frequencies are 
reported in Appendix M. 
5.3.3.2. Trust in information source 
Table 5.11 shows the ranking of trust that participants gave to sources of information, 
respondents’ anticipated likelihood of undertaking preparedness actions based on 
recommending source and anticipated likelihood of undertaking protective actions based on 
recommending source. National government was rated as most trusted, followed by UK 
nuclear agencies and international nuclear agencies. Friends/family and online forums/social 
media were lowest rated. UK nuclear agencies, emergency services and the military were 
considered to be the sources that participants would be most likely to adhere to instructions 
from if they were to recommend preparedness actions. Participants ranked emergency 
services, UK nuclear agencies and the military as the sources in response to which they would 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The UK was last exposed to nationwide communications aimed to educate the public as to 
how they can prepare for nuclear attack almost 40 years ago: The Home Office’s Protect and 
Survive campaign (HMSO, 1980). Whilst Protect and Survive has been regarded with some 
disdain, both at the time of distribution (Thompson, 1980) and still today (Clay, 2018), almost 
73% of respondents stated that they wish to receive pre-incident communications for nuclear 
attack preparedness; 74% of these people wish to receive this information preferably any time 
before an attack is known.  
5.4.1. Preparedness 
Using this survey, I aimed to identify the proportion of people possessing recommended items 
that might allow them to cope better with a nuclear disaster. The proportion who possess 
these materials specifically due to a concern about nuclear disasters or out of a concern for 
general emergencies was also assessed. 
An average of three items considered necessary for nuclear disaster preparedness were found 
to be in the possession of respondents. Having a torch (and extra batteries) and a first aid kit 
were most commonly owned by a wide margin. However, a quarter of participants had a 
stored bag with cash and important documents (the least commonly possessed preparedness 
item) suggesting a reasonable level of preparedness overall. As was found in the previous 
survey conducted in Hawai’i, each preparedness measure was taken primarily for general 
emergency preparedness. Not only this, but rates of preparedness for each item were greater 
for a different type of emergency over nuclear preparedness. This suggests that the UK public 
have other disaster scenarios in mind when considering preparedness.  
Amongst the many personal and predictor variables associated with intentional preparedness 
it is notable that high perceived likelihood of both unspecified and nuclear disasters were 
important with 74% believing there to be at least some risk of nuclear attack against the UK. 
Not only this, but associations extended to the moderate/high perceived risk of a nuclear or 
other disaster personally affecting themselves or loved ones. These associations were 
particularly strong. However, many respondents to this survey did not believe the UK to be 
protected from nuclear attack by the military, with only 12% believing the UK to be fully 
protected. This group are also less likely to intentionally prepare, an outcome that suggests 
some pessimism to exist: that whilst preparedness for some disasters is felt to be potentially 
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effective, effective self-protection or effective military protection may not be felt to extend to 
catastrophic disasters. 
Another notable outcome is that those who had received little or no general disaster or 
nuclear attack preparedness information, and those not believing, or not knowing if 
preparedness information received was sufficient, were less likely to intentionally prepare. 
Although it is impossible to determine causality in these associations, this is consistent with a 
beneficial effect of preparedness information and strengthens the argument for providing the 
public with such information, at least regarding general disaster preparedness.  Of course, this 
could be an issue of recall. While approximately three-quarters reported not having received 
such information, Page and colleagues (2008) found that around half of their surveyed public 
could recall having received the Preparing for Emergencies booklet, though 40% had read it. 
Similarly, Rubin and colleagues (2006) found more than 60% of those surveyed to not recall 
receiving or received but not read the leaflet. This suggests that it is not enough to simply 
distribute preparedness information alone, but that encouraging preparedness behaviour 
requires a more concerted effort on the part of authorities. 
That sheltering-related actions were perceived to be lower in effectiveness than evacuation 
(albeit to a location as far away as possible) is another argument for the provision of pre-
incident information; in this case to educate on actions shown to be the safest to take when 
radiation is present. While it is undoubtedly true that being far from radiation is safer than 
sheltering close-by, pre-incident communications encourage the public not to place 
themselves in additional danger by attempting to flee. Perceptions of evacuation being the 
necessary response may be influenced by media reports of radiation disasters, such as the 
Fukushima plant disaster, which suggest evacuation to be necessary (e.g. Onishi and Fackler, 
2011). In reality, evacuation can cause unnecessary exposure (e.g. Hashimoto et al., 2016). This 
is an important point on which to focus pre-incident communications, further evidenced by 
the fact that sheltering-related information was one of the two pieces of information most 
desired by survey respondents, representing a desire to increase understanding of appropriate 
response.  
Emergency services were the only source of prior preparedness information found to be 
associated with intentional preparedness. This is interesting when we consider emergency 
services were rated highest for likelihood of adherence should they instruct the public to take 
preparedness or protective actions. Emergency services were not rated as the most highly 
trusted source however. This suggests that whilst the public consider other sources more likely 
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to be accurate in their information, messages from emergency services carry a greater sense of 
urgency. It may also be that the public perceive emergency services to be more discerning in 
their public communication campaigns, whereas other sources, such as national government 
(though rated most trustworthy) are not. These factors (urgency and selectiveness in message 
subject) in combination may therefore be effective in influencing desired behaviours. 
Absolute preparedness outcomes were comparable between the participants of this survey 
(3.02 out of 6 preparedness actions) and participants in the Hawai’i survey (3.71 out of 7). 
Mean intentional preparedness is similar also, though Hawai’i respondents, perhaps 
understandably considering geographical factors, appear slightly more prepared according to 
this metric (Hawai’i mean=2.93; UK mean=2.21). Overall, more personal and predictor 
variables were associated with intentional preparedness in UK respondents, however some of 
these factors were only recorded (risk perception, sheltering effectiveness) in the UK survey. 
5.4.2. Pre-incident communication preferences 
Associations between predictor variables and respondent’s desire for pre-incident 
communications painted a less clear picture than for preparedness. This is evident in risk 
perception. One might expect that those expressing high perceived risk of a nuclear disaster 
occurring in the UK during their lifetime would be more likely to want preparedness 
information specific to nuclear attack. Instead however, the data suggests there to be less 
desire for preparedness information in those who believe there to be a risk of nuclear and of 
unspecified disasters occurring during their lifetime. What is clearer is that those who did not 
believe preparedness information they had previously received to be sufficient had a stronger 
desire for preparedness information now.  
Preferences appeared to exist for pre-incident communications to be delivered during a time 
of no known threat with preferred distribution methods being a leaflet or letter directly to 
homes and online. This is consistent with previous studies of disaster preparedness, including 
radiation disasters (e.g. Pearce et al., 2013) and again demonstrates a desire to be prepared 
which will likely preserve life, if not in the unlikely event of a nuclear attack, but also in 
response to other types of disaster that might affect the UK. The spread of preferred methods 
in this survey suggests that a multi-method approach to distribution should be considered.  
The most highly desired content of pre-incident communications was how to prepare for a 
nuclear attack and sheltering related information. The least frequently selected was 
information specific to nuclear accidents and information specific to a deliberate nuclear 
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incident. Despite the inclusion of the word ‘specific’ in these choices, it may be that these were 
the least desired content as they are too vague or abstract in their description, the desire 
instead being for concrete and specific information. Also, only 21% selected information about 
general emergency preparedness; this is interesting since respondents’ report preparing for 
general emergencies, rather than specifically for nuclear attack. 
Despite the positive appearance of these outcomes, there remains a minority who exhibited 
some of the beliefs identified in risk communication literature and in the previous survey: fear, 
fatalism and denial. We might also attribute such attitudes to the lack of desire for pre-
incident communication in those believing there to be a high disaster risk, as detailed above. 
Whereas Hawai’i respondents to the question of why pre-incident communications are not 
desired were often able to refer to particular factors that they believed rendered preparedness 
or protective actions ineffective (such as the size of the island(s)), respondents in the present 
survey did not offer such specific detail. 
5.4.3. Limitations 
In the previous chapter (Hawai’i survey) I discussed several limitations that apply also to this 
study. These include the possibility to type 1 error occurring, recall bias and selection bias. 
Additional limitations, not previously discussed may also apply here and are described below. 
Self-report responding increases the risk of social desirability bias. In this survey, and equally 
applicable to the Hawai’i survey, inflation of preparedness measures taken, may have occurred 
if respondents were actively trying to portray themselves as socially responsible. This may also 
extend to reporting a desire to receive pre-incident communications. This factor should be 
particularly noted since the high numbers expressing a wish to receive preparedness 
information runs in contradiction with focus group outcomes (Chapter 3), and what appears to 
be popular sentiment regarding previous nuclear preparedness campaigns (Protect and 
Survive). Many emergency preparedness campaigns have come into existence in the space 
between Protect and Survive and the present day which may provide an explanation for this 
discrepancy. Increasing exposure to such information campaigns (in schools, on public 
transport, in the workplace etc) and evidence gathering to optimise their positive impact (e.g. 
Hellier, 2014) may have made more recent public information campaigns more palatable, 
accessible, effective and necessary (Marshall et al., 2007) in public perception. This may 
therefore account for the perception of Protect and Survive as a ‘fantasy document’ (Preston, 
2014) and not reflecting what is believed necessary in the modern day.  
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A median split was used to categorise intentional preparedness as being high or low. While this 
facilitated clear reporting of preparedness rates, this method is not without problems. Firstly, 
an assumption is made that all levels below the median are equal, as are all levels of 
preparedness above the split. An alternative method would have been to categorise the 
responses as three levels of preparedness (high, low and medium) and to remove the middle 
group. However, this would have reduced the sample size for analysis. Secondly, this method 
would have introduced a loss of power meaning that effects present in the data may have 
been missed. 
Respondent demographics appeared broadly representative of the population in all areas for 
which data are available, apart from education, employment variables and having dependent 
children; respondents to this survey were more highly educated and less likely to be in full-
time employment than the national average. Also, a greater number of childless adults 
responded to this survey than are nationally average. This should be considered when making 
inferences regarding population behavioural intentions. 
The investigation of preparedness in this study may have benefitted from multivariate 
regression analysis. Using this model an understanding of interactions between predictor 
variables might have been explored, together with an assessment of the total variance 
explained by the variables studied. This latter aspect may have bene particularly pertinent in 
deciding whether the variables provided a good explanation for preparedness, or whether 
additional research is required. Stronger evidence could also have been gained in this study by 
moving forward to an ‘A/B’ experimental test of different forms of messaging developed using 
my model, and using a measure of intentions about preparedness as the outcome. 
Nonetheless, this study provides a sound basis for future studies of UK disaster preparedness. 
While the focus here was on nuclear attack preparedness, insights are gathered as to general 
disaster preparedness. Further, as is seen in the Hawai’i false alert, making preparedness 
materials available to the public does not necessarily equate to the public being motivated to 
act in the event of such as disaster. Further study in this area could therefore build on the 
knowledge gained here by developing insight into public understanding of the actions that 
might be required of them and how the undertaking of those actions could be facilitated in 
terms of infrastructure (for sheltering) and transport systems (for evacuation). 
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5.4.4. Implications  
5.4.4.1. For policy 
This survey allowed for separation between what is incidental preparedness (having items for 
non-preparedness reasons) from intentional preparedness. The finding that intentional 
preparedness occurs to a significantly greater extent suggests that emergency planners and 
communicators cannot rely on the UK having more than a few items that might prove 
necessary for prolonged sheltering without making a concerted effort to collect them.  
It appears that much time has passed since nuclear preparedness information was last 
received by many. This is evidenced by the reporting of preparedness information received in 
open text response, and the outcome that 20% had received such information more than 15 
years ago. This survey demonstrates a desire for pre-incident information, particularly 
preparedness and sheltering information, which is seen as low in effort. 
When informing the public of sheltering instructions, information should be included as to why 
this is an effective method and what sheltering involves (including shutting windows, not 
approaching windows and placing oneself in a location central within the building). The 
dangers of evacuation should also be included. Whilst previous phases of this study 
(systematic review and focus groups) have shown there will still be people who ignore 
sheltering instructions, for various reasons such as picking up children/being with family, or 
simply to get as far away as possible, there is likely to be an opinion in the public that 
evacuation is the only effective safety measure to take. Many may attempt evacuation 
contrary to advice, risking exposure to radiation and nuclear blast associated hazards, as was 
witnessed in Japan following the Fukushima disaster (e.g. Hashimoto et al., 2016).  
It is notable that of those not wishing to receive pre-incident information, less than 10% 
selected the response option: if an attack happened, the government would provide us with 
everything we needed. Coupled with the low effort ratings of preparedness actions and a 
general desire for pre-incident information amongst respondents, this suggests that the public 
do not believe the government will provide supplies in the event of a nuclear disaster, but also 
don’t view it as a hardship to accumulate items themselves.  
Pre-incident communications should also be distributed via various channels to maximise 
reach. In Hawai’i this was attempted online (HI-EMA), town hall meetings (Teague, 2017) and 
by publicly testing cold war emergency sirens (Broder van Dyke, 2017), but with limited 
success. For example, town hall meetings were rated as relatively high in effort in Hawai’i 
(Chapter 4) and are arguably less commonplace in the UK, being selected as the preferred 
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method of information distribution by the fewest number of present survey respondents (who 
would presumably also rate this as high in effort) below word of mouth. In fact, watching 
online preparedness videos were rated as higher in effort than storing cash and important 
documents, putting together a first aid kit, obtaining a battery powered radio and spare 
batteries and obtaining a torch (and extra batteries) in the present study suggesting this 
method to not be simple or accessible for all citizens. Again, not all the UK public will accept, or 
be able to access pre-incident communications for nuclear attack preparedness no matter the 
method of distribution, but by focussing attention on evidenced preferences (leaflet/letter, 
online, television, radio) the likelihood of reception will increase.   
The importance of trust in the source of communications represents perhaps the most 
significant discrepancy between systematic review (Chapter 2) and focus group (Chapter 3) 
outcomes. In the review, engagement with communications and subsequent adherence with 
instructions was found to be enhanced in those who trusted the credibility of the message 
source (Latré et al., 2017; Murakami, 2016; Perko et al., 2013; Rogers et al., 2013). In the focus 
groups there appeared to be an inherent distrust in current and previous protective advice. 
Importantly, trust in message source was found to matter little with regards to nuclear threat. 
In fact, trust in source was considered unimportant if the perceived effectiveness of 
recommended actions was low or if the effort involved in carrying out actions outweighed the 
perceived potential risk of harm. Specifically, trust was considered to not influence adherence 
with protective actions if those actions are considered unreasonable or not evidence-based. 
One way in which trust is fostered in sources however, is by drawing upon an evidence-base to 
make public health recommendations.  
In the present survey, participants rated national government to be the most trusted source. 
However, rankings differed between trusted sources and those sources who would inspire the 
greatest level of adherence, with UK nuclear agencies, emergency services and the military 
being the top three rated. Interestingly, very little previous preparedness information was 
reported to have come from UK nuclear agencies (a source also found to rate highly for trust), 
a finding that seems objectively accurate: at the time of writing, the websites of the UK Atomic 
Energy Authority; The Office for Nuclear Regulation and The Atomic Weapons Establishment 
(the three main UK agencies in this area) contain little public safety advice. 
5.4.4.2. For this PhD 
To re-introduce the epistemological stance of using differing methodological approaches to 
gathering data in this PhD, there were benefits of conducting a survey at this phase of the 
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research. It was evident from the focus groups that there is interest in preparedness 
information in some, but that preparedness rates were anecdotally low. This survey allowed 
for expanding on the participant sample and for quantifying rates of preparedness and desire 
for nuclear risk communication. It also facilitates testing of factors raised as important in focus 
groups, such as who is most trusted to communicate with the public amongst other central 
factors. Amongst key factors from the focus groups that have implications for this PhD and 
were tested in this survey were that information received does not influence subsequent 
adherence if the perceived effort involved in undertaking protective actions is judged to 
outweigh the protection those actions would offer. This represents a cost-benefit analysis (e.g. 
Ahmed And Daw, 1980; Carr et al., 2018) to the individual. In this case cost could presumably 
be financial or time-consumption, whilst benefit is the perceived life-preserving effectiveness 
of the measure. In this study, the gathering of preparedness items were all ranked as relatively 
low in effort and actions which may be required in the event of a nuclear disaster (sheltering 
and evacuation) were relatively high: although only the top three most highly rated for effort 
(be prepared to leave your home to a place of shelter outside of your town or village; be 
prepared to leave your home to a place of shelter within your town or village and; be prepared 
to shelter (e.g. at home) for up to 2 weeks) scored above 5 out of 10 for effort. One would 
presume however, that in the event of a nuclear attack, perception of effort would reduce in 
survivors.  
In scores of response-action effectiveness, it is also interesting to see that the three sheltering-
associated actions are perceived to be the least effective. In fact, sheltering is ranked lower in 
effectiveness than taking Stable Iodine. Previous phases of this study have shown that Stable 
Iodine, and its purpose, are not widely known, particularly in areas away from nuclear power 
plants. Even in those areas, storing Stable Iodine is not widely undertaken.  
Overall, effectiveness ratings are low; only the top two actions (getting underground and 
leaving your home for a destination as far away as possible) were considered more than 50% 
effective on average. Leaving home being the most highly rated for effort, suggesting once 
more that the public undertake a cost-benefit analysis when preparing; with factors such as 
fatalism and risk perception influencing whether benefits of taking action outweighs the costs. 
There is little to separate the strength of association between perceived effort and intentional 
preparedness (B=1.11, p>0.003) from perceived effectiveness of sheltering and intentional 
preparedness (B=1.22, p>0.001). 
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A positive conclusion that might be drawn from effort and effectiveness ratings comes from 
considering the perception of sheltering. Whilst sheltering is rated as relatively low in 
effectiveness, it is also rated reasonably low in effort (around 50%). The perception of an 
action’s effectiveness appears to be one that can be influenced by using effective public 
information. This is perhaps the most central tenet that this PhD aims to address. Sheltering 
ability is reliant on preparedness, specifically the acquisition of the items rated as low in effort 
in this survey. In other words, sheltering is only as effortful as the most effortful preparedness 
actions (i.e. storing medication, food and water). 
In summary, respondents to this survey were intentionally prepared (for general disasters) if:  
• protective actions (i.e. sheltering) are perceived to be effective; 
• preparedness actions are perceived to be low in effort; 
• they have received ample and sufficient preparedness information, and; 
• the risk was perceived to be high enough 
However, further pre-incident communications are desired if: 
• disaster risk perception is low; and 
• previous information received is considered insufficient. 
Furthermore, information was not desired if individuals had already undertaken low effort 
preparedness actions or they believe sheltering to be an effective protection from radiation.  
5.5. Conclusion 
The outcomes of this survey suggest a desire in the UK public to be prepared for the unlikely 
event of a nuclear attack. Preparedness and knowledge of protective actions will likely 
preserve life not only in a nuclear attack, but also in other disasters. Few respondents reported 
having received preparedness information, but those who had were more likely to have 
prepared intentionally. Perhaps centrally, those who have received preparedness information 
had undertaken low effort actions and believed in the effectiveness of sheltering. This suggests 
that the problem is not the current messages themselves, but the poor dissemination of those 
messages. Preferences for how preparedness information should be delivered, by whom it 
should be distributed, and its content have important implications for policymakers and 




Chapter 6: Discussion and Recommendations 
6.1. Introduction 
6.1.1. Summary of the problem 
In this thesis the challenges that exist in educating the public as to effective preparedness for, 
and response to, a nuclear catastrophe have been outlined. This problem has been laid out in 
Chapter 1, but to re-summarise the problem that this thesis aims to address, these include 
beliefs about CBRN lethality (Sheppard et al., 2006), unfamiliarity (Covello, 2011) and 
unpredictability (Smith, 2010) which can elicit intense emotional responses such as anxiety 
(Becker, 2004) and attitudes such as fatalism (Taylor et al., 2011). The result of these 
phenomena is that individuals can avoid or dismiss risk communications (Rogers et al., 2013). 
However, further complexities exist: at what stage in the timeline of the event do we target 
our communications? Do we wait until a known risk exists or communicate during peacetime 
at risk of being ignored by the public? The issue of trust frequently arises in public health 
communications, but how do we know who is trusted to communicate? And how can trust be 
fostered? In addition to the question of who communicates, does the ‘how’ make a difference 
to acceptance and influence on behaviour towards increased preparedness? These are 
important questions as production and distribution of effective preparedness communications 
can facilitate engagement and may improve disaster preparedness, which in turn may predict 
adaptive, protective behaviour in the event of a radiation emergency (Taylor et al., 2011). So, 
how can we most effectively communicate with the public about nuclear disaster 
preparedness? 
6.1.2. What did this research achieve? 
Evidence-based development of effective nuclear risk communications should maximise the 
likelihood of increased preparedness for a nuclear disaster. This research intended to add to 
our understanding of attitudes and behaviour in preparation for and response to an 
emergency involving nuclear materials. The aims of this project were to:  
1. Identify predictors of behaviour in preparation for, and in the immediate aftermath of 
an incident involving release of nuclear radiation, and; 
2. Identify how best to communicate pre-incident information to the public. 
These aims were addressed over three phases. First, a systematic review identified what is 
already known about preparedness and reported public information needs for a radiation 
disaster, as well as adherence to recommended protective actions. Second, a set of focus 
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groups identified: public perceptions of nuclear attack and nuclear plant radiation releases; 
reported information needs before and during a nuclear incident; ways to provide this 
information, and; facilitators or barriers to engagement with pre-incident communications. 
Finally, two online surveys (with members of the public in Hawai’i and the UK) quantified 
actual and expected behaviours during an incident believed to involve a nuclear attack as well 
as preparedness and information preferences, and tested whether possible predictors of 
behaviour identified in the previous phases were associated with perceptions and behaviour. 
Using these methods, the present research findings have added to what is known in the 
context of nuclear preparedness communications in the UK and corroborated previous 
findings, particularly in the context of CBRN and public health communications. 
6.1.3. Unique contribution to knowledge 
This research lays the groundwork for the development of effective pre-nuclear attack 
communications to be distributed to the UK public. No other study has explored information 
preferences for catastrophic nuclear attack preparedness in the UK. Indeed, evidence for 
guidance development anywhere is scarce. Often, this research is designed to explore reported 
information needs when a threat is imminent and is not designed to inform the public of 
nuclear attack preparedness at a time of no known threat.  
The last UK information campaign of this nature (Protect and Survive) was developed over 
forty years ago. Whilst much of the recommended actions in Protect and Survive hold true 
today (Dodson, 2014), its high-profile faults meant it received resistance upon distribution. 
Contemporary evidence for public information needs can aid in remedying previous mistakes. 
This research has produced novel findings about how we should communicate with the public 
about nuclear preparedness, though evidence exists that compliments or challenges some of 
these findings. For example, previous research suggests trust in the communicating source to 
be vital in whether recommended actions are adhered to (e.g. Lofstedt, 2003; Wray et al., 
2006). My research does not contradict this, but it was apparent in these studies that trust is 
invalidated should recommended actions be considered unreasonable, unachievable or 
inefficacious. This is perhaps a circular issue since trust is fostered in part by making 
instructions reasonable, achievable and efficacious, however, a communicating source cannot 
assume what is reasonable to one is reasonable to all. As is shown, this assumption may result 
in reduced adherence.  
212 
 
A further unique finding is the preference for nuclear risk communication to be embedded in 
our institutions, or to be ‘drip-fed’ into the public; this challenges the importance of the 
correct method being used, and arguably even the most appropriate source. An obvious 
counter-argument exists regarding the introduction of ‘nuclear disaster drills’ into schools and 
the workplace, however. That is, we perform drills and practices, such as fire and first aid, 
because we perceive the risk of these events to be greater than that of nuclear attack.  
This research was also the first test of pre-incident communication preferences in a population 
who had experienced existential nuclear threat. Undertaking of a near equivalent survey with 
a population who have not faced this experience allowed for comparison between self-
reported information preferences. As previously discussed, this has provided further unique 
findings: that around three-quarters of those surveyed desire pre-nuclear incident 
communications whether or not they had recently experienced nuclear attack threat, but also 
that those believing the risk of disaster to be high are less likely to desire pre-incident 
communications.  
6.1.4. Strengths and limitations of research 
Strengths  
In the systematic review, many of the conclusions, particularly related to attack scenarios, 
relied on outcomes of studies that explored hypothetical scenarios. One clear strength of this 
PhD was that adherence to an actual instruction to shelter in a population facing imminent 
attack could be quantified in the Hawai’i survey. In that survey more than half of the 
respondents believed themselves to be at risk of a real and imminent catastrophic nuclear 
attack. Other studies of radiation emergency response have drawn on actions taken in 
accidental nuclear radiation leaks, the features of which differ from the situation experienced 
by Hawai’i. Many of the Hawai’i survey outcomes aligned with the outcomes of the other 
survey, conducted with a UK population. This suggests that there remains value in using 
hypothetical situations to inform research of this type. 
A further strength of this research is its scope. For reasons outlined above, the systematic 
review encompassed nuclear and radiological, deliberate and accidental radiation disaster 
scenarios and reported information needs at pre- and during incident periods. This allowed for 
exploration of key variations in reported information needs. The scope could then be refined 
to that of nuclear attack communications as research phases were progressed through. 
Recommendations are focussed on attack-specific outcomes where possible, but have drawn 
on evidence from studies of radiological device detonation and accidental radiation leaks 
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where appropriate. I believe this to have been an appropriate method for reporting outcomes 
and that where I have done, recommendations for nuclear attack risk communication are 
richer for their inclusion. 
Related to the scope of the project, another strength is the step process that was used in 
which each study built on the last. The paucity of data specific to nuclear catastrophe means 
that building upon known aspects in fields related to health and disaster communications has 
enabled the provision of a sound empirical base for this work and opened up avenues for 
future research (which are further discussed below). The approach taken to answering this 
question has been loosely structured on this process in that sometimes this meant that dead 
ends were not followed up, but the use of multiple methods in this process was beneficial in 
several regards. First by conducting a systematic review that covered a wide scope it enabled a 
broad overview of all important aspects of this topic which could be drawn together for 
exploration in the first phase of original data collection. Next, using qualitative methods 
allowed for the development of novel survey items that might otherwise have been missed 
(such as informing the list of sources to be rated for trust). The next, quantitative, phase 
allowed for triangulation of findings. This integration is not always easy however, for example 
there was a clear discrepancy as to whether pre-incident information was desired. 
Nonetheless where similar findings can be found in the focus groups, UK survey and Hawai’i 
survey, it provides greater confidence in their veracity. 
Limitations 
Study limitations have been discussed within each chapter, however a few more general 
limitations should also be considered. 
While a strength of this PhD related to its scope, covering nuclear and radiological dispersion 
devices, it was evident in the existing literature that the terms nuclear and radiological are a) 
often used interchangeably by experts (e.g. Bakhshi et al., 2014; FEMA, 2016) and b) often 
conflated in the minds of the public. Both were included in the review which also included 
studies of deliberate nuclear detonation and nuclear power plant accidents. Of course, there 
are no data on actual response to deliberate nuclear attack, whereas nuclear plant leak 
response data provides accounts of actual behaviour. As previously stated, the false alert 
incident in Hawai’i was the first credible attack warning to be researched in terms of actual 
public response. Studies from preparedness and immediate response phases were also 
included in the review. While this was useful to gather data from both points in time, there 
were also studies included wherein no distinction was made between risk communication 
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(given during a period of no threat) and emergency risk communication (given immediately 
following the emergency occurring). Also, other than those exploring the use of stable iodine, 
studies of nuclear plant accident response wholly related to emergency risk communications 
and public response behaviour, rather than preparedness. To summarise, the limitations 
relating to scope are a lack of data in the literature review relating to preparedness, and a lack 
of comparative data for adherence in actual nuclear attack to which the Hawai’i survey 
outcomes could be measured. 
For pragmatic reasons only studies written in English were included in the systematic review. 
Much research was conducted following the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster, some of which 
was published only in Japanese. Similar issues may apply to the Chernobyl disaster and in 
countries experiencing or having been threatened by nuclear attack (for example, Japan or 
Korea). It is possible therefore that some studies of relevance were not included. Following 
this, data was collected using focus groups and surveys only available to English-speakers. 
Again, cultural differences may limit the generalisability of these data. There are also likely to 
be cultural differences that influenced Hawai’i survey outcomes. For example, some 
respondents stated in open text that they considered firearms as preparedness items – 
something unlikely to apply in other cultures where firearm ownership is limited. Previous 
studies have been in geographic regions where evacuation may be more widely considered, or 
recommended in some nuclear power plant emergencies, or with populations living only in 
brick buildings. Many respondents commented that evacuation is not an option on Hawai’i’s 
islands or that sheltering was not an option in wooden houses. Whilst a strength of this 
research is in the cross-cultural data collection, a limitation is the ability to extrapolate across 
studies. 
Changes over time should also be considered when interpreting these outcomes. For example, 
studies were included in the systematic review that followed the Three Mile Island disaster 
which occurred fifty years before the time of writing. Concepts and knowledge of 
preparedness have likely changed since then just as historical context has changed with 
emerging nuclear super-powers, and formed and broken nuclear treaties, all reflected in the 
ticking minute hand of the Doomsday Clock. The generation who originally received Protect 
and Survive no longer have young children. Technology, and the potency of nuclear weapons 
have changed. In fact, in mid-2018 (during the period of this research), FEMA revised their 
nuclear disaster planning guidance to account for 100KT to 1000KT detonations, up from their 
original 10KT (The National Academies of Science, Workshop, August 2018). This represents a 
change in focus from smaller devices possibly deployed by terrorists to larger thermonuclear 
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attacks by state actors. Whilst detonation models of damage and potential fallout have been 
updated by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to reflect this amendment, it is 
notable that these models show that an explosive yield ten times larger than those previously 
modelled do not result in ten times the damage. Guidance, such as to remain in a (preferably 
concrete) shelter until advised otherwise still holds as the most effective protection from 
associated aspects of nuclear attack such as radiation sickness (Vergano, 2018). Other than 
perhaps influencing perceived risk, this change in US government planning likely matters little 
in terms of the aims of this research. 
6.2. Key findings and implications 
Presented here are the key findings that have arisen from this work. For clarity it has been 
indicated which of the recommendations associated with these findings are direct outcomes of 
this research, and which come from the past literature. An opinion as to the strength of the 
evidence-base for each recommendation is also given using the following terminology: strong 
(e.g. confirmed by two good quality studies), medium (e.g. one good quality study, or several 
lower quality studies) or weak (e.g. inconsistent evidence or only in one low quality study). 
6.2.1. Disaster preparedness is mixed 
From this thesis: 
Preparedness in the survey respondents appeared to be higher than what was suggested by 
focus group participants. Both Hawai’ian and UK participants were found to have obtained 
around half of recommended items intentionally for general disaster preparedness. It was not 
clear whether item gathering was the direct result of receiving preparedness instructions or if 
preparedness was based on what the public perceived to be necessary for disaster 
preparedness independent of guidance. Also, the method of using a median split to categorise 
preparedness as high or low in the analysis of these surveys should be considered as this has 
the potential of misleading interpretation; using an absolute criterion for preparedness may 
have been preferable, although to my knowledge no such criterion currently exists. 
In the UK survey having received little or no general disaster preparedness information, or 
little to no nuclear attack specific preparedness information and not believing, or not knowing 
if preparedness information received was sufficient was associated with low preparedness. By 
contrast, higher levels of preparedness were associated with high nuclear attack risk 
perception. But importantly, in the Hawai’i survey no association was found between being 
prepared for a disaster and subsequent adherence to the recommendation to shelter. This 
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suggests that it is not enough for communicators to simply tell the public how to prepare – 
people must be informed as to how to respond in the event of a nuclear disaster occurring. 
From previous literature: 
Outcomes of the review suggested strong evidence for generally low disaster preparedness in 
the public. Barriers to preparedness included believing there to be no time to evacuate in an 
emergency (Malešič et al., 2015) and unwillingness to follow instructions (Guterbock et al., 
2010; Williams et al., 2005). There was also little alignment with factors associated with 
preparedness. In the Chapter 2 review, two studies of terrorism found preparedness to be 
associated with: being older, a resident of rural areas, having higher education (Lemyre et al., 
2007), perceived probability of an incident, coping efficacy, perceived front-line preparedness 
and worry (Lee and Lemyre, 2009). Furthermore, we cannot definitely say that disaster 
preparedness alone results in survival without the need for outside assistance (Perman et al., 
2011). Heagele (2016) found a lack of evidence that disaster preparedness results in self-
sufficiency or resilience when required. In fact, contrary to current belief, it might be that 
taking preparedness measures is counter-productive: in a survey of New York residents 
following superstorm Sandy, an association was found between preparedness (amassing 
recommended items and making evacuation plans) and perceived non-recovery whilst having 
stored medication was associated with requiring mental health and medical services in the 
days following (Clay et al., 2019). 
6.2.1.1. But what is ‘prepared’ in this context? 
Ultimately, with this mixed picture of preparedness, the question should be asked as to what 
level of preparedness should we strive for? And how might we define ‘being prepared’ for a 
disaster of this magnitude?  Recognised preparedness guidance (FEMA, 2018; HI-EMA, 2017; 
HMSO, 1980) was drawn from in formulating lists of preparedness items for the surveys 
undertaken in the PhD; however, a lack of consistency exists in recommended CBRN 
preparedness. Other documents (e.g. American Red Cross, 2006; CDC, 2005; DHS, 2006) 
suggest more items are necessary. Preparedness literature often indicates that the public are 
not disaster prepared: survey respondents had around half of the suggested items, though if 
longer lists were used, they may appear less prepared. For example, recent campaigns such as 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s ‘Ready’ campaign states that general disaster 
preparedness involves having “thought about and planned for the types of disasters for which 
(individuals and groups) are at most risk, have developed a family communication and 
evacuation plan in the event of a disaster, and have assembled a complete disaster supply kit” 
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(DHS, 2018). Whether family communication plans had been formulated was not directly 
examined in this research, however, focus groups said they would look to reunite with their 
families rather than follow sheltering advice which suggests that few had made a plan that was 
consistent with published guidance. Redlener and colleagues (2004) suggest a lack of both 
logistical and emotional preparedness in the public. In a 2017 National Household survey of 
preparedness conducted across the US, FEMA found around half of respondents had taken 
three of six preparedness actions that included taking part in a drill, talking with others about 
preparedness and developing a household plan. However, whilst almost all had amassed 
supplies for three days without electricity, less than one in five had attended a meeting or 
undertaken formal emergency preparedness training (FEMA, 2017). If we use these definitions, 
then preparedness is more than simply amassing supplies. This is also important as Heagele 
(2016) found that a lack of consensus regarding recommended disaster preparedness is likely 
to result in individuals compiling suboptimal disaster supply kits. What’s more, Florig and 
Fischhoff (2007) have shown the financial cost of preparedness is greater with longer lists and 
therefore is likely to be prohibitive for many. However, in the event of a nuclear catastrophe it 
is doubtful as to how effective owning a torch would be. On the other hand, torch ownership, 
in addition to the acquiring and storing of other items of limited use in such an event, may be a 
marker of a wider acceptance of the need to be disaster prepared that for many is likely to 
extend to awareness of more effective countermeasures such as sheltering. Prioritising 
preparedness actions, rather than insisting that all must be completed, may be beneficial. In 
this regard, it is positive that hope can be gained by the fact that the key protective action for 
nuclear incidents, sheltering, was considered low in effort by many of the survey respondents. 
This is an area that can be addressed in pre-incident communications and doing so could result 
in increased public preparedness. It is also notable that preparedness was rarely for nuclear 
attack preparedness, but instead for general preparedness. The consistency between items 
collected for general preparedness in the present research and those recommended for 
nuclear preparedness in previous literature suggests some evidence that communicating about 
general disaster preparedness is preferable and perhaps more efficacious than communicating 
specifically about nuclear preparedness. This positive indication towards a general 
preparedness among the public can be traced to the concept of agility that was introduced in 
Chapter 1. Preparedness for multiple events heightens ability to call on protective actions that 
are appropriate to the set of circumstances and suggests a recognition that a serious threat 
exists, even if not acknowledged explicitly. Pre-incident risk communication can be used not 
only to educate, but to support the public to enhance flexibility and resilience towards a threat 
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by recognising effectiveness of actions that can protect against a nuclear attack and to respond 
quickly if required. This latter point speaks to the issue of anticipation of the threat which may 
go some way towards heightening the emotional readiness as addressed by Redlener and 
colleagues. Along with agility this anticipation is arguably as important or perhaps more so 
than amassing listed supplies. 
6.2.2. Those who perceive that a nuclear disaster is likely to occur are more prepared (but do not 
necessarily want to be told how to prepare)  
From this thesis: 
In the UK survey, there was strong evidence that prepared respondents were those generally 
believing there to be a moderate to very high risk of an unspecified disaster or nuclear attack 
occurring against the UK and it personally affecting themselves or their loved ones. High risk 
perception was also associated with acceptance of pre-incident communications: those same 
people were generally less likely to desire pre-nuclear incident communications. This was 
explored in focus groups where protective instruction was felt to be required only in the event 
of nuclear attack risk being known to be high (i.e. when an attack is imminent). This represents 
a discrepancy in the results that may require further exploration and is discussed further in the 
next section. 
Focus group participants also felt that the likelihood of an attack was low but that their 
perception of likelihood might rise should preparedness communications be distributed. Some 
focus groups suggested that knowing the current national threat level would influence their 
response to preparedness instructions; however, intensifying of threat warnings, or simply 
perceiving there to be a general increase in terrorism, without personal consequence was felt 
to desensitise them to the threat, reducing their likelihood of making preparedness-related 
lifestyle changes. Such an effect of public perception has been shown by Stevens et al (2011) 
who suggested that community adaptation (‘habituation’) occurs quickly in response to terror 
events. This leads to reduced concern and perception of likelihood.  
This represents a critical concern for risk communicators: We communicate risk and 
recommend preparedness measures to reduce the likelihood of harm to the public if that 
event occurs. However, if the public remain unaffected, their desire for risk communications is 
reduced. This is in contradiction to the belief that risk information should be normalised in the 
public to aid recall (see section 6.2.7 below). Risk communicators may need to be careful to 




6.2.3. Despite these barriers, people want nuclear preparedness information 
From this thesis: 
Although attitudes varied as to whether pre-incident communications for nuclear disaster 
preparedness were wanted or required in focus groups, a strong desire for nuclear attack 
preparedness communications was evident in survey respondents overall (83.5% in Hawai’i; 
73% in the UK). In fact, a large majority of these groups expressed a preference to receive 
communications during a period of ‘no known threat’ as opposed to, ‘when a threat was 
imminent’. However, this was in direct contradiction of views expressed by the focus group 
participants who preferred to receive information only when a threat was imminent. While it is 
tempting to suggest that recent experiences in Hawai’i boosted their desire for information, 
the high proportion of participants requesting information in the UK survey suggests that this 
is not the whole story. The question exists then: does high perceived risk of a nuclear attack 
increase or decrease desire for pre-incident preparedness communications? An explanation 
offered by the present data is the preference for ‘drip feeding’ information into the public. In 
short, this is the desire for preparedness information to be embedded in established 
institutions, rather than coming in the form of a one-off information campaign. In this 
instance, survey respondents who had not received preparedness information were less likely 
to be prepared. The lack of nuclear preparedness information in the public during living 
memory for many suggests that preparedness information has come from alternative sources, 
a sort of ‘drip feeding’ in itself. Survey respondents did not dismiss the idea of preparedness 
information, in fact many expressed a desire for information during a time of no known threat. 
In this case, two suggestions can be made: firstly, that drip feeding preparedness information 
that is general, rather than specific to the type (nuclear) of disaster can promote preparedness 
when it is less explicit than a one-off campaign, and secondly that the timeline of the event 
should be considered carefully in distributing preparedness information, i.e. drip feeding 
information during peacetime can be effective, there may be little desire for slower time 
preparedness information should the risk be known to have increased, however if an attack is 
known to be imminent then information as to immediate actions is desired.  
An alternative possibility is that the difference reflects the different methods of data collection 
used. While survey respondents may have considered the question of pre-incident information 
in a purely rational manner and concluded that it would be sensible to have information 
regarding risk and preparedness, the setting of a focus group may promote a different 
response, with participants who spend longer reflecting and discussing the issue coming to 
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understand that they will be likely to pay attention to risk information in the absence of an 
immediate threat.  
Reasons for believing pre-incident communications were unnecessary included: fatalism, a 
desire for ‘blissful’ ignorance, uncertainty as to what exactly would happen in a nuclear attack, 
perceived failure of past public information campaigns, detachment from the city of residence 
(or not feeling oneself to be a permanent resident of the place in question) and lack of 
interest. Some also felt that preparedness is a barrier to exercising common sense in the 
event. The most common reason selected for not wishing to receive nuclear risk 
communication in both surveys was, ‘I don't believe I could be protected if Hawai’i/the UK was 
attacked’. Respondents who did not believe preparedness information received to date was 
sufficient, or did not know if it was sufficient expressed a desire for nuclear pre-incident 
communications. This provides evidence to support the recommendation that nuclear risk 
communications should be clear, transparent and consistent. 
6.2.4. The public want to know about preparedness, countermeasures and radiation in the event 
of an incident 
From this thesis: 
In both surveys, preferred pre-incident content largely concerned preparedness (e.g. what to 
include in an emergency kit), sheltering (e.g. how and where), radiation effects (e.g. how to 
recognise radiation poisoning) and stable iodine (e.g. why it helps). Content to be distributed 
in the event of a nuclear attack concerned evacuation (e.g. planned procedures), family-centric 
needs (e.g. how to protect loved ones), detonation effects (e.g. the range of damage) and 
actions of authorities. 
Focus group outcomes were that rather than pre-incident content containing specific advice 
which may not be suitable for all, a range of actions for varying radiation-disaster situations 
should be included. This could include worst and best-case scenarios designed to reassure 
people that their actions are appropriate. Explanation as to why actions are advised was also 
requested, to manage fear and expectations. In fact, groups felt that their ability to adhere to 
instructions was reliant on their perceived ability to carry out the actions ‘properly’, so these 
needed to include adequate information (such as how long to shelter) and they would be 
seeking reassurance that their personal circumstances would be accounted for in the guidance. 
Low self-efficacy was linked to fatalism by the focus groups and reduced engagement with 
communications. This was echoed in the UK survey where not feeling that it was possible to 
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undertake countermeasures was a reason for not wishing to receive pre-incident 
communications. One study in the literature review also found large numbers willing to shelter 
but perceiving themselves lacking in resources to do so (Williams et al., 2005). These 
constraints evident in both the present research and the previous literature strongly suggest 
that the public may not shelter in the immediate aftermath of a nuclear attack when radiation 
levels are highest, in favour of seeking out alternative locations of safety. 
According to the focus groups participants, information should be brief, and include visuals, 
bullet points, logos or catchphrases to capture attention and encourage engagement. A desire 
was expressed for two-to-three simple actions to take in the event, particularly if relevant to 
different scenarios. 
From previous literature: 
The original finding of a desire expressed for two-to-three simple actions that are relevant 
would correspond with what has been referred to as ‘survival processing’: recall of details 
perceived to be most central to survival (Naire and Panderirada, 2011), and aligns with 
Edworthy and colleagues’ (2015) finding that where emergency risk information is 
comprehensive, elements that can be inferred from elsewhere, such as other risk 
communication, are best recalled. This is also consistent with strong evidence from a 
randomised control trial included in the systematic review in which preference was expressed 
for a nuclear safety leaflet, which was felt to be easier to understand, and which offered a pin-
up summary with pictures (Hellier et al., 2014). 
Based on the outcomes of this research several specific recommendations as to content can be 
made:  
o There is strong evidence to show that pre-incident communications should provide 
information relating to: preparedness; sheltering; radiation effects and, if appropriate, 
stable iodine. Preparedness information should include: emergency supply kit contents 
and amounts to store; how to prepare for a nuclear attack and, how to prepare for any 
emergency. Sheltering information should include a short list of the following actions 
judged to be most important for increasing the chance of survival: how and where to 
shelter; what to do if lacking an appropriate shelter (or if driving); how to know 
whether to shelter at home or elsewhere; how to ensure effectiveness of home 
shelters (such as creating a functional toilet); how long to shelter and; why sheltering 
is recommended. Radiation information should include types of radiation and how to 
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recognise radiation poisoning; what removes radiation; how to avoid exposure; how 
long the radiation would take to clear (including how long to stay sheltering) and; the 
longer-term effects of fallout. Detonation-related content should also be included, 
such as the potential range of damage. Stable iodine information should include when 
to use it, why it helps and, side-effects. 
o To facilitate increased engagement, evidence is strong that pre-incident 
communications should detail actions that authorities would take in a disaster, 
including how food would be supplied to affected people. 
o Pre-incident communications should also contain a range of actions for varying 
radiation-disaster situations. Some (medium-quality) evidence from this research 
suggests that this might include worst and best-case scenarios and personal accounts 
of radiation-exposure survivors and an explanation as to why evacuation is advised if 
this is an anticipated order. This also includes what to take if evacuating and planned 
evacuation procedures (e.g. modes of transport). 
o Further, pre-incident communications should contain two-to-three simple actions (i.e. 
the most vital instructions relating to sheltering, above) to take in the event, 
particularly if relevant to different disaster scenarios. There is medium evidence that 
communications should also be brief, include visuals, bullet points, logos or 
catchphrases. 
o To facilitate increased adherence with protective instructions in the event of a nuclear 
attack, there is medium evidence to suggest that messages should provide of a range 
of actions tailored to different scenarios. 
o To facilitate increased adherence with protective instructions in the event of a nuclear 
attack, it is strongly recommended that messages should provide adequate 
information (such as how long to shelter) to enable the public to fully and effectively 
undertake actions. 
A further recommendation that entails findings from previous literature, is: 
o To facilitate increased preparedness, pre-incident communications should be clear in 
their layout and recommended actions; this includes provision of literacy aided 
materials for those with language deficits. 
6.2.5. Fatalism is a barrier to engagement with risk communication 
From this thesis: 
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Fatalistic attitudes were a common reason for not wishing to receive pre-incident 
communications in both surveys. In Hawai’i, fatalism was also amongst reasons cited for taking 
no action in response to the warning alert. Fatalism was also cited in focus groups as a reason 
for non-adherence with recommended countermeasures, but not as a reason for non-
engagement with pre-incident communications. 
It is clear that fatalism conflicts with the perceived efficacy of protective behaviours and 
represents an important barrier to preparedness for a nuclear emergency. However, the public 
might still engage with preparedness communications despite holding this attitude. Based on 
the findings of this research, it is clear that communications must show how a nuclear attack 
can be survived following the initial blast. It might be that risk communications cannot change 
the minds of all, but communications can have a positive effect nonetheless. 
From previous literature: 
In addition to the original finding that fatalism is a potential barrier to communication 
engagement, there is strong evidence from two studies in the review that explicitly cited 
fatalism as a barrier to preparedness (i.e. feeling unable to plan for the unknown) (Guterbock 
et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2005). 
We can draw upon the wider health psychology field in exploring this. While fatalism has long 
been considered a barrier to adherence with treatment regimes, research has found that 
supporting patients to overcome feelings of powerlessness and to feel more in control 
regarding their own health behaviour has resulted in some considering fatalism a motivator of 
positive behavioural change in response to diagnosis and treatment planning wherein the 
individual feels there is nothing to lose from adhering to a treatment regime (Fairchild, 2015). 
Referred to as fatalistic-optimistic polarity, this may particularly be the case if we consider that 
in at least some cases, fatalistic talk has a social function, enabling emotional management of 
uncertainty and stress and allowing for acknowledgement of powerlessness to help us to make 
sense of the world (Keeley et al., 2009). Added information in preparedness communications 
such as survivability rates found in nuclear attack impact modelling studies (Buddemeier, 
2010) may act as a motivator in this case. 
6.2.6. Pre-existing knowledge of nuclear preparedness is low 
From this thesis: 
Little knowledge of protective actions was expressed by focus groups; feeling unprepared for 
nuclear attack was also expressed by most Hawai’ian and UK survey respondents. More than 
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half of Hawai’i respondents said they had received no nuclear preparedness information; this 
rose to 80% in the UK. Approximately half of those who had received preparedness 
information felt it to have been sufficient. Also, regarding information sufficiency, focus groups 
living close to a nuclear plant had some knowledge of stable iodine but felt that the 
information included with it was inadequate. 
Lack of awareness of actions that could be taken or of the effectiveness of protective actions 
was amongst reasons as to why no action was taken in response to the ballistic missile warning 
by many Hawai’i survey respondents.  
From previous literature: 
The importance of pre-existing knowledge was highlighted in the systematic review where 
acceptance of information during a nuclear disaster was found to be predicted by having 
agent-specific knowledge (Murakami et al., 2016; Perko et al., 2012).  
Based on the outcomes of this research a specific recommendation as to nuclear preparedness 
risk information content can be made:  
o To facilitate increased engagement, pre-incident communications should make 
transparent what preparedness UK authorities have in place. What is strongly evident 
is that this includes what a warning of imminent attack would look or sound like. 
6.2.7. Recall is aided by multiple methods of distribution and information being ‘normalised’ 
From this thesis: 
Two strong findings related to preferred distribution method: that no one method was 
preferred but instead the use of multiple methods was endorsed, and that information should 
be ‘drip fed’ into the public rather than distributed via a sudden, one-off information 
campaign. This method of drip-feeding related to information being embedded in institutions 
such as schools and the workplace. Focus groups felt that repetition of preparedness 
information over time would positively influence adherence. The example of attention being 
paid to unattended bags, despite the infrequency of this form of terror attack was cited. Pre-
flight safety information was cited in reference to how easily protective actions are forgotten if 
given infrequently (i.e. only as often as one travels by air). Interestingly, respondents to the 
Hawai’i survey who reported having acted on preparedness knowledge cited recall of 
hurricane and tsunami protection. This suggests risk communications about different disaster-
types can serve to reinforce each other. In this way, nuclear preparedness drills could be 
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exercised much like fire drills. This was considered less alarming and more effective in 
engaging people, less overwhelming and aiding recall of information. Though not necessarily a 
one-off campaign, the public response to Protect and Survive seems to support this point of 
view. More recently a one-off ‘grab bag’ contents awareness campaign distributed by Scottish 
Police during a dedicated preparedness month (BBC, 2019) was met with suspicion and ridicule 
in the public and shows how preparedness communication can result in blowback. It should be 
noted that recall was not tested in this thesis. 
Whilst social media was considered the least trustworthy source and method of 
communication, focus groups considered it not without benefits. For example, social media 
can be a starting point to verify information elsewhere and is an immediate method for 
distribution in the event of an attack. Survey and focus group participants also expressed a 
desire to see demonstrations of protective procedures on television or the internet. 
From previous literature: 
Embedding nuclear preparedness information in institutions did not arise in the previous 
literature, nor was ‘drip-feeding’ explored in the surveys. However, some original findings align 
with existing literature in the field, for example, the use of multiple sources resonates with 
review outcomes and the varying preferences for distribution method expressed by survey 
respondents. Leaflets/letters were one such preference, preferably personalised to the home 
owner and building type (UK survey; focus groups). This method was a preference in a study of 
nuclear plant information distribution (Malešič et al., 2015). Focus groups also considered the 
internet to be an appropriate online resource if used by credible sources (UK survey; focus 
groups), a finding shared by some studies in the systematic review (e.g. Guterbock et al., 2010; 
Williams et al., 2005). 
Based on the outcomes of this research two specific recommendations as to information 
distribution can be made:  
o There is strong evidence suggesting that to facilitate increased engagement, pre-
incident communications should be distributed via multiple methods. Leaflets/letters 
should be personalised to the home owner and type of building and internet resources 
should allow for viewing of demonstrations of actions and procedures. 
o To facilitate increased engagement, there is medium evidence to suggest that pre-
incident communications should be embedded in institutions such as schools and 
workplaces. This might include introducing drills or educational seminars. 
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6.2.8. Instruction adherence in a nuclear emergency is low 
From this thesis: 
Only 8% of Hawai’i survey respondents actively sought immediate shelter in the minutes 
following the ballistic missile false alarm. Whilst few actually needed to seek shelter as they 
were already at home, this lack of adherence is likely to be in part due to a failure in 
messaging; message receivers were not told where to seek shelter or to stay at home if already 
there. Text responses in the survey suggest a lack of pre-existing knowledge of effective 
sheltering. This is echoed across phases of this study: non-adherence was suggested by focus 
group participants who did not believe their homes to be effective shelters (and by those 
perceiving sheltering to be counterintuitive in the review (Bass et al., 2015; Oak Ridge, 2011; 
Rogers et al., 2013)) or to not be a viable response due to desire to connect with loved ones. 
From previous literature: 
Anticipated adherence to a sheltering recommendation was also found in those with low 
confidence in local or national preparedness planning and those wishing to get supplies 
(Lasker, 2004; Miller, 1981; Nyaku et al., 2014). It would increase, however, if food and water 
could be delivered (Guterbock et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2005). Many studies in the review 
(Guterbock et al., 2010; Lasker, 2004; Malešič et al., 2015; Nyaku et al., 2014; Van Bladel et al., 
2000; Williams et al., 2005) found collection of children to be a reason for sheltering non-
adherence.  
While a further original finding here was that focus groups also suggested self-evacuation to 
be unlikely due to perceived transport overburdening and fear of others’ behaviour, for 
comparison, some studies reported on actual evacuation behaviour following the Three Mile 
Island disaster and found non-adherence occurred due to low perception of danger, fear of 
looting, waiting for an order to evacuate and believing oneself to be at a safe distance from 
the incident (Cutter and Barnes, 1982; Houts et al., 1980; Perry, 1981; 1983). Having received 
the advisory to evacuate, fear of harm, confusion and anticipation of a broader evacuation 
order with associated problems such as traffic gridlock were all reasons for adhering to the 
evacuation order (Cutter and Barnes, 1982). Altogether, this paints a picture of medium 
evidence (due to the lack in quality of the studies in question) for low intention to comply with 




Based on the outcomes of this research a specific recommendation as to message content can 
be made:  
o To facilitate increased adherence with protective instructions in the event of a nuclear 
attack, evidence is strong that messages should inform the public as to whether food 
and water could be delivered to those who are sheltering. 
Based on this, and previous research, a further recommendation can be made: 
o To facilitate increased adherence with protective instructions in the event of a nuclear 
attack, evidence is strong that messages should use basic terminology. 
6.2.9. Recommended countermeasures are considered low in efficacy  
From this thesis: 
The belief that protective actions are largely ineffective in a nuclear attack was generally 
universal: UK survey respondents ranked building a shelter from furniture to be the least 
effective protective action from a list (getting underground was ranked most effective). Of 
course, this is likely to be true. However, an association was found between UK survey 
participants being more prepared if they felt sheltering to be effective. Importantly, focus 
groups felt that believing recommended actions to be ineffective diminished the potentially 
positive effect of trust in the communicating source.  
From previous literature: 
The original finding from the two surveys of increased preparedness when sheltering is 
considered effective provides an interesting comparison with previous literature as adherence 
with recommended countermeasures has also been found to increase, and fatalism decrease, 
where those actions were proven effective (Becker, 2004). 
Based on this, and previous research, a specific recommendation as to message content can be 
made:  
o To facilitate preparedness, evidence is strong that sources of pre-incident 
communications should make efforts to be relatable to the public, such as by ensuring 
recommended actions are widely considered to be effective. 
6.2.10. There is no clear preference for communicating source 
From this thesis: 
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The most frequently reported sources of preparedness information in surveys were local news 
media, workplace and educational institutions (Hawai’i), social media, friends/family, national 
news media and national government (UK). This is important since the only significant 
association related to source in surveys was UK participants being more likely to be 
intentionally prepared if they had received disaster preparedness information from emergency 
services. Emergency services were also amongst sources considered most trusted to provide 
nuclear risk communication.  
In the focus groups, no clear preference for information source emerged. Instead participants 
highlighted the importance of an information source being relatable (as long as their advice 
was considered reasonable). Government sources were generally considered appropriate if 
their information was verified by a ‘nuclear watchdog’. 
From previous literature: 
In the systematic review only one UK-based study reported on preferred risk communication 
source (any non-government: Pearce et al., 2013), and that study was exploring radiological 
device detonation. 
Based on the present research, two specific recommendations as to message content can be 
made:  
o To facilitate increased preparedness, evidence is medium that pre-incident 
communications should come from UK nuclear agencies, emergency services or the 
military. If distributed via the media or government sources messages should include 
verification by a ‘nuclear watchdog’. This verification should include emphasis of the 
evidence base for given preparedness actions. 
o To facilitate increased adherence with protective instructions in the event of a nuclear 
attack, evidence is medium that messages should come from UK nuclear agencies, 
emergency services or the military. 
6.2.11. Trust in source is associated with adherence 
From this thesis: 
Across both surveys the most highly trusted sources to provide nuclear risk information were 
national government (including the Hawai’i Environmental Management Agency) and expert 
(nuclear) agencies. Online forums and social media contacts were rated lowest. In addition to 
nuclear agencies, UK survey participants also ranked emergency services and the military as 
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sources whose advice participants would be most likely to comply with in relation to 
preparedness and protective actions in the event of a nuclear attack. 
In contradiction to common understanding of trust in risk communication, it was interesting to 
see that the Hawai’i Environmental Management Agency was rated the most highly trusted 
from the list of options following their false alert. This supports the importance of pre-existing 
knowledge and experience in fostering trust. This may also speak to an outcome from focus 
groups that trust is not only fostered by what is said, but also by the source of information 
being able to show that they have the public’s best interests at heart. 
In focus groups a range of actions tailored to different scenarios was felt to increase faith in 
information. Trust alone is not enough, however. Even with highly trusted sources, adherence 
is also reliant on recommended actions appearing reasonable or evidence-based. For example, 
one focus group participant who had received preparedness messaging whilst living in a 
warzone felt it ineffective as it was not personalised to their circumstances. 
It is important to remember that providing direct instructions for protection in the event of a 
radiation emergency is not the only purpose of pre-incident information. Perhaps equally 
important is educating regarding the nature of a nuclear bomb, providing reassurance to the 
public that their safety is being considered (which findings here suggest increases trust), 
increasing preparedness and setting expectations as to what might be instructed in the event 
(such as sheltering). Frewer et al. (1996) suggest sources gain or lose trust depending on ability 
to meet public expectations. The findings of this study provide some evidence to suggest that 
expectation setting is perhaps equally as important as preparedness actions, akin to 
normalisation of information. An argument perhaps exists that a change in focus regarding 
desired outcomes of pre-incident information is required: to informing of how authorities are 
preparing for such eventuality and expectation setting alongside enhanced instruction 
adherence.  
From previous literature: 
Acceptance of information during an incident was predicted by trust in the message source 
(e.g. Murakami et al., 2016; Perko et al., 2012) in the review, strongly suggesting trust to be 
important in health communications. 
Whilst caution is needed in drawing comparison across the two surveys, and by proxy, in the 
review UK non-governmental sources (Pearce et al., 2013), the US President (Guterbock et al., 
2010) and US public health departments (Nyaku et al., 2014) were amongst those rated 
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highest for trustworthiness, while the nuclear industry (Belgium: Latré et al., 2018) and US 
government (Radiological Threat Awareness Coalition, 2008; Williams et al., 2005) were rated 
lowest. Such discrepancies suggest trust is based on pre-existing knowledge and experiences. 
Consistency between messengers was found to increase trust (Rogers et al., 2013), as was 
perceived reliability (associated with the use of basic terminology), accuracy (i.e. consistency 
across messages) and effectiveness of recommendations (Becker, 2004; Prince-Embury, 
1992ii). 
Other than the retention of public trust in HI-EMA, the original findings certainly resonate with 
other health-related studies regarding protective behaviour. For example, Smith et al. (2017) 
found vaccine adherence to be associated with trust in the healthcare provider who 
recommends the vaccine and trust in the vaccine effectiveness. 
Based on the present and previous research, several specific recommendations as to content 
and distribution can be made: 
o To facilitate increased engagement, there is strong evidence that pre-incident 
communications should show how recommended actions can be effective, achievable 
or reasonable. 
o To facilitate increased engagement, there is strong evidence that pre-incident 
communications should maintain honesty. This includes stating where there is 
uncertainty. 
o To facilitate increased preparedness, there is strong evidence that pre-incident 
communications should ensure consistency across messages and between 
messengers. 
o To facilitate increased adherence with protective instructions in the event of a nuclear 
attack, there is strong evidence that messages should be repeated but maintain 
consistency across messages and messengers. 
o To facilitate increased adherence with protective instructions in the event of a nuclear 
attack, there is strong evidence that messages should make efforts to show that 
sources have the public’s best interests as their primary concern. This can be achieved 
by providing reassurance that personal circumstances are accounted for in response 
advice. 




o To facilitate increased adherence with protective instructions in the event of a nuclear 
attack, there is medium evidence to suggest that messages should signpost to sources 
of verification which might be more trusted by certain groups. 
o To facilitate increased adherence with protective instructions in the event of a nuclear 
attack, there is strong evidence that messages should ensure accuracy of 
recommended actions. 
6.2.12. Parents are unlikely to shelter without their children  
From this thesis: 
Parental status was a commonly occurring influence on adherence in this research. UK survey 
participants with children under 18 years were more likely to be prepared. Prioritising the 
collection of, or simply being with children was a reason for non-adherence in focus groups 
despite an acknowledged risk to one’s own health. Focus group members with children 
preferred evacuation to sheltering as a response action Desire to protect children was also 
cited as a reason for wanting pre-incident communications in the focus groups, although UK 
survey respondents with a child over 18 years old living at home were less likely to desire 
communications.  
From previous literature: 
There is much alignment between these original findings and the previous literature here. 
Parents with children under 18 are more likely disaster prepared (Guterbock et al., 2010; 
Williams et al., 2005); sheltering non-adherence is likely amongst parents (Becker, 2004; Nasar 
and Greenberg, 1984) although adherence may increase if people know that their children are 
safe (Lasker, 2004; Williams et al., 2005) and; evacuation is a preferred countermeasure 
(Kanda et al., 2013iii; Nasar and Greenberg, 1984; Prince-Embury, 1992ii; Zeigler and Johnson, 
2010). 
Based on the present and previous research, two specific recommendations as to message 
content can be made:  
o To facilitate increased engagement, there is strong evidence to suggest that pre-
incident communications should include how families can be protected if not together 
(such as advice around the collection of children from school) and how to 
communicate with loved ones. 
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o To facilitate increased adherence with protective instructions in the event of a nuclear 
attack, there is weak evidence to suggest that messages should provide information as 
to how children are kept safe if at school. 
6.2.13. Communicating nuclear risk is unlikely to raise nuclear attack anxiety  
From this thesis: 
The emotional impact of preparedness is a common concern for policy makers in designing risk 
communications. Although no questions were explicitly asked about anxiety in this PhD, little 
anxiety was expressed in qualitative responses. (‘why worry about something that you cannot 
control?’). Some data regarding associated emotions was collected however. For example, in 
focus groups little fear of consequences was associated with lack of preparedness amongst 
participants. What’s more, risk reminders such as the distribution of nuclear risk 
communications, were considered unlikely to cause fear. In fact, fear was suggested to be 
relieved by the knowledge that the authorities are prepared to protect the public. 
From previous literature: 
While there have been studies that suggest anxiety to be a potential barrier in nuclear 
preparedness adherence (e.g. Becker, 2005), there is also medium evidence to suggest that 
communicating risk does not prompt fear or anxiety in the public (e.g. Gray and Ropeik, 2002; 
US Dept of Health and Human Services, 2002). In fact, under-response to public information 
campaigns is a more likely outcome than over-response in the form of excessive anxiety 
(Pearce et al., 2019). Not only this, but the more we trust the source the less we will 
experience fear (Lofstedt, 1996). Messaging that contains fear appeals (i.e. are designed to 
elicit fear) have been found to not be effective in motivating behavioural change (e.g. Reser 
and Bradley, 2017), perhaps unless accompanied by evidence of efficacy (Witte and Allen, 
2000). Reser and Bradley (2017) outline communication approaches found in climate change 
research to elicit a stronger influence when they include: raising audience self-efficacy or sense 
of personal control; promoting a re-evaluation of cost-benefits and; outline effective low-cost 
alternative actions. This effect has been seen recently in response to the ‘Run, Hide, Tell’ 
campaign which aimed to prepare the public for a terrorist attack using a firearm (Pearce et 
al., 2019). This is not necessarily to be taken as a positive however: for people to pay attention 
to risk information they need to have a reasonably accurate representation of risk severity as 
well as their own susceptibility in order to motivate action (Rubin et al., 2012). We should 
remember that focus groups in this research were self-selecting and happy to discuss nuclear 
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threats and so were not representative of the population. Care should therefore still be taken 
in drawing conclusions around anxiety and fear elicited from pre-incident communications. 
6.3 Links to theory 
6.3.1. Communication models 
In Chapter 1 a brief outline of risk communication models was provided that have 
characteristics theorised to be relevant to this study. These were Learning Theory (Keselman et 
al., 2005), the Social-Cognitive Model (Lee and Lemyre, 2009), the Communication Persuasion 
Matrix (McGuire, 1989), the Extended Parallel Process Model (Witte, 1992; Witte & Allen, 
2000) and Miletti and Peek’s (2000) social psychology of public response to warnings theory. 
As will be explained here, these outcomes align closely with many of the central aspects of 
these models.  
The central facet of Learning Theory that knowledge presented must reaffirm existing 
knowledge acquired through experience and cultural influence (mental maps) certainly aligns 
with the study outcome that risk communications should be embedded in institutions. This 
process of ‘drip feeding’ preparedness information by normalising it in society would allow for 
mental maps of nuclear preparedness to be formed, and might improve readiness for 
emergency risk communications, such as an instruction to shelter due to imminent attack.  
The Social-Cognitive Model places perceived coping efficacy, perceived likelihood and front-
line preparedness as central predictors of preparedness and information seeking related to 
terror risk. Much of this model aligns with outcomes of the present study: UK survey 
respondents who believed the government not to offer protection from nuclear attack were 
less likely to be personally prepared. However, focus groups expressed an opinion that front-
line preparedness was a reason to not require personal preparedness. Those perceiving there 
to be a high risk of nuclear attack were also more likely to be prepared. Contrary to the model 
however, these individuals were also less likely to desire risk information. Information was also 
not required by those who felt preparedness was low in effort (suggesting high perceived 
coping efficacy). Worry, experienced as a consequence of cognitive evaluations (such as of 
coping efficacy) did not appear to be a factor in this study. Having been developed to target 
public communications regarding CBRN terror, it appears that there is much overlap between 
predictors of behaviour in The Social-Cognitive Model and associations between predictors 
and behaviour in the present study which suggests this model to be an appropriate fit for pre-
nuclear risk communications development. 
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Adjusting messaging to address the public’s perception of risk is also a central factor in eliciting 
a desired outcome from risk communication in the Communication Persuasion Matrix, as well 
as Covello’s four organising models. In this study the input variables outlined by this model 
were explored and no clear preference for source, message and channel was found. These are 
aspects that are likely to be dictated by Covello’s trust determination, found here to be 
important in eliciting adherence, but not as important as perception of risk, and of the desired 
outcome (the fifth input of the Communication Persuasion Matrix) being perceived to be a 
reasonable and effective protective measure. 
Coping efficacy is also an important factor in acceptance of fear inducing messages in the 
Extended Parallel Process Model. In this case, low self-efficacy and fatalism were barriers to 
acceptance of pre-nuclear incident messaging, in-line with the model. This is defined as 
reactance (Brehm and Brehm, 1981), and was manifested in the UK-based survey as denial 
that a nuclear attack could occur against the UK.  
The final model of risk communication discussed, Miletti’s social psychology of public response 
to warnings, relates largely to emergency risk communication response, and so data from the 
Hawai’i survey will be drawn upon. Following Miletti’s five stages we see that most of the 
Hawai’i public heard the warning as it was sent via a method instantly accessible to most. A 
problem came at the second stage however; many people did not understand from the 
warning that their own homes were a suitable shelter and remaining at home was a 
consequence of not knowing what else to do, despite understanding what the overall risk 
being communicated was. This research showed that around half of the warning recipients 
believed there to be an immediate risk to themselves. This suggests personalisation of that 
risk, the fourth stage. The final stage, performing the desired behaviour was found to be 
undertaken deliberately by very few, however, as discussed, situational factors (being at home 
already) meant that the desired behaviour was passively undertaken by most.  
6.3.2. Underpinning methodological framework 
The theories outlined above each provide elements that appear to inform nuclear risk 
communications development in the context of the outcomes of this research. At the outset of 
this thesis it was decided that a framework to underpin the methodology might aid in 
understanding the underlying mechanisms behind behaviour change towards a more disaster 
prepared public. Theoretical Domains Framework (TDF) was selected to provide this function. 
TDF was informed by public health research and has not previously been used to inform the 
development of a behaviour change intervention related to any form of CBRN agent 
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preparedness. This framework has guidance (Atkins et al., 2017) for conducting research aimed 
at developing a behaviour change intervention. This is achieved by understanding influences 
on behaviour in the context in which those behaviours occur. In this research, it provided a 
checklist for ensuring that influences on behaviour change were accounted for during data 
collection. Not all domains included in the framework were relevant and refinement of the 
scope of this research across phases reflects this. However, the Framework was effective in 
identifying domains that appear to be important in the development of effective nuclear risk 
communications that are aimed at influencing preparedness behaviour. These are reflected in 
Table 6.1.  
In Chapter 1, the TDF was introduced in the context of knowledge mobilisation, or, applying 
the scientific process in a way that can enable guidance to be operationalised by a non-
scientific audience. Also introduced in Chapter 1 was a model representative of factors central 
to communication and behaviour change. Using the outcomes of this thesis within the TDF 
framework, this model can be updated and a guiding framework for pre-nuclear incident 
communications be proposed. Domains of the TDF found to be important for nuclear risk 
communication (discussed above) that correspond with aspects of the previously outlined risk 
communication models are beliefs about capabilities (self-efficacy), beliefs about 
consequences (risk perception), knowledge (mental maps) and memory, attention and 
decision processes (social psychology of warning response). It may be that the other domains: 
social or professional role identity, emotion, environmental context and resources and social 
influences also overlap. Without further exploration it is difficult to know.  
TDF alone does not provide a statement as to the structural and psychological processes that 
regulate behaviour change and while not developed to target risk communication 
development directly, it has been valuable in this research process. Identification of important 
behaviour change domains can allow for mapping onto existing models to identify which 
model might best explain how to communicate with the public about nuclear risk. It can also 
be used alongside the COM-B (Cane et al., 2012; Michie et al., 2014), a further refined model 
of behaviour in which capability, opportunity and motivation interact and which is used to 







Table 6.1. Research outcomes mapped to TDF domains 








Survey respondents wished to receive information on 
preparedness and protective actions prior to an attack 
being imminent. In the event, cognitive overload is 
more likely; risk communication embedded in society 




Social identify; group 
identity 
Focus groups who would access risk information on 
social media would look to groups that fit their social 
identity (e.g. mums groups); in one previous study 
young males were found to seek out peers to verify 
risk information (Bass et al., 2015) 
Knowledge Knowledge of scientific 
rationale; procedural 
knowledge 
Agent-specific knowledge has been associated with 
acceptance of nuclear preparedness messaging (Perko 
et al., 2012), however in the Hawai’i survey, believing 
an attack was imminent upon receipt of the missile 
alert was associated with having not received 
preparedness information or not believing information 





Focus groups expressed a belief that sheltering would 
mean longer time spent suffering following nuclear 
attack 
Emotion Anxiety; fear; stress Fear was not resultant of lack of preparedness 
amongst focus groups; knowing that authorities are 






resources; barriers and 
facilitators; person x 
environment interaction 
Ability to evacuate based on transport overcrowding 
was an influence on adherence to protective actions 





Adherence was reliant on focus groups’ ability to carry 
out actions ‘properly’ and receiving assurance that 
personal circumstances were accounted for; low self-
efficacy was linked with fatalism and reduced 




Social and group 
pressure/ norms/ 
support 
Observing other’s behaviour, such as non-adherence 
to sheltering was cited as an influence of behaviour in 
focus groups, surveys and previous literature (e.g. 
Lasker, 2004) 
 
6.3.2.1. Model of key nuclear attack preparedness ingredients 
Using the outcomes of this thesis, the model proposed in Chapter 1 can be updated (figure 6.1) 
and is presented here as an ‘ideal world’ scenario in which a full understanding of context, 
psychology and communication principles allows communicators to craft the characteristics of 
their messages in order to affect pre-incident preparedness behaviours and also behaviour in 




Figure 6.1. Updated model representation of factors known to contribute to effective 
communications targeted at behaviour change in the context of nuclear catastrophe 
preparedness.  
6.4. Key lessons learned 
Throughout this thesis, lessons have been learned regarding how agencies might communicate 
with the public to enable enhanced preparedness for a nuclear catastrophe. Here these 
lessons are restated as guiding principles for agencies charged with providing preparedness 
information. 
• Communications should be distributed by, or labelled as coming from, emergency 
services as these are considered amongst the most trustworthy and most likely to 
prompt preparedness actions being taken. Otherwise no clear preference for 
communicating source was expressed, though the military, UK nuclear agencies and 
the Government with a ‘nuclear watchdog’ verification were considered appropriate. 
• Pre-incident communications aimed specifically at nuclear catastrophe preparedness 
should be framed around the key informational elements of preparedness 
instructions, recommended countermeasures and facts about radiation. In particular, 
information about why different countermeasures (sheltering; evacuation) might be 
ordered in the event would be helpful. However, preparedness communications 
designed to encapsulate a range of disaster-types may have wider acceptance and 
engagement. Further items for inclusion in nuclear-specific communications are 
outlined below. 
• Pre-incident communications distributed as written materials should be brief, using 
basic terminology and formatted to include visuals with two or three central 
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instructions such as using bullet points or elements that capture attention (such as 
using a catchphrase). 
• Recommended preparedness actions and countermeasures to take in the event should 
be shown to be effective, achievable and reasonable. Communications should be 
honest (such as by stating where information is unknown in the event of a nuclear 
catastrophe) and consistency through repetition across messages and messengers, 
with reassurance that the public’s safety and survival is at the centre of all 
communications to facilitate trust in the message and messenger. 
• Sheltering is shown to be effective at certain distances from a nuclear blast as a 
protective measure (when escape is not an option). Furthermore, the public appear to 
consider this reasonably efficacious under these circumstances also. The efficacy of 
sheltering should be highlighted in communications to confirm the fact for those 
already confident in sheltering as a countermeasure, and to inform those who are not 
previously aware of this. 
• Many people, particularly parents, are likely to ignore instructions that require 
isolation (such as sheltering) in favour of seeking out loved ones. The safety and 
protection of children, such as sheltering in school, should be highlighted in 
communications to discourage people from putting themselves in danger. 
• Timeline issues should be highlighted in communications. Particularly this includes 
what communications might be received (and how) at different stages of the timeline: 
for example, information may be ‘drip-fed’ during periods of low threat, but swiftly 
distributed such as via social media at a time of imminent threat. Additionally, 
appropriate preparedness actions at different stages of the timeline should be 
outlined: for example, at a time of low threat appropriate actions include gathering 
first aid supplies and bottled water, whereas sheltering or evacuation (as instructed) 
are appropriate at a time of increased threat or continued sheltering following a 
release of radiation (including whether supplies could be delivered to those sheltering 
or whether extended sheltering should also be prepared for). 
• From Hawaii we can see that there needs to be prior knowledge among the public as 
to what warnings will look or sound like, as well as having knowledge of key terms that 




6.4.1. Knowledge mobilisation 
Using these details, guidance for knowledge mobilisation can be proposed (figure 6.2) which 
also addresses issues of timeline referred to in Chapter 1. While not a framework, it does 
illustrate practical guidance to facilitate knowledge mobilisation and how policy makers need 
to be aware that different things are important at different time points: 
During a period of no known (or non-immediate) threat: sources such as the UK Government, 
emergency services and/or UK nuclear agencies should embed messaging into existing 
institutions and/or send personalised letters or leaflets to households. These methods should 
include two to three simple instructions as to what to do to prepare for a nuclear attack, 
including what actions to take in the event of an impending attack. Specifically, this should 
include information regarding sheltering, preparedness actions and the nature and effects of 
radiation (agent specific information). Attention should be given to ensuring that the public are 
aware that advised actions are effective in protecting many people potentially in the range of a 
nuclear explosion and its fallout and how they are achievable. If appropriate, the preparedness 
and protective actions of authorities should also be detailed. 
When a threat is known to be imminent: Those same sources as above should provide a brief 
message which reaffirms the central message(s) of preparedness messaging and necessary 
immediate actions (e.g. take shelter). This should be delivered via immediate warning systems 
(e.g. alarms, social media, SMS). Communicators should be aware the public in this instance 
may take social cues such as waiting to see what actions are taken by friends and neighbours 
and may be more accepting of warnings when coming via sources that align with their own 
social identity. Further, cognitive overload is possible due to the magnitude of information. 
This reinforces the need for information at this stage to be brief and specific.  
Immediately following the incident: On going reminders of the information previously received 
will be required during the immediate aftermath of a nuclear explosion (e.g. to continue 
sheltering). Communicators should be aware that social influences are likely to persist during 




Figure.6.2 Framework for knowledge mobilisation of pre-nuclear incident preparedness 
communications (Communications following nuclear catastrophe was not addressed in this 
thesis but is included in this framework for illustrative purposes) 
6.5. Next steps and research agenda 
The following table (6.2.) lays out a research agenda for continuing the development of 







During no known threat (peacetime)
Knowledge – agent-specific 
information to increase 
acceptance
Knowledge – inform as to 
what warning may look / 
sound like in the event
Beliefs about capabilities –
ensure the efficacy and 
achievability of actions are 
highlighted / personal 
circumstance accounted for in 
advice
Emotion – inform as to the 
preparedness capabilities of 
authorities
Method – personalised letters 
/ embedded nuclear 
preparedness in institutions
Content – preparedness; 
sheltering radiation
Format – 2/3 simple 
instructions; basic language; 
brief; visuals
Source – emergency services; 
UK nuclear agencies; 
Government 
When threat is known (imminent)
Decision making – cognitive 
overload likely; public must 
attend to relevant information 
to undertake most effective 
actions.
Social identity – seek out 
information from sources who 
fit social identity 
Environmental context / 
resources – advise as to the 
most effective action to take 
(e.g. sheltering if evacuation 
not possible)
Social influences – observing 
other’s can be an additional 
influence on behaviour
Method – immediate 
distribution method (alarm; 
social media)
Content – immediate actions
Format – brief message re-
affirming central 
preparedness message (e.g. 
take shelter)
Source - Source – emergency 
services; UK nuclear agencies; 
Government 
Following incident
Recall / reminder of 
information previously 
received (e.g. sheltering 
guidance)
Social influences – observing 




Table 6.2. Research agenda for next steps and identifying gaps 
Step Example research questions Example research design 
Design 
messages 
What message designs provide the 
most effective impact? (e.g. 
content, source, delivery method); 
What should messages look like 
during peacetime? What should 
messages look like when the threat 
is imminent? 
Qualitative methods (focus groups; 
workshops) using specific nuclear attack 
messages along with generic disaster-
risk preparedness messages. 
Participants asked to rate and discuss 
messages on aspects such as clarity, 




What format of message has the 
most effective acceptance and 
retention rate? 
RCT to test content and trust in 
recommendations (experimental group 
receive a message that is personalised 
to their circumstances (i.e. specific to 
their type of housing, mentioning local 
landmarks that might be targeted); 
control group rates a generic message 






What is the effect of using social 
media to distribute preparedness 
messaging?; Can message recipients 
accurately recall and relate key 
elements of preparedness advice at 
various timelines following receipt?; 
Is there a detrimental long-term 
impact on messaging if the event 
that is prepared for does not come 
to pass; What level of impact does 
trust in the source have on a 
practical level? 
Survey to establish the benefits of using 
social media for distribution (reach, 
trust etc) with repeated surveying to 
test recall and uptake of 
recommendations across a timeline (i.e. 
did initial preparedness steps diminish 
over time?) 
 
The next stage in the development of effective pre-nuclear incident communications is to use 
the recommendations presented here to design, test and evaluate messages. Aside from this, 
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gaps emerged from the literature that if explored, would also complement our understanding 
of effective public communication in the pre-incident phase.  
One gap relates to use of social media in nuclear emergency communications. During a 
disaster social media use has been found to increase (Pew, 2006; Rainie, 2005) particularly 
during the immediate period (Thelwall & Stuart, 2007). This was seen during the Hawai’i 
ballistic missile false alert where screenshots of the warning were widely shared on Twitter 
with users looking for corroboration. Studies have shown that in high pressure situations 
individuals are able to convey key elements of messages relating to protective actions and that 
content, style and previous exposure of messages influence re-Tweeting on that platform 
(Sutton et al., 2014). Though social media was considered the least trustworthy source of 
information in this research, some cited it as being a way into nuclear preparedness education 
wherein information viewed could be verified elsewhere. It is unclear to what extent social 
media could be used to disseminate and promote communications during the pre-incident 
phase.  
Secondly, more data are needed on how different information sources can foster trust in the 
public. Trust is central to whether information is accepted, and recommended actions adhered 
to. Few studies have explored the facilitation of trust, or distrust, when the information being 
communicated has existential connotations. Indeed, it was suggested here that trust is 
secondary to perceived efficacy of recommendations. In a nuclear attack, the public’s 
perception of countermeasure effectiveness will differ from that of a smaller scale or isolated 
CBRN incident. Not only this but sources of information considered most likely to foster the 
greatest adherence in undertaking protective actions in this research were not necessarily the 
sources identified in the previous literature as being most trustworthy. For example, Wray and 
colleagues (2006) concluded in their large-scale Pre-event Messaging Project that local sources 
are most trusted and should be used to disseminate messaging originating from national 
government. However, local sources were not considered in the same way here; these findings 
suggest nationwide distribution is preferred. However, participants in this research also 
desired information particular to their circumstance which would perhaps be impossible to 
achieve on a nationwide scale. This should be explored further, perhaps using a randomised 
control trial in which groups rate a message for its content and their trust in its recommended 
actions that are personalised to their circumstances (i.e. specific to their type of housing, 
mentioning local landmarks that might be targeted), and a control group rates a generic 
communication for the same variables. 
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The longer-term impact of any information campaign is a third key knowledge gap. Hopefully, 
any pre-event messages that are disseminated will never need to be used. However, 
maintaining knowledge over time is important. To date, studies have generally only focused on 
the immediate impact of messages. Whether messages about high impact events which do not 
come to pass have a wider, detrimental, effect on the credibility of future messages on related 
issues is largely unknown (Rubin et al., 2005) though Glik (2007) suggests risk communications 
advocating preparedness for a non-imminent disaster are less successful in motivating 
behaviour change than communications in an emergency. Of course, non-imminent disasters 
are not necessarily those that do not come to pass so this comparison is perhaps arbitrary. 
However, this may present another challenge for communicators nonetheless, and the 
frequency with which messages need to be repeated and reinforced is an area worthy of 
further investigation.  
In this research situational factors that facilitate or present a barrier to message engagement 
and preparedness were reported on. Demographic data were also tested for associations in 
the surveys. However, humans are social beings, so it may be that additional influences on 
engagement and adherence exist that our cognitions and beliefs do not account for. For 
example, two studies in the review reported on community attachment as a factor in 
willingness to adhere (Guterbock et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2005). While some focus group 
members commented on a lack of attachment to their city, this was not explored further in 
terms of adherence. Social identity was a domain of the TDF that arose frequently during the 
review suggesting the potential importance of social factors that are worthy of further 
research. Socio-economic status is another: Protect and Survive was criticised as being elitist as 
assumptions about household-types and resources were suggested to lead to inequities in 
patterns of survival (Preston, 2014). A further two areas which have had little or no attention 
in risk communication research are engagement with preparedness messaging among people 
with disabilities and language deficit. Non-native speakers particularly have been found to 
worry that they will miss vital information which can affect preparedness and adherence (Bass 
et al., 2016i). Exploration of the comprehension of vital preparedness and protection terms 
should be undertaken in recipients for whom English is not a first language. 
6.6. Conclusion 
The UK public may be more prepared for a nuclear catastrophe than previously thought. 
Measures taken for general disaster preparedness have some overlap with those 
recommended for nuclear disaster. However, factors such as fatalism towards a nuclear attack 
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reduce people’s intention to further prepare and, due to low perception of countermeasure 
effectiveness, there is also little intention to adhere to instructions to shelter amongst the 
public, should the UK be attacked with a nuclear weapon.  
Whether the UK public would accept and engage with pre-nuclear incident communications 
designed to heighten preparedness and increase knowledge of protective actions to take in the 
event is unclear. The desire for preparedness information is strong in those surveyed. 
However, we see that those who believe the risk of nuclear attack is high, those who believe 
sheltering to be an effective countermeasure and those who believe that preparedness is low 
in effort are less likely to be receptive of such information. Moreover, the data suggests there 
to be low perception of countermeasure effectiveness against catastrophic nuclear attack 
overall, a further factor to cause disengagement with pre-incident communications. The 
natural follow on from this research is to design a preparedness communication and measure 
changes in actual preparedness and any increased knowledge of nuclear attack 
countermeasures. 
Several recommendations have been made as to how pre-nuclear incident communications 
might be most effective in influencing engagement with messaging, preparedness and 
adherence to instructions in the event. These include communications coming from 
emergency services, nuclear agencies or the military, using multiple methods or being 
embedded in institutions such as initiating nuclear drills in schools and workplaces, and 
offering recommendations for a range of disasters, not solely nuclear.  
Ultimately, risk communications are used to help the public understand risk and make 
informed decisions, though messaging will not reach everyone. Neither will messaging 
influence the behaviour of all who are reached. This may particularly be the case in high 
impact, low likelihood events such as nuclear attack. However, this research has shown that 
preferences do exist for risk communications and it is likely that where information converges 
with the perceptions of the target audience it can enhance preparedness in the public, and 
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Appendix A. Full Systematic Review search strategy 
The following databases were searched for relevant publications: Medline (via OVID, Epub 
ahead of print (January 16 2017); In-Process and Other Non-Indexed Citations, Ovid MEDLINE 
(R) Daily and Ovid MEDLINE (R) (1946 to present) search conducted 17th January 2017); 
Embase (via OVID, 1974 to 2017 January 16) search conducted 17th January 2017; PsycINFO 
(via OVID, 1806 to January Week 2 2017) search conducted 18th January 2017; Web of Science 
(core collection) search conducted 20th January 2017.  
Database: Ovid MEDLINE(R) <Epub ahead of print (January 16 2017), In-Process and Other 
Non-Indexed Citations, Ovid MEDLINE (R) Daily and Ovid MEDLINE (R) (1946 to present)> 
Search Strategy: 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1 Fukushima /     (2122) 
2 exp Radioactive Hazard Release/px (Psychology)     (107) 
3 Fukushima .kw     (110) 
4 Chernobyl /     (5450) 
5 Chernobyl .kw    (61) 
6 Chenobyl /     (2) 
7 Chenobyl .kw     (0) 
8 "Three Mile Island" /     (191) 
9 "Three Mile Island" .kw     (1) 
10 Hiroshima /     (2025) 
11 exp Nuclear Warfare/px (Psychology)     (18) 
12 Hiroshima .kw      (3) 
13 Nagasaki /     (1698) 
14 Nagasaki .kw     (4) 
15 Sellafield /      (322) 
16 Sellafield .kw     (5) 
17 Windscale /     (67) 
18 Windscale .kw      (0) 
19 Kyshtym /     (51) 
20 Kyshtym .kw     (0) 
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21 Fukui /     (669) 
22 Fukui .kw     (1) 
23 Tokaimura /     (11) 
24 Tokaimura .kw     (0) 
25 - 30 
(Nuclear adj release (33) or accident* (1140) or disaster* (307) or attack* 
(105) or terror* (114) or emergenc* (167)) .ab,ti,kw. 
31 exp Nuclear Weapons /hi (History)      (77) 
32 "Radioactive Fallout"/     (4061) 
33 "Radioactive Fallout" .kw     (644) 
34 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30     (1774) 
35 
1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 
16 or 17 or 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 31 or 32 or 33 or 34 
(15253) 
36 "Dirty Bomb" /     (93) 
37 "Dirty Bomb" .kw     (3) 
38 "Radiological Dispersion Device" /     (18) 
39 exp Disaster Planning/hi, mt, td (History, Methods, Trends)     (2155) 
40 "Radiological Dispersion Device" .kw     (0) 
41 "Radiological Weapon" /     (6) 
42 "Radiological Weapon" .kw      (0) 
43 - 48 
(radi* adj5 (accident* (2934) or release (5405) or disaster* (204) or 
attack* (1583) or terror* (330) or emergenc* (3328))) .ab,ti,kw. 
49 Goiania /     (459) 
50 Goiania .kw     (0) 
51 Litvinenko /     (24) 
52 Litvinenko .kw     (0) 
53 "Polonium 210" /     (302) 
54 "polonium 210" .kw     (11) 
55 43 or 44 or 45 or 46 or 47 or 48     (13207) 
56 
36 or 37 or 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 49 or 50 or 51 or 52 or 53 or 54 or 
55      (16048) 
57 Shelter* /     (10062) 
58 Shelter* .kw      (220) 
59 "Duck and Cover"/     (7) 
282 
 
60 "Duck and Cover" .kw      (0) 
  
61 evac* /     (20396) 
62 evac* .kw     (115) 
63 relo* /      (14588) 
64 relo* .kw     (120) 
65 Iodine/re (Radiation Effects)     (18) 
66 Behav* /     (1532356) 
67 Behav* .kw      (27776) 
68 Psych* /      (1369475) 
69 Psych* .kw     (70765) 
70 - 72 (respon* adj3 crisis (625) or emergenc* (5315) or public (4638)) .ab,ti,kw. 
73 adhere*/      (196883) 
74 adhere*.kw      (3624) 
75 engage*/      (127855) 
76 engage*.kw      (488) 
77 comply/      (9519) 
78 comply.kw      (1) 
79 compliance/      (152734) 
80 compliance.kw     (1333) 
81 communicat*/     (373405) 
82 communicat*.kw     (8136) 
83 Warning*/      (22296) 
84 Warning*.kw      (132) 
85 instruct*/     (94562) 
86 instruct*.kw     (320) 
87 70 or 71 or 72     (10578) 
88 
57 or 58 or 59 or 60 or 61 or 62 or 63 or 64 or 65 or 66 or 67 or 68 or 69 or 
73 or 74 or 75 or 76 or 77 or 78 or 79 or 80 or 81 or 82 or 83 or 84 or 85 or 
86 or 87     (3307960) 
89 35 or 56     (29685) 





Appendix B. Systematic Review outcome tables  
Table B1. Downs and Black (1998), risk of bias checklist (adapted). Scoring: yes=1, no=0, 
































































































Aim / objective described?  
Main outcomes to be measured 
clearly described?  
Characteristics of patients described? 
Interventions  described?  
Distributions of principal confounders 
described? 
Main findings described?  
Estimates of random variability?  
Probability values reported except 
where value is less than 0.001?  
Subjects asked to participate 
representative of population?  
Subjects prepared to participate 
representative population?  
16. If 'data dredging' was this made 
clear?   
Statistical tests appropriate?   
Main outcomes valid and reliable?  
Were different intervention groups 
used or was recruitment from same 
population? 
Were cases and controls recruited 
over the same period of time?   
Was the randomised intervention 
assignment concealed? 
Adequate adjustment for 
confounding in analyses?  
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Appendix C. Tables for each Theoretical Domain Framework domain (with examples for each 
construct) mapped from systematic review outcomes 
 





No. of studies 







5 Interaction of specific knowledge and 
trusting authorities predicted message 
acceptance   
Adherence 2 83% would shelter 48 hours if told loved 
ones safe  
Information 
seeking 
2 Some sought information regarding 
potential impact before evacuating 
following advisory (during incident)   
Materials 2 Confidence in knowing what RDD was, how 
to respond, in low literacy respondents 
given literacy aided material (pre-incident)  






4 Receiving leaflet intervention (including 
information about decontamination) a 




3 Perceived government or front-line 




2 Barriers to preparedness: can’t plan for 
unknown  
Method 1 Internet usage predicted knowledge of 
preventative behaviours    
Total = 23 
 
 
TDF Domain 2: Skills 
skills constructs Type of 
construct 
No. of studies 
that show this 
Example 





















Social identity Community 
attachment 
2 Community attachment predicted increased 
willingness to shelter at home 
Group ID Parental 
status 
13 Non-adherence associated with prioritising 
collection or checking on children 
  2 Respondents with children more likely to 
have prepared  
Age 5 Older respondents more likely to have 
emergency supply kit   
Education 3 Information seekers near TMI were more 
highly educated  
  1 TMI evacuees more likely to have attained 
high school education  
Gender 2 TMI evacuees more likely female   
Pets 1 pet owners more likely prepared  
Employment 1 full-time workers more likely prepared   
Total = 30 
 
 


















2 confidence in community ability to manage 
attack does not affect behaviour if at home  
Beliefs Danger 2 Sheltering directives felt counterintuitive 
would likely not follow instructions to 
shelter-in-place   
Total = 9 
 
 









Pessimism  Pessimism 1 Few preparedness behaviours due to belief 
nuclear sites are safe/ in emergency there 















No. of studies 







7 78% who perceive high likelihood that 
attack could harm them/ their family likely 
to evacuate   
2 Reasons for non-evacuation: fear of looting 
Attitudes Perceived 
seriousness  
2 respondents believing NPP accident 
potentially disastrous accepted messages 
less    




2 Perception of radiation risks most influential 




2 Perceived probability a predictor of 
preparedness  
Fatalism 2 Reason for not evacuating: ‘whatever 
happens is in God’s hands’    
Total = 18 
 
 





No. of studies 






1 Reasons for evacuating: anticipating 
evacuation order/ associated problems 
(traffic)  
Assistance 1 Anticipated adherence increased in the 32% 
who expect psychological assistance if 
sheltering-in-place 
 





No. of studies 
that show this 
Example 
Intrinsic motivation Urgency 1 48% would self-evacuate if learned of actual 
attack occurring   
Notice 1 18%-19% would evacuate if given prior 
notice of incident 
 
TDF Domain 9: Goals 
Goals constructs Type of 
construct 
No. of studies 























Uncertainty 1 Uncertainty (e.g. doubt around exposure) 
found to predict information seeking 
behaviour    
7 Reasons for evacuating: confusion (lack of 
leadership, conflicting information) 
Attention control Instruction 13 Situational variables related to evacuation: 
specific instructions to evacuate   
2 Many found information (pre-incident) 
confusing, unclear (such as not fully 
understanding the terms shelter-in-place or 
plume)  
Decision making Denial/ 
unwillingness  




10 Attitude toward science and technology 
marginally significant effect on acceptance 
in affected population (those with a more 
positive attitude less inclined to accept 
messages   
4 Reasons for non-sheltering: lack of trust in 
public health officials   
Total = 38 
 
 







No. of studies 




Time 1 Barriers to preparedness: lack of time  
Resources Resources 5 Barriers to preparedness: lack of money / 
resources    
2 Bringing food, water, supplies directly to 





Geography 5 Urban area residents prepped to lesser 
extent than rural residents 
  
1 Living close to NPP predicted acceptance of 
messages    













No. of studies 
that show this 
Example 




1 Adherence associated with collaboration of 
information  
Social  1 Significant association between behaviour 
and behaviour of neighbours   
4 Reasons for non-evacuation: social 
influence (such as neighbours’ behaviour  
Support Social 1 Young men would want to find out more 
information (during incident) by seeking out 
peers    
Total = 7 
 
 
TDF Domain 13: Emotion 
Emotion construct Type of 
construct 
No. of studies 




3 Reasons for evacuating TMI emergency: 
concerns with forced evacuation 
Fear Worry 4 Information seekers near TMI not 
necessarily those reporting most worry 
  8 Reasons for non-evacuation: little 
perception of danger 
  Total = 15  
 






No. of studies 
that show this 
Example 
Direct experience Personal 
experience 
1 Preparedness plans in respondents who 
experienced an event that caused them to 





Appendix D. Full nuclear attack scenario variations presented to focus groups and unused 






























Scenario: IND detonation in metropolitan area (Urban groups) 
It is a weekday, 10am. You are at home, in your kitchen, stood with your back to the window. 
Suddenly a brilliant flash of light fills the room. It is so intense that you are forced to squeeze your 
eyes shut. 
When you open them again your vision is severely impaired? All you can see at first is a red-orange 
blur which gradually gets darker, as if it is the middle of the night. 
You are temporarily disoriented but your vision begins to clear after 10-15 seconds and returns 
almost to normal. 
Instinctively you turn towards the window to see what could have caused this flash. 
As you take a step towards the window it smashes violently inwards with a boom. 
The shockwave knocks you off your feet. 
You stand back up and more cautiously this time, stepping over broken glass, you return to the 
window. 
First you hear the noise of car alarms and feel heat from somewhere.  
Next you notice a car along the road which is overturned. Then you notice more glass and debris in 
the streets and surrounding other cars. 
You see smoke nearby and some small fires but cannot tell where they are coming from. 
Finally, at what you judge to be two to three miles in the distance, you see a large cloud rising 
quickly into the air. 
Scenario: IND detonation in metropolitan area (Rural groups) 
It is a weekday, 10am. You are at home, in your kitchen, listening to the radio. 
A voice suddenly declares that “reports have come in of a major incident having occurred in 
London.” 
The voice is quiet at first but you hear the words “…eyewitness accounts are of a blinding flash of 
light and smashed windows.”  
The message goes on to describe “overturned cars in the street of London.” 
In the background of the radio broadcast you can vaguely make out the sounds of car alarms and 
people shouting and screaming. 
The voice on the radio goes quiet for some time, before finally stating “reports confirm a large 
mushroom cloud rising above central London. It very much appears now that London has been 














Scenario 2: Nuclear Plant Emergency 
‘It is a weekday, 10am. You are at home, in your kitchen, listening to local radio. 
A voice suddenly declares that ‘in the last few minutes an announcement has been made regarding 
the current state of the _______ nuclear power plant in ________.’ 
The voice is unclear but you hear the words ‘…partial meltdown in Unit 2 of the reactor’ and 
‘release of undetermined levels of radioactive gases.’  
The message goes on to describe ‘…pump malfunctions leading to exposure of the core and melting 
of the fuel rods.’ 
The voice on the broadcast advises ‘pregnant women and pre-school children within 5 miles of the 





















 What are your initial thoughts on the scenario you have just read? 
 
• What might happen? 
 
 What are your thoughts about infrastructure damage?  
Prompt: phone lines down, buildings damaged or destroyed. 
 
• How might this damage affect people?  









Are you concerned that you might experience something like this? 
 














I’d like to hear your thoughts on immediate responses to such an event 
happening? 
 
Prompt: think about self-protection, think about protection of others (Initial 
explosion; Radiation fallout exposure; Injury by other means) 
 
• Would those be your actions? And why? 
 
What if I told you that overloading of the phone network can hinder aid. 
Would you still try to call people? 
 













If the scenario were to occur, how likely would you be to follow 
instructions to evacuate? 
 
• Why is that? 
 
Is there a difference between those with/without families/dependents? 
 
• Why is that? 
 
What if I told you that explosion damage will not extend more than 3 to 5 
miles, but radioactive material in the air will travel further. Knowing this 
would it change your intentions to follow instructions? 
 
o If no, then why? 
 
In the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident some who evacuated against 
advice were unnecessarily exposed and sadly died. Knowing this would it 
change your intentions to follow instructions? 
 
o If no, then why? 
 
What if I told you that evacuation may be chaotic? Evacuating later would 
likely be easier (such as regarding the amount of traffic on the roads). 
Knowing this would it change your intentions to follow instructions? 
 








What if I told you that dose is directly proportional to exposure time. 
Knowing this would it change your intentions to follow instructions? 
 
o If no, then why? 
 
Results of recent tests indicate that a modern urban environment can greatly 
reduce effects of a nuclear detonation. For example, burns from the heat of 
the initial explosion can be reduced by buildings blocking it. Knowing this 
would it change your intentions to follow instructions? 
 
o If no, then why? 
 
For those who say no: What if I told you this was conducted by scientists / 




For those who would evacuate: what if the instruction was to shelter-in-
place? How likely would you be to follow this instruction?  
 
• Why is that? 
 
Is there a difference between those with/without families/dependents? 
 
• Why is that? 
 
What if I told you that the most dangerous radiation levels will decrease 
significantly in the first 24 hours. Knowing this would it change your 
intentions to follow instructions? 
 
o If no, then why? 
 
What if I told you that food in sealed containers and any unspoiled food in 
your refrigerator or freezer are safe to eat and tap water is still drinkable for 
the entire time you would need to remain indoors. Medicine in sealed 
containers is also safe. Knowing this would it change your intentions to 
follow instructions? 
 
o If no, then why? 
 
What if I told you that schools, hospitals, and nursing homes have 
emergency plans in place to protect people at the facility in the event of a 
nuclear explosion. Knowing this would it change your intentions to follow 
instructions? 
 
o If no, then why? 
 
Ingestion of stable iodine saturates the thyroid stopping radioactive iodine 
from being absorbed and accumulated in the thyroid. Knowing this would it 
change your intentions to follow instructions to use it? 
 
o If no, then why? 
 
Would you give KI to your families/dependents if such an event occurred? 
 
What if in the aforementioned scenario you were at work? Would this 
change your intentions to follow instructions? 
 
o If no, then why? 
 






 What if this scenario was a release of radiation from Hinkley Point instead? 















How could the government get people to engage with information about 
protective actions to take in radiation emergencies? 
 
Prompt: what sources are suitable as methods of also       disseminating such 
emergency information? 
 
• Is this different for other types of emergencies such as flooding or 
fire? 
 










Do any methods for receiving information have benefits over others in 
terms of warning of radiation risks? 
 
• What about in terms of providing education regarding protective 
actions before or immediately after a radiation incident? 
 

















Are there any sources of information who could communicate regarding an 
emergency of this nature who are more trustworthy than others? 
 
• Why is this the case? 
 
And, what would you base your trust on?  
 
Prompt: Accuracy of the information they give, transparency/giving all 
information there is, bias or prejudice in delivering information, timing of 
message (i.e. during peacetime or when it happens) etc? 
 













What would you do if you were to receive such information via your 
favoured information sources? (i.e. TV, internet, newspaper)? 
 









What do you think you would need to know prior to being alerted of this to 
help you protect yourself better? 
 
Prompt: decision making regarding protective actions, factual information, 
where did the attack come from, who is/will be affected 
 








 Is there anything that you feel you would / wouldn’t want to know? 
 
• Before 
• Immediately after 
 







• What might encourage you to accept advice or information 
regarding protective radiation preparedness or response actions? 
 








• What would be the most important influence if you were to 
receive a number of messages? (this could be one particular 
source, or simply consistency between some, wording, pictures, 








Would the timing of the instructions make a difference to how it is 
received? 
 
Prompt: such as if it requires following proactive instructions? I.e. pre-event 
information 
 
Prompt: such as if it requires following reactive instructions? i.e. emergency 
broadcast after the event 
 
• What if it was an emergency broadcast that repeated instructions 









Are there any other potential barriers to acceptance of advice or 
information regarding protective radiation preparedness or response 
actions not already discussed? 
 






   
 To be asked within the group:  
 Are there any pieces of radiation related information that I have given during 
the course of this focus group that has particularly stuck with you? / That 



















Appendix F: Focus group information, consent and demographic data forms 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
Version 2b – 03/04/2017 
 
KCL Ethics Reference: HR-16/17-4118  
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Developing evidence-based communication strategies to promote protective behaviours 
in nuclear incidents – Focus Group Study 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in this focus group which will make up part of my PhD 
research project. Please be assured that your decision to participate is entirely up to you: 
choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before deciding whether to give 
your consent for this research, please take some time to read the following information 
regarding its purpose. This will allow you to understand your potential role in taking part. If you 
wish to discuss this further, please use the contact details at the end of this form.  
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
Previous research has found that members of the public often fail to engage in information 
which explains protective actions people can take in the event of a potentially catastrophic 
nuclear incident. This may be because of fatalism, the perceived low likelihood of nuclear 
incidents, anxiety and subsequent avoidance, and suggested actions being seen as ineffective. 
It is not clear what official communicators should do about this. In particular, we do not know 
what the preferred sources of pre-incident information sources are or what the preferred content 
would be. 
 
Through this research I hope to help improve the way emergency responders communicate with 
the public about preparedness and response to nuclear and other radiation incidents that have 
the potential to cause harm to public health. 
 
I aim to achieve this by understanding what people know and think about nuclear terrorism and 
other radiation-type incidents and by identifying what encourages people to engage with pre-
incident information about nuclear terrorism.  
 
What are the implications of conducting the study? 
 
There is increasing focus within public health on enabling people to take control of their own 
health and wellbeing. Practically, providing members of the public with the knowledge they need 
to take appropriate actions during an incident involving the release of a nuclear agent will 
enable them to take actions to protect themselves and others, potentially resulting in lives 
saved.  
 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
 
You have been invited to take part because you are a member of the general public living close 
to a nuclear reactor, or living within a major city. Only people aged 18 or over can take part. It is 
also assumed that you have no prior knowledge or training in preparation for, or response to a 
potentially health threatening incident involving radiation. 
 
Members of a profession who may have received training specific to radiation incidents in terms 
of preparedness and response, including but not limited to military personnel, emergency first-
responders and medical staff are excluded from this study. 
 




No. Your participation in this focus group study is entirely voluntary. Having read this 
information sheet you should make an informed decision as to whether you wish to take part or 
not. Only once you have read this information sheet and had any further questions you might 
have clarified using the contact information at the bottom of this page should you make your 
decision.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you decide to take part in this study, you will first be asked to sign a consent form. You will be 
able to keep this information sheet and I will keep the consent form. You will then be invited to 
take part in a focus group within your local area. You will attend 1 group which will consist of 
between 5 to 7 other people, each of whom has received the same information as you. Focus 
groups will last approximately 2 hours. You will be provided with a scenario about a hypothetical 
nuclear incident to prompt discussion in which you will be requested to discuss your thoughts on 
what information you might want before and during an incident of this nature, potential ways you 
would wish to be provided with this information, and any facilitators or barriers to engagement 
with this information that you foresee.  
 
You are free to withdraw from this study at any time and without giving any reason. You can do 
this in person by informing the researcher (for example, during the focus group) or a contact 
telephone number, e-mail and postal address of two members of the research team will be 
provided should you wish to make contact to withdraw consent after completion of the focus 
group. Your data will not be included in this study should you withdraw consent at any point up 
to 1st November 2017.  Beyond this point analysis will have begun. Please note that, although 
we will make our best efforts to withdraw your data if you request it, the nature of this research 
means it may not always be possible. For example, if withdrawing your data makes it impossible 
for us to use data from another participant you are talking to during the focus group. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
Your participation in this study will help shape future research into public communication 
regarding preparation and response to incidents involving the release of potentially health 
threatening radiation. Development of effective communication and messaging strategies will 
not only protect health and potentially save lives, but will also reduce the cost and burden on the 
NHS of those experiencing negative health effects not directly attributed to radiation, such as 
stress and anxiety.   
 
As a thank you for taking part, we will pay you £40 at the end of the focus group. We will also 
send you a copy for the final report.  
 
Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
 
What is said in the focus group is regarded as strictly confidential. Focus group sessions will be 
audio recorded for later transcription and analysis. The UK Data Protection Act 1998 will apply 
to all information gathered within the focus group. Information will be held on password-locked 
computer files and locked in cabinets within King’s College London, and will only be accessible 
by members of the research team. Participant details will be kept on file, however. This is done 
in case we need to contact you in the future regarding other research that you might be 
interested in taking part in. This information will be anonymised for storage and kept in an 
encrypted file which can be de-anonymised, but only by members of the research team. 
 
All data for analysis will be anonymised. In reporting on the research findings, I will not reveal 
the names of any participants or the organisation where you work. At all times there will be no 
possibility of you as individuals being linked with the data. 
 




This project is part of a three-year PhD funded by Public Health England and undertaken 
through King’s College London. This project has been approved by the King’s College London 
Research Ethics Committee.   
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
Results of this study will be summarised into a report of the main findings which will be sent to 
you and disseminated through publication and conferences within the UK. 
 
Who should I contact for further information? 
 
If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please contact me using 
the following contact details:  
 
Louis Gauntlett 
Department of Psychological Medicine 
King’s College London 
Weston Education Centre 





Tel: 020 7848 5684 
 
What if I have further questions, or if something goes wrong? 
   
If this study has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint about the conduct of 
the study you can contact King's College London using the details below for further advice and 
information:  
 
Dr James Rubin 
Senior Lecturer in the Psychology of Emerging Health Risks & Assistant Director, NIHR Health 
Protection Research Unit in Emergency Preparedness and Response at King's College London 
 
Department of Psychological Medicine  
King’s College London 
Weston Education Centre 













CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the 
Information Sheet and/or listened to an explanation about 
the research. 
 
Title of Study: Developing evidence-based risk and crisis communication strategies to promote 
protective health behaviours in nuclear incidents – Focus Group 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: HR-16/17-4118  
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must 
explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If you have any questions arising from 
the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you 
decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at 
any time. 
 
I confirm that I understand that by ticking/initialling each box I am  
consenting to this element of the study. I understand that it will be  
assumed that unticked/initialled boxes mean that I DO NOT consent  
to that part of the study. I understand that by not giving consent for  




1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet  
dated 03/04/2017, version 2b for the above study. I have had the  
opportunity to consider the information and asked questions which  
have been answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that I will be able to request that my data be withdrawn  
at any time up to 1st November 2017. I understand that it may not  
always be possible for my data to be withdrawn. 
 
3. I consent to the processing of my personal information for the  
purposes explained to me.  I understand that such information will  
be handled in accordance with the terms of the UK Data Protection  
Act 1998. 
 
4. I understand that my information may be subject to review by  
responsible individuals from the College for monitoring and audit  
purposes. 
 
5. I acknowledge that as with all focus groups there will be other  
people in the room, therefore confidentiality cannot be guaranteed  
 
6. I understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained  
wherever possible and it will not be possible to identify me in any  
publications   
 







researchers who would like to invite me to participate in follow up  
studies to this project, or in future studies of a similar nature. 
 
8. I agree that the research team may use my data for future research  
and understand that any such use of identifiable data would be  
reviewed and approved by a research ethics committee. (In such  
cases, as with this project, data would/would not be identifiable in  
any report). 
 
9. I understand that the information I have submitted will be published  
as a report and I wish to receive a copy of it. 
 
10. I consent to my interview being audio recorded. 
 
11. I understand that I must not take part if I fall under the exclusion  
criteria as detailed in the information sheet and explained to me  
by the researcher. 
 
12. I agree to maintain the confidentiality of focus group discussions  









__________________               __________________              _________________ 
Name of Participant                 Date        Signature 
 
 
__________________               __________________              _________________ 




Focus group demographic data collection sheet     
 
Date / Time________________________________________________________ 
Title of Focus Group: Developing evidence-based communication strategies to promote 
protective behaviours in nuclear incidents – Focus Group Study 
KCL Ethics Reference: HR-16/17-4118  
I would be grateful if you could complete the following demographic data collection sheet. This 
information will be used for the purpose of data analysis and information will not be used to 
identify you in any way. 
What is your gender? 
☐  Female   ☐  Male   ☐  Non-binary/ third gender  
☐  Prefer to self-describe _________________  ☐  Prefer not to say 
What is your age? 
☐  18-24  ☐  25-44  ☐  45-64 ☐  65-74 ☐  75+  ☐  Prefer not 
to say 
What is your current employment status? 
☐ Full-time employment ☐ Part-time employment ☐ Student ☐  Retired 
☐  Employed in voluntary role  ☐ Not currently in employment   ☐  Prefer not 
to say 
What race/ethnicity best describes you? ☐  Prefer not to say 
White 
☐  English  / Welsh / Scottish / N. Irish / British   ☐  Irish  ☐  Gypsy / Irish Traveller  
☐  Any other White background, please describe___________________________ 
310 
 
Mixed / Multiple ethnic groups 
☐  White and Black Caribbean  ☐  White and Black African  ☐  White and 
Asian  
☐  Any other Mixed / Multiple ethnic background, please describe___________________________ 
Asian / Asian British 
☐  Indian ☐  Pakistani  ☐  Bangladeshi   ☐  Chinese              
☐  Any other Asian background, please describe___________________________ 
Black /African / Caribbean / Black British 
☐  African   ☐  Caribbean                            ☐  Any other Black /African / Caribbean 
background, please describe___________________________   
Other ethnic group 
☐  Arab   ☐  Any other ethnic group, please describe______________________                       
 What is your highest level of education completed? 
☐ Completed school ☐  College level qualification   ☐  Degree level qualification 
☐  Higher than degree level (e.g. masters, PhD)  ☐ Did not attend school  
☐  Prefer not to say 
What is your marital status? 
☐ Married ☐ Unmarried, cohabiting  ☐ Same-sex civil partnership ☐ Divorced 
☐ Separated  ☐  Widowed  ☐  Single ☐  Prefer not to say 
Do you have dependent children? 
☐ Yes  ☐ No  ☐  Prefer not to say 
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If yes, do your children live with you? 
☐ Yes  ☐ No  ☐ 1 or more of my children live with me  
If yes, are your children school-aged? 






Appendix G. Focus Groups: list of online recruitment resources and advert text 
 
• Gumtree.com 
• Facebook Community Groups: 
o Bridgwater Matters  
o Wilstock and Stockmoor Community ‘Uncut’  
o Minehead Conversation Group  
o Fitzhead Village  
o Taunton Somerset UK News and Events  
o Tower Hamlets Mums 
o Love Barnet 
o Healthwatch Lewisham 




Advertisement for use for recruitment of volunteers for study ref: HR-16/17-4118, approved by the 
Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee, King’s College London. This project 
contributes to the College's role in conducting research, and teaching research methods. You are under 
no obligation to reply to this email, however if you choose to, participation in this research is voluntary 
and you may withdraw at any time. 
Participants wanted for the study: Developing evidence-based communication strategies to 
promote protective behaviours in nuclear incidents – Focus Group Study 
Despite the potentially catastrophic nature of nuclear and radiological events, there are actions which 
members of the public can take in order to reduce the risk to themselves and others.  
 
This study aims to examine: 
• What information people might want to best protect themselves and others in preparation of 
deliberate radiation release or accidental nuclear reactor meltdown  
• What information people might want to best protect themselves and others in the immediate 
aftermath of deliberate radiation release or accidental nuclear reactor meltdown  
• How people would wish to receive information on protective measures before and after 
deliberate radiation release or accidental nuclear reactor meltdown 
 
Participants must be over the age of 18, living in London / the vicinity of Hinkley Point, and cannot be 
working in the healthcare service, emergency response or the military. If selected to take part you will 
be asked to take part in one focus group lasting 2 hours and consisting of 5 to 7 other people. All 
participants will receive £40 for their participation. 
 
If you have any queries regarding this research, or wish to register your interest in taking part, please 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   


























































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   












































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   



















































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   




























































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   



































































































































































































































































































































Appendix I. Full Hawai'i survey items 
 
Public Responses to the Ballistic Missile Alert of 
January 2018 – A survey study - Ward Research 
 
Start of Block: Information Sheet for Participants 
                                                                                           
Aloha!    
       
Welcome to the survey: Public Responses to the Ballistic Missile Alert of January 2018             
       
Before you decide whether you want to take part, please read the information below. Click the 
forward arrow at the bottom to move to the next page where you will be asked to consent to 
participation in this research.       
       
Information for participants 
  
My name is Louis Gauntlett and I would like to invite you to take part in this original research 
project. You should take part only if you want to; choosing not to take part will not 
disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important 
that you understand why the research is being done and what it involves. Please take time to 
read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us to 
provide information on anything that is not clear or let us know if you would like more 
information. This study has been approved by the King’s College London Research Ethics 
Review Committee. 
  
 What is the purpose of this research? 
  
 The Hawai’i alert was probably the first activation of a credible warning system alerting a 
population to a possible nuclear attack. This research is intended to find out what people did 
when they received this alert, and why they behaved in different ways, may help us to design 
better ways of providing emergency alerts in the future. 
  
 Who is conducting and funding the research? 
  
 The research is being conducted by a joint team from King’s College London, Public Health 
England and The University of Hawai’i at Mānoa. This research makes up part of a King’s 
College London PhD project, funded as part of the NIHR Health Protection Research Unit in 
Emergency Preparedness and Response at King’s College London, a partnership with Public 
Health England, which is the Government agency in England in charge of protecting the 
public’s health during emergencies. 
  




We are interested in hearing from members of the public who received a warning that a 
ballistic missile was approaching Hawai’i on January 13th 2018 by any means including mobile 
phone, radio and word of mouth. If you are in this group and are 18 years of age or older, you 
are eligible to take part in the study. 
  
 What will happen if I take part? 
  
 If you would like to take part, we will ask you to fill in an on-line questionnaire. The 
questionnaire takes about 15 minutes to complete and contains questions about how you 
heard about the warning, what actions (if any) you took, and what if any additional 
information you would have wanted. At the end of the questionnaire we will ask you to tell us 
if you would also be interested in taking part in a second study we are conducting. The second 
study is more detailed, and involves talking to a researcher in person or on the phone about 
how you reacted to the message. 
  
 What are the possible benefits of taking part?   
You will be credited by Ward Research for completing this survey. In addition, we hope that our 
results will help us understand how best to communicate with people in the event of a major 
disaster such as a nuclear attack. We hope this will never happen, but if it does, communicating 
effectively with people may help them understand what protective actions to take and may 
help to save lives. If you choose to take part in the second part of this study and are selected for 
the interview phase you will receive a $10 Amazon voucher.  
 Confidentiality – who will know I am taking part in the study? 
  
 Your responses will be completely confidential. The responses you provide will be used within 
the research study and will be stored on a password protected drive for the duration of this 
project. At the end of this survey you will be given the opportunity for further participation in 
this study through a 1:1 interview (face-to-face or via telephone). If you wish to take part you 
be asked to leave your name and contact information. Nobody from outside the research team 
will be allowed access this or any other information that might identify you.  
  
 What will happen to the results of the study? 
  
 We will send a copy of our final report with a summary to everyone who requests it. We also 
hope to publish our results (without any personally identifiable information) in a peer-
reviewed journal. 
  
 Do I have to take part? 
  
 No. Your participation in this project is completely voluntary. You may stop participating at 
any time without giving any reason. If you stop being in the study, there will be no penalty or 
loss to you. 
  
 You can do this by closing the link of the survey prior to starting or completing it. Data from 
unfinished surveys (i.e. those closed prior to completion) will not be used in the final analysis 
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and will be discarded. Each page of the survey will include a 'next' button to move to the next 
question. Next buttons will only become live once a response is given to the question, by 
responding to each question and clicking 'finish' at the last page indicates consent for 
responses to be used in analysis. 
  
 If you decide to take part, you will still be free to withdraw your data within two weeks of 
submitting the survey, without giving a reason. 
  
 What happens now? 
  
 If this study has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint about the conduct 
of the study you can contact King's College London using the details below for further advice 
and information: 
  
 Dr James Rubin gideon.rubin@kcl.ac.uk on +44 020 7848 5684. Address: Department of 
Psychological Medicine, King’s College London, Weston Education Centre, c/o 125 Cold 
Harbour Lane, London, SE5 9NU 
  










End of Block: Information Sheet for Participants 
 
Start of Block: Individual identifier 
 
ID Please enter the individual identifier sent to you by Ward Research in the space below. 
Failure to do so will mean you are unable to be credited by Ward Research. 
 
 
Please note that this identifier WILL NOT be associated with your responses to this survey. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Individual identifier 
 
Start of Block: Consent to take part 
 
 If you think you might like to help with this important study and are willing to proceed, please 
read and check each statement below and select a response from the drop down box below.   
   I confirm that I am 18 years of age or older 
 
 
I confirm that I was in Hawai'i on 13th January 2018 
  
 I understand that my responses will be stored securely for the duration of this research study 
  
 I understand that my information may be subject to review by responsible individuals from 
the College for monitoring and audit purposes 
  
 I understand that participation in this study is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time by closing the document 
  
 I understand that I am free to request deletion of my responses within two weeks of 
submitting the survey 
  
 I confirm that I have read and understood the information above and I agree to take part in 
this study 
▼ I consent to all of the above items (1) ... I DO NOT consent to all of the above items (2) 
 
Skip To: End of Survey If you think you might like to help with this important study and are willing to 
proceed, please... != I consent to all of the above items 




Start of Block: About you 
 
Q1 This first section is designed to find out about you.     I am (select one)    
• Male  (1)  
• Female  (2)  
• Non-binary gender  (3)  
• Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
End of Block: About you 
 
Start of Block: About you 
 
Q2 On January 13th 2018 I was (select one) 
• Between 18 – 29 years old  (1)  
• Between 30 – 39 years old  (2)  
• Between 40 – 49 years old  (3)  
• Between 50 – 59 years old  (4)  
• Between 60 – 69 years old  (5)  
• 70 years or above  (6)  
• Prefer not to say  (7)  
 
End of Block: About you 
 
Start of Block: About you 
 
Q3 On January 13th 2018 did you have at least one dependent child? (select all that apply) 
• No  (1)  
• I had a dependent child / children aged under 18 who was living with me  (2)  
• I had a dependent child / children aged over 18 who was living with me  (3)  
• I had a dependent child / children under 18 but they did not live with me  (4)  
 
End of Block: About you 
 




Q4 How would you describe your ethnicity? (select all that apply) 
• American Indian or Alaska Native  (1)  
• Asian  (2)  
• Black or African American  (3)  
• Hispanic or Latino  (4)  
• Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander  (5)  
• White  (6)  
• Other (please specify)  (7) ________________________________________________ 
• Prefer not to say  (8)  
 
End of Block: About you 
 
Start of Block: About you 
 
Q5 Which of the following best describes your employment status on January 13th 2018 I 
was.... (select one) 
• Employed, working 40 hours or more per week  (1)  
• Employed, working 1-39 hours per week  (2)  
• Not employed, looking for work  (3)  
• Not employed, not looking for work  (4)  
• Retired  (5)  
• Disabled, not able to work  (6)  
 
End of Block: About you 
 
Start of Block: About you 
 
Q6 What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have 
received? (Select one) 
• Less than high school degree  (1)  
• High school degree or equivalent (e.g. GED)  (2)  
• Some college but no degree  (3)  
• Associate degree  (4)  
• Bachelor degree  (5)  
• Graduate degree  (6)  
• Prefer not to say  (7)  
 
End of Block: About you 
 





Q7.1 This section aims to understand immediate responses of the public to receiving the 
ballistic missile warning on January 13th 2018.     How were you first made aware of the 
ballistic missile warning? (select one) 
• Official warning message from the Hawai’i Emergency Management Agency (HI-EMA) 
via SMS / text message to your cell phone  (1)  
• Public warning siren sounding  (2)  
• National news (Television / radio)  (3)  
• Local news (Television / radio)  (4)  
• Word of mouth (informed by friend / family / neighbour in person)  (5)  
• Other (please specify)  (7) ________________________________________________ 
• I wasn't made aware until I saw the second message informing me that it had been a 
false alarm / after the false alarm message  (8)  
 
Skip To: End of Block If This section aims to understand immediate responses of the public to receiving 
the ballistic miss... = I wasn't made aware until I saw the second message informing me that it had been 
a false alarm / after the false alarm message 
 
 
Q7.2 Where were you upon first receiving the warning? (Select one) 
• At home, indoors  (1)  
• At work, college, university or school (indoors)  (2)  
• Working outdoors  (3)  
• In another public area (outdoors) e.g. on the street  (4)  
• In another public area (indoors) e..g. in a cafe  (5)  
 
End of Block: Immediate response 
 
Start of Block: Immediate response 
 
 
Q8.1 Upon first hearing the original warning, did you believe that it had been sent by HI-EMA? 
• Yes – I believed that the warning came from HI-EMA  (1)  
• No – I believed the warning to be from a source other than HI-EMA  (2)  
• No – I believed the warning to be a hoax  (3)  
• N/A - I did not hear until after it was known to be a false alarm  (4)  
 
Skip To: Q8.3 If Upon first hearing the original warning, did you believe that it had been sent by HI-EMA? 
= Yes – I believed that the warning came from HI-EMA 
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Skip To: End of Block If Upon first hearing the original warning, did you believe that it had been sent by 










Q8.3 Did you believe that an attack was imminent? 
• Yes – I believed that an attack was imminent  (1)  
• No – I believed the warning to be a hoax or a mistake or that it would come to nothing  
(2)  
 
End of Block: Immediate response 
 
Start of Block: Immediate response 
 
 
Q9.1 Which of the following best describes your immediate response to first hearing the 
warning? (select all that apply) 
• Took no action/carried on with what I was doing  (1)  
• Sought immediate shelter  (2)  
• Made efforts to verify that the information was correct / the warning was genuine  (3)  
• Made efforts to find out protective actions I could take  (4)  
• Immediately initiated a pre-arranged plan  (5)  
• Left home/the place I was at to seek out friends or family  (6)  
• Got in contact with / tried to get in contact with friends / family using social media or 
by phone  (7)  
• Other (please write in the box below)  (8) 
________________________________________________ 
 
Skip To: Q9.3 If Which of the following best describes your immediate response to first hearing the 





Q9.2 Why did you take no action/carry on with what you had been doing? (enter text) 
________________________________________________________________ 
 




Q9.3 Why did you take the action you did upon receiving the ballistic missile warning? (select 
all that apply) 
• I felt prepared / knowledgeable as to what actions I should take (1)  
• I felt unprepared / lacked knowledge as to what actions I should take (2)  
• I wished to verify that the information received was accurate (3)  
• I wanted to protect my family (4)  
• I wanted to be with family / friends (5)  
• I wanted to help others (strangers) who may have been hurt (6)  
• My family / friends and I had a pre-arranged meeting place for such an emergency (7)  
• I did what the warning advised me to do (regardless of whether I felt it the safest 
action or not) (8)  
• I thought my actions would protect me (9)  






Q9.4 Please select any ways in which you attempted to find out information as to how to 
protect self / others following receipt of the warning (select all that apply) 
• N/A (I did not seek information about protective actions when I received the warning)  
(1)  
• Searched online (web search)  (2)  
• Checked on social media  (3)  
• Contacted HI-EMA  (4)  
• Contacted friends / family  (5)  
• Contacted another agency / authority (please type enter of agency)  (6) 
________________________________________________ 
• Other (please specify)  (7) ________________________________________________ 
 








Start of Block: Preparedness 
 
 
Q10.1 This section will ask you about your emergency preparedness 
 
Which from the list 
below did you have on 
January 13th 2018? 





























•  •  •  •  •  •  •  
A battery 
powered 
radio (4)  
•  •  •  •  •  •  •  




•  •  •  •  •  •  •  
Walkie-
talkies (6)  
•  •  •  •  •  •  •  
A flashlight 
(and extra 
batteries) (7)  
•  •  •  •  •  •  •  
A first aid kit 
(8)  
•  •  •  •  •  •  •  











specify) (11)  







Q10.2 Prior to January 13th 2018, had you received information regarding general disaster 
preparedness? (select one) 
• A great deal of information  (1)  
• Some information  (2)  
• A little information  (3)  




Q10.3 Prior to January 13th 2018, had you received information regarding preparedness and / 
or protective actions you could take before and in the event specifically of a nuclear 
attack?  (select one) 
• A great deal of information  (1)  
• Some information  (2)  
• A little information  (3)  
• No information  (4)  
 
Skip To: Q10.7 If Prior to January 13th 2018, had you received information regarding preparedness and / 




Q10.4 Where did that information come from? (select all that apply) 
• Local authorities (e.g. council; mayor's office)  (4)  
• Social media  (5)  
• Local news media  (6)  
• National news media  (7)  
• Friends / family  (8)  
• National government sources  (9)  
• Nuclear agencies (e.g. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Centres for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC))  (10)  
• Emergency services (e.g. police; fire brigade)  (11)  
• Medical staff or resources  (12)  
• The military  (13)  
• Other (please specify  (14) ________________________________________________ 






Q10.5 When did you most recently receive this information? (select one) 
• During the past year  (1)  
• 1 to 5 years ago  (2)  
• 5 to 15 years ago  (3)  





Q10.6 Do you feel the information you received prior to 13th January 2018 regarding 
preparedness and protective actions was sufficient? (select one) 
• Yes  (1)  
• No  (2)  





If nuclear missiles were fired at Hawai'i, do you believe that the military would be able to 
intercept them safely?  
• yes - we are fully protected  (1)  
• we are partially protected  (2)  
• no - we are not protected  (3)  
• I dont know  (4)  
 
End of Block: Preparedness 
 
Start of Block: Preparedness 
 
Q11.1 Would you want to receive information regarding what actions you could take to 
prepare for a nuclear attack? 
• Yes  (1)  
• No  (2)  
 
Skip To: Q11.2 If Would you want to receive information regarding what actions you could take to 
prepare for a nucl... = Yes 
Skip To: Q11.4 If Would you want to receive information regarding what actions you could take to 





Q11.2 When would be the best time for you to receive information regarding preparedness 
actions to take in a nuclear attack? 
• Only when an attack is known to be imminent  (1)  




Q11.3 What one or two things would YOU want to find out to help you prepare for a nuclear 
attack? 
• Specify here:  (1) ________________________________________________ 
 
Skip To: Q11.5 If What one or two things would YOU want to find out to help you prepare for a nuclear 




Q11.4 Why would you not wish to receive information regarding preparedness and protective 
actions prior to a nuclear attack? (select all that apply) 
• I would be too afraid  (1)  
• I don’t believe Hawai‘i will be attacked with a nuclear device  (2)  
• I don’t believe I could be protected if Hawai‘i was attacked with a nuclear device  (3)  
• I do not feel it would be possible to undertake actions that would be advised  (4)  




Q11.5 How likely do you think a nuclear attack on Hawai’i is in your lifetime? 
• No risk at all  (1)  
• A little risk of this happening  (2)  
• Moderate risk  (3)  
• Quite a high risk  (4)  
• Very high risk / quite probable  (5)  
 







Start of Block: Preparedness 
 
 
Q12.1 On a scale of 1 -10 what do you perceive to be the effort involved is in carrying out the 
following preparedness activities?   
 
 
(1 = very little to no effort involved; 10 = more effort than I would be prepared to take) 
 
   
(Please note that each slider must be moved to at least the number 1 row to save your 
response to this question) 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Obtain a battery powered radio and spare 
batteries ()  
Store a 14 day supply of food/water () 
 
Store a spare supply of medication () 
 
Put together a first aid kit () 
 
Watch preparedness videos online () 
 
Attend (a) town hall meeting(s) about nuclear 
attack preparedness ()  
Obtain walkie-talkies () 
 
Obtain a flashlight (and extra batteries) () 
 
Store a bag with cash and important 
documents ()  
Be prepared to shelter where you are (e.g. at 
home) for up to 72 hours ()  
Be prepared to shelter where you are (e.g. at 
home) for up to 1 week ()  
Be prepared to shelter where you (e.g. at 
home) for up to 2 weeks ()  
Be prepared to evacuate your home to a place 
of shelter within your town or village ()  
Be prepared to evacuate your home to a place 





End of Block: Preparedness 
 
Start of Block: Preparedness 
 
 
Q13.1 Rank the following. Drag sources using your mouse or finger.   
    
Who would you most trust to provide you with information about how to prepare for a nuclear 
emergency?   
    
Rank 1 = most likely to take this action if recommended; 12 = least likely 
______ HIEMA (1) 
______ Friends / Family (2) 
______ Local authorities (e.g. the Mayor) (3) 
______ Federal Government (4) 
______ Nuclear agencies (International health protection or nuclear agencies (e.g. the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)) 
(5) 
______ National news media (6) 
______ Online Forums / social media (7) 
______ Scientists (8) 
______ Emergency services (e.g. police; fire brigade) (9) 
______ Medical staff or resources (10) 
______ Local news media (11) 
______ The military (12) 
 
End of Block: Preparedness 
 
Start of Block: Block 30 
 
  
Thank you for completing our survey.   









Appendix J. Hawai’i survey: Full frequency data 
Initial Reaction to the Warning Frequency Percentage 
How were you first made 
aware of the ballistic 
missile warning? 
Official warning message from HI-EMA via 
SMS to cell phone 
297 65 
 Public warning siren sounding 8 2 
 National news (TV/radio) 5 1 
 Local news (TV/radio) 20 4 
 Word of mouth 92 20 
 Other 16 3.5 
 I wasn’t made aware until I saw the second 
message informing me it was a false alert 
16 3.5 
 Total  454  
Where were you upon 
first receiving the 
warning? 
At home, indoors 327 75 
 At work, college, university or school 
(indoors) 
25 6 
 Working outdoors 16 4 
 In another public area (outdoors) e.g. on 
the street 
49 11 
 In another public area (indoors) e.g. in a 
café 
21 5 
 Total 438  
Note: Respondents who selected ‘I wasn’t made aware until I saw the second message informing me it was a false alert’ in response to the 
previous question were not shown this question 
Did you believe that it 
had been sent by HI-
EMA? 
Yes 312 69 
 No – I believed the warning to be from a 
source other than HI-EMA 
18 4 
 No – I believed the warning to be a hoax 63 14 
 N/A (I did not hear it until it was known to 
be a false alarm) 
61 13 
 Total 454  
Did you believe that an 
attack was imminent? 
Yes 208 53 
 No - I believed the warning to be a hoax or 
a mistake or that it would come to nothing 
182 47 
 Total 390  











Which of the following best describes your immediate response to 
first hearing the warning? 
Frequency Percentage 
Took no action/carried on with what I was doing   87 22 
Sought immediate shelter   36 9 
Made efforts to verify that the information was correct / the warning 
was genuine 
186 47 
Made efforts to find out protective actions I could take   63 16 
Immediately initiated a pre-arranged plan   18 4.5 
Left home/the place I was at to seek out friends or family   8 2 
Got in contact with / tried to get in contact with friends / family using 
social media or by phone   
144 36.5 
Other 38 10 
Total 394  
 
Why did you take the action you did upon receiving the ballistic 
missile warning? 
Frequency Percentage 
I felt prepared / knowledgeable as to what actions I should take   36 8 
I felt unprepared / lacked knowledge as to what actions I should take   86 19 
I wished to verify that the information received was accurate   189 42 
I wanted to protect my family 111 24 
I wanted to be with family / friends   74 16 
I wanted to help others (strangers) who may have been hurt   10 2 
My family / friends and I had a pre-arranged meeting place for such 
an emergency 
6 1 
I did what the warning advised me to do (regardless of whether I felt 
it the safest action or not)   
21 5 
I thought my actions would protect me 28 6 
Other 28 6 
Total 454  
 
Please select any ways in which you attempted to find out 
information as to how to protect self / others following receipt of the 
warning 
Frequency Percentage 
N/A - (I did not seek information about protective actions when I 
received the warning)  
73 16 
Searched online (web search)   145 32 
Checked on social media   141 31 
Contacted HI-EMA 13 3 
Contact friends / family 176 39 
Contacted another agency / authority 24 5 
Other 101 22 









Which of the following actions had you taken prior to January 13th 
2018 to prepare for an emergency? 
Frequency Percentage 
Stored a spare supply of medication Yes 212 47 
 N/A 74 16 
Obtained a battery powered radio   Yes 272 60 
 N/A 10 2 
Stored a 14 day supply of food/water   Yes 202 44 
 N/A 4 1 
Obtained walkie-talkies Yes 40 9 
 N/A  24 5 
Obtained a flashlight (and extra batteries)   Yes 395 87 
 N/A 4 1 
Put together a first aid kit   Yes 346 76 
 N/A 10 2 
Stored a bag with cash and important documents   Yes 151 33 
 N/A 13 3 























Thinking of the actions listed on the previous page, did you take these 
preparedness actions for... 
Frequency Percentage 
Stored a spare supply of 
medication 
Nuclear attack 1 0.4 
 A different type of emergency (e.g. 
flooding) 
39 18 
 No specific emergency (general prep) 124 56 
 Not for emergency prep reasons 57 26 
Obtained a battery 
powered radio   
A different type of emergency (e.g. 
flooding) 
71 25 
 No specific emergency (general prep) 162 58 
 Not for emergency prep reasons 47 17 
Stored a 14 day supply of 
food/water   
Nuclear attack 1 0.4 
 A different type of emergency (e.g. 
flooding) 
65 29 
 No specific emergency (general prep) 116 52 
 Not for emergency prep reasons 41 18 
Obtained walkie-talkies A different type of emergency (e.g. 
flooding) 
16 16 
 No specific emergency (general prep) 43 42 
 Not for emergency prep reasons 43 42 
Obtained a flashlight (and 
extra batteries)   
Nuclear attack 1 0.3 
 A different type of emergency (e.g. 
flooding) 
80 21.5 
 No specific emergency (general prep) 233 63 
 Not for emergency prep reasons 58 16 
Put together a first aid kit   A different type of emergency (e.g. 
flooding) 
56 17 
 No specific emergency (general prep) 221 67 
 Not for emergency prep reasons 53 16 
Stored a bag with cash and 
important documents   
A different type of emergency (e.g. 
flooding) 
29 16 
 No specific emergency (general prep) 99 56 
 Not for emergency prep reasons 48 27 
Other Nuclear attack 2 2 
 A different type of emergency (e.g. 
flooding) 
11 12 
 No specific emergency (general prep) 54 57 










Preparedness information received prior to the false alert  Frequency Percentage 
Prior to January 13th 




A great deal of information 93 20 
 Some information 201 44 
 A little information 92 20 
 No information 68 15 
 Total 454  
Had you received 
information regarding 
preparedness and / or 
protective actions 
specifically for a 
nuclear attack? 
A great deal of information 23 5 
 Some information 92 20 
 A little information 107 23.5 
 No information 232 51 
 Total 454  
Where did your nuclear 
specific information 
come from? 
Local authorities (e.g. council; mayor’s 
office) 
23 10 
 Social media 14 6 
 Local news media 81 36 
 National news media 11 5 
 Friends or family 20 9 
 National government sources 16 7 
 Nuclear agencies 1 0.4 
 Emergency services 2 1 
 The military 9 4 
 Other 29 13 
 Cannot recall 16 7 
 Total 222  
When did you most 
recently receive this 
information? 
During the past year 134 60 
 1 to 5 years ago 66 30 
 6 to 15 years ago 9 4 
 More than 15 years ago 13 6 
 Total 222  
Do you feel the 
information you 
received prior to 13th 
January 2018 regarding 
preparedness and 
protective actions was 
sufficient? 
Yes 71 32 
 No 96 43 
 I don’t know 55 25 




How likely do you think a nuclear attack on Hawai’i is in your lifetime? Frequency Percentage 
No risk at all 46 10 
A little risk 221 49 
Moderate risk 135 30 
Quite a high risk 32 7 
Very high risk / quite probable 20 4 
Total 454  
 
If nuclear missiles were fired at Hawai'i, do you believe that the 
military would be able to intercept them safely? 
Frequency Percentage 
Yes – we are fully protected 64 14 
We are partially protected 180 40 
No – we are not protected 88 19 
I don’t know 122 27 
Total 454  
 
Pre-incident communication preferences Frequency Percentage 
Would you want to receive 
information regarding what 
actions you could take to 
prepare for a nuclear 
attack? 
Yes 379 83 
 No 75 16.5 
 Total 454  
When would be the best 
time for you to receive 
information regarding 
preparedness actions to 
take in a nuclear attack? 
Only when an attack is known to be 
imminent 
36 9.5 
 Preferably any time before an attack is 
known 
343 90.5 
 Total 379  
Note: Respondents who selected ‘No’ in response to the question as to whether they would want to receive pre-incident communications 
were not shown this question 
Why would you not wish to 
receive preparedness 
information? 
I would be too afraid 3 4 
 I don't believe Hawai’i will be attacked 
with a nuclear device 
8 11 
 I don't believe I could be protected if 
Hawai’i was attacked 
43 57 
 I do not feel it would be possible to 
undertake actions advised 
5 7 
 Other 16 21 
 Total 75  
Note: Respondents who selected ‘Yes’ in response to question as to whether they would want to receive pre-incident communications were not 







Perceived Effort in Undertaking Preparedness Actions 
What do you perceive to be the effort involved is in carrying out the following preparedness 
activities?   
1 = very little to no effort involved; 10 = more effort than I would be prepared to take 
Rank order of 
perceived 






1 Be prepared to evacuate your home to a place of shelter 
outside of your town or village 
6.96 2.96 
2 Be prepared to shelter where you are (e.g. at home) for 
up to 2 weeks 
6.38 3.2 
3 Be prepared to evacuate your home to a place of shelter 
within your town or village 
6.22 3 
4 Attend (a) town hall meeting(s) about nuclear attack 
preparedness 
5.55 3.05 
5 Be prepared to shelter where you are (e.g. at home) for 
up to 1 week 
5.48 3.3 
6 Store a 14 day supply of food/water 5.23 3.34 
7 Be prepared to shelter where you are (e.g. at home) for 
up to 72 hours 
4.67 3.48 
8 Obtain walkie-talkies 4.53 3.14 
9 Store a spare supply of medication 4.27 3.36 
10 Store a bag with cash and important documents 4.22 3.37 
11 Watch preparedness videos online 3.86 3.05 
12 Put together a first aid kit 3.8 3.39 
13 Obtain a flashlight (and extra batteries) 3.56 3.65 












Appendix K. Hawai’i survey unadjusted odds ratios for associations with preparedness 
 
Association between predictor variables and individual preparedness 
Variable and variable levels Total preparedness odds ratio (95% CI) 
Prior level of disaster preparedness information received -0.28 (-0.61-0.05) 
Prior level of nuclear preparedness information received -0.09 (-0.5-0.32) 
Source of preparedness information 0.04 (-0.03-0.11) 
How recently was preparedness information received  0.35 (0.03-0.67)* 
Was preparedness information considered sufficient? -0.35 (-0.68—0.01)* 
Belief in protection from military -0.31 (-0.57—0.05)* 
Average low preparedness effort scores 0.04 (-0.06-0.14) 
Average high preparedness effort score -0.11 (-0.24-0.01) 





Appendix L. Hawai’i survey unadjusted odds ratios for associations with adherence 
Associations between predictor variables and individual responses to the alert 
Variable and 
variable levels 






















ratio (95% CI) 
Location upon receiving warning 
Indoors 328 (84) 317 (97) Reference 39 (12) Reference 
Outdoors 61 (16) 13 (21) 0.01* (0.00-
0.02) 
12 (20) 1.81 (0.89-3.71) 
By what means was the message received? 
SMS from HI-
EMA 
289 (74) 248 (86) Reference 38 (13) Reference 
Warning siren 8 (2) 6 (75) 0.5 (1-2.54) 2 (25) 2.2 (0.43-11.31) 
National news 2 (0.5) 2 (100) Not Calculated 0 (0) Not Calculated 
Local news 10 (2.5) 10 (100) Not Calculated 2 (20) 1.65 (0.34-8.1) 
Word of 
mouth 
69 (18) 55 (80) 0.65 (0.33-1.27) 8 (11.5) 0.87 (0.38-1.95) 
Other means 11 (3) 9 (82) 0.74 (0.15-3.57) 1 (9) 0.66 (0.08-5.31) 
Was the message believed to be from HI-EMA? 
Yes 308 (79) 257 (83) Reference 45 (15) Reference 
No – a 
different 
source 
18 (5) 16 (89) 1.59 (0.35-7.12) 1 (5.5) 0.34 (0.04-2.65) 
No- hoax 63 (16) 57 (90) 1.88 (0.77-4.61) 5 (8) 0.5 (0.19-1.32) 
Was an attack believed to be imminent? 
No (hoax or 
mistake) 
181 (46.5) 157 (87) Reference 9 (5) Reference 
Yes 208 (53) 173 (83) 0.76 (0.43-1.33) 42 (20) 4.83* (2.28-
10.24) 
Prior level of disaster preparedness information received 
A great deal 75 (19) 62 (83) Reference 6 (8) Reference 
Some 
information 
172 (44) 149 (87) 1.36 (0.65-2.85) 28 (16) 2.24 (0.88-5.65) 
A little 
information 
84 (21.5) 68 (81) 0.89 (0.4-2) 10 (12) 1.55 (0.54-4.5) 
No 
information 
58 (15) 51 (88) 1.53 (0.57-4.11) 7 (12) 1.58 (0.5-4.98) 
Prior level of nuclear preparedness information received 
A great deal 22 (6) 19 (86) Reference 5 (23) Reference 
Some 
information 
79 (20) 72 (91) 1.62 (0.38-6.88) 15 (19) 0.8 (0.25-2.5) 
A little 
information 
91 (23) 70 (77) 0.53 (0.14-1.95) 13 (14) 0.57 (0.18-1.8) 
No 
information 
197 (51) 169 (86) 0.95 (0.26-3.43) 18 (9) 0.34 (0.11-1.04) 
Belief in protection from military 
Fully 
protected 
57 (15) 50 (88) Reference 11 (19) Reference 
Partially 
protected 
148 (38) 125 (84) 0.76 (0.31-1.88) 15 (10) 0.47 (0.2-1.1) 
Not protected 77 (20) 68 (88) 1.06 (0.37-3.03) 15 (19) 1.01 (0.42-2.41) 

















































































Associations between predictor variables and believing an attack to be imminent and with believing an 
attack to be imminent coupled with adhering to protective instructions / taking protective action 
Variable and 
variable levels 
No. (%) of 
participants 





attack to be 
imminent 
Adjusted odds 
ratio (95% CI) 












ratio (95% CI) 
Location upon receiving warning 
Indoors 328 (84) 174 (53) Reference 33 (10) Reference 
Outdoors 61 (16) 34 (56) 1.11 (0.64-1.93) 9 (15) 1.55 (0.7-3.42) 
By what means was the message received? 
SMS from HI-
EMA 
289 (74) 164 (57) Reference 31 (11) Reference 
Warning siren 8 (2) 5 (62.5) 1.27 (0.3-5.42) 2 (25) 2.77 (0.54-14.35) 
National news 2 (0.5) 0 (0) Not calculated 0 (0) Not calculated 
Local news 10 (2.5) 6 (60) 1.14 (0.32-4.14) 2 (20) 2.08 (0.42-10.24) 
Word of 
mouth 
69 (18) 28 (41) 0.52 (0.3-0.89)* 7 (10) 0.94 (0.39-2.23) 
Other means 11 (3) 5 (45) 0.63 (0.19-2.13) 0 (0) Not calculated 
Was the message believed to be from HI-EMA? 
Yes 308 (79) 201 (65) Reference 41 (13) Reference 
No – a 
different 
source 
18 (5) 6 (33) 0.27 (0.1-0.74)* 0 (0) Not calculated 
No- hoax 63 (16) 1 (1.5) 0.01 (0.00-
0.06)* 
1 (1.5) 0.1 (0.01-0.78)* 
Prior level of disaster preparedness information received 
A great deal 75 (19) 32 (43) Reference 5 (7) Reference 
Some 
information 
172 (44) 90 (52) 1.46 (0.84-2.52) 23 (13) 2.16 (0.79-5.92) 
A little 
information 
84 (21.5) 47 (56) 1.71 (0.91-3.2) 8 (9.5) 1.47 (0.46-4.72) 
No 
information 
58 (15) 39 (67) 2.76 (1.35-
5.63)* 
6 (10) 1.61 (0.47-5.58) 
Prior level of nuclear preparedness information received 
A great deal 22 (6) 10 (45) Reference 3 (14) Reference 
Some 
information 
79 (20) 47 (59) 1.76 (0.68-4.57) 13 (16) 1.25 (0.32-4.84) 
A little 
information 
91 (23) 48 (53) 1.34 (0.53-3.41) 9 (9) 0.69 (0.17-2.81) 
No 
information 
197 (51) 103 (52) 1.3 (0.54-3.15) 17 (9) 0.6 (0.16-2.23) 
Source of preparedness information  
Local 
authorities 
23 (12) 11 (48) Reference 2 (9) Reference 
Social media 14 (7) 11 (78.5) 4 (0.88-18.22) 3 (21) 2.86 (0.41-19.77) 
Local news 
media 





9 (5) 5 (55.5) 1.36 (0.29-6.41) 0 (0) Not calculated 
Friends or 
family  




13 (7) 8 (61.5) 1.74 (0.44-6.97) 2 (15) 1.91 (0.24-15.45) 
Nuclear 
agencies 
1 (0.5) 1 (100) Not calculated 0 (0) Not calculated 
Emergency 
services 
2 (1) 2 (100) Not calculated 0 (0) Not calculated 
The military 7 (4) 3 (43) 0.81 (0.15-4.5) 1 (14) 1.75 (0.13-22.78) 
Other 23 (12) 12 (52) 1.19 (0.37-3.78) 6 (26) 3.71 (0.66-20.76) 
Cannot recall 15 (8) 5 (33) 0.54 (0.14-2.1) 2 (13) 1.61 (0.2-12.91) 
How recently informed of preparedness information 
During the 
past year 
116 (48) 68 (59) Reference 16 (14) Reference 
1 – 5 years 
ago 
59 (24) 34 (58) 0.96 (0.51-1.81) 6 (10) 0.71 (0.26-1.91) 
6 – 15 years 
ago 
6 (2) 1 (17) 0.14 (0.02-1.25) 1 (17) 1.25 (0.14-11.4) 
More than 15 
years ago 
11 (4.5) 2 (18) 0.16 (0.03-0.76) 2 (18) 1.39 (0.27-7.02) 
Belief that preparedness information was sufficient 
Yes 59 (31) 24 (41) Reference 6 (10) Reference 
No 88 (46) 59 (67) 2.97 (1.5-5.88)* 16 (18) 1.96 (0.72-5.35) 
Don’t know 45 (23) 22 (49) 1.39 (0.64-3.05) 3 (7) 0.63 (0.15-2.67) 
Belief in protection from military 
Fully 
protected 
57 (15) 30 (53) Reference 10 (17.5) Reference 
Partially 
protected 
148 (38) 77 (52) 0.96 (0.52-1.77) 11 (7) 0.38 (0.15-0.94)* 
Not protected 77 (20) 45 (58) 1.26 (0.63-2.52) 11 (14) 0.78 (0.31-1.99) 
Don’t know 107 (27.5) 56 (52) 0.99 (0.52-1.88) 10 (9) 0.48 (0.19-1.24) 
Perceived likelihood of nuclear attack 
No risk at all 35 (9) 11 (31) Reference 4 (11) Reference 
A little risk 189 (48.5) 70 (37) 1.27 (0.59-2.75) 13 (9) 0.57 (0.17-1.87) 
Moderate risk 118 (30) 88 (74.5) 6.4 (2.8-14.61)* 14 (12) 1.04 (0.32-3.4) 
Quite a high 
risk 
27 (7) 22 (81) 9.6 (2.88-
32.03)* 
8 (30) 3.26 (0.86-12.33) 
Very high risk 20 (5) 17 (85) 12.36 (2.99-
51.14)* 
3 (15) 1.37 (0.27-6.84) 




Appendix 13. Full UK survey items 
Public Attitudes Towards Nuclear Preparedness Communications – A survey study 
 
Welcome to the survey: Public Attitudes Towards Nuclear Preparedness Communications   
    
Before you decide whether you want to take part, please read the information below. If you 
are happy to continue, please click the button to move to the next page where you will be 
asked to consent to participation in this research.    
    
Information for participants   
My name is Louis Gauntlett and I would like to invite you to take part in this original research 
project. You should take part only if you want to; choosing not to take part will not 
disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important 
that you understand why the research is being done and what it involves. Please take time to 
read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us to 
provide information on anything that is not clear or let us know if you would like more 
information. This study has been approved by the King’s College London Research Ethics 
Review Committee.      
What is the purpose of this research?      
Evidence suggests that during a radiation emergency, the way in which authorities 
communicate with the public can influence how people respond to their instructions. When 
deciding how best to communicate with the public, it is therefore important that we first 
understand what information needs members of the public have to make sure that we are 
providing the best information and in the best way.       
Who is conducting and funding the research?      
The research is being conducted by a joint team from King’s College London and Public Health 
England. This research makes up part of a King’s College London PhD project, funded as part of 
the NIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Emergency Preparedness and Response at King’s 
College London, a partnership with Public Health England, which is the Government agency in 
England in charge of protecting the public’s health during emergencies.      
Who is being asked to take part?      
We are interested in hearing from members of the public who live in the UK and are 18 years 
or over. 
What will happen if I take part?      
If you would like to take part, we will ask you to fill in an on-line questionnaire. The 
questionnaire takes about 15 minutes to complete and contains questions about any 
preparedness for a nuclear disaster and information preferences such as source and method of 
information distribution.      
What are the possible benefits of taking part?      
Participants will receive X number of Lifepoints upon completion of the survey. In addition, we 
hope that our results will help us understand how best to communicate with people in the 
event of a major disaster such as a nuclear attack. We hope this will never happen, but if it 
345 
 
does, communicating effectively with people may help them understand what protective 
actions to take and may help to save lives.  
Confidentiality – who will know I am taking part in the study?      
Your responses will be completely confidential. The responses you provide will be used within 
the research study and will be stored on a password protected drive for the duration of this 
project. Anonymised data may be subject to review by responsible individuals from King’s 
College London for monitoring and audit purposes.      
What will happen to the results of the study?      
We hope to publish our results (without any personally identifiable information) in a peer-
reviewed journal.      
Do I have to take part?      
No. Your participation in this project is completely voluntary. You may stop participating at any 
time without giving any reason. If you stop being in the study, there will be no penalty or loss 
to you. You can do this by closing the link of the survey prior to starting or completing it. Data 
from unfinished surveys (i.e. those closed prior to completion) will not be used in the final 
analysis and will be discarded. Each page of the survey will include a 'next' button to move to 
the next question. Next buttons will only become live once a response is given to the question, 
by responding to each question and clicking 'finish' at the last page indicates consent for 
responses to be used in analysis.      
If you decide to take part, you will still be free to withdraw your data within two weeks of 
submitting the survey, without giving a reason.       
What happens now?      
If this study has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint about the conduct 
of the study you can contact King's College London using the details below for further advice 
and information: 
  
Dr James Rubin gideon.rubin@kcl.ac.uk on +44 020 7848 5684. Address: Department of 
Psychological Medicine, King’s College London, Weston Education Centre, c/o 125 Cold 
Harbour Lane, London, SE5 9NU 
  
If you wish to contact the research team with a general query about this study then use: 
Louis Gauntlett, louis.gauntlett@kcl.ac.uk on +44 020 7848 5684. Address: Department of 
Psychological Medicine, King’s College London, Weston Education Centre, c/o 125 Cold 
Harbour Lane, London, SE5 9NU 
   




End of Block: Introduction page 
 
Start of Block: Consent to take part 
 
If you think you might like to help with this important study and are willing to proceed, please 
read and check each statement below and select a response from the drop down box below.   
 
I confirm that I am 18 years of age or older 
 
I confirm that I am a UK resident 
  
I have read and understand the information about this project provided above 
  
I understand that my responses will be stored securely for the duration of this research study 
  
I understand that my information may be subject to review by responsible individuals from the 
College for monitoring and audit purposes 
  
I understand that participation in this study is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time by closing the document 
  
I understand that I am free to request deletion of my responses within two weeks of 
submitting the survey 
  
I confirm that I have read and understood the information above and I agree to take part in 
this study 
▼ I consent to all of the above items (1) ... I DO NOT consent to all of the above items (2) 
 
Condition: If: I DO NOT consent …. Is selected: skip to end of survey 
End of Block: Consent to take part 
 
Start of Block: About you 
 
Q1 This first section is designed to find out about you.     I am (select one)    
• Male  (1)  
• Female  (2)  
• Non-binary gender  (3)  
• Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
End of Block: About you 
 




Q2 I am (select one) 
• Between 18 – 29 years old  (1)  
• Between 30 – 39 years old  (2)  
• Between 40 – 49 years old  (3)  
• Between 50 – 59 years old  (4)  
• Between 60 – 69 years old  (5)  
• 70 years or above  (6)  
• Prefer not to say  (7)  
 
End of Block: About you 
 
Start of Block: About you 
 
Q3 Do you have at least one dependent child? (select all that apply) 
• No  (1)  
• I have a dependent child / children aged under 18 living with me  (2)  
• I have a dependent child / children aged over 18 living with me  (3)  
• I have a dependent child / children under 18 but they do not live with me  (4)  
 
End of Block: About you 
 
Start of Block: About you 
 
Q4 Do you have any pets? 
• Yes  (1)  
• No  (2)  
 
End of Block: About you 
 




Q5 Which of the following best describes your employment status? (select one) 
• Employed, working 40 hours or more per week  (1)  
• Employed, working 1-39 hours per week  (2)  
• Not employed, looking for work  (3)  
• Not employed, not looking for work  (4)  
• Retired  (5)  
• Disabled, not able to work  (6)  
 
End of Block: About you 
 
Start of Block: About you 
349 
 
Q6 What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have 
received? (Select one) 
• Left school without qualifications  (1)  
• Secondary education (O-level/GCSE/A-level)  (2)  
• Higher education (BSc, BA/higher qualification)  (3)  
• Prefer not to say  (4)  
 




























End of Block: About you 
 





Q8 What do you believe to be the likelihood of a catastrophic disaster of any kind (e.g. severe 
flooding, earthquake, attack from foreign military) occurring anywhere in the UK within your 
lifetime?  
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
(1 = definitely WILL NOT happen in my 




Q9 What do you believe to be the likelihood of a catastrophic disaster of any kind (e.g. severe 
flooding, earthquake, attack from foreign military) occurring in the UK within your lifetime 
AND it directly affecting the health of you and/or close family members?  
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
(1 = definitely WILL NOT happen in my 




Q10 What do you believe to be the likelihood of a nuclear attack by another country or 
terrorists occurring anywhere in the UK within your lifetime?  
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
(1 = definitely WILL NOT happen in my 




Q11 What do you believe to be the likelihood of a nuclear attack by another country or 
terrorists occurring in the UK within your lifetime AND it directly affecting the health of you 
and/or close family members?  
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
(1 = definitely WOULD NOT directly affect me; 
10 = definitely would directly affect me) ()  
 
 
End of Block: Risk Perception 
 




Q12 This section will ask you about your preparedness for an emergency.      
 
 
Which from the list 
below do you currently 
have? 





























•  •  •  •  •  •  •  
A battery 
powered 
radio (4)  
•  •  •  •  •  •  •  




•  •  •  •  •  •  •  
A flashlight 
(and extra 
batteries) (7)  
•  •  •  •  •  •  •  
A first aid kit 
(8)  
•  •  •  •  •  •  •  











specify) (11)  






Q13 Have you received information regarding general disaster preparedness? (select one) 
• A great deal of information  (1)  
• Some information  (2)  
• A little information  (3)  




Q14 Have you received information regarding preparedness and / or protective actions you 
could take before and in the event specifically of a nuclear attack? (select one) 
• A great deal of information  (1)  
• Some information  (2)  
• A little information  (3)  
• No information  (4)  
 






Q16 Where did that information come from? (select all that apply) 
• Local authorities (e.g. council; mayor's office)  (1)  
• Social media  (2)  
• Local news media  (3)  
• National news media  (4)  
• Friends / family  (5)  
• National government sources  (6)  
• UK nuclear agencies  (7)  
• International health protection or nuclear agencies (e.g. the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA); Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC))  (8)  
• Emergency services (e.g. police; fire brigade)  (9)  
• NHS staff or resources  (10)  
• The military  (11)  
• Other (please specify)  (12) ________________________________________________ 
• Cannot recall  (13)  
 
Condition: ‘Cannot recall’ Is Selected. Skip To: If nuclear missiles were fired at the....(Q19) 
 
Q17 When did you most recently receive this information? (select one) 
• During the past year  (1)  
• 1 to 5 years ago  (2)  
• 5 to 15 years ago  (3)  




Q18 Do you feel the information you received regarding preparedness and protective actions 
was sufficient? (select one) 
• Yes  (1)  
• No  (2)  






Q19 If nuclear missiles were fired at the UK, do you believe that the UK military would be able 
to intercept them safely? (select one) 
• yes - we are fully protected  (1)  
• we are partially protected  (2)  
• no - we are not protected  (3)  
• I dont know  (4)  
 
End of Block: Preparedness 
 
Start of Block: Preparedness 
 
Q20 Would you want to receive information regarding what actions you could take to prepare 
for a nuclear attack? 
• Yes  (1)  
• No  (2)  
 
Condition: ‘No’ Is Selected. Skip To: Why would you not wish to receive inf....(Q23) 
 
Q21 When would be the best time for you to receive information regarding preparedness 
actions to take in a nuclear attack? 
• Only when an attack is known to be imminent  (1)  




Q22 What 2 pieces of information would you most want to know in nuclear emergency 
preparedness materials (choose 2 from the following list) 
 
Information about sheltering (e.g. where to shelter, why sheltering is effective) 
 
Information about evacuating (e.g. where to evacuate, when to evacuate) 
 
Information about how to prepare in advance for a nuclear emergency (e.g. what supplies to 
keep) 
 
Information about radiation (e.g. what it is, how it affects you) 
 
Information about how you will be given information about an incident (e.g. where to look for 
trustworthy information, how you will be warned about an incident) 
 




Information specific to a deliberate nuclear incident (e.g. a nuclear bomb) 
 
Information about how to prepare for emergencies more generally (e.g. how to prepare for a 
flood, or a major storm) 
 





Q23 Why would you not wish to receive information regarding preparedness and protective 
actions prior to a nuclear attack? (select all that apply) 
 
I would be too afraid  (1)  
 
I don’t believe the UK will be attacked with a nuclear device  (2)  
 
I don’t believe I could be protected if the UK was attacked with a nuclear device  (3)  
 
I do not feel it would be possible to undertake actions that would be advised  (4)  
 
If an attack happened, the government would provide us with everything we needed (5) 
 
Other (please specify)  (6)  
 
Please randomize the order of responses (apart from ‘other’) 
 
 
End of Block: Preparedness 
 






Q24 On a scale of 1 -10 what do you perceive to be the effort involved in carrying out the 
following preparedness activities? 
 
(1 = very little to no effort involved; 10 = much more effort than I would be prepared to take)  
 
(Please note that each slider must be moved to at least the number 1 row to save your 
response to this question) 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Obtain a battery powered radio and spare 
batteries ()  
Store a 14 day supply of food/water () 
 
Store a spare supply of medication () 
 
Put together a first aid kit () 
 
Watch preparedness videos online () 
 
Be prepared to shelter (e.g. at home) for up to 
72 hours ()  
Obtain a torch (and extra batteries) () 
 
Store a bag with cash and important 
documents ()  
Be prepared to shelter where you are (e.g. at 
home) for up to 1 week ()  
Be prepared to shelter where you (e.g. at 
home) for up to 2 weeks ()  
Be prepared to leave your home to a place of 
shelter within your town or village ()  
Be prepared to leave your home to a place of 












End of Block: preparedness 
 
Start of Block: Efficacy 
 
 
Q25 How effective do you feel each of the following actions would be in protecting you should 
a nuclear attack occur 5 miles from where you are? (0 = I dont know; 1 = not at all effective; 7 













 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Sheltering (i.e. remaining inside and building a 
shelter with furniture ) ()  




Leaving your home to a destination as far 
away as possible ()  
Leaving your home to a shelter elsewhere in 
your location (such as the outskirts of town) ()  
Taking Stable Iodine (a tablet used to prevent 
radiation damage in the thyroid) ()  
Getting underground (e.g. into a basement) () 
 








End of Block: Efficacy 
 





Q26 By what method(s) would you prefer to receive information regarding nuclear disaster 
preparedness (select all that apply) 
• Internet / online  (1)  
• leaflet / letter posted to your residence  (2)  
• At a local council meeting  (4)  
• Newspaper  (5)  
• Television  (6)  
• Radio  (7)  
• Word of mouth  (8)  
• Other (please specify)  (9) ________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Information seeking 
 
Start of Block: Trust 
 
 
Q27 Rank the following. Drag sources using your mouse or finger.   
    
Who would you most trust to provide you with information about how to prepare for a nuclear 
emergency?   
    
Rank 1 = most trusted to provide accurate and effective information; 9 = least likely to provide 
accurate and effective information 
______ National Government (1) 
______ Friends / Family (2) 
______ Local authorities (e.g. the Mayor, local council) (3) 
______ International health protection or nuclear agencies (e.g. the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA); Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)) (4) 
______ UK Nuclear agencies (e.g. the Office for Nuclear Regulation) (5) 
______ National news media (6) 
______ Online forums / Social media (7) 
______ Scientists (8) 
______ Emergency services (e.g. police; fire brigade) (9) 
______ NHS staff or resources (10) 
______ Local news media (11) 









End of Block: Trust 
 
Start of Block: anticipated adherence 
 
 
Q28 How likely are you to undertake preparedness actions (i.e. during a time whilst there is 
NO KNOWN threat) for a nuclear attack if advised to by each of the following sources?   
    


















 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
National Government (e.g. MPs) () 
 
Friends / Family () 
 
Local authorities (e.g. the Mayor, local council) 
()  
International health protection or nuclear 
agencies (e.g. the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA); Centres for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC)) () 
 
UK Nuclear agencies (e.g. the Office for 
Nuclear Regulation) ()  
National news media () 
 




Emergency services (e.g. police; fire brigade) () 
 
NHS staff or resources () 
 
Local news media () 
 









Q29 How likely are you to undertake protective actions (i.e. if threat of attack is known to be 
imminent or immediately following an attack) for a nuclear attack if advised to by each of the 
following sources?   
    


















 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
National Government (e.g. MPs) () 
 
Friends / Family () 
 
Local authorities (e.g. the Mayor, local council) 
()  
International health protection or nuclear 
agencies (e.g. the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA); Centres for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC)) () 
 
UK Nuclear agencies (e.g. the Office for 
Nuclear Regulation) ()  
National news media () 
 




Emergency services (e.g. police; fire brigade) () 
 
NHS staff or resources () 
 
Local news media () 
 
The military () 
 
 
End of Block: anticipated adherence 
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Appendix M. UK survey: Full frequency data 
What do you believe to be the likelihood of a catastrophic 
disaster of any kind (e.g. severe flooding, earthquake, attack 
from foreign military) occurring anywhere in the UK within your 
lifetime? 
Frequency Percentage 
No risk at all 123 12 
A little risk 224 22 
Moderate risk 254 25 
Quite a high risk 269 26.5 
Very high risk / quite probable 144 14 
Overall mean average (out of ten) 5.66  
Total 1014  
 
What do you believe to be the likelihood of a catastrophic 
disaster of any kind (e.g. severe flooding, earthquake, attack 
from foreign military) occurring in the UK within your lifetime 
AND it directly affecting the health of you and/or close family 
members? 
Frequency Percentage 
No risk at all 186 18 
A little risk 272 27 
Moderate risk 315 31 
Quite a high risk 187 18 
Very high risk / quite probable 54 5 
Overall mean average (out of ten) 4.81  
Total 1014  
 
What do you believe to be the likelihood of a nuclear attack by 
another country or terrorists occurring anywhere in the UK 
within your lifetime? 
Frequency Percentage 
No risk at all 265 26 
A little risk 258 25 
Moderate risk 226 22 
Quite a high risk 188 18.5 
Very high risk / quite probable 77 7.5 
Overall mean average (out of 10) 4.62  
Total 1014  
 
What do you believe to be the likelihood of a nuclear attack by 
another country or terrorists occurring in the UK within your 
lifetime AND it directly affecting the health of you and/or close 
family members? 
Frequency Percentage 
No risk at all 289 28.5 
A little risk 254 25 
Moderate risk 251 25 
Quite a high risk 150 15 
Very high risk / quite probable 70 7 
Overall mean average (out of 10) 4.44  








Which of the following items do you currently have in 
preparedness for an emergency? 
Frequency Percentage 
A spare supply of medication Yes 402 40 
 N/A 80 8 
A battery powered radio   Yes 384 38 
 N/A 15 1 
A 14 day supply of food/water   Yes 352 35 
 N/A 13 1 
A flashlight (and extra batteries)   Yes 813 80 
 N/A 6 0.5 
A first aid kit   Yes 747 74 
 N/A 7 1 
A stored bag with cash and important documents   Yes 249 24.5 
 N/A 11 1 








































Why do you have this item (listed above)? Frequency Percentage 
A spare supply of 
medication 
Nuclear attack 13 3 
 A different type of emergency (e.g. 
flooding) 
56 14 
 No specific emergency (general prep) 263 65 
 Not for emergency prep reasons 70 17 
A battery powered radio   Nuclear attack 14 4 
 A different type of emergency (e.g. 
flooding) 
40 10 
 No specific emergency (general prep) 178 46 
 Not for emergency prep reasons 152 39.5 
A 14-day supply of 
food/water   
Nuclear attack 12 3 
 A different type of emergency (e.g. 
flooding) 
51 14 
 No specific emergency (general prep) 183 52 
 Not for emergency prep reasons 106 30 
A flashlight (and extra 
batteries)   
Nuclear attack 12 1 
 A different type of emergency (e.g. 
flooding) 
85 10 
 No specific emergency (general prep) 483 59 
 Not for emergency prep reasons 233 29 
A first aid kit   Nuclear attack 11 1 
 A different type of emergency (e.g. 
flooding) 
68 9 
 No specific emergency (general prep) 486 65 
 Not for emergency prep reasons 182 24 
A bag with cash and 
important documents   
Nuclear attack 12 5 
 A different type of emergency (e.g. 
flooding) 
41 16 
 No specific emergency (general prep) 136 55 
 Not for emergency prep reasons 60 24 
Other Nuclear attack 5 4 
 A different type of emergency (e.g. 
flooding) 
24 20.5 
 No specific emergency (general prep) 68 58 












Prior preparedness information received Frequency Percentage 




A great deal of information 25 2 
 Some information 113 11 
 A little information 104 10 
 No information 772 76 
Have you received 
information regarding 
preparedness and / or 
protective actions 
specifically for a nuclear 
attack? 
A great deal of information 35 3 
 Some information 86 8 
 A little information 78 8 
 No information 815 80 
Where did your nuclear 
specific information come 
from? 
Local authorities (e.g. council; 
mayor) 
34 17 
 Social media 50 25 
 Local news media 36 18 
 National news media 45 23 
 Friends or family 49 25 
 National government sources 45 23 
 UK nuclear agencies 18 9 
 International health protection or 
nuclear agencies 
21 11 
 Emergency services 36 18 
 NHS staff or resources 28 14 
 The military 27 14 
 Other 8 5.5 
 Cannot recall 22 11 
 Total 199  
When did you most 
recently receive this 
information? 
During the past year 34 19 
 1 to 5 years ago 79 45 
 6 to 15 years ago 33 19 
 More than 15 years ago 31 17.5 
 Total 177  
Do you feel the information 
you received regarding 
preparedness and 
protective actions was 
sufficient? 
Yes 92 52 
 No 61 34 
 I don’t know 24 13.5 







If nuclear missiles were fired at the UK, do you believe that the UK 
military would be able to intercept them safely? 
Frequency Percentage 
Yes – we are fully protected 124 12 
We are partially protected 432 43 
No – we are not protected 225 22 
I don’t know 233 23 
Total 1014  
 
Pre-incident communication preferences Frequency Percentage 
Would you want to receive 
information regarding what 
actions you could take to 
prepare for a nuclear attack? 
Yes 738 73 
 No 276 27 
 Total 1014  
When would be the best 
time for you to receive 
information regarding 
preparedness actions to take 
in a nuclear attack? 
Only when an attack is known to be 
imminent 
190 26 
 Preferably any time before an attack is 
known 
548 74 
 Total 738  
Note: Respondents who selected ‘No’ in response to the question as to whether they would want to receive pre-incident communications were not shown this 
question 
 
Why would you not wish to 
receive information 
regarding preparedness and 
protective actions prior to a 
nuclear attack? 
I would be too afraid 32 12 
 I don't believe the UK will be attacked 
with a nuclear device 
94 34 
 I don't believe I could be protected if 
the UK was attacked with a nuclear 
device 
116 42 
 I do not feel it would be possible to 
undertake actions that would be 
advised 
67 24 
 If an attack happened, the government 
would provide us with everything we 
needed 
33 12 
 Other 13 5 
Note: Respondents who selected ‘Yes’ in response to question as to whether they would want to receive pre-incident communications were not shown this question 
What 2 pieces of information 
would you most want to 
know in nuclear emergency 
preparedness materials? 
Information about sheltering 293 29 
 Information about evacuating 224 22 
 Information about how to prepare in 
advance for a nuclear emergency 
302 30 
 Information about radiation 117 11.5 
 Information about how you will be 
given information about an incident 
153 15 





 Information specific to a deliberate 
nuclear incident 
78 8 
 Information about how to prepare for 
emergencies more generally 
214 21 
 Something else 4 0.4 
By what method(s) would 




Internet / online 586 58 
 Leaflet / letter posted to your 
residence 
622 61 
 At a local council meeting 102 10 
 Newspaper 232 23 
 Television 559 55 
 Radio 319 31 
 Word of mouth 104 10 





Appendix N. UK survey unadjusted odds ratios for associations with preparedness 
Association between personal variables and intentional preparedness 
Variable and variable 
levels 
No. (%) of 
participants 
No. (% within variable 




ratio (95% CI) 
Gender    
Male 503 (50) 205 (41) Reference 
Female 507 (50) 201 (40) 0.95 (0.74-1.23) 
Non-binary gender 2 (0.2) 0 (0) Not calculated 
Prefer not to say 2 (0.2) 1 (50) 1.45 (0.09-23.37) 
Age     
18-29 166 (16) 79 (47.5) Reference 
30-39 163 (16) 64 (39) 0.73 (0.47-1.13) 
40-49 176 (17) 53 (30) 0.49 (0.31-0.76)* 
50-59 185 (18) 76 (41) 0.79 (0.51-1.2) 
60-69 168 (16.5) 66 (39) 0.73 (0.47-1.13) 
70+ 155 (15) 69 (44.5) 0.9 (0.58-1.4) 
Prefer not to say 1 (0.1) 1 (100) Not calculated 
Dependent Children    
None 675 (66.5) 239 (35) Reference 
Children <18 living with 
me 
262 (26) 136 (52) 1.97 (1.47-2.63)* 
Children >18 living with 
me 
53 (5) 19 (36) 1.02 (0.57-1.83) 
Children not living with 
me 
24 (2) 13 (54) 2.16 (0.95-4.89) 
Pets    
Yes 538 (53) 242 (45) Reference 
No 476 (47) 165 (35) 0.65 (0.5-0.84)* 
Geographic Location    
Outside of London 889 (88) 354 (40) Reference 
London 125 (12) 53 (42) 1.11 (0.76-1.63) 
Employment    
Not Employed 452 (44.5) 179 (40) Reference 
Employed 562 (55) 228 (40.5) 1.04 (0.81-1.34) 
Education level    
Left school without 
qualifications  
59 (6) 24 (41) Reference 
Secondary education 466 (46) 167 (36) 0.81 (0.47-1.42) 
Higher education 488 (48) 216 (44) 1.16 (0.67-2.01) 















Association between predictor variables and intentional preparedness 
Variable and variable 
levels 
No. (%) of 
participants 
No. (% within variable 




ratio (95% CI) 
General disaster risk perception 
No risk at all 123 (12) 45 (36.5) Reference 
A little risk 224 (22) 69 (31) 0.77 (0.48-1.23) 
Moderate risk 254 (25) 98 (38.5) 1.09 (0.7-1.7) 
Quite a high risk 269 (26.5) 114 (42) 1.27 (0.82-1.98) 
Very high risk / quite 
probable 
144 (14) 81 (56) 2.23 (1.36-3.65)* 
General disaster (with direct effect) risk perception 
No risk at all 186 (18) 57 (31) Reference 
A little risk 272 (27) 91 (33) 1.14 (0.76-1.7) 
Moderate risk 315 (31) 132 (42) 1.63 (1.11-2.4)* 
Quite a high risk 187 (18) 90 (48) 2.1 (1.37-3.21)* 
Very high risk / quite 
probable 
54 (5) 37 (68.5) 4.93 (2.56-9.47)* 
Nuclear attack risk perception 
No risk at all 265 (26) 95 (36) Reference 
A little risk 258 (25) 79 (31) 0.79 (0.55-1.14) 
Moderate risk 226 (22) 94 (41.5) 1.27 (0.88-1.83) 
Quite a high risk 188 (18.5) 91 (48) 1.68 (1.15-2.46)* 
Very high risk / quite 
probable 
77 (7.5) 48 (62) 2.96 (1.75-5.01)* 
Nuclear attack risk perception (with direct effect) 
No risk at all 289 (28.5) 97 (33.5) Reference 
A little risk 254 (25) 83 (33) 0.96 (0.67-1.37) 
Moderate risk 251 (25) 102 (41) 1.35 (0.95-1.92) 
Quite a high risk 150 (15) 81 (54) 2.32 (1.55-3.48)* 
Very high risk / quite 
probable 
70 (7) 44 (63) 3.35 (1.95-5.76)* 
General preparedness information 
A great deal 25 (2) 23 (92) Reference 
Some information 113 (11) 85 (75) 0.26 (0.06-1.91) 
A little information 104 (10) 58 (56) 0.11 (0.02-0.49)* 
No information 772 (76) 241 (31) 0.04 (0.01-0.17)* 
Nuclear preparedness information 
A great deal 35 (3) 28 (80) Reference 
Some information 86 (8) 63 (73) 0.68 (0.26-1.78) 
A little information 78 (8) 38 (49) 0.24 (0.09-0.61)* 
No information 815 (80) 278 (34) 0.13 (0.06-0.3)* 
Source of preparedness information 
Local authorities 34 (17) 27 (79) 2.38 (0.98-5.79) 
Social media 50 (25) 38 (76) 2.02 (0.97-4.18) 
Local news media 36 (18) 30 (83) 3.23 (1.27-8.2)* 
National news media 45 (23) 35 (78) 2.23 (1.03-4.84)* 
Friends or family  49 (25) 36 (73) 1.7 (0.83-3.47) 
National government 
sources 
45 (23) 31 (69) 1.26 (0.62-2.58) 
UK nuclear agencies 18 (9) 13 (72) 1.46 (0.5-4.27) 
International nuclear 
agencies 
21 (10.5) 17 (81) 2.5 (0.8-7.76) 
Emergency services 36 (18) 31 (86) 4.11 (1.52-11.12)* 
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NHS 28 (14) 22 (78.5) 2.19 (0.84-5.7) 
The military 27 (13.5) 22 (81) 2.67 (0.96-7.4) 
Other 11 (5.5) 4 (36) 0.29 (0.08-1.02) 
Cannot recall 22 (11) 8 (36) 0.26 (0.1-0.67) 
How recently informed 
During the past year 34 (19) 24 (70.5) Reference 
1 – 5 years ago 79 (45) 60 (76) 1.32 (0.53-3.24) 
6 – 15 years ago 33 (19) 21 (64) 0.73 (0.26-2.03) 
More than 15 years ago 31 (17.5) 16 (52) 0.44 (0.16-1.23) 
Information sufficiency 
Yes 92 (52) 76 (83) Reference 
No 61 (34) 32 (52) 0.23 (0.11-1.48)* 
Don’t know 24 (13.5) 13 (54) 0.25 (0.09-0.65)* 
Belief in protection from military 
Fully protected 124 (12) 76 (61) Reference 
Partially protected 432 (43) 189 (44) 0.49 (0.33-0.74)*  
Not protected 225 (22) 75 (33) 0.32 (0.2-0.5)* 
Don’t know 233 (23) 67 (29) 0.25 (0.16-0.4)* 
Low perceived 
preparedness effort  





5.35 (Mean total) 5.51 (Mean within 
variable) 
1.06 (1-1.13)* 
Sheltering Effectiveness 2.74 (Mean total) 3.2 (Mean within 
variable) 
1.25 (1.16-1.34)* 




Association between predictor variables and individual preparedness 
Variable and variable levels Total preparedness: 
odds ratio (95% CI) 
Prior level of general disaster preparedness information received -0.69 (-0.82-0.56)* 
Prior level of nuclear preparedness information received -0.6 (-0.73-0.47)* 
Source of preparedness information: Local authorities 0.44 (-0.2-1.07) 
Source of preparedness information: Social media 0.23 (-0.32-0.78) 
Source of preparedness information: Local news media 0.79 (-0.18-1.41)* 
Source of preparedness information: National news media 0.37 (-0.2-0.94) 
Source of preparedness information: Friends / family 0.49 (-0.06-1.05) 
Source of preparedness information: National government 0.54 (-0.03-1.1) 
Source of preparedness information: UK nuclear agencies 0.44 (-0.39-1.28) 
Source of preparedness information: International nuclear agencies 1.03 (0.27-1.8)* 
Source of preparedness information: Emergency services 1.12 (0.52-1.73) 
Source of preparedness information: NHS 0.4 (-0.29-1.09) 
Source of preparedness information: The military 0.74 (0.05-1.43) 
Source of preparedness information: Other -0.33 (-1.38-0.72) 
Source of preparedness information: Cannot recall -1 (-1.75--0.25)* 
How recently was preparedness information received  -0.25 (-0.51-0.00) 
Was preparedness information considered sufficient? -0.57 (-0.92--0.22)* 
Belief in protection from military -0.38 (-0.49--0.28)* 
Average low preparedness effort scores 0.01 (-0.04-0.06) 
Average high preparedness effort score 0.00 (-0.04-0.05) 
*= Significant result 
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Appendix O. UK survey unadjusted odds ratios for associations with pre-incident 
communications preferences 
Association between personal variables and desire for pre-incident communications 
Variable and variable 
levels 
No. (%) of 
participants 
No. (% within variable 




ratio (95% CI) 
Gender    
Male 503 (50) 359 (71) Reference 
Female 507 (50) 375 (74) 0.88 (0.66-1.16) 
Non-binary gender 2 (0.2) 2 (100) Not calculated 
Prefer not to say 2 (0.2) 2 (100) Not calculated 
Age     
18-29 166 (16) 133 (80) Reference 
30-39 163 (16) 127 (78) 1.14 (0.67-1.94) 
40-49 176 (17) 122 (69) 1.78 (1.08-2.93)* 
50-59 185 (18) 118 (64) 2.29 (1.41-3.72)* 
60-69 168 (16.5) 121 (72) 1.56 (0.94-2.6) 
70+ 155 (15) 116 (75) 1.35 (0.8-2.29) 
Prefer not to say 1 (0.1) 1 (100) Not calculated 
Dependent Children 
None 675 (66.5) 478 (71) Reference 
Children <18 living with 
me 
262 (26) 199 (76) 0.77 (0.55-1.07) 
Children >18 living with 
me 
53 (5) 42 (79) 0.63 (0.32-1.26) 
Children not living with 
me 
24 (2) 19 (79) 0.64 (0.23-1.73) 
Pets    
Yes 538 (53) 405 (75) Reference 
No 476 (47) 333 (70) 1.31 (0.99-1.72) 
Geographic Location 
Outside of London 889 (88) 650 (73) Reference 
London 125 (12) 88 (70) 1.14 (0.76-1.73) 
Employment    
Not Employed 452 (44.5) 334 (74) Reference 
Employed 562 (55) 404 (72) 1.11 (0.84-1.46) 
Education level    
Left school without 
qualifications  
59 (6) 42 (71) Reference 
Secondary education 466 (46) 335 (72) 0.97 (0.53-1.76) 
Higher education 488 (48) 361 (74) 0.87 (0.48-1.58) 
Prefer not to say 1 (0.1) 0 (0) Not calculated  











Association between predictor variables and desire for pre-incident communications 
Variable and variable 
levels 
No. (%) of 
participants 
No. (% within variable 




ratio (95% CI) 
General disaster risk perception 
No risk at all 123 (12) 68 (55) Reference 
A little risk 224 (22) 160 (71) 0.49 (0.31-0.78)* 
Moderate risk 254 (25) 172 (68) 0.59 (0.38-0.92)* 
Quite a high risk 269 (26.5) 218 (81) 0.29 (0.18-0.46)* 
Very high risk / quite 
probable 
144 (14) 120 (83) 0.25 (0.14-0.43)* 
General disaster (with direct effect) risk perception 
No risk at all 186 (18) 107 (57.5) Reference 
A little risk 272 (27) 193 (71) 0.55 (0.37-0.82)* 
Moderate risk 315 (31) 238 (75.5) 0.44 (0.3-0.65)* 
Quite a high risk 187 (18) 155 (83) 0.28 (0.17-0.45)* 
Very high risk / quite 
probable 
54 (5) 45 (83) 0.27 (0.12-0.59)* 
Nuclear attack risk perception 
No risk at all 265 (26) 169 (64) Reference 
A little risk 258 (25) 171 (66) 0.9 (0.62-1.28) 
Moderate risk 226 (22) 179 (79) 0.46 (0.31-0.69)* 
Quite a high risk 188 (18.5) 154 (82) 0.39 (0.25-0.61)* 
Very high risk / quite 
probable 
77 (7.5) 65 (84) 0.32 (0.17-0.63)* 
Nuclear attack risk perception (with direct effect) 
No risk at all 289 (28.5) 182 (63) Reference 
A little risk 254 (25) 174 (68.5) 0.78 (0.55-1.12) 
Moderate risk 251 (25) 193 (77) 0.51 (0.35-0.75)* 
Quite a high risk 150 (15) 125 (83) 0.34 (0.21-0.56)* 
Very high risk / quite 
probable 
70 (7) 64 (91) 0.16 (0.07-0.38)* 
How recently informed 
During the past year 34 (19) 30 (88) Reference 
1 – 5 years ago 79 (45) 71 (90) 0.84 (0.24-3.02) 
6 – 15 years ago 33 (19) 24 (73) 2.81 (0.77-10.26) 
More than 15 years ago 31 (17.5) 28 (90) 0.8 (0.16-3.91) 
Information sufficiency 
Yes 92 (52) 86 (93) Reference 
No 61 (34) 49 (80) 3.051 (1.24-9.94)* 
Don’t know 24 (13.5) 18 (75) 4.78 (1.38-16.52)* 
Belief in protection from military 
Fully protected 124 (12) 94 (76) Reference 
Partially protected 432 (43) 336 (78) 0.89 (0.56-1.43)  
Not protected 225 (22) 150 (67) 1.57 (0.95-2.57) 
Don’t know 233 (23) 158 (68) 1.49 (0.91-2.44) 
Low perceived 
preparedness effort  





5.35 (Mean total) 5.37 (Mean within 
variable) 
0.98 (0.92-1.05) 
Sheltering Effectiveness 2.74 (Mean total) 2.88 (Mean within 
variable) 
0.86 (0.8-0.93)* 
*= Significant result 
  
